PacLII Home | Databases | WorldLII | Search | Feedback

Court of Appeal of Solomon Islands

You are here:  PacLII >> Databases >> Court of Appeal of Solomon Islands >> 2022 >> [2022] SBCA 18

Database Search | Name Search | Recent Decisions | Noteup | LawCite | Download | Help

Djokovic v Attorney General [2022] SBCA 18; SICOA-CAC 3 of 2021 (4 November 2022)

IN THE SOLOMON ISLANDS COURT OF APPEAL


Case name:
Djokovic v Attorney General


Citation:



Decision date:
4 November 2022


Nature of Jurisdiction
Appeal from Judgment of The High Court of Solomon Islands (Lawry J)


Court File Number(s):
3 of 2021


Parties:
Robson Djokovic


Hearing date(s):
30 September 2022


Place of delivery:



Judge(s):
Goldsborough P
Palmer, CJ
Gavara-Nanu, JA


Representation:
Mathews, T KC & Rano, W for the Appellant
Banuve, S for the Respondent


Catchwords:



Words and phrases:



Legislation cited:
Constitution of Solomon Islands 1978 S 26 (1) S 20 (1) S 20 (6), S48 and 55(1), S 23, S 23 (1)
Constitution (Amended) (Dual Citizenship)Act 2018 S 22,8(a)
Electoral Act 2018 , S 7,8 and 9


Cases cited:
Paia v Soakai [1980-1981] SILR 86, Kereme v O'Neill [2019] PGSC 7, Isdore Kaseng v Rabbie Namaliu [1995] PNGLR 481,


Ex Tempore/Reserved:
Reserved


Allowed/Dismissed:
Dismissed


Pages:
1-17

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

  1. This is an appeal against the decision of Lawry PJ (primary judge) given on 5 February, 2021 in proceeding titled Civil Case No. 335 of 2020 (the proceeding), in which the primary judge dismissed all of appellant’s claims.
  2. The appellant made following claims in the proceeding: -
  3. The following are agreed facts in the Court below: -
  4. The following were described in the Court below as agreed questions for determination: -

Grounds of Appeal

  1. The appellant raised the following grounds of appeal: -

And the Appellant seeks the following: -

(1) The appeal be allowed.
(2) An order for the following declarations: -
(3) Any orders deemed fit consequent to the appeal being allowed by this Honourable Court.
(4) The Respondents to pay the costs of this appeal and of the cost (sic.) below.

Appellant’s place of birth

  1. The appellant was born on 10 July, 1973 at Gizo in the Western Province.

He was a natural born son of a Nancy Betty Tanabose who was a member of the indigenous tribe of Kokoa of the Katupika region in Choiseul Province and a member of the Puibangara tribe of Senga in Choiseul Province through her father.

  1. The appellant argued in the court below that under ss. 20 (1) (a) and 26 (1) of the Constitution, having Solomon Islands parentage made him an indigenous Solomon Islander. He argued that because he was an indigenous Solomon Islander, under these provisions he was always a citizen of Solomon Islands.
  2. It is not disputed that appellant was an indigenous Solomon Islander, under ss. 20 (1) (a) and 26 (1) of the Constitution. What is disputed is the appellant’s claim that being an indigenous Solomon Islander, he was always a citizen of Solomon Islands. He argued that pursuant to s. 2 of the Constitution being a citizen of Solomon Islands under the above two constitutional provisions was a right conferred on him by the supreme law of the land, therefore that right could not be removed from him. The appellant argued that any statutory provision or any other law which was inconsistent with ss. 20 (1) (a) and 26 (1) of the Constitution was to that extent invalid and had no legal effect.
  3. It is appropriate to also note the following background facts. In 1981, the appellant moved to Australia with his parents when he was 8 years old. He was granted Australian citizenship as a minor. Before turning 18 years old, he continued to visit Solomon Islands. In 1991 when he turned 18 years old, he was asked by Solomon Islands Immigration authorities to relinquish or surrender either his Australian passport or Solomon Islands passport. He claims as a result, he surrendered his Australian passport. He claims that as a result, he was only a permanent resident of Australia. In 1992, while living in Solomon Islands he got married. He continued to visit his parents who were in Australia. Some officials of the Australian High Commission in Honiara told him that because Australia accepted dual citizenship, and because there were no requirements for revocation of Australian citizenships, he was still recognized as an Australian citizen despite surrendering his Australian passport. In 2000 civil unrest broke out in Honiara, he then had to relocate his family to Australia and took up residence in Australia for purposes of children’s education and work. Using his Solomon Islands passport, he continued to travel to Solomon Islands for work and to see relatives. In 2009, he took up further studies in Brisbane and spent more time in Australia. He claims around that time he misplaced his Solomon Islands passport, he then applied for an Australian passport which was granted to him in a matter of days. He used his Australian passport to travel to and from Solomon Islands from then on. In 2014, when he was in Solomon Islands he applied for Solomon Islands passport, but the Solomon Islands Department of Immigration advised him to surrender his Australian passport to apply for a Solomon Islands passport. He was advised also to wait for new laws to be passed by the Parliament regarding Solomon Islands citizenship before applying for a Solomon Islands passport. The appellant nonetheless went ahead and issued the proceeding. Before the court below and before this Court he continued to argue that as an indigenous Solomon Islander, he was always a Solomon Islands citizen and was therefore entitled to have a Solomon Islands passport without having to apply for it.
  4. During the different periods of time, he was in Solomon Islands he worked for the Solomon Islands Government and upon legal advice given to him, he registered as a voter in the general elections. He also became a leader of a political body. He apparently did these with the view to standing in general elections.
  5. The primary judge held in his decision that pursuant to s. 23 (1) of the Constitution, the appellant being an Australian citizen had to renounce that citizenship to apply for a Solomon Islands passport. The appellant argued that the primary judge misinterpreted s.23 (1), he argued he did not lose his Solomon Islands citizenship because he chose to be a Solomon Islands citizen when he turned 18 years old.
  6. The following extract from the appellant’s amended submissions in our view conveniently captures the gist of appellant’s arguments. In paragraphs 84 to 87 at pages 141-142 of the Appeal Book: -
  7. The respondent’s principal argument is that the appellant being an Australian citizen, was caught by s. 23 (1) of the Constitution. The appellant therefore had to renounce his Australian citizenship to apply for a Solomon Islands passport. The fact that he was an indigenous Solomon Islander did not automatically qualify him to be a citizen of Solomon Islands. The respondent argued that the primary judge was correct in decision.

