Kwaiani v Regina [2007] SBCA 17; CA-CRAC 34 of 2006 (7 September 2007)

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NATURE OF JURISDICTION:	Appeal from a judgment of the High Court of Solomon Islands.
COURT FILE NUMBER:	Criminal Appeal No. 34 of 2006
DATE OF HEARING:	Monday 19th March 2007
DATE OF JUDGMENT:	Friday 7th September 2007
THE COURT:	Lord Slynn of Hadley P, Adams JA Salmon JA.
PARTIES:	Kwaiani (appellant) -v- Regina (respondent)
ADVOCATES:
appellant:	G Brown
respondent:	M McColm and Henry Kausimae
KEYWORDS:
RESERVED/DISMISSED:
PAGES:

This is an application for leave to appeal against the appellant’s conviction for the murder of Steven Albert at Koa River, on 11 January 2005. There was no doubt that the deceased was killed by a single stab wound in the upper left side of his back inflicted by the appellant. In substance, the defense was accident. Subsidiary defenses concerning intention and knowledge were also raised. There was evidence that the appellant was drunk.

On the afternoon of the day of the murder the appellant (referred to by the Chief Justice as Fredson) traveled to Buma Village. He had been drinking. Part of the journey was on a bus and another passenger on that bus described the appellant as drunk. The final part of the journey was across a river in a small boat which capsized. The appellant arrived at Buma village and went uninvited into the house of one of the residents. The appellant’s reason for going to the village had to do with a young woman from the village with whom he had been having an affair. The occupier of the house that the appellant entered described him as drunk. She told him to leave. He did but first drove a knife he was carrying into the wall of her kitchen. The knife was described as a narrow two-sided knife with a sharp point. Photographs show it as being about 25 centimetres long. When he left the house that he had entered, the appellant went to the edge of the village. There he had a conversation with a man called Daniel whom he asked for directions to the main road. Daniel walked with him for a distance, showing him the way. Daniel thought the appellant was drunk. During their conversation the appellant said that he was frightened that someone might kill him and that, if anyone attacked him, he would kill him. Daniel saw that the appellant was carrying a knife in his right hand. A man called Douglas joined them. Douglas told the appellant he could not go to (or, possibly, stay in) the village because he was drunk. He could see that the appellant was drunk because of his movements, which were not normal, and demonstrated what he meant (the transcript does not contain a description of the demonstration). The appellant lunged at Douglas, who warded off the blow with his hand, which was cut. (Whether the appellant had attempted to stab Douglas or merely to punch him is unclear from the transcript.) Douglas fell over, then got up and followed the appellant. Daniel said, “It wasn’t too dark yet at that time”. Douglas said -

“I also got to the main road. He was already 30 metres away from me. He was on the southern road. I followed him up to the main road and from where I was he was about 30 metres away from [me]. He was running when I saw him. I was still following him. I was walking but not slow - I wasn’t walking very fast. He was about 30 metres away from me. I could see his backside when I followed him ... He then disappeared from my sight. This was at the front of the bridge. He turned down the road that leads to the river. This is Koa bridge ...

Douglas said that he shouted a warning that there was a drunk with a knife and he then heard someone shout that a boy had been stabbed. He said that he went to the river and saw the victim being held by the other two boys. He said, “It was dark by then” (discussed below). When precisely this occurred is uncertain, but some minutes after the stabbing seems likely.

The three young men had been bathing in the river. One (Max) was still in the water, the other two were drying and dressing themselves (Robert and Steven). Steven was bending over putting on his shoes. The appellant, with his knife in his right hand, stabbed Steven just below his shoulder on the left-hand side of his back as he passed. Robert was standing with Steven at the time. He said that the “man just run forward and stabbed Steven”. The man was three to four metres (indicating in the Court) away when he saw him. He saw him with the knife in his right hand. He recognized him as the man who had stabbed Steven after he had been caught.

“He came and stabbed Steven and ran on. He did not stop. As soon as he stabbed him he did not stop, he kept going.

I suggest to you that he was running and did not know that he had stabbed Steven? No.

Did he do anything to show that he knew that he had stabbed Steven? He came along and stabbed him and kept going.”

(The italicized words were omitted from the Chief Justice’s note of evidence but it is agreed by Counsel they were said. The possible significance of this is discussed below.)

