Yaneo v Director of Public Prosecutions [1986] SBHC 13; [1985-1986] SILR 199 (26 August 1986)

1985-1986 SILR 199

IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOLOMON ISLANDS

Criminal Appeal Case No. 31 of 1986

YANEO

v

DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS

High Court of Solomon Islands
(Ward C.J.)
Criminal Appeal Case No. 31 of 1986

26 August 1986 at Honiara
Judgment 26 August 1986

Appeal against conviction under Motor Vehicle (Third Party Insurance) Act 1972 s.8 - whether guilty plea equivocal - whether duty to point out defence.

Facts:

The appellant was convicted on his plea of guilty by the Magistrate’s Court (Central) of using a vehicle without a policy of third party insurance c/s 8 of the Motor Vehicle (Third Party Insurance) Act 1972. Notwithstanding his guilty plea, the appellant appealed against his conviction on the ground that he had no knowledge that the insurance had lapsed and that being unrepresented at trial he was unaware of a defence under s.8(3) of the Act.

Held:

1. The trial court has no duty to explain every possible defence to an accused. To do so would be an impossible burden.

2. On an appeal against conviction following a guilty plea, the court will only consider whether the plea was equivocal. Usually only what appears on the record will be considered, but in exceptional circumstances the court will consider other matters that show equivocation. The court will not allow such an appeal simply because the accused says he did not know he had a statutory defence. (Fanasia v. DPP (1985/86 SILR 84 explained).

3. Here there was a misunderstanding apparent on the record as to whether the accused was driving a taxi.

Accordingly, the conviction was quashed and the case was remitted to the Magistrate’s Court for rehearing by another Magistrate.

Cases considered:

Fanasia v. DPP (1985/86) SILR 84
R. v. Blandford Justices ex parte G. (an infant) (1966) 1 All ER 1021
R. v. Griffiths (1932) 23 CAR 153

Kenneth Brown for the Appellant
Thomas Kama for the Respondent

Ward CJ: This appellant was convicted by the Central Magistrates Court on 9th July 1986 on his own plea of guilty to three counts:

1. Using an unlicenced motor vehicle

2. Driving without a valid driving licence

3. Using a motor vehicle without third party insurance.

He was fined $30, $20 and $100 respectively and, in addition, his licence was endorsed on counts 2 and 3 and he was disqualified from driving for 6 months on count 3.

He limits his appeal to count 3 and, despite his plea of guilty, appeals against conviction and sentence. The ground of his appeal against conviction is “that I was employed as a driver by Motor Rewinders Limited and I had no knowledge that the insurance had lapsed and I did not know I had a defence under section 8(3) Motor Vehicles (Third Party Insurance) Act.”

Mr Brown has pointed out for the appellant that it would appear the learned magistrate misunderstood the position when he recorded that the accused drove a taxi because he was then, as now, driving for Motors Rewinders Limited and has never driven a taxi.

Mr Kama for the respondent accepts he never drove a taxi but sought to call fresh evidence the purpose of which would be to show that the accused was aware the insurance had lapsed and would not, therefore, be able to avail himself of the defence under section 8(3).

Mr Brown, with commendable brevity, has simply pointed out that the appellant was unrepresented at the trial, has a defence and should, therefore, be allowed to appeal against conviction. He cites Fanasia v. DPP, (1985/86) SILR 84, and the two cases therein referred to by Wood C.J. I shall return to these cases later.

In considering whether an appeal against conviction will lie following a plea of guilty at the lower court, the only question the court must consider is whether the plea was equivocal. Thus the accused cannot simply come to the appellate court and say “I now want to change my plea to not guilty”. There must be something at the earlier hearing that suggests the plea was not an unequivocal admission of guilt. Usually this will only be considered if it is apparent on the record but, in exceptional circumstances, the court will consider other matters that may be thought to show some equivocation.

On the face of the record here, it is clear the accused pleaded guilty and, at no stage, thereafter, did he say anything to resile from that.

Mr Brown further suggests, however, that where there is a statutory defence the court has a duty to point it out and explain it to the accused.

I cannot accept that. Clearly the court is under a duty to ensure the accused understands the charge to which he is being asked to plead but it is no part of the courts duty to explain each possible defence to him. To do so would cast an impossible burden on the magistrate both in time and in deciding how far he needs to go. Similarly there is a risk an accused person who does not understand fully the role of the magistrate may feel he is suggesting the accused should offer a defence that is inappropriate or untrue in his case.

