North New Georgia Timber Corporation v Hivu [1994] SBHC 29; HC-CC 387 of 1993 (16 September 1994)

HIGH COURT OF SOLOMON ISLANDS

Civil Case No. 387 of 1993

NORTH NEW GEORGIA TIMBER CORPORATION,
GOLDEN SPRING (INTERNATIONAL) SOLOMON ISLANDS
COMPANY LIMITED

-V-

S. HIVU, CHIEF N. PULEKEVU, I. ROVE, S. BAENASI
(Representing the people of Keru village)

High Court of Solomon Islands
(Muria, CJ.)

Hearing: 15 September 1994
Ruling: 16 September 1994

A. Radclyffe for Golden Springs
P. Tegavota for North New Georgia Timber Company
F. Waleilia for all Defendants

MURIA CJ: The plaintiff Golden Springs (International) (S.I.) Company Ltd applied for leave to issue contempt proceedings against the First, Second and Third Defendants in this case. The basis of the application is that the defendants were in breach of the injunction order issued by this court on 5 November 1993.

Mr. Radclyffe submitted that on 5 March 1994 the people from Keru Village set fire to five machines on instructions from the three defendants. Again Counsel submitted that on 26 March 1994, three more machines were destroyed on instructions from the three defendants.

Mr. Tegavota representing North New George Timber Company supports the application since his client was the grantor of the timber rights in the areas concerned.

Mr. Waleilia strongly opposed the application. He submitted that on the materials before the court, there is insufficient ground for the court to grant leave to issue contempt proceedings against the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Defendants.

Counsel further objected to the application adding that the applicant only presumes that the three defendants were involved in the destruction of the machines basing on the fact that they come from Keru Village. He further submitted that contempt of Court proceedings is a serious allegation and for leave to be granted to issue such proceedings, the Court must be properly satisfied, adding that the affidavit filed in support of the application in this case is in sufficient to ground leave to issue contempt proceedings.

As a general principle contempt process should not be lightly used bearing in mind that it is a process of Court which may very well carry penal consequences, and even loss of liberty. It is with this general principle in mind that I consider it essential that for the court to grant leave in such a case as here concerned us, there must be sufficient evidence to satisfy the Court of the pressing need to issue the leave sought. If there is not enough evidence to satisfy the Court as such, leave must be refused.

In order to satisfy the Court of the pressing need to grant leave, there must be some evidence showing that the alleged contemnors have knowledge of the order they were said to have breached. There must also be some evidence pointing to the alleged contemnors as those actually in breach of the order or if others were in breach of the said order, those others had done so as servants of, agents of or authorised by the alleged contemnors. These are matters which I consider necessary in the present application before leave can be granted.

On the present materials before the Court, the court is left guessing whether the defendants had been served with the ex parte order of 5 November 1993. Equally on the evidence present, the court has been asked to presume that those who destroyed the plaintiff's machines did so at the behest of the three defendants. In the light of the general principle which I stated earlier, the court is bound to be very slow in exercising its discretion in favour of granting leave in such a situation.

I accept there was a meeting on 16 May 1994 with the Hon. Minister for Justice regarding the incidents in question and that the three defendants were present. I do not see anything wrong with the three defendants attending that meeting which was a lawful attempt by the Government to assist in settling the dispute between the plaintiffs and village people concerned.

The threat mentioned in paragraph (9) of the affidavit in support is clearly not sufficient to connect the defendants or any of them with it.

Bearing all these in mind I come to the conclusion that I cannot exercise the Court's discretion to grant leave under the present circumstances. Of course this does not prevent the plaintiff from further seeking leave of the court to issue contempt proceedings if there are sufficient grounds to do so.

The present application must, however, be refused.

(G.J.B. Muria)
CHIEF JUSTICE