In the
Supreme Court of the Republic of Palau
Appellate Division
EDARUCHEI CLAN OF NGERKEYUKL, rep. by JOSEPH KOSHIBA,
Appellant,
v.
EDARUCHEI CLAN OF NGERDELOLK, rep. by IDESIAR LESTER NGIRAMEKED,
Appellee.	
ESTATE OF ITARU KISHIGAWA and CARP CORPORATION, rep. by MARI KISHIGAWA,
Appellants,
v.
EDARUCHEI CLAN OF NGERKEYUKL, rep. by JOSEPH KOSHIBA, and EDARUCHEI CLAN OF NGERDELOLK, rep. by IDESIAR LESTER NGIRAMEKED,
Appellees.	

Cite as: 2024 Palau 12
Civil Appeals Nos. 22-018 & 23-016
Appeals from Civil Action No. 20-071

Decided:	November 1, 2024

Counsel for Appellant Ngerkeyukl	        Allison Nixon
Counsel for Appellant Estate of Itaru Kishigawa	        Rachel Dimitruk
Counsel for Appellee Ngerdelolk  	        Kassi Berg, Tamara Hutzler

BEFORE:	FRED M. ISAACS, Associate Justice, presiding
KATHERINE A. MARAMAN, Associate Justice
KEVIN BENNARDO, Associate Justice
Appeals from the Trial Division, the Honorable Gregory Dolin and the Honorable Arthur R. Barcinas, Associate Justices, presiding.
	AMENDED OPINION
PER CURIAM:
[¶ 1]	The underlying case involves a dispute between two clans that bear the same name but hail from different hamlets in Peleliu State: Appellant Edaruchei Clan of Ngerkeyukl (“Ngerkeyukl”) and Appellee Edaruchei Clan of Ngerdelolk (“Ngerdelolk”). Both Clans claim to be the rightful owners of Ngercheu Island. The Trust Territory High Court determined in Rusasech v. Trust Territory, 1 TTR 472 (Palau 1958) (“Civil Action No. 98”) that Ngercheu belonged to “Clan Edaruchei.” The question presented in this case is whether Ngerkeyukl or Ngerdelolk is the “Clan Edaruchei” that won ownership of Ngercheu nearly sixty-six years ago.
[¶ 2]	For the reasons set forth below, we VACATE and REMAND.
	Background
[¶ 3]	Ngercheu is an island within the state of Peleliu. In 1927, the Government of Japan declared Ngercheu to be government property and ordered residents to either pay rent or move out. Rusasech v. Trust Territory, 1 TTR 472, 475 (Palau 1958) (“Civil Action No. 98”). Residents of Ngercheu paid rent from about 1932 to about 1943, until the Japanese military ordered them to vacate the island so that it could be used for military purposes during World War II. Id. 
[¶ 4]	After the end of hostilities, residents returned to Ngercheu. The United States, then administering Palau as a United Nations Trust Territory, established a system to reclaim land taken by the Japanese Government. On May 25, 1954, Rubasch Fritz (“Rubasch”) filed Claim No. 25 for the return of Ngercheu on behalf of “Clan Edaruchei.” As an attachment to Claim No. 25, Fritz provided a signed “Statement” dated July 25, 1954, typed in English, in which he said, “I am the chief of the clan Edaruchei and have been since 1937 . . . Ngercheu Island belonged to the clan as far back as the rubaks can remember.”
[¶ 5]	On July 23, 1954, the District Land Office held a hearing on Claim No. 25 and initially awarded ownership of Ngercheu to the Trust Territory Government. Rubasch and Ngireblekuu, representing “Clan Edaruchei,” appealed this determination in Civil Action No. 98. The High Court reversed the Determination of Ownership made by the District Land Office and ordered that title to Ngercheu be “confirmed in appellants on behalf of the clan Edaruchei.” This Judgment was acknowledged by a handwritten notation on the “Determination of Ownership and Release No. 25” wherein it states, “Release to the claimant by court judgment civil action #98.” 
