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Kirite'e v Ome [2022] SBCA 31; SICOA-CAC 7 of 2021 (28 November 2022)

IN THE SOLOMON ISLANDS COURT OF APPEAL


Case name:
Fangidua Kirite’e v Ome


Citation:


Decision date:
28 November 2022


Nature of Jurisdiction
Appeal from Judgment of The High Court of Solomon Islands (Justice Faukona, DCJ)


Court File Number(s):
7 of 2021


Parties:
Fangidua Kirite’e representing himself and members of his family v John Ome, David Suiti, Alick Luna and Amota Somodai Luina representing themselves and members of their families & Attorney General representing the Assistant Field Officers, Malaita and the Ministry of Agriculture


Hearing date(s):
27 October 2022


Place of delivery:



Judge(s):
Hansen, Vice President
Palmer, CJ
Lunabek, JA


Representation:
N. Laurere for Appellant
S. Banuve for Respondent


Catchwords:
Limitation Act Chapter 18. Section 5 and 39. Condonation .Tort. Elements to be Proved


Words and phrases:


Legislation cited:
Limitation Act 1996 S 5, S 39 (1) and (2), S 39 (2)


Cases cited:
Kirite’e v Ome [2012] SBHC 99, Kirite’e v Ome [2018] SBHC 25, Kirite’e v Ome [2021] SBHC 51, Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562, Industries PLC v Dickman [1990] UKHL 2; [1990] All ER 568, Chow v Attorney General [2002] SBHC 26, Peabody Donation Fund, Governors of the v Sir Lindsay Parkinson & Co Ltd [1985] AC 210., Rowling v Takaro Properties Ltd [1987] UKPC 2; [1988] 1 AC 473; [1988] 2 WLR 418; Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire [1989] AC 53; [1988] 2ALL ER 238,


ExTempore/Reserved:
Reserved


Allowed/Dismissed:
Dismissed


Pages:
1-24

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

  1. This is an appeal against an assessment of damages filed on the 4 May 2021. It appealed a decision dated 20 April 2021. There is a cross appeal and an application to appeal out of time. The cross appeal is against both the liability decision of 20 February 2018 and the assessment of damages dated 20 April 2021.The cross appeal was dated 7 May 2021 and the leave application 31 August 2022.
  2. In an earlier ruling it is recorded that Mr Kii, of the Attorney’s Chambers appeared for all defendants. That is clearly an error, because as the Judge noted at paragraph 11 of the liability decision, default judgment was entered against all first defendants in terms of relief prayed in the amended claim on 30 June 2016.
  3. We also note that the appeal is against quantum only, as counsel confirmed to us. For that reason, it is appropriate that we consider the leave application and the cross-appeal against liability first.

Background

  1. The claimant represented owners of the Fa’asifau Customary Land in East Kwara’ae Malaita province. This land was registered by the family as customary land in or about 2011 as the perpetual estate in parcel number 172-101-1. It appears, however, that there may have been disputes in the past with the first respondents regarding this land.
  2. In any event, the matters that gave rise to the cause of action in these proceedings commenced on 8 July 2000, when the first respondents and members of their family threatened to burn down the claimant’s village and kill him and members of his family because of a long-standing land dispute. They also laid claim over some coconut trees which they say the claimant, or his family had felled. This was denied.
  3. The first respondents apparently complained to the Department of Agricultural Lands and Fisheries. As a consequence, an assistant field officer, Mr L Wale, wrote in the following terms:
  4. This was signed by Mr Wale. It was copied to Mr Somodai and also to the police at Atori, CID Auki and Agriculture Field Officer, Atori. (We note that Mr Wale was initially named as a defendant in his personal capacity. This should never have occurred and at some stage he was dropped as a defendant).
  5. On 7 September 2000 the first respondents and members of their family delivered this letter to the claimant and demanded payment of compensation. On 9 September the first respondents and members of their family repeated their demand and threatened to burn the claimant’s village and kill him if no payment was made by a given deadline, being 13 September 2000.
  6. On 13 September the first respondents and members of their family carried out an armed attack on the claimant and members of his family which led to the village being burnt down and other business and personal properties were damaged. The claimant says that he and members of his family suffered injuries and trauma from that attack, and then particularised that damage. They apparently left the area and have never returned.
  7. It is alleged that the second respondent, through the writing of the letter by the Assistant Field Officer, was negligent of performing its duties in the following manner:
  8. It can be seen from this pleading that the latest date the cause of action accrued was 13 September 2000. All the necessary facts and the identity of the perpetrators was known to the appellant by then. That is of some significance, especially in the light of the fact there is no suggestions the appellant was unaware of this.

