Pitakaka v Regina [2007] SBCA 16; CA-CRAC 5 and 6 of 2007 (18 October 2007)

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NATURE OF JURISDICTION:	Appeal from Judgment of the High Court of Solomon Islands (Justice Brown)

COURT FILE NUMBER:	Criminal Appeal Case Nos. 5 and 6 of 2007 (On Appeal from High Court Criminal Case Nos. 315 & 329 of 2004)

DATE OF HEARING:	11th October 2007
DATE OF JUDGMENT:	18th October 2007 (Read by the Registrar of High Court)

THE COURT:	Lord Slynn of Hadley McPherson JA Ward JA

PARTIES:	CARRADINE PITAKAKA AND WILLIAM HENCE (Appellants) -V- REGINA (Respondent)

ADVOCATES:
1st Appellant: 2nd Appellant Respondent:	K. Averre S. Lawrence Director of Public Prosecutor with N. Mirou

KEY WORDS:

EX TEMPORE/RESERVED:

ALLOWED/DISMISSED:

PAGES:	1-12

These appellants and three others were jointly charged with the murder of Brother Nathaniel Sado in February 2003. The trial lasted more than six months and included a trial on the voir dire which took three months. The judgment, in which the learned judge convicted all the accused, was delivered almost exactly a year after the trial started.

This Court was advised that the length of trial was largely due to the fact that the court fitted it around other court cases so that it frequently could only be heard on one or two days a week. This is unsatisfactory in any trial especially where the decision will depend on the court’s assessment of the credibility of witnesses and the evaluation of complex and, as was the situation in the present case, frequently conflicting testimony. The risk of injustice is heightened by further delay in delivering the judgment as also occurred here.

The brief facts of the prosecution case may be taken from the introductory summary in the judgment:

"It is alleged that these five, acting in concert, beat Brother Sado to death at a village known as Pite on the Weathercoast of Guadalcanal after he had been imprisoned for some time in a hole made about the roots of an abololo tree. Pite was a Guadalcanal Liberation Front (GLF) controlled village at the time of the insurrection by the GLF. The Crown case was that Ronnie Cawa, the second in command to Harold Keke, the leader of the Front, had the Brother kept against his will as prisoner whilst he was interrogating him. It is alleged that these five accused on a particular morning inflicted such a beating on him that he died.

The Crown case then is that these five acted together by common purpose or agreement to kill or alternatively aided and abetted each other in beating him well knowing he would die.

The motive for murder was that the GLF suspected Brother Sado had traveled to the Weathercoast as a spy seeking information about the activities of the GLF about Pite village, for they were the suspicions which drove the interrogation by Cawa and which after beatings, caused Cawa to imprison the brother. The truth or otherwise of the GLF suspicions which gave rise to the beatings is not on point although the prosecution does say those suspicions were false.

After the killing, Brother Sado’s body was buried at the beach at Pite village and was ultimately exhumed on October 2003. A post mortem examination was carried out in Honiara."

The appellant Pitakaka was the only accused who neither made any statements to the police nor gave evidence or made a statement at the trial.

1. The judge failed to direct himself as to the contradictions and inconsistencies of the witnesses and the effect of previous inconsistent statements;

4. The judge had pre-determined the issue and the appellant was denied a fair trial

The first and second grounds relate to each other and we shall take them together. For reasons which will become apparent, they determine the appeal and we will limit our determination to them. However, a complaint similar to that raised in ground 4 is advanced by Hence and we shall return to that later in this judgment.

As has been stated, the appellant did not give evidence and had not made any statements under caution to the police prior to the trial. All his co-accused had made statements in interviews with the police and three, including Hence, gave evidence in the trial.

All were alleged to have made admissions in their interviews and all to a greater or lesser extent resiled from them in the witness box. In each of those cases, the learned judge did not accept the sworn evidence and was satisfied their earlier statements were the truth.

Whilst at least one co-accused had given evidence of this appellant’s presence at Pite on the day of the murder, the prosecution case that there was evidence of more than mere presence against Pitakaka rested on two prosecution witnesses, Sarevo and Kibo. Its case was that the deceased had been beaten by the accused and then re-imprisoned. The next day, he was again beaten this time fatally. There was no evidence that the beating the previous day had contributed to his death but the prosecution adduced it as evidence of the knowledge and intent of the all accused to harm Brother Sado.

