N11150

PAPUA NEW GUINEA 
[NATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE]

OS (JR) NO. 109 OF 2023

BETWEEN:
RAMU NICO MANAGEMNT (MCC) LIMITED
Plaintiff

AND:
ALA ANE
Registrar of Titles
First Defendant

AND: 
BENJAMIN SAMSON
Secretary for the Department of Lands and Physical Planning
Second Defendant

AND: 
THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF PAPUA NEW GUINEA  
Third Defendant

AND: 
BILLY PUIO 
Fourth Defendant

AND: 
DALSTON LEA 
Fifth Defendant

Waigani: Purdon-Sully J
2025:	5, 7 & 11 February

JUDICIAL REVIEW – Application for leave for judicial review - Objections as to Competency based on locus standi and correct mode of proceedings –– National Court Rules, Order 16 r 1, 3, 4, 13(13)(2)(b)(a)  – Plaintiff seeks relief in form of prerogative writs – Order 16 correct mode of proceedings -  no resolution of Plaintiff Board authorising the commencement of proceedings in evidence– competency ground of lack of standing upheld - judicial review exercise in discretion - delay and prejudice to Fifth Defendant sounds against permitting the Plaintiff to remedy the defect –- judicial review proceedings dismissed 

Cases cited:
Application by Edward Mike Jondi as General Secretary of the PNG Party [2016] SC1561 
Firth v Staines [1890] 2 QB 70
Huon Logistics Ltd v Kekam Limited [2024] PGNC 342; N11026 
Jimm Trading Ltd v Maddison [2017] N6749 
Medaing v RAMU Nico Management (MCC) Ltd [2011] PGSC 40; SC1144
Morauta v Pala [2016] SC1529
National Fisheries Authority v New Britain Resources Development Ltd [[2015] N6078 
Opotio v Bure [2023] PGNC228; N10400
Radio Taxis Ltd v Wamo [2018] PGSC 98; SC1768 
Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd (1897) AC 22
Telikom (PNG) Ltd v Independent Consumer and Competition Commission (2008) SC906 
Wentworth v Rogers (No 5) (1986) 6 NSWLR 534

Counsel:
Mr Pato for the plaintiff
Ms Yom for first, second and third defendants 
Ms Kaki for the fifth defendant 

