On 25 June 1998 the RPSR was
presented to Cabinet for its consideration. In onclusion, Cabinet inter
er
alia, directed
the Prime Minister’s Office to effect implementation of the
Report in as far as it was practicable (see affidavit of George
Hiele at
paragraph 8). What happened thereafter forms part of the matters in dispute.
THE POWERS OF THE MINISTER
FOR PUBLIC SERVICE.<
ass="MsoNoMsoNormal" style="margin-top: 1; margin-bottom: 1">
The powers of the Minister for
Public Service are spelled out in the Public Service Act (Cap. 92). Section
3, which is the applicable provision states:
“Notwithstanding the
provisions of any other the Minister may, where here he is of the opinion
that it is in the public
interest to do so, after consulting the Commission,
cause all or any of the following acts to be done
(a) create new divisions
within the public service or abor abolish or amalgamate any existing divisions
within the public
service;
(b) develop new schemes of
service within thin the public service or abolish, amend or amalgamate any
existing scheme
of service within the public service,
/p>
(d) approve and revie postings of public officofficers within Central Government Ministries and the
provinces.”
The Applicants argue th whilst it concedes the Minister had. power under the said provision to
abolish, ash, amend or amalgamate
the public offices of the Applicants, section 3
of the Public Service Act required the Minister inter alia, to
consult the Public Service Commission before doing so. They go on to say
that guidance is provided by the provisions of section 140(2)
of the
Constitution as to the process of consultation. I quote:
lass="MsoNoMsoNormal" style="margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-top: 1; margin-bottom: 1">
“Where any person or
uthority is directed by any law to consult any other personerson or authority
before taking any decision
or action, that other person or authority must be
given a genuine opportunity to present his or its views before the decision
or action, as the case maybe, is taken.”
The Applicants contend that no
consultation had taken place is instance and even if cons consultation is
held to have
taken place, they argue the opportunity given was not genuine.
netoali for the
Respondents argues to the contrary, that consultation was conducted bted by the
Minister before the decision
was undertaken to abolish, amend or amalgamate
the public offices of the Applicants.
EVIDENCE OF CONSULTATION.
class="MsoNoMsoNormal" style="margin-top: 1; margin-bottom: 1">
Was the Public Service
Commission (“PSC”) consulted by the Minister? Ingraph 10 of the
affidaffidavit of George Hiele,
he deposed that the RPSR was forwarded to the
Public Service Commission for its consultation on 14th July 1998 by the
Secretary to the Public Service. The Commission met on 17th July 1998 to
consider the Report and to comment on it. See Exhibits
“GH2” and “GH3”
annexed to the affidavit of George Hiele. Also Mr Waeta Ben Tabusasi,
Chairman of the PSC, deposes in
his affidavit filed 10th May 1999 at
paragraph 2, that the PSC did meet on 17th July 1998 to consider the Report
submitted
by the Sub - Task Force II This is consistent with the submission
of the Respondents that consultation was duly made by the
Minister with the
PSC. At paragraph 3 of his affidavit, Mr Tabusasi deposes the matter was
deferred to its next meeting
to enable a proper and well detailed submission
to be made. This with respect is evidence of the consultative process.
The next question that arises
from this is whegenuine opportunity was given to the PSC to present its
s
views. The
Applicants submit this was not done. They refer to the letter of
the Permanent Secretary to the Public Service Division dated
21st July 1998
in which the RPSR was re - submitted for the consideration of the PSC with
the request that it be considered
the next day (see Exhibit “GH4”). The
Applicants argue this was too short a notice and fell short of amounting to
a genuine
opportunity being given to the PSC to present their views on the
exercise to be undertaken.
With respect, I must disagree.
The evidence as adduces not bear this out. In spite of the short notice
gi given as per
letter of 21st July 1998 (Exhibit “GH4”), the PSC was able to
convene an extraordinary meeting on two consecutive days (the
22nd and 23rd
July 1998) to consider the RPSR afresh. There is no suggestion, or evidence
adduced, that the request made
to convene an extraordinary meeting was
unreasonable in the circumstances. If the PSC had thought otherwise it would
have said so. It should be borne in mind as well that the letter of the 21st
July 1998 (Exhibit “GH4”) was in the form of a
request. The PSC therefore
was not obliged to comply with it if it had felt it was impossible or
impracticable to comply
with. The fact very short notice might have been
given does not necessarily mean no genuine opportunity was given. I am
satisfied the PSC had genuine opportunity to consider the RPSR on its
extraordinary meeting held over two days on 22nd and
23rd July and to
present its views (see Exhibit “GH5”). The evidence adduced showed the RPSR
had been previously considered
by the PSC on 17th July 1998; at least some
five days earlier. It wasn’t the first time for it to be considered
therefore
on the 22nd and 23rd of July 1998. The contents of Exhibit “GH5”
showed quite plainly that the PSC did apply its mind fully
to the issues
raised in the RPSR and to make comments on it. Question No. 1 in my
respectful view accordingly must be
answered in the affirmative.
