Miki v Reginam [2004] SBHC 27; HC-CRC 019 of 2004 (25 March 2004)

HIGH COURT OF SOLOMON ISLANDS
Criminal Case Number 19 of 2004

HENRY MIKI

V.

REGINA

High Court of Solomon Islands
(Palmer C.J.)

Hearing: 25^th March 2004
Ruling: 25^th March 2004

Ms. K. Ruddock for the Applicant
F. Mwanesalua for the Respondent

Palmer C.J: I dismissed the bail application of the Applicant Henry Miki (hereinafter referred to as “the Accused”) after hearing submissions of Ms. Ruddock, learned Counsel for the Accused. I now publish reasons for that decision.

The Accused was charged late last year on 7^th October 2003 with the murder of Elwin Freeman Iro (“the Deceased”) at Henderson, Guadalcanal Province. He was committed for trial to the High Court after a short form of preliminary inquiry (“PI”) on 19^th January 2004. Call over on the case is yet to be done and a trial date fixed. The accused applied for bail pending trial of his action on 10^th February 2004 but was denied. He makes a second attempt for bail in this application.

The ground relied on primarily as amounting to an exceptional circumstance warranting his release on bail was the same ground relied on in the earlier application on 10^th February 2004^[1]. That bail application was declined by this Court.

Ms. Ruddock for the Accused relies on the affidavit of Henry Miki filed in support on 26^th February 2004 and the following statements of:

1. Errol Anthony Robert Correy;
2. Tracey Margaret Young;
3. Craig Ian Petterd;
4. Aln Schmidt;
5. Dean McIntyre Andrew Tucker;
6. Richard Martin Smith;
7. Sinead Judith Done;
8. Eroni Delai;
9. Henry Miki.
   

The thrust of Ms. Ruddock’s submissions is that with these further statements taken into account, they weaken considerably or shed doubt on the earlier evidence or statements this court had relied on in the earlier bail application. I have had opportunity to read through the statements of those witnesses. The first eight were accounts of investigating officers who had arrived at the scene on various occasions, their observations and records of what they saw at the scene and various interviews conducted with persons associated with the Accused or the Deceased. Ms Ruddock submits that on the whole, those statements cast doubt on the prosecution claim that (i) a knife was used and (ii) that the Accused used a knife to stab the Deceased with. To the contrary, she submits their evidence supports the defence claim that the Deceased died from an injury caused from the broken louver glasses. That as a result there was doubt as to the question whether the Deceased had been stabbed as alleged by the Prosecution.

Unfortunately none of those statements have undermined, attacked or discredited the eye witness account of Moses Lakwolly (“Lakwolly”) in any substantial way. Lakwolly was present at the scene with the Accused and had stated that he saw him stabbing the Deceased with a small knife. His statement has been corroborated by the statements of other witnesses present at the scene. On the other hand, the statements the Accused wishes to rely on were from investigating officers who were not present at the scene. They came after the event. Their statements were confined to observations of the scene after the alleged crime or discussions held with persons associated with the scene of the crime; none have directly impeached Lakwolly’s statement.

Lakwolly’s statement has been corroborated to some extent by Felix Maui’s (“Felix”) statement. Although Felix did not actually mention that he saw the Accused stabbing the Deceased, or that the Accused had a knife with him, much of his statement is consistent with the version of events described in the statement of Lakwolly. In an additional statement for instance, taken on 20^th November 2003, Felix did say that he saw an object in the Accused’s hand immediately after the incident.

The statement of Moses Timi is also relevant as it supports the version of Lakwolly that the Deceased had been stabbed. In his additional statement of 5^th November 2003 he states that shortly after hearing the Accused shout out that he had seen the Deceased, they (the Accused, Lakwolly and Felix) rushed out of the house. He states in his statement that he saw the Deceased placing “his hand on the right side of his neck and not walking properly as he bent down while moving in the house.” This is consistent with the version of Lakwolly that the Deceased had been stabbed on the neck by the Accused. Not long after that he heard a number of louvers being broken. This is also consistent with the version of Lakwolly. The sound of broken louvers occurred after the Accused, Lakwolly and Felix had rushed out of the room.

Nancy Tosilea also states that the sound of broken louver glasses occurred after they had gone out of the house; she estimated the time at two minutes later. This is consistent with what Lakwolly had said that the stabbing occurred before they went out of the house. The prosecution case is that the fatal injury had been incurred prior to the louvers being broken.

Tua Valenti’s earlier statement is also consistent with the allegation that the Deceased had been stabbed, although he seems to have made a second contradictory statement. The Accused has also made an admission in his confession statement.

This is not the time to determine the veracity of the various statements made; that will occur at trial. Prosecution’s evidence at bail applications is to be taken at its highest, which in this case cannot be said to be weak. Contrary therefore to what Defence seeks to impress upon this court, if anything, the strength of Prosecution evidence as at this point of time has actually increased. There has been no change of circumstances since the previous bail application. I am not satisfied the application for bail based on exceptional circumstances has been supported by those further statements and accordingly this application must also be denied.

The Court.

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^[1] Henry Miki v. Regina CRC 19 of 2004, 10^th February 2004