Max saw the man moments after the attack as he ran towards him and as he fled down the river. He said that, although it was getting dark, he could still identify people. He denied, in effect, that he could not recognize the attacker because it was dark, saying that he “did not recognize him because it was my first time to see ... [but] I could identify him though”. He denied that it was necessary to walk slowly to the river because it was dark (which was in his statement to the police). He said, “It wasn’t that dark ... a little bit dark”.

The appellant continued to run up the Koa River to a point where he was apprehended by people from the victim’s village.

The injury that the victim suffered was described by the doctor who examined him after his death as a slightly curved wound with a vertical length of 5 centimetres and a width of 3 centimetres going to ribs 1-3. There was a cut into the thorax cavity. The doctor said that there was insufficient blood loss to cause death. The doctor thought that the muscle skin flap above the hole to the thorax cavity acted like a valve and produced a tension pheumothorax that can kill quickly through the build-up of air in the thoracic cavity.

The appellant was interviewed by police on 12 and 13 January 2005. In the English translation of the record of his interview the following appears -

A29 I know that I have a knife when I reached the main road from Buma and when I reached the Koa River.

Q30 I put it to you that when you reached the side of the water or river at Koa that you stabbed or hit a boy with the knife you hold. What will you say on this?

A30 Actually I knew that since many of the people chased me and one of the men only I know to making my way clear by threatening them for no one to caused harm or death to anyone. It is not my intention to cause such a problem however; accidentally it resulted to be that.

A31 I cannot recall it because I was too drunk and actually escaped for my safety.

Q37 Refer to your answer on Q30. Why did you say that it was accidentally happen?

A37 I do not search for any specific person to kill or cause harm to him. I have no specific ill-feeling towards this person who died because it was night time when this incident happens. This thing is why I say the killing is an accident.

The appellant did not give evidence but made a lengthy statement which he read out to the Court. He explained that he had gone to Buma village to visit a girl whom he had got to know but whose family opposed their friendship. He was worried because she had said that she would commit suicide as a result of her father’s rejection of her. He said that on the day he decided to meet the girl he “made the big mistake and started to drink some beers”. He said that when he went to the village he had no aggressive intentions and did nothing aggressive. He said that some women accused him of being “the man who took [the girl], so he decided to leave. He was followed by men who started to question him in angry and aggressive tones. They grabbed his bag. The appellant “struggled to run” and that was when the boy [Douglas] was cut with the knife. He fled and was chased. As he did so one of the pursuers struck at him with a piece of timber but it was rotten and broke on his arm as he fended it off. His pursuers threw rocks and sticks at him. One man on the road jumped out and threw a rock which struck his head. He fell, got to his feet and continued to run. He said his “head was pain and dizzy, my eyes were round, I could not see properly, I saw everything just the same”. He struggled to run “as I can’t manage to balance myself”. He said -

“I did not know that I stab that boy. I did not know he was there. I did not see him; I was just running wherever I could to escape the ones chasing me. I don’t even know how he looked.

From the photos I can see where the boys in the river say they were but I do not know this. I did not see the boy that was stabbed. My knife would have been in my right hand and I was moving my arms up and down as I was running along the road and down the track. It was rocky and the light was getting dark.

I had no intention and no wish to hurt this boy. If it was me that did cut him it was not meant to happen. I did not know that my knife must have contacted his back. I did not even see or know that he was there. I had no reason to hurt this boy. I did not want to do anything except escape ... All I wanted was to make my way clear and get away. I had no intention to cause any harm or any death to anyone. It accidentally resulted that the boy was injured and died. I do not remember hitting him. All I was thinking and doing was escaping for my safety. I have never hurt or injured anyone ever before. There was no reason or wish for me to hurt this boy who I didn’t even see. I could not know that he might be injured because I did not even know he was there or that anyone would be there.”

(1) The verdict was unsafe and unsatisfactory and against the weight of the evidence.

(2) The trial Judge took into account and gave undue weight to irrelevant matters.

(4) The trial Judge failed to give sufficient weight to the evidence that from an early point the appellant was attempting to escape from the village and the situation.

(5) Having found that the appellant had no intention to cause death or grievous bodily harm, the trial Judge erred in finding that the appellant knew that the act of stabbing would probably cause death or grievous bodily harm.

6) The Judge failed to properly consider whether it was possible that the appellant may not have realized the victim was there.