ass="MsoNoMsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; margin-top: 1; margin-bottom: 1">
REGULATION 76 OF THE PUBLIC
SERVICE COMMISSION REGULATIONS.
Regulation 76 pertains to the
procedure to be adopted when any recommendation is made for the retirement
or termination
of employment of any officer under regulation 73. It reads:
lass="MsoNoMsoNormal" style="margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-top: 1; margin-bottom: 1">
“Any recommendation for the
retirement or termination of employment of an officerficer in accordance with
regulation 73
shall be made to or by the Secretary for the Public Service
who, if he is satisfied that such action should be taken, shall
advise the
officer concerned stating the reasons for the proposed action. Thirty days
shall be allowed for the officer
to make any representations and thereafter
the case shall be submitted to the Commission for decision, together with
any representations the officer may have made.”
<
There are four par
Regulation 76. These can be summarised as follows:
(1) That the rendation for
retirement or termination of employment ment shall be made either to the
Secretary for the
Public Service (“SPS”) or by him.
(2) If the SPS is satisfied
that such action should be t he shall advise the officefficer concerned with
reasons.
(3) The officer has y days
to make representations.
(4) Thereafter the matter is to
be tted to the PSC for decision together with any representatintations from
the officer.
Mr Ashley in his submissions
rred only to the first part as being applicable; that such such
recommendations shall be made
either to or by the SPS. He points out that
the hall - marks of the restructuring exercise was to have the Applicants
made redundant under regulation 73(d). In that situation, regulation 74
should have been applied. He argues this had not been
complied with by the
Respondents and thereby their dismissal was wrongful.
class="MsoNoMsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; margin-top: 1; margin-bottom: 1">
THE EVIDENCE BEFORE TH COURT IN RESPECT OF APPLICANT LILIGETO:
Liligeto was one of the
Applicants affected by the programme of the Government to restructure ture
and stream line the
Public Service. His post, that of an Under Secretary
(also described as the Deputy Secretary to Prime Minister) was included
in the posts to be abolished, as contained in the RPSR (see section 4.1
at paragraph 5 of the Report; also see proposed structure set out in
page 4 - 3 in respect of the Prime Minister’s Office - the post of Deputy
Secretary to Prime Minister was omitted). After the PSC had been
consulted about the terms of that Report, it was then set in motion for
implementation. By letter
dated 28 September 1998, a Notice of
Recommendation for Redundancy was dispatched to Liligeto in accordance with
the
procedure set out in regulation 76 (see Exhibit “GH8” attached to the
affidavit of George Hiele). That letter advised him of the intention to
make him redundant. The reason given was to facilitate improvements in the
public sector and giving him thirty days to make representations to the SPS.
Liligeto responded by letter dated 20 October
1998, basically accepting the
retrenching exercise undertaken by the Government (Exhibit “GH9”). His case
was then forwarded
to the PSC by memorandum dated 27 October 1998, for
decision on the termination of his employment contract by way of redundancy
(see Exhibit “GH10”). His case came before the PSC on 3rd November 1998. At
item 421/98 of the Minutes of its 36th/98
Meeting, the PSC made the
following decision:
“The submission to
prematurely retired (sic) and terminhe employment of all Under nder
Secretaries (Admin) and First and
Second Secretaries because the officer’s
posts have been de - established in the new Partnership Ministries
Organisation
to facilitate improvement in the Service was considered by the
Commission.
The Commission also noted
that the submission was straiorward and therefore DECIDEECIDED that the
following Under Secretaries
(Admin) and First and Second Assistant
Secretaries be prematurely retired under PSC Reg 1979 Section 73(c) and be
made
redundant under PSC Reg 1979 Section 73 (d) wef 3/11/98.