[¶ 6]	Because there are two Edaruchei Clans in Peleliu State, Appellant Edaruchei Clan of Ngerkeyukl Hamlet and Appellee Edaruchei Clan of Ngerdelolk Hamlet, the crux of this dispute revolves around to which of these two “Edaruchei Clan[s]” Civil Action No. 98 refers. On October 19, 1990, the male title-bearer of Ngerkeyukl, Uchelmekediu Ichiro Loitang, filed a claim to Ngercheu Island on behalf of Rorow Lineage of Ngerkeyukl. The male title-bearer of Ngerdelolk, Idesiar Santos Olikong, also filed a claim to Ngercheu Island on behalf of Ngerdelolk. The Land Claims Hearing Office (LCHO) transferred the aforementioned claims to the Trial Division and the case became Civil Action No. 543-90. The Trial Division determined that it had no jurisdiction to determine “which of the two so-named Edaruchei Clans, from Ngerkeyukl or Ngerdelolk, is actually the Edaruchei Clan” and referred the case to the LCHO to make that determination. No further action was taken by the LCHO and this question was effectively left undecided.
[¶ 7]	Finally, on February 15, 2018, Joseph Koshiba executed a Lease Agreement of Ngercheu to a foreign national, purportedly on behalf of “Edaruchei Clan.” He filed, on June 5, 2020, an action to quiet title to Ngercheu against Ngerdelolk and Itaru Kishigawa. In this complaint, Ngerkeyukl sought declaratory relief that Ngerkeyukl owned Ngercheu in fee simple and that the Lease Agreement was valid and enforceable. Itaru Kishigawa, who claimed the Ngerkeyukl male title of Uchelmekediu, joined the litigation to support Ngerkeyukl’s claim of ownership to the island, but challenge Koshiba’s authority to enter into the lease without the approval of the strong senior members of Ngerkeyukl and Koshiba’s authority to represent Ngerkeyukl in the lawsuit. Ngerdelolk filed a counterclaim on August 7, 2020, seeking a declaration that Ngerdelolk owned Ngercheu. 
[¶ 8]	On March 20, 2021, Itaru passed away. Itaru’s counsel filed a motion to continue trial and extend discovery deadlines, in order to appoint a new Uchelmekediu. The trial court denied this motion on May 12, 2021 and decided to bifurcate the trial, first to hear the dispute between Ngerkeyukl and Ngerdelolk, while holding in abeyance Itaru’s claims pending the resolution of the issue of ownership. The Estate of Itaru Kishigawa and Carp Island Corporation were substituted for Itaru. On May 15, 2021, the Estate of Itaru Kishigawa filed a Motion for Reconsideration. A hearing was held, and the trial court maintained the decision to bifurcate while also agreeing to extend the discovery deadlines. 
[¶ 9]	Trial was held from November 29 to December 7, 2021. Both Clans presented extensive evidence during the trial. Ngerdelolk argued that Rubasch filed Claim No. 25 on behalf of Ngerdelolk because he was a member of the Clan, and later bore the chief title of the Clan. In support of its claim, Ngerdelolk presented several witnesses who testified that in April 1979, Rubasch held his blengur and acquired the title of Idesiar of Ngerdelolk. 
[¶ 10]	Rubasch’s granddaughter, Associate Justice Lourdes F. Materne, presented a document she found in Rubasch’s safe at his home. This document (hereinafter referred to as “Exhibit F”), titled “Owner of a Certain Right” and dated January 31, 1977, states first and foremost that “Ngercheu Islands are owned by Edaruchei Clan of Ngerdelolk Village.” It then recognizes that a previous Uchelmekediu of Ngerkeyukl Clan, Ilemelong, cultivated the Western portion of Ngercheu, and purports to grant a use right to Ilemelong’s oldest son, Francisco Morei, in exchange for his contributions to the Clan. The signature block contains an X-shaped mark purportedly from the male title-bearer of Ngerkeyukl, Uchelmekediu Ngireblekuu, the signatures of two witnesses, including his daughter Christina Ngireblekuu, as well as an empty space for Rubasch as “Acting Idesear.” Christina testified at trial that she recognized her signature but did not remember signing Exhibit F, and that her father was illiterate. Rubasch did not sign the document.