Ms Brown emphasized there was no evidence that the appellant had any prior knowledge of the boy or any motive to harm him. She described the path down to the river by reference to photographs which showed that it curved just before it reached the river so that visibility of the victim and his friend would have been obstructed, she submitted, until he was very close to them. She submitted that the evidence was consistent with the appellant’s explanation that he was running away in fear from his pursuers with the knife in his hand and did not intentionally stab the boy as he ran past. She submitted that there was no evidence that the appellant should have known that a single stab wound to the upper back would cause grievous bodily harm.

As to the second ground, Counsel was critical of a section of the Judgment headed, “Assessment of the evidence and conclusion”. The Judge posed the question as to whether the appellant intended to stab the victim and then said that for the reasons that followed he answered that question in the affirmative. He then set out 10 reasons. All but the final one comprise a description of the facts commencing with the appellant’s journey to Buma village. Counsel submitted that the first nine reasons do not go to intention. The tenth point deals with the crucial evidence of the witness, Robert, who was standing next to Steven when he was stabbed, which is set out above.

There was some cross-examination which Counsel agreed had been incorrectly recorded. Ms Brown submitted that the error in the record misled the Judge. Counsel submitted that the answers to the correctly worded questions supported the proposition that a reasonable inference from the evidence was that the accused did not know he had stabbed Steven. She submitted that this inference and the inference that the stabbing was intentional were equally available.

As to ground three, the criticism of the judgment is that the Judge did not deal in any depth with the Defense submissions. On the other hand, the Chief Justice stated that he had “considered and weighed carefully the evidence and submissions” of defense counsel and “carefully considered the possibility argued meticulously before me by Ms Brown that the injury was inflicted accidentally, taking into account all the relevant facts and circumstances surrounding the event...” In the discussion that follows as to the other grounds of appeal, we make reference in detail to parts of the Chief Justice’s judgment. It will be evident that his Lordship dealt, one way or another, with every aspect of the defense case. It is unnecessary for a judge to specifically deal with every submission on every matter of fact made by counsel, providing each of the issues is dealt with fairly. In our view this ground should be rejected.

As to ground five, Counsel submitted that there was no evidence of substantial force being used nor was there evidence of the appellant being aware of the extent of the injury. She referred to the medical evidence as to the probable cause of death. She submitted that the Judge had failed to consider the actual knowledge of the appellant or that there are degrees of stab wounds and the fact that death occurs cannot to be used to infer knowledge. This is further discussed below.

In his reply Mr McColm referred to a passage in the prosecutor’s closing address where there is a description of a demonstration by Robert of the manner of the stabbing. It is said there that Robert demonstrated the stabbing as a sort of downward motion. Counsel said that this and the nature of the injury were inconsistent with accidental contact while running. Mr Kausimae addressed the appellant’s second ground. He submitted that the evidence showed that the appellant was in an aggressive mood, which in turn made it less likely that what happened was an accident. Finally, Mr McColm submitted that the Judge’s conclusion that the act was intentional was one that was clearly open to him on the evidence. In the written submissions Counsel for the respondent noted that intention and knowledge need not coincide in order to prove malice aforethought beyond reasonable doubt in murder and that these states of mind must be inferred from the facts. Reference was made to the characteristics of the knife, which it was submitted would cause a very serious injury no matter what part of the body of a person it was used on. Counsel referred to Robert’s evidence to the effect that he saw the appellant when the appellant was some 3 to 4 metres away and to the Judge’s finding that it would not have been difficult for the appellant to have seen or noticed the boys in time as he came around the track towards the river and to have avoided them if he wanted to.

The Chief Justice commenced his judgment by noting that it was not in dispute that the deceased had died as the result of a single stab wound inflicted by the appellant and said that a crucial question was whether the stabbing was intentional or accidental. This required his Lordship to consider the surrounding circumstances and, in particular, those of the stabbing itself. His Lordship briefly summarized the Crown case and then stated that he was satisfied that the appellant did intend to stab the deceased with a knife “for the following reasons”. There followed a number of findings about what the appellant had done in the course of the day, commencing with his arrival at Buma Village and the reasons for his visit, discussing the customary approach to his behaviour, his inappropriate conduct whilst there, the fact that he was armed with, displayed and used his knife, the fact that he was chased out of the village, that this was normal and to be expected, the circumstances and course of the chase, the state of the light and the detailed circumstances of his arrival at the edge of the river where the boys were washing. It was argued in support of Ground 2 that most of these findings were immaterial.