Proceedings

  1. The Category B Claim, alleging negligence against all the defendants, was filed on 27 September 2011. It can be seen this is almost exactly 11 years after the cause of action accrued, and more than five years after the limitation period set out in section 5 of the Limitation Act 1996 expired.
  2. An Amended Claim, this time in Category A, was filed on 21 November 2013, in which all of the defendants excepting Mr Wale and the Attorney General were shown as first defendants. Mr Wale ceased to be a defendant, and the Attorney General was named as the second defendant representing the Assistant Field Office, Malaita, and the Ministry of Agriculture.
  3. Even before the Amended Claim, an Application to Strike Out had been filed on 14 May 2012. This was supported by a sworn statement of Mr Kii, the counsel who had carriage of the matter for the Attorney General. It notes that the claim was well out of time under the Limitation Act and sought the strike out on the grounds that they were time-barred and further, there was no reasonable cause of action against the fourth and fifth defendants (Mr Wale and the AG).
  4. That matter was heard by Mwanesalua J on 13 August 2012, and he handed down a Reserved Judgment on 31 August 2012, refusing to strike out the proceedings.[1] Despite the fact there was no appeal against this ruling, it is a matter we will need to return to in due course.
  5. On 30 June 2016 Default Judgment was entered against the now first defendants in terms of the relief prayed for in the Amended Claim. The liability issue came on for hearing before Faukona PJ on 26 October 2017. His Judgment was delivered on 20 February 2018.[2]
  6. Finally, on 8 December 2020 the same Judge presided over the hearing for the assessment of damages, with the Reserved Decision being delivered on 20 April 2021.
  7. The effect of the liability decision of 20 February 2018 was that the Judge found the second defendant, through the actions of Mr Wale, partly contributed to the acts done by the first defendant which resulted in damage. He, therefore, found Mr Wale breached his duty of care and breached work guidelines, rendering the AG liable to contribution for Mr Wale’s actions in writing the letter. Again, this judgment is a matter to which we will need to return.
  8. The Judge found in relation to damages the following:[3]
132. In the finality, I hereby conclude in my assessment of the following amounts to compensate the Claimant and his family for damages and loss of properties and earnings because of destruction. Most of which I resume to minimal award.
Damages to houses.
  1. Sawmilling - $1,045,000.00
  2. Piggery Project - $ 108,500.00
  3. Copra – 418,000.00

135. It would appear the 1st Defendants had done the bulk of damages. The 2nd Defendant’s was found guilty for negligence, an issue quite difficult to assess. However I noted the circumstances in the country which was fragile and a total broke down of law and order. Of course I agree the 1st Defendants were militants which with all expectation the 2nd Defendant would have acknowledged. The problem is if the 2nd Defendant failed his part what would happen to the Officer? It’s another problem.

136. What was done by the first Defendants could not possibly foresee by the second Defendants by human standard. Therefore I would conclude by apportioning negligence which is different from physical damage. The 2nd Defendant should pay one third (1/3) of the total amount awarded.

Orders:
  1. Award total cost for damages and loss of earning @ $2,712,646.90 to the Claimant.
  2. Defendant 2 to pay (1/3) of awarded damages as assessed @ $904,215. 63 to the Claimant.
  3. Defendant 1 to pay (2/3) i.e. $1,808,434.27 to the Claimant
  4. Costs of this application is to be paid by the Defendants (1) and (2) as in the percentage as awarded above.
  5. Defendants (1) and (2) to pay costs of Claimant’s Counsel (Rule Ch.24 Schedule 3 Part 3) according to the percentage sharing as above.
  6. Part 3; no award concerning physical injuries sustained, they were not being pleaded in the amended claim.