[¶ 11]	On the other hand, Ngerkeyukl maintained that Rubasch was claiming Ngercheu on their behalf despite not being a member of the Clan because he was a highly respected member of the community who had served as a district court judge and spoke English. In support of its claim, Ngerkeyukl highlighted that it had historically occupied Ngercheu. Witnesses testified that the female title bearer for both Edaruchei Clans, Samoang, lived on the island, as well as Uchelmekediu Ngireblekuu and their relatives, in the Quonset huts provided by the Trust Territory Government. Several of these witnesses used to live on Ngercheu themselves. Two witnesses testified about gravesites in Ngercheu and identified them as the graves of their ancestors from Yap. Susumu Mori, eighty years old, testified that he was Samoang’s great-grandson and used to live on Ngercheu with her until World War II. Consistent with other testimony, he explained that during World War II, Samoang and her family left Ngercheu and returned after the end of hostilities. He further stated that at one point, Samoang told him to seek out and convince Rubasch Fritz to make a claim for Ngercheu on behalf of Ngerkeyukl. 
[¶ 12]	On December 27, 2021, the trial court entered a Memorandum Opinion and Judgment awarding ownership of Ngercheu to Edaruchei Clan of Ngerdelolk. Memorandum Opinion, Edaruchei Clan of Ngerkeyukl v. Edaruchei Clan of Ngerdelolk et al., Civ. Action No. 20-071 (Tr. Div. 27 Dec. 2021) [hereinafter Trial Court Decision]. After trial, several post-trial motions were filed. On January 6, 2022, the Estate of Itaru Kishigawa filed a motion under Rule 7(b)(5) and Rule 59(e) of the Palau Rules of Civil Procedure, requesting that the trial court reconsider its ruling and amend its judgment. Both Ngerdelolk and Ngerkeyukl opposed the Estate’s post-trial motion, with Ngerkeyukl filing a partial joinder, arguing the Estate’s objections were too late and that neither the Estate nor Carp Corporation had any authority to speak or act on behalf of Ngerkeyukl.
[¶ 13]	On August 25, 2022, the trial court issued an order denying all post-trial motions, stating that its reasoning for the ruling would be forthcoming. On September 23, 2022, Ngerkeyukl filed a timely Notice of Appeal against Ngerdelolk. The trial court subsequently issued an order explaining its reasoning on February 23, 2023. The Estate appealed from this order on March 24, 2023. 
	Standard of Review
[¶ 14]	We review a trial court’s findings of fact for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo. Kiuluul v. Elilai Clan, 2017 Palau 14 ¶ 4. Under this standard, if the lower court’s factual findings are supported by evidence such that a reasonable trier of fact could have reached the same conclusion, they will not be set aside unless this Court is left with a definite and firm conviction that an error has been made. Kerradel v. Besebes, 8 ROP Intrm. 104, 105 (2000). The lower court will be reversed only if its findings so lack evidentiary support in the record that no reasonable trier of fact could have reached the same conclusion. Ngerusebek Lineage v. Irikl Clan, 8 ROP Intrm. 183, 183 (2000). When a lower court chooses between two permissible views of evidence, we will not disturb its factual findings. Uchelkeukl Clan v. Rudimch, 17 ROP 162, 164 (2010). 
[¶ 15]	Where the relevant facts of a case are undisputed and the statutory standard is relatively clear, the issue is a mixed question of law and fact. Ngiralmau v. ROP, 16 ROP 167, 169 (2009) (citing 75A Am. Jur. 2d Trial § 604 (2007) (“In a mixed question of law and fact, (1) the historical facts are admitted or established; (2) the rule of law is undisputed; and (3) the issue is whether the facts satisfy the relevant statutory or constitutional standard . . . .”)). We review mixed questions of law and fact de novo. In re Kemaitelong, 7 ROP Intrm. 94, 95 (1998); Remoket v. Omrekongel Clan, 5 ROP Intrm. 225, 228 (1996).
	Discussion
I.	CA/APP 22-018
[¶ 16]	This case, at its core, concerns a pre-Constitution claim for the return of public lands: Claim No. 25, filed on May 25, 1954. Ultimately, the decision reached by the High Court stems from pre-Constitution legal precedents regarding claims for the return of public lands. See Kerkur Clan v. Koror State Pub. Lands Auth., 2017 Palau 36 ¶ 18 n.4; Olsuchel Lineage v. Ueki, 2019 Palau 3 ¶ 5. Specifically, the High Court relied on Policy Letter P‑1, issued on December 29, 1947 by Deputy High Commissioner C. H. Wright. This letter declared, among other things, that: 
Land transfers from non-Japanese private owners to the Japanese Government, corporations, or nationals, will be subject to review. Such transfers will be considered valid unless the former owner (or heir) establishes that the sale was not made of free will and the [sic] just compensation was not received. In such cases, title will be returned to [the] former owner upon his paying into the Trust Territory Government the amount received by him.