It seems to us that all these circumstances were relevant as part of the narrative of events. Merely relating them does not justify the conclusion that they were given undue weight. They were indicative of the appellant’s frame of mind on the day in question and at the time of the stabbing. They reflected on the credibility of the appellant’s account. It was appropriate for the Chief Justice to mention them as part of the process of reasoning that led to his ultimate conclusion. Of course, not all were culpable in the sense that they went directly to proof of guilt but that is not the only test of relevance. The appellant, in effect, claimed that he was so terrified by being chased by angry and violent villagers that he ran past the deceased and his friend in a blind panic which, combined with the dizziness caused by being hit on the head with a rock, his intoxication and the darkness, prevented him from being aware of their presence or even of having stabbed Steven. The conclusions by his Lordship that the appellant was only being chased by Douglas and Daniel, who were some distance behind, that no sticks and stones were thrown and that the appellant was not hit on the head were directly relevant to evaluating the appellant’s account of events and rightly regarded as significant. The criticism of his Lordship’s judgment in this respect should be rejected.

A vital question was, of course, whether the appellant saw the deceased at all and, if so, what opportunity he had to avoid him. The Chief Justice said -

“Although it was getting dark, there was still sufficient lighting around at that time. The defense says it was quite dark at that time and that Fredson would not have been able to see Steven and Robert until he came upon them. Robert, however, says that he could still see clearly, although he acknowledges it was getting dark at that time. Max also says that he saw Fredson as he ran past him up the river.

I do not accept the submission that it was too dark for Fredson to see clearly and reject the suggestion that he did not see or could not have seen Steven as he ran past. The evidence adduced and which I accept is that there was still sufficient lighting around for them to see someone from a distance of 3-4 metres away. Robert says that he saw Fredson at that distance when he ran towards them.”

Counsel for the appellant relied heavily on the sentence in Douglas’ evidence set out above in paragraph [4] in italics. However, when considered in the context of Douglas’ evidence as a whole, it is clear that he was not saying that it was so dark that he could not see easily. He had seen the appellant running, seen his back as he turned to go out of sight and only seconds later (as it must have been) heard that Steven had been stabbed and, a minute or two afterwards, saw the boys by the river.

It is important to note that all this evidence was given in pidgin. The Chief Justice’s note is in English. Although his Lordship set some questions and answers, much of the evidence noted in narrative form. His Lordship thus had not only the great advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses and assessing the true import of their evidence (in particular, in this case, what the witnesses intended to convey by their use of the pidgin equivalent of “dark”) but we have only an English transcript amounting, in effect, to a conflation of questions and answers.

It is essential to bear in mind the very significant difference between the trial Judge’s perception of the evidence and ours when considering whether his Lordship’s assessment of the purport and weight of that evidence should be held to have been mistaken. In our view, there was an adequate basis for his Lordship’s conclusion about the extent of the light and the appellant’s ability to see the victim. Certainly this Court is not in a position to conclude that his Lordship was wrong.

The Chief Justice also concluded, assisted by the photographs of the scene, that it would not have been difficult for the appellant to have seen the victim in time to have avoided them if he wanted to do so. Again, there was an adequate evidentiary basis for this conclusion and, again, we are unpersuaded that his Lordship erred in reaching it.

The defense argued at the trial and submitted in this Court that, at least, there was a reasonable possibility that the stabbing of the victim was accidental. The conclusion that the appellant could have seen the victim before coming upon him, of course, provides an evidentiary foundation for the conclusion that he did see the victim and could have avoided him if he were so minded. The Chief Justice also relied on the physical layout of the track -

“It would not have been difficult for Fredson to have seen or noticed [the young men] in time as he came around the track towards the river and he could easily have avoided them if he wanted to ... [Referring to the place identified in the photograph as where they were standing] he could have continued running straight into the river without having to turn in towards where they were standing or having to make contact with them as the area he ran towards was wide enough for him to run through unhindered ...”

In dealing with the possibility that the stabbing was accidental, the Chief Justice also referred to the evidence of Robert set out above. However, his Lordship’s note mistakenly omitted the passages in italics. It is submitted by Ms Brown in this Court that this led his Lordship into significant error. The following passages from the Chief Justice’s judgment concerning what the appellant did are important-

“In cross-examination it was put to Robert that Fredson was running and did not stab Steven. This was denied by Robert.

It was also put to him that Fredson did not do anything that would indicate that he stabbed Steven. Again, Robert maintained that Fredson came along and stabbed Steven before continuing on.