The appeal

  1. The appellant appeals only against the assessment of damages. The notice of appeal is a discursive document. It sets out no fewer than eight grounds of appeal. The notice of appeal states:
that in assessing the quantum of damages the Court below erred in fact and law in
  1. Not taking into consideration the costs of the same goods damaged 20 years ago is now more than three times and not simple dishonesty as stated by the Court.
  2. Failing to take into account that the defendant failed to respond to the various sworn statements filed in support of assessment of damages and thus the facts deposed went unchallenged.
  3. Failing to consider that the defendants did not file any notice for cross-examination of the witnesses if they seek to challenge the evidence by respective witnesses as to how each arrived at the amount.
  4. Failing to even consider the sworn statement of Moses re Virivolomo (PS for MCA) filed on 15 November 2019 who stated that the amount of $5,274,900 was assessed by Ministry of Infrastructure Development (MID) and represents the amount of time and work put into the project by the claimant and members of his family who are entitled to the amount assessed.
  5. Giving wrong reason/s for awarding minimal award in each case. The fact that the projects were in the rural area does not make the costs any cheaper respectively. In fact it is much more expensive given the difficulties of transportation and various other challenges.
  6. Failing to note as per submission of counsel that interests and costs are at the Court’s discretion, thus tainted the whole valuation report as being dishonest because of the amount arrived at.
  7. Holding that personal injuries to the claimant and members of his family were not pleaded when it was pleaded in the relief sought in the amended claim.
  8. Knowing that the first defendants have nothing from which the claimant can recover damages, order that two thirds of the amount arrived at would be paid by the first defendants and only one-third from the second defendant.

The cross-appeal

  1. Grounds 1 and 2 of the cross-appeal clearly relate to the matters of liability. We will return to this. The third ground said that the Judge erred in fact and law in applying the principles for the assessment of damage as there was no evidence from which damages could be inferred against the cross-appellant second defendant as opposed to the direct evidence available against the first respondents, who had default judgment entered against them and had been convicted in related criminal proceedings.

Leave to apply out of time

  1. As noted above, the liability decision was handed down the High Court on 20 February 2018. The Leave Application is supported by a sworn statement of Freliz Fakarii, in which she says that in the interests of justice and fairness to the first defendant/second cross-defendants, leave to appeal out of time should be granted to allow it to show that the Attorney should be heard on issues of liability and quantum. This Appeal and Cross Appeal was originally listed in the August Session of this Court. The Court pointed out to Mr Banuve that the first two grounds were in fact against liability and were years out of date. This led to the Leave Application being filed.
  2. As counsel for the appellant noted, the notice of cross-appeal was filed three years and two months after the date of judgment. The affidavit in support of the leave application is completely silent as to the reasons for this appalling delay. We would have expected some effort to explain it. We are entitled to infer that there are no reasonable matters that could have been placed before us to explain this extraordinary delay. At the beginning of the hearing, we heard from counsel and determined that the delay was so gross that leave should not be granted, and it was refused. Litigants, especially the State, should not expect the Court to grant a leave application where there is such appalling and unexplained delay. This meant in the cross-appeal grounds 1 and 2 were no longer relevant, and the only live matter on the cross-appeal was matters of quantum.

The Limitation Act 1996

  1. We said earlier that though there was no appeal against the decision of Mwanesalua J dated 31 August 2012, refusing to strike out these proceedings, it was a matter we needed to return to. The first observation we would make is that the Application to Strike Out was brought within the Limitation Act, but also because there was no reasonable or probable cause of action pleaded. The second matter does not appear to have been addressed by the Judge at all.
  2. The judge noted that the appellant’s case was that s 5 of the Limitation Act does not apply, but it is covered by the circumstances of s 39(1) and (2) of the Act. He went on to conclude:
  3. The relevant sections of the Limitation Act read as follows:
Section 39 reads:

