Sina v Allardyce Lumber Company Ltd [1999] SBHC 101; HC-CC 327 of 1994 & 091 of 1997 (4 October 1999)

HIGH COURT OF SOLOMON ISLANDS

Civil Cases Nos. 327 of 1994 and 91 of 1997

JOHN SINA, NELSON EDIKERA, GOERGE GADO

v

ALLARDYCE LUMBER COMPANY,
JOHN MARK MATUPILO & ATTORNEY GENERAL

High Court of Solomon Islands
(Muria, CJ.)
Civil Cases Nos. 327 of 1994 and 91 of 1997

Hearing: 22 September 1999
Ruling: 4 October 1999

S. Watt for for Plaintiffs
J. Sullivan & T. Kama for Defendants

MURIA CJ: Following the Order made by the learned Registrar on 30 July 1999 a question has been posed for this Court's determination. That question concerns the jurisdiction of this Court and it asks whether the High Court has jurisdiction to say that the two actions (CC237/94 and CC91/97) are subject to a binding settlement if there was settlement of the cases between the parties. It is to be noted that the Court is not asked to determine whether there had been a binding settlement between the parties.

ass="MsoNormal" sal" style="margin-top: 1; margin-bottom: 1">The disputes between the parties in these cases arose as a result of the logging operations of the first defendant in the area of land between Kazo and Timbala Rivers in, Vella La Vella. These disputes gave rise to the two mentioned civil cases, CC327/94 and CC91/97. The plaintiffs have claimed ownership of that area of land.

Ownership ofland in question is clearlyearly in dispute between the parties There is, however, suggestion that settlement had been reached between the plaintiffs and the defendants (John Mark Matupiko in CC237/94 and Monty Jale in CC91/97) regarding the ownership over the land in question. Based on that alleged settlement the defendants had filed a summons seeking to strike out the plaintiffs' Statement of Claim. That summons came before the Registrar on 30 July 1999 resulting in the question now before this Court.

The original jurisdictidiction of the High Court is unlimited. It has power to decide on any matter unless Parliament has specifically devolved any of that power to some other court or tribunal. The unlimited jurisdiction is still preserved, although as a matter of convenience, Parliament has enacted laws establishing subordinate Courts which would exercise some of that jurisdiction see Kenilorea -v- Attorney General [1984] SILR 179 and Grandly Simbe -v- East Choiseul Area Council & Others (Judgement 9 February 1999) Civ. App. No. 8 of 1997. The obvious instance that come to mind is the Local Court which has been given jurisdiction to deal with "matters and proceedings of a civil nature affecting or arising out of customary land" and appeals lie from that Court to the Customary Land Appeal Court.

Included in the plaintiffs' claim in this case is the challenge to the Timber Rights Agreement. The plaintiffs said that the Timber Rights Agreement is null and void and so is the licence issued to the first defendant. The basis for that assertion is that the land between Kazo v. Ongo and Timbala Rivers covered by the Licence is outside the area approved at the Area Council hearing. As such, the plaintiffs argued that the second defendant had no right to grant timber right over that land.

The action was filed by the pthe plaintiffs on 8th December 1994. Since then various interlocutory hearings on the matter had taken place. In addition, the parties had on occasions discussed the matters among themselves. Consequently it has been alleged that settlement had been reached between the parties as to the matters in dispute, in particular, as to the ownership of the land in question.

The defendantsdants have sought the matters to be struck out on the basis of the settlement being reached between the parties. The plaintiffs deny reaching any settlement with the defendants in the two mentioned civil cases.

The question posed for ther the Court in this application is such that it is one arising in connection with customary land and so this Court is said to have no jurisdiction to deal with it. It is true that there is a dispute here about ownership of customary land. It is also true that the ownership dispute here arose out of the Timber Rights Agreement which the defendants are also challenging. In other words the dispute over ownership of the customary land in question is part and parcel of the defendants' case challenging the landowner defendants' right to grant timber rights to the defendant companies and to allow them to enter and log on the land in question.

A question that can be asked thereforeefore is: Can the High Court be deprived of its power to determine a matter or an issue simply because the dispute concerns or relates to ownership of customary land? I am certain the answer must be "no". If it were so, then the Court's power to grant relief such as by way of injunction would be curtailed as the Local Court which has exclusive jurisdiction over customary land related matters does not have power to grant injunctive remedy. It was pointed out clearly in Simbe's case where it was said:

""It does not follow that, simply because there is a disputes about ownership of customary land the High Court is deprived of its jurisdiction to grant relief by injunction".

The cases of Mae -v- Konihaka: Maeru -v- Mindu [1985/1986] SILR 218 and Oloni and Fagasi -v- Konairamo and Fa'aferoa [1988/1989] SILR 66 are not in point here. In this present application the Court is not asked to determine whether settlement had actually been reached and what that settlement was. The Court is simply asked to determine whether it has power to determine whether or not the two actions have been subject to binding settlements. If there was any settlement reached between the parties, there is nothing to stop them coming back to this court and informing the Court that they had settled the matter between them. There is no reason for them to wait for the signal from the High Court telling them that their actions have been subject to binding settlement before they can proceed to fortify that settlement. However, for the purpose of the question raised, the short answer is that this Court has jurisdiction to determine the question of whether or not the two actions have been subject to binding settlements.

I rule accordingly.

GJB, MURIA
CHIEF JUSTICE