Willie v Solomon Islands Electricity Authority [2018] SBCA 7; SICOA-CAC 18 of 2017 (11 May 2018)

IN THE SOLOMON ISLANDS COURT OF APPEAL

NATURE OF JURISDICTION:	Appeal from Judgment of The High Court of Solomon Islands (Brown J )
COURT FILE NUMBER:	Civil Appeal Case No. 18 of 2017 (On Appeal from High Court Civil Case No. 153 of 2017)
DATE OF HEARING:	8 May 2018
DATE OF JUDGMENT:	11 May 2018
THE COURT:	Goldsbrough P Hansen JA Young JA
PARTIES:	ROSE SUSAN BEN WILLIE -V- SOLOMON ISLANDS ELECTRICITY AUTHORITY
ADVOCATES: APPELLANT: RESPONDENT:	L. Ramo K. Ziru
KEY WORDS:
EXTEMPORE/RESERVED:
ALLOWED/DISMISSED
PAGES	1- 5

1. This is an appeal against a decision in the High Court to refuse an application for a declaration in respect of an invoice issued by the Solomon Islands Electricity Authority (the Respondent) directed to a householder Rose Susan Willie (the Appellant) for moving a supply line.
   
2. The Appellant is the registered owner of the fixed term estate (FTE) in parcel number 191-052-341. The Respondent is the sole authorised supplier and generator of electrical power throughout Solomon Islands, created and governed by statute, the Electricity Act Cap 128.
   
3. In the course of building on her land, the Appellant approached the Respondent with a view to having a supply line which runs over her property moved so that it might not interfere with a new or modified structure which she had permission to build. The supply line had been in its existing position prior to the date on which she had been registered with her FTE on 17 May 2012.
   
4. The Respondent has not completed the work of moving the supply line, rather it has created a proforma invoice for the proposed work which the Appellant disputes. It is not the principle that the Respondent seeks to charge the Appellant for the work that is in issue here. It is the amount which the Respondent seeks to recover for that work which causes the application for a declaration.
   

From negotiations, which were in evidence in the court below, it is clear that counsel for both parties looked to the Electricity Act for answers. They found none. In the absence of answers contained within that statutory framework for the Respondent, the Appellant seeks to submit that any proposed charges are ultra vires and deemed illegal. No authority for those propositions is cited in the written submissions of the Appellant nor was any authority cited in oral argument or in answer to questions raised during the hearing.

5. The Electricity Act [Cap 133] establishes, at section 3, an Authority to be known as the Solomon Islands Electricity Authority which shall be a body corporate under that name with perpetual succession and a common seal and which may, in such name, sue and be sued, and may enter into contracts, and may acquire, purchase, take, hold and enjoy real and personal property of every description, and may convey, assign, surrender and yield up, charge, mortgage, transfer or otherwise dispose of, or deal with or in, real or personal property vested in the Authority upon such terms as the Authority deems fit.
   
6. Cap 133 sets out the powers and duties of the Authority and gives power to the Minister to prescribe various fees and charges to be levied for the supply of electrical power. At section 55 in particular at item (v) the Minister may prescribe the rate of charges to be made in respect of electricity supplied from the Authority’s public installations and of the hire of apparatus belonging to or operated by the Authority, and the fees payable in respect of the inspection, testing and maintenance of consumers' installations and apparatus, and in respect of the fixing and testing of meters, and in respect of any other services properly rendered on account of consumers. The Minister, it is submitted on this appeal, has not prescribed the fees payable for services properly rendered on account of consumers
   
7. The Appellant, in her own material at page 30 of the Appeal Book, acknowledges liability to pay some of the cost of relocation of the supply line running over her premises, given that it was in place prior to her FTE being registered in her name. She then goes further to submit that, as there has been no regulation made by the Minister in this regard, no fee can be payable.
   
8. The power of the Minister is that he may prescribe, and where he has prescribed, the Authority is limited to that prescription, whether it be a rate for the sale of electricity or otherwise within S55 (v). In the absence, though, of prescription we do not accept the submission that non-prescribed proposed charges are ultra vires and deemed illegal. The Authority is a corporate body in its own right and, save where rates are prescribed, may levy charges for services sought in its discretion. We add that the Authority would be expected to act reasonably in determining those charges.
   
9. The cost of materials referred to in the proforma invoice was queried as was the proposed cost of labour and transport. Perhaps through accounting error no amount has been included in the total for transport, explanations given for material costs that were queried as were explanations of charging the cost of labour to the client when performing work at their request, as one would expect any organisation to do. All of those matters, however, go to quantum and not to the principle of requiring payment.
   
10. This is not, it appears to this Court, a claim going to the principle of charging but a claim going to quantum. In those circumstances a declaration that the invoice is a nullity could never be granted nor could the invoice be properly described as ultra vires. In short, there is no substance to the claim for a declaration.
    
11. In the High Court, the substantive claim was properly rejected although the manner of the rejection as communicated was less than optimal. Whilst it need not have been extensive, the Appellant was entitled to an explanation as to why the claim inevitably failed. There is nothing to be gained in discussing the lack of a filed defence, given that in Category C claims no defence is required prior to first hearing, and this matter did not proceed beyond a first hearing.
    
12. The appeal is dismissed with the costs of and incidental to the appeal to be paid by the Appellant to the Respondent.
    

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Goldsbrough P

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Hansen JA

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Young JA