The witness Sarevo could only speak of the beating on the day prior to the death and Kibo was the only prosecution witness of events on the day of the murder. Apart from these two, the only evidence against Pitakaka was that he was present and involved in leading the deceased to the beach where he appears subsequently to have been killed and then assisting in the burial of the body.

It is not challenged that, without the witness Kibo, there was insufficient evidence to convict Pitakaka. The previous statements by the co-accused to the police certainly implicated him and the learned judge correctly warned himself, more than once, that they could not be evidence against Pitakaka.

At the outset, he took care to note that Pitakaka had made no previous statements:

"The Crown case relies on evidence of two Crown witnesses who were alleged to have seen the beatings leading to the death of Brother Sado although neither witnessed Brother Sado die. As well, the Crown relies on confessional material on various records of interview given by the defendants to investigating police (apart from the accused Carradine Pitakaka, who did not make a statement.)"

"[Prosecuting counsel] was correct to point out that the evidence of these two principal Crown witnesses is critical to prove the charge of murder against the accused, Carradine Pitakaka. He had made no statement to the police."

"The prosecutor says that each of the five co-accused (excepting Pitakaka) voluntarily confessed in their respective statements to the Police..."

"Of course, Hence’s statement in his record that Ronny and Pitakaka beat Brother Sado cannot be evidence against either of his co-accused."

The passages set out above acknowledge the fundamental rule that statements made by one accused are not evidence against his co-accused unless the maker of the statements either expressly or by implication adopts them and makes them part of his own evidence; R v Rudd [1948] 32 Cr App R 138.

The principal thrust of Mr Averre’s submission on behalf of the appellant is that the judge, despite warning himself, still allowed the previous statements of the co-accused made in their interviews to confirm the evidence of the two vital witnesses. Clearly they had to be regarded as accomplices and, as such, their evidence required particular scrutiny. The judge acknowledged that.

The need to treat their evidence with particular care was also emphasised by counsel in his submission on the first ground of appeal. Mr. Averre has pointed to numerous instances where the witnesses Sarevo and Kibo gave evidence which is inconsistent or contradicts their own earlier evidence and instances where the one witness contradicts the other. Inconsistent evidence is not uncommon in court and the trial judge, once he has warned himself of the inherent difficulty, can decide which he accepts and which he does not.

Counsel’s complaint in his first ground is that the judge in this case did not deal correctly or, in many cases, at all with this aspect of the case in his judgment. Although he frequently states he accepts various parts of their evidence, he does not explain how he reaches that conclusion in the face of contradictory statements by the same witness.

We do not need to consider the first ground more than to note that the testimony of these two vital witnesses was frequently inconsistent and so any assessment of their credibility undoubtedly called for an explanation of the basis upon which the judge accepted that any particular passage was correct.

The basis of the second ground is that the only way the learned judge was able to reach any conclusion that Kibo and Sarevo were credible was to compare them with the evidence given by the appellant’s co-accused. That is undoubtedly what he did.

"Mr. Lawrence as did other counsel, attacks the evidence of both Seravo and Kibo as unreliable. I do not propose to deal separately with those which address particular parts of the Crown witnesses evidence as affording support for counsel’s submissions but rather deal with the various arguments when I address Pitakaka’s case. For the issue relates to the witnesses’ credit insofar as their evidence is tied to the material elements of the offence and should not be broken down into a numerical exercise, for and against according to inconsistencies or other criticisms."

That was a significant passage. It appears that, at that stage, the judge was heading into the error that determines Pitakaka’s appeal.

When he reached the case against this appellant, the judge dealt with the evidence of Kibo against all the accused in some detail. He accepts the evidence on a number of essential ingredients of the offence in respect of Pitakaka and then explains how he concludes the witness is truthful:

"It remains for me to say that I accept the evidence of Kibo on these important points. His story is collaborated (sic) by those who gave statements earlier, to the investigating police in the material respect of the beating to death (ignoring the fact that co-accused named Pitakaka as a perpetrator)..."

The passage in parentheses further demonstrates that he recognises the need to avoid using the co-accused’s statement to the police against this appellant but the difficulty we see is that his finding that the appellant committed the offence is based on his conclusion that Kibo is truthful – a decision reached on the corroborating strength of the same co-accused’s statements.

