Mengeolt v Republic of Palau [2017] PWSC 8; Criminal Appeal 15-002 (30 March 2017)

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE REPUBLIC OF PALAU
APPELLATE DIVISION

SERIO MENGEOLT, Appellant, v. REPUBLIC OF PALAU, Appellee.	CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 15-002 (Criminal Case No. 14-198) OPINION
	/td>

Decided: March 30, 2017

Counsel for Appellant
on the brie brief: S. Remoket
on oral argument: D. Mizinov

Counsel for Appellee: G. Jibbensmith

BEFORE: JOHN K. RECHUCHER Associate Justice
R. BARRIE MICHELSEN, Associate Justice
KATHERINE A. MARAMAN, Associate Justice^[1]

Appeal from the Trial Division, the Honorable Arthur Ngiraklsong, Chief Justice, presiding.

MICHELSEN, Justice:
Appellant Serio Mengeolt pleaded guilty below to one count of murder in the second degree following the trial court’s denial of his motion to dismiss the charges against him. As allowed by the plea agreement, he now appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to dismiss. For the reasons below, the trial court’s decision is AFFIRMED.

BACKGROUND

The institution of the case below marked the conclusion of a six-year investigation into the death of Teruko Kingya. During this time, the Republic interrogated Mengeolt on three separate occasions.^[2] At the conclusion of each interrogation, Mengeolt was released without charge. On December 5, 2014—31 days after the last of the 3 interrogations—the Republic instituted the present case by filing an Information charging Mengeolt and two others with various crimes relating to the death.
Mengeolt filed a motion under 18 PNC § 404(a)(1) to disthe chargesarges contained in the Information, arguing that the Information was untimely filed in violation of 18 PNC7;&#13(b).ifically, Meng Mengeolt argued that the Republic’s initial interrogatiogations oons of him started § 403(b)&#8210-day limit for for filing charges, which the Republic failed to comply with. The trial coal court concluded that § 403(b)7;s 3 filing deadlinedline is not triggered by arrests unaccompanied by criminal charges. Bes. Because Mengeolt was released without e after each interrogation, the trial court concluded that § 403(b) is inapplicablicable and denied the motion. Mengeolt appeals this conclusion, arguing that the trial court misconstrued § 403(b).

The Trial Division’s decs decision rested on its interpretation of 18 PNC § 403. A court&#82constructiruction of a statute is subject to de n de novo review. Roll ’Em Prods., Inc. v. Diaz Broad. Co., 2196, 914).

DISCUSSION

Articleticle IV, IV, Section 7 of the Palau Constitution provides that an accused has a right “to a speedy, public and impartial trial.” Additionally Rule 48(b), ROP R. Crim. Pro., provides: “If there is unnecessary delay in filing an information or complaint against a defendant who has been held to answer to the court, or if there is unnecessary delay in bringing a defendant to trial, the court may dismiss the information or complaint.” In addition to the more general constitutional right, and the Court’s authority pursuant to Rule 48(b), the legislature has added additional strictures now codified at 18 PNC § 403(b).section establishes shes a time requirement for institution of charges in certain cases. 18 PNC § 403(b) (“Any inform oion or complaint chargingndividual with the commission of an offense shall be filed iled within thirty days from the date on which the individual was arrestederved with a summons in connection with such charges.”#8221;); 18 PNC § 404(a)(1) (&#8f no complainplaint or information against an individual is filed until after the time limit required by section 403(b) ... any such charge against that individontained in such untimely complaint shall be dismissed or o or otherwise dropped.”). Mengeolt argues that the 30-day time limit to file an information or complaint began to run when he was first detained and interrogated by the police in 2009.^[3] The Republic counters that investigative interrogations unaccompanied by criminal charges do not trigger § 403(b)&#8 filing deadline.

A. Section 403(b), closely modeled after a United States statute, presumptively carries with it the construction given by United States courts.

