Ngiraingas v Shmull [2019] PWSC 23 (16 July 2019)

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE REPUBLIC OF PALAU
APPELLATE DIVISION

JACKSON NGIRAINGAS, Appellant, v. TEMMY SHMULL, Appellee.

Cite as: 2019 Palau 23
Civil Appeal No. 19-002
Appeal from Civil Action No. 15-077

Decided: July 16, 2019

Counsel for Appellant Salvador Remoket

Counsel for Appellee Siegfried B. Nakamura

BEFORE: JOHN K. RECHUCHER, Associate Justice
KATHERINE A. MARAMAN, Associate Justice
KEVIN BENNARDO, Associate Justice

Appeal from the Trial Division, the Honorable Kathleen M. Salii, Associate Justice, presiding.

OPINION

BENNARDO, Justice:

[ 1] appeal traces its originrigins to a 2015 lawsuit by Temmy Shmull alleging defamation on the part of Jackson Ngiraingas. In 2017, the Trial Division found in Shmull’s favor and ordered Nggas to pay $10,000.00 in puin punitive damages and $9,639.00 in attorney’s fees. This Court affirmed the Trial Division’s finding of liability in Ngiraingas v. Shmull, 2018 Palau 19.
[ 2] Shmull filed a motion foon for an order in aid of judgment in the Trial Division pursuant to 14 PNC §§ 2001, 2101 et seq

JURISDICTION

[ 3] Neither raised an issueissue with our exercise of jurisdiction over this appeal. Nevertheless, we must be the most zealous watchdog over the limits of our own jurisdicand therefore must consider it in connection with every appy appeal.
[ 4] In Baulesuartel, /i>, 19 ROP 44 (App. Div. 2012), we found that we lacked jurisdiction to review the appealed Order in Aid of Judgment issued pursuant to 14 PNC ټ2105. We did so for two reasons: (1) the order was not anot a final judgment, nor were any of the exceptions to the final judgment rule applicable; and (2) the order was a ministerial, or “housekeeping,” order that lacked independent substance. Id. at 46.^[1]
[ 5] The current apis distingstinguishable on both fronts. First, it is a final judgment. A final judgment requires no further judicial action to determine the parties’ righi>Feichtinger v. Udui, 16 ROP 173, 175 (App. Div. 2009)2009). In Baules, the appealed Order in Aid of Judgment expressly left issues open and reserved ruling on at least one issue until a later time. Thus, it was not “final.” Baules, 19 ROP at 46.
[ 6] Here, the Trial Division’s Orders in Aid of Judgment set a definite schedule of payments in a specified amount. While it is true that the Trial Division may revisit the Orders in the event of changed circumstanceshe future, no further judicjudicial action is required. Thus, it is an appealable final order.
[ 7] Second, the appealders aers are not ministerial. In Baules, the judgment following trial enjoined the defendant from using certain land witpermission. Id. at 45. The defendant did not appeal the judgment. When the defendantndant continued to use the land without permission, the plaintiff sought an Order in Aid of Judgment to enforce the original injunction. Id. Thus, in Baules, the appealed Order in Aid of Judgment created no rights or responsibilities between the parties that hadn’t already been created by the original judgment. Accordingly, we held that the Baules Order in Aid of Judgment was ministerial and therefore unappealable. Id. at 46. If the Baules defendant wanted to challenge the Trial Division’s injunction, he should’ve done it after the initial judgment rather than wait for the injunction to be reiterated in an order in aid of judgment.
[ 8] Hthe Trial Division̵’s Orders in Aid of Judgment do more than simply reiterate the previous judgment. The Orders set a minimum monthly payment ($200) and a schedule of payments (the tenth of each month, beginning on 10 January 2019). While the original judgment required Ngiraingas to pay Shmull $19,636, it did not specify how or when such payments would be made. Thus, the Orders in Aid of Judgment created rights and responsibilities between the parties that were not contained in the original judgment. As such, the Orders in Aid of Judgment are not merely ministerial.
[ 9] As an appeom a non-minisministerial final order, it is therefore proper for us to exercise jurisdiction over this appeal. Having determinet we possess jurisdiction over this appeal, we turn to its merits.