Consideration and reasons for decision

  1. The primary judge held that by virtue of s. 20 (1) (a) of the Constitution, on Solomon Island’s Independence Day on 7 July, 1978 the appellant became a citizen of Solomon Islands. He did not have to apply for Solomon Islands citizenship under s. 20 (2) of the Constitution. However, given that he was an Australian citizen, after turning 18 years old, s. 23 (1) required him to renounce his Australian citizenship if he wanted to remain a Solomon Islands citizen. He failed to comply with that constitutional requirement. As a result, s. 23 (1) operated to terminate his Solomon Islands citizenship. Thus, the need for him to apply for a Solomon Islands passport.
  2. Section 20 (1) and (2) of the Constitution provide as follows: -

Persons who become citizens on Independence Day

20.-(1)(a)Every person who is immediately before Independence Day an indigenous Solomon Islander shall become a citizen of Solomon Islands on Independence Day.
(b)Every person who was born in Solomon Islands before Independence Day and who has or had two grandparents who are or were members of a group, tribe or line indigenous to Papua New Guinea or the New Hebrides shall become a citizen of Solomon Islands on Independence Day.
(2) Every person who before Independence Day has made, or been included in, an application to the Government for citizenship of Solomon Islands containing the information specified in subsection (4) of this section and who at the time of making such application possessed any of the qualifications specified in subsection (3) of this section shall become a citizen of Solomon Islands on Independence Day.
  1. Section 23 of the Constitution provides as follows: -