As the facts are outlined on a plea of guilty, and, in particular, as the accused mitigates, the court must be careful to see that, if any matter, arises which suggests the plea is wrongly made, they should enter a plea of ‘not guilty’.

The position is set out clearly in the judgment of Widgery J. in R. v. Blandford Justices ex parte G. (an infant) (1966) 1 AER 1021 at 1026 as quoted in Fanasia’s case. However, the passage quoted in that report, although accurately expressing the point, is incomplete and I feel it should be read as a whole.

At risk of appearing pedantic and repeating to magistrates a matter of which they are fully aware, I quote the passage in full:-

“In every instance where a magistrate receives the reply “guilty” to the common form question asking the accused to plead, it is necessary for the magistrate to consider whether it is safe to accept the plea and to enter a conviction. Of course, in many cases the question is not a difficult one. If the accused is represented, if the accused .... is a man of mature years who clearly understands what is being put to him, it may well be that the magistrate can accept the plea in the sense that he can regard it as being a satisfactory plea on which he can safely act without further enquiries. In cases, however, where the accused is not represented or where the accused is of tender age or for any other reasons there must necessarily be doubts as to his ability finally to decide whether he is guilty or not, the magistrate ought, in my judgement, to accept the plea as it were provisionally, and not at that stage enter a conviction. He ought.... in these cases to defer a final acceptance of the plea until he has had a chance to learn a little more about it and to see whether there is some undisclosed factor which may render the unequivocal plea of guilty a misleading one. I have no doubt that experienced magistrates in fact do in these cases wait until they have heard the facts outlined by the prosecution and wait until they have heard something of what the accused has to say. If at that stage the magistrate feels that nothing has been disclosed to throw doubts on the correctness of the plea of guilty, he properly accepts it, enters a conviction and that is an end of the matter so far as this point is concerned. If, however, before he reaches that stage he finds there are elements in the case which indicate that the accused is really trying to plead not guilty or, as Lord Goddard put it “guilty but....”, then the magistrate has, in my judgment, no discretion but must treat the plea as what it is, namely, a plea of ‘not guilty’”.

Despite the reference in that passage to “some undisclosed factor” it is clearly no part of the magistrate’s duty to search for every possible innuendo in the accused’s statements and, having found one, decide whether it can conceivably be stretched to a possible defence. An appellate court in deciding whether a plea was equivocal should not either.

Despite Mr Brown’s urging, I do not accept that the case of R. v. Griffiths (1932) 23 CAR 153 establishes any general principle that, on a plea of guilty, the appellate court will review a conviction because there is a good defence in law. That statement in Fanasia’s case with great respect to my learned predecessor, is a quotation from the headnote to the Criminal Appeal Report. The judgment of Lord Hewart CJ shows it establishes no proposition further than that the court will always consider whether a guilty plea was equivocal. In Griffith’s case the depositions clearly showed the accused had a defence and, indeed, during the hearing he made a comment that asserted it, yet the trial court proceeded to convict him. Fanasia’s case also was, in essence, a consideration of the same point of whether the record showed the plea was equivocal. I take it as authority for that. Insofar as it appears to suggest this court will allow an appeal against conviction after a plea of guilty simply because the accused says he did not know he had a statutory defence, I cannot accept it.

Whilst, as I have said, it is the magistrate’s duty to ensure an accused person understands the nature of the charge, he is also entitled to assume that, in general, the accused person has a basic understanding of his position. Clearly any magistrate who foresees a possible difficulty would be well advised to clarify it but his duty does not and cannot extend to giving each accused person an individual exposition on his rights. Similarly it is not open to a convicted man simply to come to the appeal court and say “I didn’t realise ....” unless there is clear additional support for the suggestion his plea was equivocal.

Returning to the case under appeal here, Mr Brown points out that there was a misunderstanding apparent on the record in the reference to driving taxi. Mr Kama accepts he was not driving a taxi.

On the particular facts of this case and bearing in mind the possible interpretation of Fanasia’s case, I shall allow the appeal in what is, probably, an over abundance of fairness.

Conviction on count 3 quashed. Case remitted to the magistrates court for hearing by another magistrate.