I do not accept the submission that it may have been incurred as he was running along for although that was put to Robert he expressly denied any suggestions to that effect. His evidence was very clear and simple. He saw Fredson when he was about 3-4 metres away running towards them and stab Steven before continuing on. He did not say that he saw him run towards them and continued past them before realizing that Steven had been injured. There was no suggestion that the injury may have been incurred accidentally as Fredson was running along and past them. This was put to him in cross-examination but he denied this.

The error in the first sentence is immaterial. It is not disputed that the appellant stabbed the victim. Taking the question as actually asked, Robert denied that the appellant did not know that he had stabbed Steven. Of course, Robert could not give evidence about what was in the appellant’s mind and the question was, therefore, objectionable. However, most lay persons would have understood that the question was really about whether the blow was accidental, and his Lordship - who was in the best position to judge - understood the answer as conveying a denial that it was accidental. In our view, the passage from his Lordship’s reasons set out above expresses his understanding of the effect of the evidence of Robert on this point. The mere fact that the appellant ran on after the stabbing does not mean that the stabbing was accidental. It simply means that he remained intent upon escaping from any pursuers. Nor does it follow that it was accidental if he did not stop when he stabbed him. The answer, “He came along and stabbed him and kept on going” is ambiguous on the face of it but it is susceptible to the meaning - even in English - that the appellant stopped (perhaps momentarily) to stab Steven before continuing on.

The Chief Justice rejected the submission that the stabbing may have occurred accidentally as the appellant was running along, relying on his view of Robert’s evidence which his Lordship summarized as follows -

“[Robert’s] evidence was very clear and simple. He saw Fredson when he was about 3-4 metres away running towards them and stab Steven before continuing on. He did not say that he saw him run towards them and continue past them before realizing that Steven had been injured. There was no suggestion that the injury may have occurred accidentally as Fredson was running along and past them. This was put to him in cross-examination but he denied this.”

This Court is certainly not in a position to conclude that his Lordship’s understanding of what the witness conveyed is mistaken. The words missing from the notes of the evidence do not, in our view, support the submission made for the appellant in this respect, although the omission does introduce a degree of uncertainty.

We would add the additional feature that it seems to us very unlikely indeed that a wound entering the thoracic cavity such as that suffered by the victim could be inflicted without the stabber being aware of doing so, let alone being unaware even of the victim’s presence. The knife must both enter and exit the body.

It follows we are also unpersuaded that Ground 6 is made out. We consider that the Chief Justice very carefully considered the possibility that the appellant did not realize that the deceased was present by the river. This possibility was inextricably bound up with the issue of accident. It is submitted that his Lordship did not properly consider what was revealed in the photographs. We are unpersuaded that his Lordship erred in this way.

So far as the fourth ground of appeal is concerned, the Chief Justice referred to the fact that the appellant was chased out of the village but concluded that only two persons were chasing him at some distance behind. It is submitted that the fact that the appellant was fleeing indicated that he had no aggressive intent. The Chief Justice referred to the appellant’s striking the wall of Ruth’s kitchen and telling Daniel that if anyone attacked him he would kill that person. This evidence is indeed suggestive of an aggressive frame of mind or, as his lordship put it, “evidence of a general intent to do something with his knife if he was attacked.”

The knowledge of the appellant that stabbing might cause death of grievous bodily harm (Ground 5)

Having concluded that the stabbing of the deceased was a deliberate and intentional act of the appellant’s will and mind “at that particular point of time”, namely when “he came upon Steven and Robert”, the Chief Justice went on to consider whether the prosecution had established that he acted with malice aforethought. In this context it is important to note, we think, that an act may be intentional and deliberate though the decision be made on the spur of the moment and, perhaps, instantly regretted. Also, a drunken intention is intention nonetheless.

The Chief Justice was not satisfied that that the appellant intended to cause the death of or grievous bodily harm to Steven. If we may say so, we think this conclusion was entirely justified. It was then necessary to consider whether the prosecution had established beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant knew the act of stabbing would probably cause the death of or grievous bodily harm to Steven. Ms Brown points to the following matters as demonstrating that the prosecution failed in this respect -

(i) no substantial force was needed and the evidence did not establish that the appellant was aware of the extent of the injury;

(ii) the injury was such that no reasonable person would have expected that death might result;

(iii) there was no evidence that the appellant knew of the likely consequences of the injury;

(iv) the Judge failed to consider the actual knowledge of the appellant or that stab wounds vary in severity - that death resulted cannot be used to infer knowledge.