It will be noted, though this
was not brought out in submissions before this Cothat the provision
ac actually relied
on by the PSC to terminate the employment contract of
Liligeto was not regulation 73(d) but regulation 73(e). The reason for
termination remained the same; that of facilitating improvement in the
Public Sector.
Following the issues of the
Notice of Termination of Employment due to Redundancy (Exhibit “WL4”) and
Termination Letter
(Exhibit “WL5”), it became apparent that the post of
Deputy Secretary to Prime Minister was not going to be abolished after
all
(see Exhibits “WL6” and “WL7”). Liligeto naturally felt aggrieved; that
somehow he might have been unfairly treated
in all this in that the right
procedures for redundancy in his case (regulation 74) had not been complied
with. Note
regulation 74 was in the following terms:
“Where termination of
oyment under regulation 73(d) is being considered as a cons consequence of
the reduction or abolition
of posts, and there will be one or more posts
remaining, officers shall be selected for termination of employment in the
following order.
(a) Volunteers.
(c) Other officers in order
of juniority, the most junior first.”<
Liligeto’s complaint was that
tocedure set out above had not complied with. Had that been been done in his
case he suggests
he might not have been made redundant.
THE EFFECT OF THE DECISION
OF THE PSC.
The issue which arisnce
is, what is the effect of that decision of the PSC. Whilst he was
recommendmmended for termination
by the SPS under regulation 73(d), he was in
fact terminated under regulation 73(c). The issue this raises is whether the
PSC had acted ultra vires or unfairly, by taking into account an irrelevant
factor, or by ignoring a relevant matter,
such that its decision can be
regarded as wrong. Was the PSC entitled to take into account regulation
73(c) as well in
the circumstances of this Applicant’s case and to effect
termination on that basis? It is not known why the PSC decided to
terminate
this Applicant’s employment contract by premature retirement rather than by
redundancy as submitted by the
SPS. Perhaps it took into account the
possibility, or was aware, that some of the Under Secretaries Posts may be
retained
under the new Partnership Ministries Organisation and that
therefore the more correct provision to use was regulation 73(c)
than
regulation 73(d) in the circumstances.
In any event, it is my
respectful view, that as a body entrusted wittatutory discretion, its
ts
obligations are not
merely confined to the submissions before it. Whilst it
is required to consider the matters raised before it, it may seek and
take
into account any other information, including the law it considers relevant,
and then make its own judgement. See
also the statements of Ward
CJ. in
Wheeler v. The Attorney-General (1988/89) SILR 54, at 59 referring to
the provisions of section 137(4), I quote:
e terms are clear and
unequivocal. A body entrusted with a statutory discretion must must address
itself independently
to the matter for consideration. It cannot lawfully
accept instructions from, or mechanically adopt the view of, another body
as
to the manner of exercising its discretion in a particular case; R v.
Stepney Corporation [1901] UKLawRpKQB 209; [1902] 1 K. B. 317. The Commission has an independent
role. It must consider the matters raised before it and it may seek any
other information
it feels is relevant. Having done so, it acts in its own
judgment. It is not, of course, unrestricted in the manner it exercises
its
power. The decision at this stage is administrative but, when deciding
matters such termination of employment which
can affect a man’s livelihood,
there is a duty to act fairly.”
See also ase of Board
of Education v. Rice [1911] UKLawRpAC 18; [1911] A.C. 179, Loreburn LC at page 182 als2 also
referred to by Ward CJ in his judgment at the same page (54):
“In the present instance, as
in many others, what comes foermination is sometimes a ms a matter to be
settled by discretion,
involving no law. It will, I suppose, be usually be
of an administrative kind; but sometimes it will involve matter of law
as
well as matter of fact, or even depend upon matter of law alone. In such
cases the Board of Education will have to
ascertain the law and also to
ascertain the facts. I need not add that in doing either they must act in
good faith and
fairly listen to both sides, for that is a duty lying upon
every one who decides anything. But I do not think they are bound
to treat
such a question as though it were a trial. They have no power to administer
an oath, and need not examine witnesses.
They can obtain information in
anyway they think best, always giving a fair opportunity to those who are
parties in the
controversy for correcting or contradicting any relevant
statement prejudicial to their view.”