Trust Terr. of the Pac. Islands, Office of the Deputy High Comm’r, Trust Territory Policy Letter, P-1 ¶ 13 (1947) [hereinafter Policy Letter]; see also Antonio L. Cortés, Land in Trust: The Invasion of Palau’s Land-Tenure Customs by American Law, 14:3 Asian-Pac. L. & Pol’y J., 167-240 (2013).
[¶ 17]	The High Court made the following relevant factual findings related to Ngercheu:
The land in question is the whole of Ngercheu Island . . . It was owned by the Clan Edaruchei since long prior to the Japanese Administration. Appellants as leaders of the clan make claim on its behalf.
In 1927[,] the Japanese Administration advised the clan that the island had been taken over by the government and that they would have to pay rent or get out. This action was taken without payment of compensation. Suit was filed by the clan to obtain restoration of the land, but pending court action, the clan started to pay rent. These rental payments continued from 1932 to 1943 at which time Japanese soldiers evacuated all of the island inhabitants. Despite efforts on the part of the clan to obtain redress in the courts, they were never able to [have] the case heard and obtain a final decision. When the American forces took the Palau Islands, the Administration permitted the clan to return to Ngercheu Island and they have been there ever since.
[The Trust Territory] concede[s] the land was taken without the owners’ consent and without payment of compensation, also that [a] final decision was never obtained in the Japanese courts in the action brought by the clan.
Civil Action No. 98 at 2.
[¶ 18]	The trial court thoroughly explained how it characterized the issue before it. The court stated that because Ngerkeyukl had admitted that Rubasch was not a member of its Clan, it would be sufficient, in order for Ngerdelolk to prevail, to establish that Rubasch was a member of Ngerdelolk. On the other hand, Ngerkeyukl needed to show “through expert testimony or otherwise, that Palauan customary or statutory law permits individuals to assert interests of clans in which they do not claim membership.” Trial Court Decision at ¶ 18. The trial court summarized its reasoning as follows:
[I]n the Court’s view, the right to claim a Clan property stems from a person’s membership to [sic] that claimant Clan, or alternatively from the person’s position as appointed representative of a Clan. Thus, in order to prevail, [Ngerkeyukl] (and [Ngerdelolk] when it comes to its counter-claims) must show that Rubasch Fritz was either a member of its clan or that he was appointed by that Clan to represent its interests.

Trial Court Decision at ¶ 23.
[¶ 19]	It is understandably difficult to reconstitute the events that led to the High Court’s decision over sixty years ago. However, a close reading of Civil Action No. 98 and the applicable pre-Constitution legal precedent make clear that the High Court intended to return Ngercheu to its previous owners. It is with that thought uppermost in mind that we take issue with the trial court’s approach: the trial court clearly erred by focusing its analysis on Rubasch’s clan membership, and did so with an impermissible view of the evidence under custom. 
[¶ 20]	We specifically take issue with the trial court’s statement that “the right to claim a Clan property stems from a person’s membership to that claimant Clan, or alternatively from the person’s position as appointed representative of a Clan.” Through this statement, the trial court misconstrued our established principles of custom. 
[¶ 21]	It is well-established customary law that a clan’s chief can administer the clan’s lands. Andres v. Aimeliik State Pub. Lands Auth., 2020 Palau 18 ¶ 20. Accordingly, titleholders often represent the clan in its legal claims for land. See, e.g., Demei v. Sugiyama, 2021 Palau 2 ¶ 11; Estate of Remed v. Ucheliou Clan, 17 ROP 255, 259 (2010). However, “a clan can, by consensus among the senior strong members, choose to forgo traditional arrangements and select who will serve as a trustee of its land . . . . ” Demei, 2021 Palau at ¶ 11; see also Elbelau v. Beouch, 3 ROP Intrm. 328, 331 (1993); Blesam v. Tamakong, 1 ROP Intrm. 578, 582 (1989); Ngirudelsang v. Etibek, 6 T.T.R. 235, 238-39 (Tr. Div. 1973) (finding that who should be named trustee of clan property is for the clan to decide.); Metecharang v. Sisang, 4 T.T.R. 469, 472-73 (Tr. Div. 1969) (“Whether the plaintiff becomes the administrator as she seeks to be in this action or whether the senior strong members select someone else is a lineage and clan problem to be settled by them.”). We have even noted that, because of the informality of the Land Court’s procedures, it is very common for one individual to represent another person or clan. See, e.g., Andres, 2020 Palau at ¶ 11; Rengulbai v. Children of Elibosang Eungel, 2019 Palau 40 ¶ 21.