Condonation by court of the delay in actions

39. (1) If it appears to the court that it would be equitable to allow an action to proceed or an arbitration to commence having regard to the degree to which-
the court may direct that those provisions shall not apply to the action, or arbitration or shall not apply to any specified cause of action to which the action or arbitration relates.
(2) In acting under this section the court shall have regard to all the circumstances of the case and in particular to-
  1. As we noted earlier, the events that gave rise to the cause of action and who the perpetrators were was known on the day that the event occurred — 13 September 2000. As well, the letter relied on to found an allegation against the Attorney was also known to the appellants at that date.
  2. While not exactly the same, the Limitation Act in this jurisdiction, in its scheme and provisions is similar to those that exist in a number of other relevant jurisdictions. First, for good public policy reasons the legislature saw fit to have a cut-off date of six years for the bringing of proceedings after the cause of action accrued. This is the starting point and the overall purpose of the legislation.
  3. As with Limitation Acts in other jurisdictions, the legislature has recognised the possibility of injustice in such circumstances and has, in s 39, created a judicial discretion to effectively allow litigation outside the six-year limitation period. But the starting point remains that the statutory period is six years, and there must be good grounds in the exercise of the discretion.
  4. The discretion must be exercised judicially and must take into account the matters set out in s 39. It is particularly important that the Court must take into account and consider the matters set out in s39 (2). The standard practice in other jurisdictions in relation to the matters set out in subsection 2 is Courts expect a sworn statement of a claimant comprehensively explaining those matters and the reasons for the delay. A defendant is then able to respond, and the Court must then judicially weigh the competing interests. The longer the cause of delay, particularly in the absence of any explanation whatsoever, the less likelihood any extension should be granted. It is a weighty matter to grant leave outside the six years laid down in s 5 by the legislature. It will never be enough to simply take the Claim at face value. We consider the approach taken in England and similar jurisdictions should apply in the Solomon Islands.
  5. The passage of Mwanesalua J’s ruling above would suggest that he thought he had a choice between applying s 5 or s 39. That is not the case, as we have pointed out. The starting point must always be s 5 and the next consideration is whether or not a claimant has put sufficient factual material before the Court, which even if weighed against such material put forward by a defendant, would create an inequitable situation. Of particular importance is prejudice to a defendant. This is highlighted in this case where for the liability hearing the evidence was 17 years old and for the assessment of damages it was 20 years old. Stale evidence in the extreme and close to impossible to respond to.
  6. This matter is compounded, as it is clear from the High Court file that no sworn statement was tendered to the Court by the claimants to explain any of the matters set out in s 39(2).
  7. The Judge was also wrong to say that cogent evidence only became available when the first, second and third defendants were convicted of arson. A Court conviction was not required to found the cause of action relied on by the claimant in these proceedings. It goes without saying that different onuses apply in criminal and civil proceedings. While a guilty plea may have assisted the appellant in his civil claim it was not necessary for the criminal proceedings to conclude to enable him to commence these proceedings.
  8. As we noted, surprisingly, this ruling was not appealed. In our view it is highly likely that a five-year delay, without any satisfactory explanation of the delay or the other matters set out in s39 (2) above, would almost inevitably be fatal to a claimant seeking the exercise of a Court’s discretion in its favour. We trust that in the future Judges will approach any such matter in a reasoned and judicial manner, with the starting point being s 5 and the six-year limitation with other matters to be considered and weighed as we have set out above.
  9. We repeat, this matter was not appealed, and our discussion of ss 5 and 39 are, of course, obiter.

The liability judgment

  1. In view of our refusal to grant leave to appeal out of time, the appeal against on liability is not alive. However, like the matter dealing with the Limitation Act above, we consider it appropriate that some comments are made.
  2. As noted above, the Judge set out the default judgment entered against all the first respondents. Clearly since then they have played no further part in this matter and did not attend at the hearing. He also recorded the criminal cases that gave rise to some of the first-named first respondents being sentenced to imprisonment for charges of arson and other matters relating to the attack on 13 September 2000.
  3. The Judge said that there were then two issues, the first being whether the then second respondent committed the tort of negligence reflected in the tone of Mr Wale’s letter of 23 August 2000, and the second whether the issues were time-barred, despite the fact that there had already been the finding referred to above in that regard.
  4. In relation to the time bar, he referred to section 12 of the Agriculture and Livestock Act, which barred any action against an officer, servant of the government, inspector, etc for any act done in the execution of duty within six months after the act of neglect of default complained of. He said that this did not apply in this case because what Mr Wale did was not performing any specific duty alluded to by the Act.
  5. The Judge then went on to analyse the letter and the effects of the writing of it, and concluded that, because Mr Wale should have inspected the site before writing the report he did, it was clear that the second respondent partly contributed to acts done by the first respondents, resulting in damages. He had referred to both Donoghue v Stevenson and Caparo Industries PLC v Dickman.[4] He stated that he considered there was no difference in the meaning and ratio between the two cases, and that Caparo Industries PLC simply used more modern language than Donoghue. He then continued, interestingly, as follows:

23. Further observations contemplates that it could probably be difficult to proof [sic], that the Defendant could able to foresee any damages would occur by reason of writing the letter. Further still, the relationship between the Claimant and the second Defendant is quite thin and may not be within sufficient proximity.