In this case, I find with
ct that the PSC had done what was required of it to be done done. It took
into account the RPSR
(Exhibit “GH1”), the Memorandum sent under covering
letter dated 21 July 1998 (Exhibit "GH4"), and the submission
from the SPS
dated 27 October 1998 (Exhibit “GH10”). It then decided in its own
deliberate judgement that the appropriate
provision to use in Liligeto’s
case was regulation 73(c). I find with respect nothing illegal or wrong with
that course
of action. It was entitled to invoke regulation 73(e) for the
termination of the employment contract of this Applicant.
class="MsoNoMsoNormal" style="margin-top: 1; margin-bottom: 1">
Perhaps the oning it did
wrong was in assuming that once the Applicant had been prematurely retiredtired
that he can then
be made redundant under regulation 73(d). Unfortunately
that is not legally correct. The reason being that once an officer
has been
prematurely retired under regulation 73(c), assuming all procedural
requirements (regulation 76) had been complied
with, that amounts to a valid
termination under the Public Service Commission Regulations. Once an officer
has been terminated,
he stays terminated. An officer therefore cannot be
terminated under regulation 73(c) by premature retirement and then re -
terminated by redundancy under regulation 73(d). However, where an officer’s
post had been abolished or reduced so that
it ceases to exist or has
diminished, it seems he would be able to claim redundancy payments as well
under section 4(1)
of the Employment Act (Cap. 72). It appears this was
actually what the PSC had in mind when it made its decision, but
unfortunately stated
it incorrectly. I accept though this was inadvertent.
On the question whether th course of action might have been unfair, I also find this unproven. The
reason foon for terminating
Liligeto was for purposes of improving the public
sector. In facilitating that purpose the Sub-Task Force II considered it
necessary to abolish all Under Secretaries Post, of which Liligeto was one
of the holders of such post. As far as they
were concerned the way to do
this in the circumstances was to have the holders made redundant under
regulation 73(d).
When the matter came before the PSC however, it decided in
its own deliberate judgment, and quite wisely, that the appropriate
provision to apply was regulation 73(c) rather than regulation 73(d). I am
satisfied the PSC did the correct thing in
the circumstances and that I find
nothing wrong or unfair about its decision in any way.
The only snag this raises in
rt of Liligeto’s case is that, if what he alleges was true, rue, that his
post was actually
never abolished, and that he had been validly terminated
by premature retirement under regulation 73(c), as found by this court,
whether he would have been entitled to make a claim for redundancy payment
as well, under section 4(1) of the Employment Act. I need say no more.
But even for arguments sake, if
what the PSC did was not right, and that the regulation it should have
adopted was regulation
73(d), would it still have been obliged to apply the
provisions of regulation 74? In my respectful view, even if termination
had
been effected under regulation 73(d) as sought to be submitted by this
Applicant, I still would not have been satisfied
that the provisions of
regulation 74 would have been applicable at the point of time the decision
was taken by the PSC
to terminate this Applicant. The reason being as
follows. It will be noted, when the matter came for decision before the PSC
in its meeting of 3rd November 1998, there was no evidence before this Court
to suggest that the PSC was aware that the
post of the Deputy Secretary to
Prime Minister was not going to be abolished after all. The only evidence
before this
Court which showed that the post was not going to be abolished
was in the form of an advertisement published in the issue of
the Solomon
Star dated 22nd December 1998, of a vacancy in that post. The important
point to note from this is that,
this came after the decision had been made
to have him terminated with effect from 3rd November 1998. From 3rd November
1998 to 3rd January 1999, he was in Office merely to fulfil the requirements
of two months notice. There is no evidence
to suggest that that decision was
ever revoked or that the Applicant ever raised any objection about the
irregular decision
to have his post retained.
p class="MsoNoMsoNormal" style="margin-top: 1; margin-bottom: 1">
I would have found with respect
therefnothing to be unfair or wrong about the actions taken by thby the PSC
in not complying
with the requirements set out in regulation 74 on 3rd
November 1998. There was no need as far as it was concerned, because
according to the RPSR approved by the PSC, the post of the Deputy Secretary
to Prime Minister was going to be abolished
in any event. It was only after
the crucial decision had been made, that Government decided to retain that
post, for
reasons only it can answer.
As to the actions of the SPS, I
also with respect, find nothing wrong or unfair about them in making the
necessary recommendations
to have this Applicant terminated by way of
redundancy, because as far as he was concerned, at the time of making the
recommendation (see Exhibit “GH8”), all the Under Secretaries Post including
the Applicant’s post were to be abolished. There
is no evidence to suggest
that up to the 27th October 1998 (date his submissions were made to have
this Applicant made
redundant - Exhibit “ GH11”), he was aware that
Government might change its mind about retaining the post of the Deputy
Secretary to Prime Minister.
