Director of Public Prosecutions v Jackson [1991] SBCA 3; CA-CRAC 005 of 1991 (1 January 1991)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF SOLOMON ISLANDS

BETWEEN:

THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS
Appellant

And:

JOHN JACKSON
Respondent

Connolly P
Savage JA
Goldsbrough JA

Delivered the day of 1991.

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

The respondent John Jackson, was tried before the High Court at Gizo on the 16 and 17 April 1991 on one count of murder on the 18 April the Chief Justice delivered a considered judgment and acquitted the respondent. The Director of Public Prosecutions has appealed against the judgment pursuant to the provisions of s.20A (1) (a) of the Court of Appeal Act 1978. That section provides that the Director of Public Prosecutions may appeal against an acquittal on any ground of appeal which involves a question of law only.

The charge and subsequent trial arose out of the death of George Talasasa during the night of the 19 and 20 May 1990 at the house of the Manager of the Gizo Hotel. The case, as the Chief Justice said in his judgment, was a tragic one where a public figure, well known in the town, died following a party. The deceased was the last guest to leave the party and when he left he was carrying one of the hotel beer coolers. He was asked by the accused, a barman from the hotel who was also attending the party, to leave it in the house. A short time later the deceased was seen lying in an empty swimming pool that was a short distance from the side door of the house.

Despite the fact that three or four people knew he was lying in the pool nobody, went to check that he was alright until the morning at which time he was dead and had been for some hours.

The medical evidence showed two physical injuries; a large swollen bruise on the right forehead and a closed fracture to the left kneecap. Neither of these injuries caused the deceased's death. That in the opinion of the doctor, who conducted the post mortem examination, was attributable to inhalation of the deceased's vomit which caused asphyxiation and the learned Chief Justice accepted that opinion as correct.

The Crown's case was that the accused had an argument with the deceased, struck him and pushed him into the pool. The Chief Justice was satisfied that the injury to the deceased's head was not caused by a blow from the accused but by the fall into the pool and that it had contributed to the vomiting and asphyxiation. The crucial question therefore was how the deceased came to fall into the pool.

The Crown called three witnesses as to the events of the night. All three were self-confessed liars in that each had given an account to the Police shortly after the events which were very different to the evidence each gave. The reasons for their acknowledged lies differed. The learned Chief Justice in his judgment canvassed the evidence of each carefully and the reasons each gave for his or her earlier lies. He rejected entirely the evidence of one witness and partly accepted and partly rejected the evidence of the two others, noting as he did so the need to treat the evidence of such witnesses with great caution. In the end he held that he was satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the following facts:-

"The deceased George Talasasa was drinking heavily during the party and consumed considerable quantities of beer and stronger liquor. By the end of the party he was very drunk and unable to walk properly. When he returned to the door opposite the pool there was an altercation with the accused over a beer cooler as a result of which the accused grabbed him by the shirt and slapped him on the face. I am uncertain whether there was also a punch but I am satisfied all the blows were to the face and not the forehead and none was of sufficient force to cause any injury. They certainly did not cause the haematoma on the forehead."

The Chief Justice went on to say that he was not satisfied the accused pushed the deceased as described by a particular witness named Kilo and further that there was no credible evidence to link the fall into the pool with the accused man in any way.

The Director of Public Prosecutions in his submissions advanced five grounds of appeal. The first and the third were directed to the assessment the Chief Justice made of the particular witnesses and the reasons, or as the Director put it, the lack of reasons for believing this part or that of a witness' evidence. We have considered the points made carefully but we are satisfied that the matters raised are all issues of fact and do not raise any question of law. It was an express part of the function of the Chief Justice to determine the facts and that is what he did. It is a necessary part of determining those facts to make an assessment of the truthfulness and reliability of the individual witnesses. No question of law was involved in that process.

The second ground urged was that the Chief Justice made an error of law in relation to the way he treated what the witnesses had said in their earlier statements to the Police. It was argued that he had treated them as if evidence given at the trial. We do not think he did and there is no substance to this point.

The fourth ground was abandoned during the course of the argument. The fifth ground was based on an allegation of bias on the part of the Chief Justice and related to a letter written by him in October 1989 which concerned a Mr J. Talasasa, a relation of the deceased and which the learned Director of Public Prosecutions contended was critical of Mr J. Talasasa. Having read the letter, which was written seven months before the deceased George Talasasa's unhappy death and which in our view is not particularly critical of Mr J. Talasasa or other members of his family, we do not consider that any rational person could suppose that it would raise a likelihood of bias towards or against either the deceased or the accused on the part of the Chief Justice in trying an entirely unrelated and different person on a charge or murdering a member of the Talasasa family. There were other matters raised in relation to this ground which made it quite clear that it had no substance at all; indeed one aspect of it in relation to counsel's conduct of the case before us was such that it would have been far better if it had never been raised.

The appeal is accordingly dismissed.

BY THE COURT
(P. D. CONNOLLY P.)