Section 403(b) was enacted in 2002 as part of RPPL 6-24, commonly referred to as the “Speedy Trial Act.”^[4] Several trial courts have noted that “the Palauan Speedy Trial Act was a near-wholesale adoption of the U.S. act” by the same name. ROP v. Kodep, 22 ROP 249, 255 (Tr. Div. 2015); see also, e.g., ROP v. Mobel, 13 ROP 283, 285 (Ct. Com. Pl. 2006); ROP v. Iyar, Crim. No. 04-411, slip op.3 (Tr. Div. Div. Nov. 28, 2005); accord Senate Judiciary and Governmental Affairs Standing Committee Report No. 6-102 (exing that “[t20;[t]he of the Bill was adapted from the U.S. federal speedy trial rial act” with “minor stylistic amendments”). “In ing the Act, the O.E.K. made one simple change to the statustatutory provisions in the U.S. Speedy Trial Act. In light of the fact that Palauan law does not provide for grand jury indictments, the O.E.K. replaced the word ‘indictment’ with ‘complaint.’” Mobel, 13 ROP at 285.^[5]
By the time of this “near-wholesale adoption,” § 403(b)’s analog the Uthe United States had already been construed by numerous federal Circuit Courts. Their constructions of the provision are of central relevance to our inquiry, under “the general ruat adoption of the wording ding of a statute from another legislative jurisdiction, carries with it the previous judicial interpretations of the wording.” Carolene Products Co. v. U.S., [1944] USSC 118; 323 U.S. 18, 26 (1944). In adopting the United States statute with only “minor stylistic amendments,” the Olbiil Era Kelulau must have anticipated that the Act’s provisions would be construed consistent with then-existing United States case law. 2B Singer, Statutory Construction § 52:2 at 7th ed. 2012) (R(“When a state legislature adopts a statute which is identical or similar to one in another state our cy, courts of the adopting state usually adopt the original jurisdiction’s constructiouction.”). Accordingly, we presume that the legislature adopted § 403(b) as previously cond bued by United States courts unless context clearly indicates otherwise.

B. Under applicable United States case law, section 403(b)’s 30-day time limit does not commwhen an individual is releareleased without charge following arrest.

By 2002, Circuit Courts in the United States had uniformly construed the provision at issue to exclude arrests unaccompanied by criminal charges. See, e.g., U.S. v. Bloom, [1989] USCA2 26; 865 F.2d 485, 489-90 (2nd Cir. 1989); U.S. v. Summers, [1990] USCA4 64; 894 F.2d 90, 90 (4th Cir. 1990); U.S. v. Amuny, [1985] USCA5 926; 767 F.2d 1113, 1120 (5th Cir. 1985); U.S. v. Blackmon, [1989] USCA6 922; 874 F.2d 378, 381 (6th Cir. 1989); U.S. v. Janik, [1983] USCA7 1043; 723 F.2d 537, 543 (7th Cir. 1983); U.S. v. Jones, [1982] USCA8 298; 676 F.2d 327, 329-31 (8th Cir. 1982); U.S. v. Candelaria, [1983] USCA9 673; 704 F. 2d 1129, 1131 (9th Cir. 1983); U.S. v. Sayers, [1983] USCA11 214; 698 F.2d 1128, 1131 (11th Cir. 1983); U.S. v. Mills, [1992] USCADC 334; 964 F.2d 1186, 1188-89 (D.C. Cir. 1989). As summarized by one district court:

Law enforcement officers frequently make arrests upon the basis of their non-judicial opinion that a defendant has committed a crime. The Speedy Trial Act, however, makes it clear that an arrest which is based upon the mere opinion of an enforcement officer is not sufficient to bring the Speedy Trial Act’s arrest–indictment interval into play. It is only when a charge is leveled against a defendant based upon a finding of probable cause by a judicial officer that the time limitation of [§ 403(b)] is rele

U>U.S. v. Padro, 508 F. Supp. 184, 185 (D. Del. 1981).
Mengeolt has failed to identify a single instance of a United States appellate courtting his proposed construction of § 403(b). UniteUnited Staase case law is uniformly adverse to his argument. In order to prevail Mengeolt must explain why the usual rule of statutory interpretation does not apply—that § 403(b) carries it tnstructiruction uniforniformly given by United States courts. As explained below, his attempts to meet this burden are unavailin>