[¶ 22]	The trial court proceeded on the assumption that clan membership is sufficient to be able to represent a clan’s legal claims. It did not make findings under the framework of Beouch v. Sasao, 20 ROP 41 (2013), to support this assumption, and our precedent so far has not elucidated the question. In the absence of a proven custom one way or another, the trial court erred in putting the sole burden on Ngerkeyukl to prove that the Clan had agreed to appoint Rubasch, without putting a similar burden on Ngerdelolk. Although Rubasch was admittedly not a member of Ngerkeyukl, he was also not Idesiar at the time he filed the claim on behalf of “Edaruchei Clan.” Thus, the trial court should have determined if sole membership in a clan is sufficient to represent clan’s claims. Then, it should have determined if Rubasch had been appointed trustee for Ngerkeyukl, for Ngerdelolk, or for both.
[¶ 23]	The record shows that the parties introduced some evidence that some individuals supported Rubasch’s claim for Ngercheu. Claim No. 25 listed five persons as witnesses: Ngireblekuu, Arbedul, O‑chob, Brenges, and Uchel Torwal. Ngireblekuu held the highest male title of Ngerkeyukl, Uchelmekediu. O-chob was Samoang’s title in Ingaol Clan of Koror, which she held at the same time as Ngerkeyukl and Ngerdelolk’s highest female titles. Arbedul was Samoang’s son. Brenges was the mother of Francisco Morei whose father, Ilemelong, held the title Uchelmekediu before Ngireblekuu. The statement in support listed seven persons as witnesses, all identified as “chief of the family”: Ngireblekuu, Arbedul, Francisco Morei, Ngiradelemel, Aibetang, Bululong, and Uchelkemur. Reviewing this evidence should help the trial court determine if the senior strong members of “Edaruchei Clan” agreed to have a trustee represent their claim, and which “Edaruchei Clan” they were a part of.  
[¶ 24]	When reviewing this evidence, the trial court should keep in mind that statements or findings made in prior adjudications between related parties may be relevant when determining the current litigants’ relative standing in the clan and/or their authority to act on behalf of the clan. See Aitaro v. Mengerkur, 14 ROP 71, 72 n.1 (2007). In fact, such evidence may be even more persuasive than the later testimony of their younger relatives based on ancient events. Id. For instance, in Aitaro, the Trial Division determined that “the very fact of plaintiffs’ and defendants’ relatives having joined together in the earlier litigation is better evidence of their mutual standing in the Clan, and of their mutual authority, than testimony to the contrary by their younger relatives based on ancient events.”. 
[¶ 25]	As the trial court itself noted, “given that all three clans [Ngerdelolk, Ngergeyukl, and Ingaol Clan of Koror] have had, at one point or another, overlapping titleholders, the existence of some relationship cannot be denied. Given such a relationship, it would not be implausible for the clans to assist each other with litigation or other dealings with governmental agencies.” Trial Court Decision at ¶ 70. Rubasch was not Idesiar for Ngerdelolk at the time he filed the Claim. However, the identity of the Ngerkeyukl titleholder was known: Uchelmekediu Ngireblekuu. Ngireblekuu appeared in Claim No. 25 as a witness, signed the statement in support of Claim No. 25, joined Civil Action No. 98 as a party and represented Edaruchei Clan alongside Rubasch in the proceedings. In addition, Ngireblekuu filed a complaint against Rubasch on August 16, 1976, which explicitly stated that Edaruchei Clan of Ngerkeyukl owned the entire island of Ngercheu. Ngireblekuu and Rubasch finally filed a joint motion to dismiss the action, stating that “the ownership or useright [sic] of the island of Ngercheu, by consensus, is not in issue” and agreeing to share the compensation equally between the two of them. Exhibit F, dated January 31, 1977, states that “Ngercheu Islands are owned by Edaruchei Clan of Ngerdelolk Village.”