THE DECISION TO RETAIN THE POST
OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY TO MINISTER
p>
The question this raises is
whether this was done in contravention of any legal s that Liligeto
mightmight have, or that
it was unfair. With respect I find little or no evidence
to suggest that any of his legal rights might have been contravened
or that
he may have been unfairly treated by the SPS or the PSC. As pointed out in
this judgment, there is no evidence
to suggest that the decision to retain
the post of Deputy Secretary to Prime Minister was made at any time prior to
the
3rd November 1998. So whilst it may have been unfortunate that the
Government may have decided after it had terminated the
employment of
Liligeto that his post after all was to be retained, I do not find with
respect anything illegal or improper
about that. As the Employer, the
Government of Solomon Islands is entitled to make such decision as it
considers appropriate
in the circumstances within the confines of the law.
QUESTION NO. 2: WHETHER A
RECOMMENDATION FOR THE ABOLITION, AMENDMENT OR AMALGAMATION OF THE
APPLICANTS PUBLIC OFFICES
WAS MADE TO OR BY THE 1ST RESPONDENT (SECRETARY TO
PUBLIC SERVICE) WITHIN THE MEANING OF REGULATION 76 OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE
REGULATIONS.
This question in my respectful
view must be answered in the affirmative. The evidence auced before
this Cour Court showed
in my respectful view that such a recommendation had
actually been made by the SPS, if not, it was done totally with his
knowledge and with his consent.
ass="MsoNoMsoNormal" style="margin-top: 1; margin-bottom: 1">
It has not been disputed that
the incumbenthat office at the said time was Fred Ganate. He was also
lso
member of Task
Force 2 which was responsible for the Public Service Reform.
When Sub - Task Force II was set up he was also included as a
member (see
pages 2 - 1 of the RPSP). It was in his capacity as member of Sub - Task
Force II that the recommendation
were made to have the Applicants either
retired or terminated under regulation 73 (see the RPSR); that is, to have
their
respective posts abolished, amended or amalgamated (see also Exhibits
“GH2”, and “GH3”, which are consistent with the view
that such a
recommendation was made to and by the SPS. The SPS was involved in the work
of Sub - Task Force II and the
preparation of RPSR, right from the outset to
its completion, and when it was forwarded to the PSC for its consideration,
comments and approval. He was therefore directly involved in the preparation
of the recommendations contained in the RPSR
and when they were sent to the
PSC. He was also directly involved when the recommendations were sought to
be implemented.
That in my respectful view fulfilled the requirement set out
in regulation 76; that any recommendation for the retirement or
termination
of employment of an officer in accordance with regulation 73 shall be made
to or by the SPS. The fact the
recommendations were comprised in the report
of Sub-Task Force II is immaterial to the requirement stipulated in
regulation
76. I am satisfied there was substantial compliance with those
requirements.
In my respectful view, question
no. 3 should be answered in the affirmative in respect of the Applicanticant
Liligeto
in as far as it pertained to the exercise of the powers of
termination by the PSC. I find nothing wrong or unfair about the
exercise of
its powers.
class="MsoNoMsoNormal" style="margin-top: 1; margin-bottom: 1">
THE CASE OFOTHER
APPLICANTS:
Five of the Applicants were
Chief Administrative Officers and the sixth, a Chief Accoun They also
claim they they had
been made redundant under regulation 73(d) of the Regulations
and that therefore regulation 74 applied in their case.
Unfortunately the evidence
adduced showed otherwise.
-
See Exhibixhibits “AM2”, “CE2”,
“CR2”, “SW2”, “JL2”, and “TN2” annexed to the affidavit of Wilson Liligeto.
These
were the various Notices of Recommendation sent to these Applicants
under regulation 73(c) for premature retirement to facilitate
improvements
in the public sector.
-
See also Exhibits “AM4”,
“CE4”, “CR4”, “SW4”, “JL4”, and “TN4” also annexed to the affidavit of
Wilson Liligeto. These
are the Notices of Termination of Employment Due To
Premature Retirement dated 10 November 1998, sent to these Applicants.