  1. It would seem, even in the Judge’s mind, this was a borderline decision.
  2. Caparo Industries PLC establishes the modern test required to found a duty of care in negligence. It is a three-stage conjunctive test, as follows:
    1. Was the damage to the plaintiff reasonably foreseeable? and;
    2. Was the relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant sufficiently proximate? and;
    3. It is just and reasonable to impose a duty of care in such situation?
  3. This test was adopted by Kabui J in Chow v Attorney-General.[5] We adopt and endorse that decision of Kabui J.
  4. In the Court below, in relation to limb 3 of Caparo Industries PLC, the respondent referred to Peabody Donation Fund, Governors of the v Sir Lindsay Parkinson & Co Limited, where Keith LJ said:[6]
  5. The difficulty with the decision is that having noted Caparo Industries PLC, the Judge was, in our view wrong to say it was just a modern use of language to describe the same test as Donoghue. It is incumbent on a Judge in a negligence case in the Solomon Islands today to consider each limb of the three-stage conjunctive test set out in Caparo. It seems to us the Judge recognised the difficulties confronting this at paragraph 23 we have set out above, but then strayed from the test and simply applied a somewhat loose view of foreseeability.
  6. We note at this stage that we accept the highly volatile situation that applied to the Solomon Islands at the time these events unfolded. We also accept the evidence that a field officer ought normally to carry out an inspection before writing a letter such as the one written by Mr Wale. However, we do not accept that Mr Wale knew or ought to have known the first defendants were somehow involved in militant activities at the material time. There was no evidence to establish this. In fact, the real genesis of the dispute is recognised by the claimant in their pleading at paragraph 6 which describes the threats made on 8 July to burn the village and kill the claimants and family over a long-standing land dispute. It is also mentioned there was allegations made at that stage over coconuts that were said to be felled, but it is clear it is the land dispute that is the genesis of what occurred. We do not accept it would have been foreseeable to Mr Wale that his letter regarding a few coconut trees valued at only $1800 would lead to the consequences that did occur. We consider the claim would have had a great deal of difficulty surmounting this.
  7. Again, the Judge noted at 23 that the relationship between the claimant and the second defendant “is quite thin and may not be within sufficient proximity”. In our view it is not within “sufficient proximity”, and the Judge nowhere establishes anything on the evidence that would create the required degree of proximity to give rise to a duty of care in negligence. Given that foreseeability and proximity are necessary pre-conditions for the establishment of negligence, it is difficult to understand how the Court arrived at finding a duty that had been negligently discharged. In fact, it seems to us that by focusing on the letter and other cases relating to similar correspondence, the Judge did not come back to his finding at 23, which would suggest a different outcome. What he has done is reverted to the initial Donoghue reasonable foreseeability test, which has been discarded in the modern law of negligence for the three-limb test of Caparo Industries PLC.
  8. Finally, in considering the third limb the decision does not appear to carry out the requisite consideration of the reasonableness of imposing a duty of care. We cited above from Peabody Donation Fund, and there are further cases such as Rowling v Takaro Properties Ltd and Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire,[7] that outline the difficulties if a duty was imposed.
  9. The second respondent, in its written closing submissions, stated at 21 and 22:
  10. The submissions then go on to say that the imposition of a duty in the present case would encourage a floodgate of similar litigation.
  11. There are similarities between the submission at 22 above, which we accept and adopt, and the statement of Templeman LJ in Hill v Chief Constable:
  12. They are apposite words and seem to us to apply to the position of an agricultural field officer or someone in similar circumstances to Mr Wale.
  13. It is our view that in any future cases it is necessary for a Judge to carefully consider the three limbs of Caparo Industries PLC, and to test the evidence carefully before concluding the three conjunctive tests have been established.
  14. However, as we say, we are not hearing an appeal on liability, and the comments we make, as with the Limitation Act, are obiter.

