Lagobe v Tapala [2011] SBCA 10; Civil Appeal Case 14 of 2011 (5 October 2011)

THE COURT OF APPEAL OF SOLOMON ISLANDS
(Mwanesalua J)

Civil Appeal Case No. 14 of 2011

BETWEEN:

JACK LAGOBE
Applicant/Appellant

AND

REUBEN TAPALA, BARNAS BABU
AND FRANK POZAPITU
Firs Respondent

AND

JONATHAN DIVE
Second Respondent

AND:

JOHN MEKERONI, KURUTU,
EDIE MAENA KIDOE, GWEN ABANA,
DONOLD ODIKANA, MR & MRS GINA,
VIRGINIA KUPER
Third Respondent

Date of Hearing : 18 August 2011
Date of Ruling : 5 October 2011

T Kama for Applicant
D Marahare for Respondents

RULING

Background

1. The Applicant has been held to be Chief of Reresare Tribe in several court cases involving the ownership or control of customary land on Vella La Vella. The First and Third Respondents arranged a meeting at Irigila Village in May 2009. At the meeting they appointed and installed the Second Respondent as Chief of Reresare Tribe in place of the Applicant. The Applicant instituted proceedings by Amended claim filed on 9th July 2009 asking for two declarations and injunctive orders. First, a declaration that the installation of the Second Respondent as Chief of Reresare Tribe was void and second a declaration that the Applicant himself to be the lawful Chief of the Reresare Tribe.
   
2. The Applicant was the Chief of the Reresare Tribe when the Second Respondent was appointed and installed as Chief of the Tribe. He contended that he holds position of Chief of the Tribe for life. The court rejected this argument and said, that the question as to "who is Chief now, who should be Chief or who can be Chief of Reresare Tribe is to be decided according to Customary Law. Next, the Applicant contended that his position as Chief of Reresare Tribe is res judicata. To that, the court said, that position would prevail if there was evidence before it to show that the Chiefs', Local Court or Customary Land Appeal Court had decide a case where the Applicant's right to be known as Chief was the sole issue in dispute. If there was such a case, then the "protective" powers of the High Court could be invoked.
   
3. The Applicant referred to cases where he said they dealt with his status as Chief of Reresare Tribe. The court rejected the cases as none of them dealt with the removal or replacement of existing Chief and the appointment of another. The court refused to grant the declarations and the injunctive orders sought. The court dismissed and struck out the claim.
   
4. The Applicant filed an application for leave to appeal and Notice of Appeal on 11 July 2011.
   
5. The Applicant appeals the whole judgment/order of the court given on 27 June 2011 whereby the court dismissed and struck out the Claim on the ground that it does not disclose any reasonable cause of action.
   
6. The grounds for the application for leave are that:-
   
   • (a) The proposed appeal raises important questions of general and public interest in respect of the Law and Customary usages on appointment and replacement of Chiefs who are in control of customary land and the application of the doctrines of res judicata and issue estoppel to such usages arising from a decision of a Customary Land Appeal Court pursuant to Section 256 (2) of the Land Title Act [Cap. 30].
     
   • (b) The Applicant has reasonable prospects of success.
     

Decision

I have read the grounds for leave to appeal and the grounds of appeal in the draft notice of appeal. The appeal raises issues of general public importance. As pointed out by the Applicant, the draft notice of appeal raises a question of law as to whether the doctrines of res judicata and/or issue estoppel apply in respect of law and custom usages relating to the appointment and replacement of Chiefs in the case where issues relates only to the status of a person as chief and where no issue of land ownership has been raised. This issue of general public importance has never being authoritatively determined by the Court of Appeal

As lawyers know it, the doctrine of res judicata is designed to put a stop to the retrial of issues to avoid inconsistent decisions. But the issue here is whether the doctrine should equally apply to chiefly status in general. It seemed that the Applicant has a sufficiently arguable case when considering his submissions.

I therefore grant leave to appeal. The costs of this application be costs in the appeal.

THE COURT