[¶ 26]	Therefore, the trial court improperly approached the evidence under our custom and must reweigh the evidence while keeping in mind customary principles governing the administration of clan land. First, the trial court should determine if under custom, a clan member can represent a clan’s claim for land. Second, the trial court should determine which “Edaruchei Clan” was Rubasch empowered to represent as trustee. To do so, the trial court should review the evidence received as to the identity of the signatories to Claim No. 25 and the accompanying statement. Third, the trial court should determine if, although Ngerdelolk and Ngerkeyukl are separate clans, they agreed to claim Ngercheu island together. The trial court is not limited by these questions on remand and may choose to receive additional evidence as necessary.
[¶ 27]	Therefore, we VACATE the Trial Division’s Judgment and Memorandum Opinion. We REMAND Civil Action CA/APP 22-018 to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.
II.	CA/APP 23-016
[¶ 28]	Having addressed the first of these consolidated appeals, we now turn to the remaining case, an appeal filed by the Estate of Itaru Kishigawa and Carp Corporation on March 24, 2023. The Estate maintains that the trial court erred in bifurcating the trial to first hear the dispute between Ngerkeyukl and Ngerdelolk, and holding in abeyance the Estate’s claims. The trial court stated that the “dispute between the two Edaruchei Clans can be resolved irrespective of who bears the title of Uchelmekediu and that “separate trials will be conducive to expedition and economy.” See Order on Mot. to Cont. Trial, Edaruchei Clan of Ngerkeyukl v. Edaruchei Clan of Ngerdelolk et al., Civ. Action No. 20-071, at 3 (Tr. Div. May 12, 2021). 
[¶ 29]	The timeliness of this appeal is at issue because of the unique circumstances of this case: On August 25, 2022, the trial court issued an order denying all post-trial motions, stating that its reasoning would be forthcoming. See Order, Edaruchei Clan of Ngerkeyukl v. Edaruchei Clan of Nderdelolk, et al., Civ. Action No. 20-071 (Aug. 25, 2022) [hereinafter First Order]. On September 23, 2022, Ngerkeyukl filed its Notice of Appeal against Ngerdelolk, in what became CA/APP 22-018. The trial court issued an order explaining its reasoning six months after its ruling and five months after Ngerkeyukl filed its Notice of Appeal. See Order, Edaruchei Clan of Ngerkeyukl v. Edaruchei Clan of Nderdelolk, et al., Civ. Action No. 20-071 (Feb. 23, 2023) [hereinafter Second Order]. The Estate then appealed from this second Order, in what became CA/APP 23-016. 
[¶ 30]	Rule 4 of our Rules of Appellate Procedure sets forth the time for filing a notice of appeal and states in part that “[t]he notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days after . . . entry of judgment or order appealed from . . . unless otherwise provided by law.” ROP R. App. P. 4(a). We have held that untimely appeals must fail because of the clear, inflexible time limits contained in our rules. Henry v. Shizushi, 21 ROP 52, 55 (2014). 
[¶ 31]	 Under Appellate Rule 4(a)(d), if a party files a motion for relief under Rule of Civil Procedure 59, “the time to file an appeal runs for all parties from the entry of the order disposing of the last such remaining motion[.]” “The rationale behind the tolling principle of the Rule is the same as traditional practice: A timely petition for rehearing tolls the running of the [appeal] period because it operates to suspend the finality of the . . . court’s judgment, pending the court’s further determination whether the judgment should be modified so as to alter its adjudication of the rights of the parties.” Browder v. Director, Dept. of Corrections of Ill., 434 US 257, 267 (1978). 
[¶ 32]	The language of Rule 4(a)(d) is clear and inflexible. Even assuming that the suspension of Rule 4’s time requirements is permissible, it is inappropriate in this case. The time for appeal is tolled until an order disposing of the last motion under Rule 59 is issued. The First Order expressly stated that it denied the Estate’s motions—as such it was a final judgment, and the Estate had to appeal within 30 days of the First Order. Because the Notice of Appeal was filed by the Estate seven months after the order, it was untimely under our Appellate Rules. Cf. Griggs v. Provident Consumer Disc. Co., 459 U.S. 56, 61 (1982) (finding that an untimely filed notice of appeal is a nullity). Therefore, the appeal is DISMISSED without prejudice.

	Conclusion
[¶ 33]	We VACATE the Trial Division’s judgment in favor of Edaruchei Clan of Ngerkeyukl and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. We DISMISS without prejudice the Estate’s appeal.