The appeal against quantum

  1. Ground 1, in our view, is a surprising complaint. The appellant seems to think it should be paid in today’s dollars, when a perusal of the file shows most of the extraordinary delay in this matter is attributable to the appellant. He took 11 years to commence these proceedings, and in our view it would be quite wrong that he should seek to benefit from what, by any standards, is unacceptable delay. Ground 1 fails.
  2. Grounds 2 and 3 relate to the failure of the second respondent to respond to sworn statements and apply to cross-examine on them. In this regard the submission is that the finding that there was an overall dishonesty by the claimant was not available.
  3. The amount of this claim is quite extraordinary. The Judge said this at paragraphs 119 and 120:
  4. We are quite satisfied this was open to the Judge. A judge is not bound to uncritically accept a fanciful claim even it is not challenged by cross examination. Particularly based on 20-year-old evidence. First, while personal injuries are mentioned in the prayer for relief, there are no pleadings that support or give particulars of any personal injuries at all. Furthermore, the extraordinary amounts claimed in our view entitled the Judge to look at them with real suspicion and a cynical eye.
  5. Ground 4 relates to disturbance to an airport project. This appears to have been supported by Government departments but was not part of Government policy. It was planned to have an air strip 1000 by 80 metres, which would incur a cost of $1.3 million. The Judge, at 78 and 79, said:
  6. This highlights the difficulty with cases that are brought long after the limitation period, with continual delays so that the assessment of damages was some 20 years after the event. It is not surprising the Judge said it was difficult to assess damages that related to the disturbance of progress of work because of the actions of the first defendants. The work was not complete, and the evidence was stale. Again, the conclusion reached by the Judge we consider was available to him and should not be disturbed.
  7. Ground 5 relates to residential houses, and again there is a reference to an increase of pricing. Our earlier comments equally apply to this. The Judge was faced with this claim long after the event and had to do his best with what was available. We consider the conclusions he reached were available to him. Again, we would not uphold this ground.
  8. In relation to ground six, we simply do not understand the submission. It notes that interests and costs were at the Court’s discretion and that the total final sum was after an allowance of five percent for interests and costs being added. It said that this “tainted the whole report”. Again, interests and costs were within the Court’s discretion, and we accept the Judge’s finding.
  9. Ground seven related to personal injuries, which we have already dealt with. It is not enough to simply put in the prayer for relief a claim for personal injuries. They must be pleaded and particularised. They are not.
  10. Finally, ground 8, which is a complaint of the apportionment of damages between the first and second respondents. In the submission it is not suggested that the Judge did not have jurisdiction to make such apportionment. It was submitted that the Judge knew of the inability of the first respondents to pay anything, and the Judge deliberately apportioned the award in such a way to deprive the appellant of an already minimal award. This is a very serious allegation to make against a Judge, which we reject. We do not consider the Judge made any deliberate attempt to deprive the appellant of damages. Rather, what occurred in the assessment is almost inevitable given the appalling delay in this case, to which the major contributor was the appellants. Given his findings in the liability judgment and his assessment of the damages, we are satisfied he was entitled to make the two-thirds, one-third split he did. Again, ground eight fails.
  11. It follows that the appeal is dismissed. Given the sorry background to this entire litigation, we think it appropriate that costs lie where they fall.
  12. That leaves the Respondents Cross Appeal on quantum. This focuses on the 2/3 and 1/3 split between defendants and the absence of direct evidence against the second respondent. We repeat what we said above. Given the difficulties created for the judge, compounded by the failure of the second respondent to call evidence or cross examine. Reviewing the material before him and the decision of the second respondent not to cross examine we are satisfied on the material that he was entitled to award damages in the sums he did. He was also entitled to make the split he did. We have no grounds to interfere with those decisions and the cross appeal is dismissed.

Hansen JA, Vice President
Palmer, CJ
Lunabek JA

[1] Kirite’e v Ome [2012] SBHC 99; HCSI-CC 387 of 2011 (31 August 2012).
[2] Kirite’e v Ome [2018] SBHC 25; HCSI-CC 387 of 2011 (20 February 2018).
[3] Kiritee v Ome [2021] SBHC 51; HCSI-CC 387 of 2011 (20 April 2021).
[4] Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562 and Caparo Industries PLC v Dickman [1990] All ER 568.
[5] Chow v Attorney-General [2002] SBHC 26; HC-CC 127 of 2000 (7 May 2002).
[6] Peabody Donation Fund, Governors of the v Sir Lindsay Parkinson & Co Ltd [1985] AC 210.

[7] Rowling v Takaro Properties Ltd [1987] UKPC 2; [1988] 1 AC 473; [1988] 2 WLR 418; Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire [1989] AC 53; [1988] 2ALL ER 238

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