The Chief Justice referred to the dimensions of the blade: 16cm long, 1.7cm wide at its widest, sharpened at both sides with a pointed tip. He described it as “deadly” when used as a weapon. He said that if used on whatever part of the body, it would be bound to cause very serious injury, which would be fatal if vital organs were involved. His Lordship observed that it would not have required much force to inflict a fatal injury. These are commonsense conclusions plainly available to any fact finder.

“Where a deliberate or intentional force is applied, Fredson cannot have failed to realize at that particular point of time that the act of stabbing would probably cause the death of or grievous bodily harm to Steven, for that was what was inflicted and death occurring shortly after.”

This passage is ambiguous. The word “for” in the concluding clause may have been meant in the sense of “because” or it may merely have been an observation that grievous injury was in fact inflicted inducing death, raising the question whether the appellant knew that these events were probable. His Lordship’s reference to the “particular point of time” at which the appellant realized the probability of death or grievous bodily harm, namely when the stabbing occurred and thus before the extent of the injury and its tragic outcome were known by the appellant, persuades us that his Lordship did not reason backwards from the consequences. It is not unreasonable, at all events, to conclude that where an injury is immediately and directly caused by an intentional and deliberate violent act, that injury was intended and it is self evident that a stab to the upper back such as inflicted here was likely to cause at least very serious injury. His Lordship linked the decision of the appellant to stab Steven to his knowledge that such an action would probably cause grievous bodily harm or death. This reasoning is not only correct, it is inevitable. It is true that the Chief Justice expressed his conclusion as to the appellant’s knowledge as being that “he cannot have failed to realize that [the intentional stabbing] would probably cause the death of or grievous bodily harm to” the deceased but in our opinion this merely reflected the inevitability of finding that, in all the circumstances, the appellant possessed the requisite knowledge.

In choosing to quote the language of s202 of the Penal Code, we do not apprehend that the Chief Justice was of the view that it was necessary that the appellant should know that the act would probably cause death as well as grievous bodily harm: knowledge of the probability of grievous bodily harm will suffice. It is, perhaps, worth emphasizing that the requisite knowledge is not that the stabbing would cause grievous bodily harm but that it probably would. It could not rationally have been concluded that, having decided - even on the instant - to stab Steven in his upper body, the appellant may not have known that the injury would probably cause at least grievous bodily harm, even if he did not intend to cause such an injury.

The question for this Court posed by s23(1) of the Court of Appeal Act is whether the verdict “is unreasonable or cannot be supported having regard to the evidence”. In substance, the issue is whether, upon the whole of the evidence, it was open to the trial Judge to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant was guilty. In answering that question it is important not to disregard or discount the consideration that the trial Judge is entrusted with the primary responsibility of determining guilt or otherwise; but if this Court concludes that, even making full allowances for the advantages enjoyed by the trial Judge, there is a significant possibility that an innocent man has been convicted, the Court is bound to act and set aside the verdict. These principles are not controversial, although they have been developed in relation to appeals from jury verdicts: see, as a useful discussion, M v The Queen [1994] HCA 63; (1994) 181 CLR 487 at 492-494; [1994] HCA 63; 76 A Crim R 213 at 216-217. They apply with equal force to trials by Judge alone.

In the end, the important factual issues were relatively simple: was it reasonably possible that the appellant stabbed the deceased by accident and, if the stabbing was intentional, did he know that it would probably cause (at least) grievous bodily harm. In dealing with these issues, the Chief Justice thoroughly considered the degree of the appellant’s intoxication, his claims that sticks and stones were thrown at him as he was being pursued by a group of angry villagers and that he was dizzy as a result of being hit on the head by a stone. His Lordship considered and rejected the appellant’s statement that he did not know what happened as he ran towards the river or that it was too dark for him to see Steven.

It is unnecessary further to analyse the evidence in the trial. It is clear from what has already been said that we are of the view that the appellant has not demonstrated any error in the Chief Justice’s consideration of the evidence or in his Lordship’s conclusions of fact. The verdict was not unreasonable and is supported by the evidence. We are therefore not of the opinion that there is a reasonable possibility that the appellant was innocent of the crime for which he was convicted.

Court of Appeal of Solomon Islands

Kwaiani v Regina [2007] SBCA 17; CA-CRAC 34 of 2006 (7 September 2007)