C. The provisions of the Speedy Trial Act are not controlled by statutory tory definitions outside the Act.

Mengeolt first argues that the Republic’s custodial^[6] interrogation of him falls within the definition of “arrest” contained in § 101. 18 PNC § 101(a) (󈯈ArrestRt’ means placing any person under any form of legal detention by legal authority.”). Thus, argueseolt,far as United States case law construing § 403(b) rests on terpretrpretrpretationation of the word “arrest” that differs from § 101(a)&#82definition, the dthe definition in § 101(a) controls. Ac/i> Kodep,OP at 258 (stating that Deft Defendant’s proposed construction of § 403(b) “flows naturally from the broad Palauan dtion of arrest ... a definition the United States Act does does not contain”) (emphasis in original).
Any defin of “arrest” contained within the Speedy TrialTrial Act purporting to apply to § 403(b) would be conclusive of the inquiry as to the meaning of the term “arrest” as used in § 403(b).ver, we are not conv convinhat the external definition found at 18 PNC § 101(a) provides thning of & of &#82 “arrest” as that term is used#167; 403(b). The definition of § 101(a) pre) predates the Constitution and was grandfathered into the Palau National from the Trust Territory Cory Code as a holdover law. Palau Const. art. XV67; 3(a); 12 TTC &#1C § 1(1#8220;‘st’ me7; means placing anyg any person under any form of legal detention by legal authority.”). Thus, while the definition of 0;arr8221;ained ined in § 101(a) cont to appo apply tply toly to those sections of Title 18 that remain from the Trust Territory Code, we conclude that laws enacted at a later time and placed in Title 18 simply “for the purpose of convenient reference and orderly arrangement,” 1 PNC § 205, are not bound to initiinition that was codified at an earlier time and for different provisions.

D. RPPL 7-51, which amended the sanctions provision in § 404(a)(1), left the operatrovisions of § 4060;403(b) unalt

Since its original adoption in 2002, Palau’s Sperial Act has been amended once, in 2008, by RPPL 7-51, which amended the Act’s provisrovision for sanctions as follows (struck through text stricken, bolded text added):

