Kinista v Maemarine [2000] SBHC 89; HCSI-CC 397 of 1999 (19 April 2000)

CC 397/99 HC

IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOLOMON ISLANDS

Civil Case No 397 of 1999

ZEPHANIAH KINISTA

V

ORKLEY RAMELELE AUGUSTINE MAEMARINE

High Court of Solomon Islands
(Palmer J.)

Civil Case Number 397 of 1999

Hearing: 19th April 2000
Judgment: 19th April 2000

K. Averre for the Appellant
R. Teutao for the Respondents

PALMER J.: This is an application for leave to appeal out of time. The relevant provisions of the law which apply to this case is as pointed out in Court, under the Land and Tides Act [Cap. 133] section 66(1). Also as pointed out and conceded by parties, this matter came before the Magistrates initially on appeal from the determination of the Acquisition Officer in respect of Dau Land. The matter went as far as this Court but was then referred back to the Magistrates Court for determination on a specific question: “What or how much interest in the proposed lease agreement to be accorded to the respondents in view of their secondary interest in the said land” This question was heard by the Magistrates Court and determination given on 21st April 1999.

It was suggested whether this question could have been dealt with by the Magistrates Court under its normal civil jurisdiction but that was not pursued by learned Counsel Mr. Averre for the Appellant, recognising that the matter was dealt with under the provisions of the Land and Tides Act and that it was remitted back to the Magistrates Court under the same jurisdiction. To that extent there is little doubt in my mind. The only issue that arises therefore is whether there is any provision under section 66 of the Land and Tides Act which provides for any extension of the time limits to file Notice of Appeal.

Mr. Teutao has conveniently referred to similar provisions in section 256 of the Land and Titles Act which deal with appeals from the Customary Land Appeal Courts. We have had case authorities, Ratatoa -v- Talauai 1983 SILR 112 and Seselono -v- Kikiolo’s 1982 SILR p 15 dealing with those provisions and in which this Court had stated very clearly that there is no provision for extension of time limits. Those case authorities apply to this case. This Court simply does not have any jurisdiction to entertain any application to extend any time limits never mind the merits of the appeal. If no appeal had been filed within 3 months, there is no justiciable matter before this Court and this Court simply cannot entertain this application. That is the harsh reality of the law as it stands.

There is nothing more for this Court to do but to order that the application be dismissed with costs.

THE COURT