"Kibo’s evidence on the material part about the beating of Brother Sado on the day he died is wholly consistent with the very story given by Cawa in his first statement to the police. I accept Kibo for I accept Cawa’s first statement."

"In Kibo’s case, he has narrated in court a story of a beating of Brother Sado on the fatal day very much in accord with that given by those co-accused who spoke to the police."

"Yet their [Seravo's and Kibo’s] evidence as to the events of the day in question and leading up to that day does not materially differ from the stories affecting Brother Sado given by the co-accused who spoke to the police. The actors were the same, the place was consistent with the evidence of these two and the death followed a beating."

It is clear that, if the statements of co-accused made in the absence of the appellant could not be evidence against him, those statements equally cannot be used to strengthen the evidence of other witnesses against him.

In a trial involving a number of accused, the judge must be careful to consider the case against each accused separately. Much of the evidence may be admissible against all or some of the accused but it is essential that the judge does not allow evidence to be considered in the case of an accused against whom it is inadmissible. The judge’s approach in the present case fell into the error.

He was entitled to use consistency of a witness’ account with that of an accused’s earlier statements as a measure of the accuracy or credibility of that witness but only as against the accused with whose statements he made the comparison. Put another way, as the contents of a statement under caution of one accused are not evidence against a co-accused so, equally, the effect of those contents cannot adversely affect the co-accused.

In the present case, the judge could properly base his assessment of the two critical witnesses in the case of each individual accused by a comparison with that same accused’s earlier statements but he may not do the same when considering the evidence of that witness as against another accused.

It may appear a somewhat artificial distinction but its importance may be shown by considering the position had the appellant Pitakaka been tried on his own. The evidence of Kibo and Sarevo would have been vital and the judge would have needed to assess the truthfulness and accuracy of each. There would be no previous statements by co-accused and so the judge would have had to decide the witnesses’ reliability on other grounds. He may have been able to do so but, in the present case, the only basis upon which he measured their reliability as against Pitakaka was by a comparison with the inadmissible contents of the co-accused’s earlier answers to the police.

The appeal against conviction of Pitakaka is allowed and the conviction set aside. He must be tried afresh before another judge.

The appellant Hence was interviewed by the police and was recorded as having made a number of admissions. There was a trial on the voir dire challenging the admissibility of the police interviews by this appellant and one other accused, Geddily Isa. After a lengthy hearing, the judge ruled that the interviews were admissible. At the main trial, the appellant gave evidence on oath the contents of which were contrary to much of his previous answers to the police. The judge believed the earlier statements and rejected his evidence on oath:

"In his earlier interview with the police, Hence does not mention Vatoloki [the village next to Pite] or leaving to go back but recounts a cogent account of his participation in the killing. I do no accept his later account in court that he left before Brother Sado died ...I do not accept his later testimony that he left Pite whilst Brother Sado lost his life ... It stretched credulity for someone interested in the affair to depart from the scene of a beating rather than to gravitate towards it."

The second and third grounds largely mirror the matter we have just considered in the appeal of Pitakaka. Mr Lawrence for Hence reiterated many of the arguments advanced by Mr. Averre. However, we consider there is a critical difference between the two cases.

The basis of our decision in the case of Pitakaka is that he made no statements to the police or in court and so the judge needed to give some other explanation for his acceptance of Kibo and Sarevo as credible and accurate witnesses.

In the case of Hence, he used the earlier statements of Hence in that assessment. As we have already stated in the previous appellant’s case, he should have been careful to use only the statements of each accused to support his finding in the case of that accused and it was unsatisfactory that he spoke of using the statements of the accused without specifying the individual accused.

However, having considered the previous statements of Hence which the judge accepted as true, there was sufficient to justify the judge in finding the consistency of those remarks as supporting the similar account as against Hence given by Kibo and Sarevo. Similarly he disbelieved the evidence of the co-accused given in court in which they supported Hence’s evidence. The judge heard those witnesses and there is sufficient evidence upon which he could reach such a finding. The second and third grounds fail.

The fourth ground of appeal relates to the judge’s ruling in the trial within a trial. The ground particularises a considerable number of issues in which it is suggested the judge erred. We do not set them out but have considered each individually. Where they are not separately mentioned, we do not considered they have sufficient merit individually or cumulatively to allow us to interfere with the verdict. We will deal with the grounds compendiously and, by so doing, intend no disrespect to counsel’s diligence.