§ 404. Sanctions

(a)(1)&#16) If, in the of any iany individual against whom a complaint is filed charging such individual with an offense, no complaint oormatb>against an individual is filed with>within until after the tihe time limit required by section 403(b) as extended by section 403(h) has passed, any such charge against that individual contained in such untimely complaint shall be dismissed or otherwise dropped....
All trial decisions of which we are aware construing the act prior to this amendment adopted United States courts’ construction of § 403(b) and concluhat not alot all forms of detention trigger its 30-day filing deadline. ROP v. Iyar, Crim. No. 04-411 (Tr. Div. Nov. 28, ;005); ROP v. MatsutaroROP v. Mov. Mobel, 13 ROP 283 (Ct. Com. Pl. 2006).
However, several trial dens since 2008 have concluded that RPPL 7-51 abrogated thosethose decisions and provided for a 30-day filing deadline following all forms of detention, even those unaccompanied by criminal charges. E.g. Kodep, 22 ROP at 257; ROP v. Wang, Crim. No. 15-079 (Tr. Div. Jul. 30, 2015); ROP v. Sasao, Crim. No. 15-153 (Ct. Com. Pl. Mar. 11, 2016); ROP v. Jia, Crim. No. 15-091 (Tr. Div. Apr. 8, 2016). These trial courts focused on the fact that § 404(a)(1)&#s dismissal sanc sanctould formerly only be invoked by individuals “againstainst whom a complaint is filed,” while the amended provision contains no limitation. The presence of the limitation under the formeformer statute was one of the factors that trial courts had looked to in construing § 403(b). Ban RPPL 7-51’#8217;s removal of the limiting language from § 404(a)(1)’s remedy piovision, several trial courts have concluded that “the Act no longer requires concurrent charging to start the [30-day fi clock....” Kodep, 22 ROP at 260.
We are unpersuaded that RPPL 7-51 alteredtered the substantive scope of § 403(b) as previously interpreted by earlier opinions of the Trial Division. Importantly, RPPL 7-51 does not purport to amend § 403(b), which contains the operative provisions dictating the triggering mechanism for the 30-day filing period. Section 403(b) sets out when the Speedy Trial clock starts, and sets a deadline of 30 days from then for the Republic to file charges. Section 404(a)(1) provides for enforcement of § 403(b), but se independent dent requirements of its own. There is a presumption that “amendatory acts do not change existing law further than is expressly declared or necessarily implied.” 1A Si Statutory Construction &#1n § 22:30 at 363-64. Even as amended by RPPL 7-51, § 404(a)ontains no independenendent filing deadline, relying solely on the deadline prescribed by § 403(b). Palauan courts had already interpreted §;403( require an ̶“arrest[] ... in connection with ...h ... char#8221; and the legislatislature saw fit to leave that sectialtered. See 1A Singer, Statutory Construction §§ 22: 400-02. We see no reasoreason to project onto the legislat8217;s amendment to §&167; 404(aa silent, implied amen amendment to § 403(b).
Nor does tgislatislative record st an intent to overrule thle the construction of § 403(b) adopted inyar, , Matsutaro, and Mobel. Indeed, tntext in which the legislation was passed suggests that no t no change in the law was intended. See 1A Singer, Statutory Conston § 22:30 at 361t 361 (&#8lthoulthough, generally, a statutory amendment is presumed to have been intended to change the law, legislative history may indicate that the amendment was intended instead as a clarification.”). Rather than responding to perceived errors in previous trial court decisions, RPPL 7-51 was passed at the request of the Palau National Code Commission. See RPPL 7-51 § 1220;The purpose of the ...e ... Bill [was] to make minor corrections to the Palau National Code that ha[d] been deemed necessary by the Palau National Code Commission.” Sen. Stand. Comm. on Judiciary and Gov’tal Aff. Rep. No. 7-269. Specificalle amendmeendment to § 404(awas drafted in responssponse to comments by the Chief Justice. Id. at 2 (“Chief Justice’s comments: ‘as written the subsection requires the filing of two complaints#8221;); accord M Mobel, 13 ROP at 286 (“It would seem improbable that the O.E.K. intended on requiring the Attorney General to file two separate criminal complaints in one case.”). Because the provision as originally drafted “may be understood to require two complaints,” House Stand. Comm. on Judicary and Gov’tal Aff. Rep. No. 7-192 at 1, the amendment was intended to “remove[] any ambiguity or any suggestion that two complaints are required,” Sen. Rep. No. 7-269, supra, at 2.
Nowhere in the legislative history of RPPL 7-51 is there any mention of: (1) §&#160b), (2) dis0;disapproval of cour217#8217; previous interpretations of the Act, or (3) an intent ange the sco the the Instead, the amen amending Act is described as effecting only “minor corrections.R.” We therefore conclude that the Act didintend to overturn Palauan courts’ prior constructionction of § 403(b), which were coent wint with United States case law, as applying only to arrests accompanied by criminal charges.

CONCLUSION

[1] Oral Argument was held on August 4, 2016. Members of this panel who were not present have listened to the recording of the hearing.

^[2] The interrogations occurred on October 9, 2009; July 1, 2013; and November 4, 2014.

^[3] Mengeolt alternatively argues that one of the interrogations in 2013 or 2014 started the 30-day time limit. Because any differences between the interrogations appear to be inconsequential for purposes of § 403(b), we focus here onfire first interrogation, which took place in 2009.

^[4] The name “Speedy Trial Act” is merely colloquial. The actual title is &#822N ACT To amend Title 1160;18 of alau National Coal Code to provide for the speedy resolution of criminal charges pending against a person.”

^[5] Several additional provisions for tolling the speedy trial clock under § 403(h), whi not affect the the present case, were also included. House of Delegates Judiciary and Governmental Affairs Standing Committee Report No. 6-102.

^[6] The trial court did not make any findings regarding whether the Republic’s interrogations were custodial, finding the distinction to be irrelevant urposes of § 403(;403(b). Be it does nots not affect the outcome of this appeal, we will accept Mengeolt’s representations that they were.