Avoidance of dual nationality

23.-(1) Subject to the provisions of subsection (2) of this section, any citizen of Solomon Islands who is a national of some other country shall cease to be a citizen of Solomon Islands at the expiry of two years after the date on which he acquired citizenship of Solomon Islands or attained the age of eighteen years, whichever is the later, or such longer period as may be prescribed by Parliament, unless before the expiry of that period he has renounced or lost the nationality of that other country or, if the law of that other country does not permit him to renounce that nationality, made such declaration as may be prescribed.
(2) Any person who, being aged eighteen years or more, acquired citizenship of Solomon Islands by virtue of section 20(2) or 21 of this Constitution and who is a national of some other country shall cease to be a citizen of Solomon Islands at the expiry of six months after the date on which he acquired citizenship of Solomon Islands or such longer period as may be prescribed by Parliament, unless before the expiry of that period he has renounced or lost the nationality of that other country or, if the law of that other country does not permit him to renounce that nationality, made such declaration as may be prescribed. (Our underlining)
  1. In the court below, the appellant relied on Paia v. Soakai [1980-1981] SILR 86. The primary judge when commenting on whether Paia assisted the appellant said: -
  2. The appellant’s principal argument underpinning his case as we alluded to earlier in our judgment is that being an indigenous Solomon Islander, he was always a citizen of Solomon Islands. That status he claims did not change even when he became an Australian citizen. It was argued that this is the combined effect of section 23 (1) of the Constitution and section 8 (1) (a) of the Citizenship Act, 1978. Apart from relying on Paia, the appellant also relied on other cases such as Peter Kenilorea Jnr v Attorney General, unreported, Court of Appeal Case No. 35 of 2021 (8 July, 2022). In that case, the respondent’s children were born in the United State of America, they became American citizens by birth up to their 18th birthdays.
  3. All arguments advanced by the appellant were rejected by the primary judge on the basis that they were inconsistent with the clear legislative intent in s. 23 (1) of the Constitution. His Lordship found that given that the appellant was a holder of Australian citizenship, s. 23 (1) on its proper construction operated as a bar to the appellant from being a citizen of Solomon Islands. The appellant therefore needed to renounce his Australian citizenship before applying for Solomon Islands citizenship. He was required to do that in a statutory application for Solomon Islands citizenship. This was to ensure compliance with the mandatory requirement under s. 23 (1) of the Constitution which was to prevent Solomon Islanders from having dual nationality.
  4. Whether the appellant as an indigenous Solomon Islander was also a citizen of Solomon Islands is in our view the central issue, which must turn on the proper construction of s. 23 (1) of the Constitution. Other issues, including the ‘agreed issues’ by the parties as well as the issues raised by the appellant in his grounds of appeal are collateral to this central issue. Section 23 (1) is sui generis which was purposely crafted by the framers of the Constitution to prevent Solomon Island citizens from holding dual nationalities. This was the clear legislative intent in s. 23 (1).
  5. The Court must give a fair and liberal interpretation to s. 23 (1) and apply its clear legislative intent. Given the mandatory nature of the provision, it is incumbent on the Court to give full effect to its terms. The Court has no power to strike down the provision in any way. To do so, would amount to legislating. The clear legislative intent in s. 23 (1) cannot be watered down by making it subject to other laws, to do so would result in diluting the binding effect of the provision.
  6. The appellant has watered down s. 23 (1) in his submissions by referring to it as a “general provision” which is to be interpreted subject to its “purposive” intent and other laws. If the Court was to accept the appellant’s submission, it will result in the mandatory constitutional provision being struck down, which the Court has no power to do. The appellant has in so submitting breached the cardinal rule that no court has power to strike down a mandatory constitutional provision. The effect of the appellant’s submissions would as we said earlier also result in diluting the binding effect of this mandatory constitutional provision. The Supreme Court of Papua New Guinea in stressing these points in Application by Dr Phillip Kereme [2019] SC1781 said: -
  7. In Application by Dr Kereme the Supreme Court adopted the minority view in another Supreme Court decision in Isdore Kaseng v. Rabbie Namaliu (No.1) [1995] PNGLR 481. The Court in that case considered the validity of the circulation of notices regarding proposed bills for debate by the Parliamentarians to Parliamentarians without Standing Orders. Under s. 14 of the Constitution, it is a mandatory requirement that circulation of the notices regarding proposed bills to the Parliamentarians be done in accordance with the Standing Orders. The proposed bills were circulated without Standing Orders being made. The majority held the circulation was valid, although there were no standing orders. The minority said the circulation without Standing Orders breached the requirements under s. 14 of the Constitution which was in mandatory terms. In Application by Dr Kereme, the Court adopted and followed the minority view in Isidore Kaseng as the correct law.
  8. Section 23 (1) being a mandatory constitutional provision, observations in Application by Dr Kereme would have relevance. However, the views we expressed here regarding s. 23 (1) may only be academic because the provision is no longer in force following passing of the Constitution (Amendment) (Dual Citizenship) Act, 2018, (Dual Citizenship Act), which repealed the provision. Under this amendment s. 49 of the Constitution was also amended, the effect of which is that a person holding citizenship of a country other than Solomon Islands is disqualified from being elected to Parliament.
  9. No doubt had the appellant waited as advised by the Solomon Islands Department of Immigration till these amendments were passed by the Parliament, he might have seen and appreciated the law in different and proper contexts and perhaps thereby opted not to issue the proceeding which was more for academic discussion than for any practical relevance. This includes the arguments advanced for and on behalf of the appellant both before the court below and before this Court.
  10. For the reasons already given, we find the primary judge did not err in his decision, especially in his application of s. 23 (1) which at the relevant times was in force. All the grounds of appeal are therefore dismissed.
  11. Consequently, we dismiss the appeal in its entirety and order that the appellant pay the respondent’s costs of and incidental to the appeal, which if not otherwise agreed are to be taxed.
  12. Orders accordingly.

Goldsbrough (P)
Palmer (CJ)
Member
Gavara-Nanu (JA)
Member


PacLII: Copyright Policy | Disclaimers | Privacy Policy | Feedback
URL: http://www.paclii.org/sb/cases/SBCA/2022/18.html