The circumstances in which these accused were interviewed by the police were unusual and complex. It is convenient to take the general background from the written submission of counsel for Hence:

"On 18 September 2003 RAMSI Police held a meting at Kolina the purpose of which was to ensure that the members of the GLF were fully apprised of the purpose for which police were there, the rights of the potential suspects and other matters. It was this meeting that the Crown relied upon to a significant degree to negate suggestions that the accused persons had been unaware of the purpose of investigating police and unable to exercise free will in the circumstances of the disarming of the GLF and the presence of army and police on the Weathercoast.

The appellants name was not present on a register of persons who attended the meeting. Mr Hence’s evidence was that he left Dui Dui late with a group of boys who were playing a tape recorder. This evidence was not challenged and so counsel for the appellant suggests that the Crown failed to prove that Mr Stafford’s aim to inform the members of the GLF of the process were successful in respect of this appellant."

In the trial within a trial, the court heard evidence of an earlier interview by police officers in which Hence admitted involvement in a number of serious offences. As has been stated, he then arrived too late at Kolina to hear the explanation given by the police. Subsequently, he was interviewed under caution about the killing of Brother Sado and it is that interview which the learned judge admitted into the trial.

Counsel points out that the judge did not deal with the failure of the appellant to make the meeting. He also suggests the judge failed to give proper consideration to the fact he was a member of the GLF and to the effect on him that his leaders in that organisation were co-operating with police and encouraging the members to participate in the peace process.

It is not necessary for the judge to refer specifically to every part of counsel’s submission when ruling on an issue in the case. In the present case, it is clear that the judge was aware of those aspects of the case and we accept they would have featured in his consideration of the matter as a whole.

Similar considerations apply to the next group of challenges which deal with the manner in which the judge dealt with the detention of the appellant, his right to silence and his request to have a lawyer present. They are all matters properly relevant to the issue of voluntariness. The judge had those issues before him and counsel’s objection is that he did not deal with them adequately or, in some cases, specifically at all. Counsel’s submissions on those points were before the judge and there was material upon which he could reach the conclusions he did.

Further objection is raised to the judge’s refusal to allow cross-examination of the police aimed at demonstrating that there had been a pattern of police conduct in relation to the manner of dealing with requests by surrendered GLF members for legal advice. That was a decision the judge was entitled to make on the evidence before him. Whilst he must ensure the defendants are not prevented from presenting their defence adequately, he must decide whether or not a particular line of inquiry is relevant or admissible. We acknowledge that evidence of conduct by other police officers in their dealings with other accused not connected with this case could be unlikely to assist the case he was trying and we do not interfere on this ground.

The judge concluded his ruling in the trial within a trial with the following comments:

"What is plain, however, from listening to William Hence and from hearing Geddily Isa’s taped interviews [he did not give evidence in the trial within a trial] is that hegemony held sway and that if I may seek to enunciate a truncated synthesis of arguments of both Mr. Lawrence and Ms Faasau [counsel for Isa], reification is now used to reason that Geddily Isa should not be held to his statements. I use reification in the sense explained by Fay B 1987; 92 Critical Social Science Liberation and its Limits – Polity Press, Cambridge, for reification (laws of social life assigned a power of their own) whilst a key idea in Kay’s critical knowledge philosophy, must also be viewed with that other idea discussed in the same context, false consciousness or the systematic ignorance that members of a society have about themselves and their society (Fay 1987 at 270). Mr. Lawrence’s argument pays credence to these ideas for whilst William Hence impliedly claims not to recognize a differentiation between stories and cognitive connection with criminal investigation per se, it is plain that he too is reliant on subjectivity to show his personal experiences and truths did not equip him to effectively take account of the RAMSI purpose of "storying".

It is that manifest failing in "intersubjectivity" or how he had understood RAMSI’s intrusion and presence in his social world on the Weathercoast that gives rise his argument on unfairness.

It should be accepted that RAMSI’s presence on the Weathercoast in the circumstances was beyond these two "lived experiences". Nevertheless, when I heard the Crown evidence especially that of Officer Stafford ... and Officer Folau, RAMSI’s purpose was broken to these people gently, there was no apparent wish to be confrontational rather as can be gleaned negotiation and explanations coupled with time to assimilate change was used. In the case of William Hence, his intelligent response in the witness box gave me reason to find that an appreciation of a cognitive thread, through story telling, in the presence of police officers leading to identification of criminal acts perhaps, was not beyond him. His right to silence given in warning must put him on notice of this intended cognitive thread, for that is a purpose of the warning. Retrospective analysis of the reasons argued by Mr Lawrence for Mr Hence to speak to the investigating officer does tend to a view that the events were determined, the outcome predicable and the scope of choice limited. This is a determinist argument which sees everything retrospectively and leaves no real room for freedom of choice in the defendant. I do not accept the argument.