ANALYSIS

[ 10] Although not clearly styled as such, we perceive two separate arguments in Ngiraingas’ appeal. First, Ngiraingas claims that the Orders improperly garnish his Social Security benefits in violation of the statutory provision that prohibits the “execution, attachment, or garnishment” of Social Security benefits. 41 PNC § 784.^[2]
[ 1 the hearing, Ngiraingas tgas testified that his sole source of income was approximately $6 per month in Social Security benefits. Orders at 1. Thus, according to Ngiraingas, the Trie Trial Division’s directive that he pay $200 per month toward the satisfaction of the judgment is an impermissible garnishment of his Social Security benefits. Appellant’s Br. 2 (“The Trial Division committed a reversible error when it ordered a garnishment of Appellant’s Social Security Benefits to pay its judgment.”).
[ 12] In its Orders, the Trial Division expressly acknowledged that it could not garnish Ngiraingas’ Social Security benefits. Orders at 2 (“While Defendant is correct that his sosecurity benefits cannot be garnished or attached, based oned on the testimony presented, the evidence is that he can make minimum, monthly payments on the judgment.”). The Trial Division clearly recognized that garnishment of Social Security benefits was beyond its authority.
[ 13] We approach this iss esas essentially a matter of statutory interpretation. The Trial Division did not find that the monthly $200 payment constituted a “garnishment” within the meaning of 41 PNC چ784. We review this legallegal conclusion de novo. Mengeolt v. ROP, 2017 Palau 17 4.
[ 14]e welhaven’t previpreviously had the occasion to interpret the word “garnishment” in the context of section 78 see ason to diverge from the ordinary meaning of the term. Under its ordinary meaninganing, &#8, “‘Garnishment’ is a proceeding in which the property, money, or credits of a debtor that are in the possession of another, i.e., the garnishee, are applied to the payment of a debt that arises from a final judgment against the debtor.” 6 Am. Jur. 2d Attachment & Garnishment § 2. &#8n other words, garnisarnishment proceedings enable a judgment creditor to enforce its judgment against the judgment debtor even though the judgment debtor is not in possession of the property.” Id.; see also Restatement (Second) of Judgments §§ 6 cmt. a, 8 (ining attachmeachment jurisdiction, also known as garnishment jurisdiction); ROP R. Civ. P. 64 (listing garnishment as an example of a remedy “providing for seizure of person or property1;); First Commercial Baal Bank v. Wong, 20 ROP 132, 139 (App. Div. 2013) (discussing ROP Rule Civ. P. 64).
[ 1e very crux of a garnishmeishment is that the money or property is diverted from a third party to a judgment creditor before it it into the hands of the judgment debtor. A garnishment necessarily involves a transfer dier directly from a third party to the judgment creditor. Thus, ordering the Social Security Administration to pay Ngiraingas’ benefit directly to Shmull to satisfy the judgment would be an example of a garnishment. But that is not what happened here. Here, the Trial Division ordered Ngiraingas to make monthly payments to Shmull to satisfy the outstanding judgment. That is simply not a garnishment. Accordingly, Ngiraingas’ argument that the Orders impose an impermissible garnishment of his Social Security benefits must fail.
[ 16] Second, Ngiraingas argues that the Trial Division improperly set the level of his monthly payment at a minimum of $200. Pursuant to statute, the Trial Division is to determine, based on the judgment debtor’s ability to pay, the fastest manner in which the debtor can reasonably pay a judgment. 14 PNC § 2105. Although not clearly indicated in Ngiraingas’ brief, he appears to seek a de novo standard of review on this issue.^[3] However, etting of a payment schedule under 14 PNC § 2105 2105 is gely reviewed ewed under the much more stringent abuse of discretion standard. See, e.g., W. Caroline Trading Co. v. Bekebekmad, 9 ROP 53, 54 (App. Div. 2002) (noting that “tctual findings concerning ting the debtor’s income and expenses and the weighing of those findings, necessary to making the statutory determination [under section 2105], calls for the exercise of discretion”).
[ 17] Regardless of whatdard dard of review we apply to Ngiraingas’ argument, the outcome is the same. The nub of the argument is that the Trial Don improperly considered the income of Ngiraingas’ spouse and his child in setting hing his minimum monthly payment at $200. Ngiraingas argues that, by considering his family members’ income, the Trial Division enforced the judgment against them instead of enforcing it only against him. Appellant’s Br. 2–3.
[ 18] Ngias’ argument ment mischaracterizes the Trial Division’s Orders. While the Trial Division did consider the incomes of Ngiraingas’ family member did so as part of an assessment of whether Ngiraingas̵’ income was necessary to support them. Orders at 2 (“His wife earns space rental income, one child in college in Cuba receives financial aid and another child has recently graduated from college and is home working, thus reducing any financial assistance [Ngiraingas] has been previously providing to them.”). This type of consideration is entirely appropriate; indeed, the statute expressly provides that the Trial Division should “allow the debtor to retain such property and such portion of his income as may be necessary to provide the reasonable living requirements of the debtor and his dependents.” 14 PNC § 2105. In order to make thie determination, the Trial Division necessarily must consider the judgment debtor’s family members’ external sources of income.

CONCLUSION

[ 19] Findingrror, we AFFI>AFFIRM the Trial Division’s Orders in Aid of Judgment.

SO ORDERED, this 16th day of July, 2019.

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[1] We are aware that that headnote two of Baules states that “An Order in Aid of Judgment does not qualify for an exemption under the final judgment rule and is simply not appealable.” Baules, 19 ROP at 44 (emphasis added). The unfortunate use of the indefinite article in this headnote wrongly conveys the message that orders in aid of judgment are never appealable. This headnote simply does not reflect the actual analysis contained in the Baules opinion. In Baules, we held that the particular Order in Aid of Judgment at issue in that case was not appealable; we did not hold that orders in aid of judgment are never appealable. We note that the headnotes that precede our opinions do not carry the force of law. Headnotes are merely navigational tools that are added after the issuance of an opinion.

^[2] Although Appellant’s brief cites to 41 PNC § 804, it is clearly mea be a be a challenge under section 784.

^[3] While Appellant’s brief has aion labeled “Standard of Review,” it simply states that legal conclusions and mand mixed findings of law and fact are reviewed de novo. Appellant’s Br. 1. Appellant’s brief makes no effort to identify which aspects of the appealed Orders are legal conclusions, which are mixed findings of law and fact, and which are something else entirely.