-
See also Exhibits “GH11” and
“GH12” in the affidavit of George Hiele filed 25th May 1999. Exhibit
“GH11” is the memorandum
from the Secretary to Prime Minister dated 27th
October 1998 to the PSC, for decision after lapse of the thirty days
period required under regulation 76. It referred to premature retirement
under regulation 73(c). Exhibit “GH12” is the
minutes of the 36th/98
Meeting of the PSC held on 3rd November 1998. Item 422/98 was the decision
of the PSC concerning
these Applicants. It states:
“In considering the
subon to prematurely retired ared and terminate all Chief Admin Officers and
Chief Accountants, the
Commission noted that under the new Partnership
Structure, new posts of Chief Admin and Chief Accountant have been created
and therefore DECIDED that the following Chief Admin Officers and Chief
Accountants be prematurely retired under PSC
Reg 73(c) and be made redundant
under PSC Reg 1979 Section 73(d).”
The effect of the premature
retirement of he Applicants under regulation 73(c) for purposes of
improvements in the
Government Service meant they had been validly
terminated under that provision. Regulation 73(d) therefore did not apply to
their circumstances, but because their posts had been abolished or reduced,
they would have been entitled to claim for
redundancy payments in any event
under section 4(1) of the Employment Act. That is exactly what they have
been given. It should be borne in mind that the new Partnering Structure set
up by the
Government, resulting in the reduction of the Chief Administration
Officer’s Posts and the Chief Accountant’s Posts was done
primarily to
facilitate improvements in Government Organisation. It wasn’t correct
therefore to say that these Applicants
had been terminated under regulation
73(d) and therefore regulation 74 would apply. The abolishment or reduction
of their
posts was a direct consequence of the Government’s push for
improvement in the Public Service. They were validly terminated
therefore
under regulation 73(c) and not under regulation 73(d) as claimed.
Question No.2 in respect of
these Applicants should also be answered in the affirmative.
In respect of Question No. 3,
it should also be answered in the affirmative in as far as it pertained to
the exercise
of the powers of termination by the PSC. I find nothing wrong
or unfair about the exercise of those powers.
SECTION 137(4) OF THE
CONSTITUTION.
Secti7(4) of the
Constitution provides as follows:
“In the exercise of t
functions under this Constitution, no such Commissionssion shall be subject to
the direction or control
of any other person or authority, except where
otherwise provided by this Constitution.
Mr Ashley reliedhat was
said by Ward CJ in the case of Wheeler v. The Attorney - General SILR SILR
1988/1989 54 at page 59, where his Lordships makes the following statements
with reference to section 137(4):
“These terms are clear and
unequivocal. A body entrusted with a statutory disc discretion must address
itself independently
to the matter for consideration. It cannot lawfully
accept
instructions from, or mechanically adopt the view of, another body as to the
manner of exercising its discretion in a
particular case; R v. Stepney
Corporation [1901] UKLawRpKQB 209; [1902] 1 KB 317. The Commission has an independent role. It must
consider the matters raised before it and it may seek any other information
it feels is relevant. Having done so, it acts in its own judgment. It is
not, of course, unrestricted in the manner it
exercises its power. The
decision at this stage is administrative but, when deciding matters such as
termination of employment
which can affect a man’s livelihood, there is a
duty to act fairly.”
The crucial submission raised
in respect of unfairnertained to the same submisubmission that the
provisions of regulation
74 had not been complied with, that the Applicants
had been terminated under regulation 73(d), and therefore the 1st and 2nd
Respondents were obliged to comply with regulation 74. I have already dealt
with this same argument above and therefore
it is not necessary to repeat
same here. The same reasons given above apply to this ground.
Mr Manetoali is correct in his
submissionshis point that I find no evidence to support any suggestionstion,
that the PSC
might have been influenced, coerced or subjected, to the
direction of any other person in terminating the Applicants employment
contract. The evidence adduced showed rather that it complied with all
relevant procedures required by the Public Service
Commission Regulations
and took into account all relevant factors applicable to the Applicants
cases before making its
own judgement.
Question No. 4 therefore must
also be answered in the affirmative.
The answers to testions
posed for determination in this Originating Summons accordingly are as
follows:
1. ANSWER QUESTION NO. 1 IN THE
AFFIRMATIVE.
p class=lass="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-top: 1; margin-bottom: 1">
2. ANSWER QUESTION NO. 2 IN THE
AFFIRMATIVE.
4. ANSWER QUESTION NO. 4 IN THE
AFFIRMATIVE.
<
ORDERS OF THE COURT:
DISMISS THE ORIGINATING SUMMONS OF THE APPLICANTS ANTS WITH COSTS.
THE COURT/p>
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