As I’ve said I’m not satisfied either ego-centric view of story telling in such degree should dictate that I reject the records on the grounds of unfairness. The records of interview maybe tendered on the trial"

That passage has given rise to the final group of grounds on the basis that the judge had no right to rely on such psychological and sociological concepts but, having decided to do so, he should have advised counsel of his intention so they could address him on the matter. Counsel further urges that the basis upon which the judge rejected the appellant’s version of events as ego-centric was unreasonable and, finally, that he failed to apply the correct test to the issue of voluntariness and admissibility.

We share counsel’s concern over use of such material to evaluate the methods employed by the police and RAMSI and, more significantly, as a basis for assessing the likelihood that the methods would induce the accused to make incriminating disclosures. Similarly there is force in counsel’s assertion that, if a judge intends to base his conclusion significantly on a novel concept or rule which has not been raised in argument, he should always advise counsel of his intention and allow them an opportunity to address the court on it.

It assumes a greater significance in the present case when weighed against the terms in which the judge described his approach to the standard of proof and to the exercise of his discretion. He concluded:

"Mr William Hence acknowledged the caution administered in pijin required under the Judges’ Rules. I am satisfied on that material found in those questions and answers that I’ve earlier referred to, the interview was voluntarily given.

Mr William Hence gave evidence before me on the voir dire and I was left to no doubt he was no fool. He appreciated the import of questions. Later ... questioning about Brother Sado commenced. A warning preceded these questions. Again I’m satisfied the answers were volunteered."

The statement that he was satisfied requires some explanation of the basis upon which such satisfaction was achieved. It is revealed in the passage in which the judge considered a submission by counsel in respect of the manner in which RAMSI conducted the interviews. He continues:

" [Counsel’s] choice of phraseology relates more to overseas than the Weathercoast of Guadalcanal where clearly there is little cultural knowledge of the criminal justice process, but my duty in terms of that process in the Solomon Islands is to be satisfied on the balance of probabilities that William Hence’s statements were voluntarily given. I am so satisfied." (our emphasis)

The use of that test was confirmed when he dealt with the exercise of his discretion to exclude the interviews if he considered it unfair to admit them.

"...the suppositions and propositions put by Mr Lawrence on Mr William Hence’s part, had this or that happened, do not address the actuality of Mr William Hence’s recorded response throughout, as events happened and having heard him both on the tape and in court, I am satisfied on balance that his clearly expressed understanding of his rights at the start of the interview reflected a real appreciation of warning and that his idea or concept of the purpose of the recording included sufficient resourcefulness to ‘play a straight bat’ to some questions and ‘glance others away’." (our emphasis)

In the absence of any other stated test, we can only assume that the same standard of satisfaction on balance is applied when the judge later explains:

"When I look dispassionately at all of these circumstances I’m not satisfied there’s been demonstrated unfairness to this defendant were the records of interview to be admitted into evidence on his trial"

A further passage also appears to suggest a ‘graded’ approach to the issue of unfairness and, as such, indicates a possible dilution of the standard of proof:

"In all the circumstances I cannot say I see such unfairness as to cause me pause when I look to Mr William Hence’s free will exercise (in the selective manner in which he answered questions) ..."

It has long been established that the burden of proving that answers given in the interviews were voluntary lies on the prosecution. The burden does not shift to the accused. As with all matters that must be proved by the prosecution in a criminal trial, they must be proved beyond reasonable doubt and the judge must ask himself whether the prosecution has proved that they were voluntary to that standard; Ibrahim v R [1914] AC 599; R v Sartori [1961] Crim LR 397. It is true that the exercise of the judge’s discretion to exclude a statement on the ground that its admission would be unfair is a matter of degree but the first and principal decision is whether the prosecution has proved it was voluntary; R v Prager [1972] 56 Cr App R 151.

Nowhere in his ruling does the judge refer to proof beyond reasonable doubt and the references instead to proof on the balance of probabilities leaves us with the clear view that the judge used the wrong test in concluding that the interviews should be admitted.

That is sufficient to require us to quash the conviction and direct that the case against Hence be tried afresh before another judge.

Before leaving the case, we should deal briefly with the ground raised by both counsel that the judge was biased or prejudged the issue.

It arose in a number of ways. Both counsel refer to an exchange in court when the judge was hearing evidence of identification of the appellant Pitakaka. When counsel challenged him on his comments he referred to the possibility that it would be taken on appeal. In a similar exchange, which arose out of a query as to the translation of an interview, the judge again made comments which clearly showed that he anticipated the possibility the case would go on appeal. We do not set the exchanges out but they were addressed to defence counsel and appear to have stemmed from the judge’s frustration with the manner in which the trial was progressing.

Counsel for the appellants suggest it goes further. The remarks about an appeal indicated the judge was considering the likelihood that the accused would be convicted. As the exchanges occurred during the prosecution case and before any of the accused had been put to their defence, any decision on guilt was seriously premature.

Other examples were cited by counsel in which the judge demonstrated impatience with counsel. Eventually in one such exchange, the judge commented "This is a joke." When counsel challenged him that he had made the remark, he denied he had done so. That lead to an application to the judge to discharge himself. In a short ruling, he refused the application and suggested that his comment about a joke had been directed at one of the accused because of the manner in which he had been "leering down" at the witness under cross examination.

In the case of Talasasa v Paia and anor; [1980-1] SILR 93, Daly CJ adopted the test suggested by Lord Denning in Metropolitan Properties v Lennon; [1968] EWCA Civ 5; [1968] 3 All ER 304, that the court must look at the impression which would be given to other people. If right-minded persons would think that, in the circumstances there was a real likelihood of bias the judge should not sit. It is also important to remember that, in Solomon Islands, the judge is the judge of fact as well as law. Any bias is more serious than in jurisdictions where there is a jury to determine matters of fact.

The test in Australia has long been a reasonable apprehension or suspicion of bias; Webb v The Queen [1994] CLR 181, but the New Zealand Court of Appeal suggested that there was effectively no difference between asking whether a reasonable and informed person would consider there was a real likelihood of bias and asking whether the same person would reasonably apprehend or suspect bias: Auckland Casino Limited v Casino Control Authority [1995] 1 NZLR 142.

A similar approach has now been adopted in England where it was suggested that the tests in the Commonwealth and England were effectively the same. The court set out the test:

"The court must first ascertain all the circumstances which have a bearing on the suggestion that the judge was biased. It must then ask whether those circumstances would lead a fair minded and informed observer to conclude that there was a real possibility, or a real danger, the two being the same, that the court was biased."; In Re Medicaments and Related Classes of Goods (No2) [2000] EWCA Civ 350; [2001] 1 WLR 700.

We have considered all the examples that counsel have placed before us. We do not set them out but they show frequent, unnecessary interruption of defence counsel and clear displays of irritation by the judge at counsel’s manner of examination of the witnesses. Such conduct by the trial judge is unfortunate and likely to hinder the trial process.

In his ruling the judge described his comment that it was a joke as an aside to his associate made in the heat of the moment. Counsel firmly resist the suggestion that those were the circumstances in which it was made and we regret the difference between the judge’s denial at the time and his subsequent explanation in the ruling. The judge described it as "A transitory emotion but an emotion nonetheless".

A judge is human but he should not allow himself the liberty of emotional outbursts. Any right thinking member of the public will consider such conduct unbecoming of a judge and likely to impede fair trial. We agree but we do not consider it would drive him to consider that there was real possibility that the judge was actually biased.

As we have stated, the conduct of the judge was unfortunate. It fails to maintain the standard of objectivity that should be the hallmark of a court trial. We note also that the judge added at the end of his judgment a short quotation from a poem by Shenstone. It was an unnecessary and undesirable thing to do. It is hard to comprehend why he considered it appropriate. Its inclusion adds to the suggestion of lack of objectivity.

However. in the whole of the circumstances, we do not find there was evidence sufficient to allow this ground and it fails.

The convictions for murder are quashed and the case returned to the High Court for trial by a different judge.

Court of Appeal of Solomon Islands

Pitakaka v Regina [2007] SBCA 16; CA-CRAC 5 and 6 of 2007 (18 October 2007)