1.	PURDON-SULLY J: Following the grant of leave, by Notice of Motion filed the 15 December 2023 the Plaintiff seeks to judicially review five (5) decisions of the First Defendant which resulted in the issuing of a replacement title to property described as Allotment 02, Section 87, Boroko (Korobosea), NCD (the property) and the subsequent transfer of the title to the Fifth Defendant.
2.	The matter was listed for substantive hearing on 5 February 2025.
3.	This is my ruling on an application by the Fifth Defendant seeking by Notice of Motion filed 4 June 2024 to dismiss the proceedings as an abuse of process under Order 16 Rule 13(13)(2)(b)(a) of the National Court Rules (the Rules) by reason of:
a.	the Plaintiff’s lack of standing to file the proceedings for want of a company resolution authorising it to institute the proceedings; and 
b.	judicial review under Order 16 of the National Court Rules (the Rules) being the incorrect mode of proceeding where the grounds of review are based on asserted fraud committed by the Fourth Defendant, a private individual.
4.	While the Fifth Defendant’s Notice of Motion also made reference to the provisions of Order 16 Rule 4(1) and (2) which relates to delay in applying for relief, this was not pressed in submissions.
5.	Two other competency grounds raised on behalf of the Fifth Defendant were abandoned during the course of further oral submissions on 10 February 2025.
6.	The First, Second and Third Defendants support the dismissal application of the Fifth Defendant.
7.	It is unchallenged that the Plaintiff commenced its proceedings without a resolution of the board authorising it to do so.  However, it is submitted on behalf of learned Counsel for the Plaintiff with respect to the issue of locus standi inter alia that:
a.	There is nothing in the Rules or the Companies Act or the Constitution of the Plaintiff that requires authorisation in the form of a board resolution before proceedings are commenced on behalf of the Plaintiff company.
b.	The authorities relied upon by the Fifth Defendant in support of the requirement of a resolution are either wrong, distinguishable on the facts or do not bind this court.
c.	If the court however decides that a resolution of the board is required then the Plaintiff should be allowed to cure the defect, the court with the power to do so in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction under s 155(4) of the Constitution to make orders, in such circumstances as seem proper and necessary to do justice in the circumstances of a particular case.
8.	With respect to the second competency ground raised it is submitted on behalf of the Plaintiff inter alia that proceeding by way of judicial review under Order 16 was the correct mode of proceeding, the grounds of review based on the decisions made by the First Defendant, a public authority, including a decision refusing to exercise its powers to nullify decisions the subject of review.
CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND
9.	 The following provides a sufficient overview of the dispute taken from Review Book and the written submissions filed by the parties.  The Fourth Defendant did not participate in the proceedings.
10.	The Plaintiff is a company incorporated and registered in Papua New Guinea and is wholly owned by the Metallurgical Corporation of China Limited and operator of the Ramu Nickel/Cobalt Project in Madang Province, Papua New Guinea.
11.	On 20 September 2006 the Plaintiff became the registered proprietor of the property.
12.	At all material times the property contained a residential dwelling which the Plaintiff entrusted to a Chinese National by the name of Wang Min to take care of and oversee given that its primary operations were in the Madang Province.
13.	The Fifth Defendant asserts that in about March 2013 he entered into an agreement with the Fourth Defendant to rent the Fourth Defendant’s store located on the property for K3,000 per month, the Fourth Defendant having represented to the Fifth Defendant that he owned the property.
14.	By December 2021 the Fourth Defendant owed the Fifth Defendant K280,000 from monies borrowed (with interest) and store goods given on credit lease.
15.	The Fourth Defendant promised to repay the money after he had sold the property.
16.	Notwithstanding his asserted hesitation (well-founded it appears given subsequent events), the Fifth Defendant purchased the property, entering into a Contract of Sale with the Fourth Defendant for K250,000 on the understanding that Fourth Defendant still owed him K280,000.
17.	 On 19 August 2022 transfer of ownership of the property to the Fifth Defendant was completed by the Office of the Registrar of Titles and the Fifth Defendant was issued State Lease title.
18.	The Plaintiff however asserts that the issuing of the title occurred when it was still in custody and possession of the original title to the land and that the Plaintiff did not apply for a replacement title. On its case, without its knowledge, someone purporting to be Mr Gu Yuxiang, a former Director of the Plaintiff, sold the property to the Fourth Defendant on the same day that the Fourth Defendant then sold the property to the Fifth Defendant.  Mr Gu’s signature however was a forgery, Mr Gu no longer in the country at the relevant time, the common seal of the company affixed to the transfer also a forgery and a fraudulent application for a replacement title to the property (asserted to have been misplaced) made.
19.	The Plaintiff further asserts that in February 2023 it became aware that unauthorised persons were residing on the property, a search at the Department of Lands & Physical Planning (the Department) revealing a purported transfer from it to the Fourth Defendant and the simultaneous transfer from the Fourth Defendant to the Fifth Defendant.  The transfers were effected without its knowledge, the original owners title copy in its possession. 
20.	In consequence, on 28 February 2023, it sent a letter to the Department to stop dealings on the land and a caveat was formally entered and registered on 19 April 2023.
21.	On 16 October 2023 the Plaintiff commended proceedings for leave for judicial review seeking relief in the form of certiorari, declarations and mandamus inter alia compelling the Fifth Defendant to surrender to the First Defendant the replacement title for its cancellation and restoration of the Plaintiff’s ownership.  It asserts that in issuing the title to the property to the Fifth Defendant, the First Defendant inter alia acted in error of law and ultra vires s 162 of the Land Registration Act (Chapter 191), failed to take into account relevant considerations and the decisions were unreasonable in the Wednesbury sense such that the issuing of the title to the Fifth Defendant was null and void being based on fraud or actions affected by fraud and the replacement instrument to the Fifth Defendant should be cancelled.
22.	In short, the Plaintiff asserts lawful and rightful ownership of the property and wants it back having been the victim of the fraudulent actions of persons unknown.
CONSIDERATION
23.	Order 16 Rule 13(13)(2)(b)(a) of the Rules states:
(2) Summary disposal 
a. Any application for judicial review may be determined summarily for failing to comply with directions or orders issued under the Order 16 of the National Court Rules or under these Rules or on any other competency grounds.
b. The Court may summarily determine a matter: 
(a) on application by a party; or
…..
24.	There are two competency grounds raised by the Fifth Defendant, supported by the First Second and Third Defendants as earlier identified.
Should the proceedings be dismissed by reason of the plaintiff’s lacking standing to file for want of a company resolution authorising it to institute proceedings?
25.	While there is no express requirement in the Rules that a board resolution authorising legal proceedings is required and no clear provision in the Companies Act that compels a company to pass a board resolution authorising the institution of legal proceedings by it, there is a sound legal basis for such a requirement supported by persuasive authority.
26.	This is because a company is a legal entity in its own right (Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd (1897) AC 22).
27.	It is a legal concept principle enshrined in s 16 of the Companies Act 1997 which provides:
28.	SEPARATE LEGAL PERSONALITY.
A company is a legal entity in its own right separate from its shareholders and continues in existence until it is removed from the register.
29.	Pursuant to s 109 of the Companies Act and subject to its constitution the business and affairs of a company are managed by or under the direction of the board. It provides:
109.	 MANAGEMENT OF COMPANY.
(1) The business and affairs of a company shall be managed by, or under the direction or supervision of, the board of the company.
(2) The board of a company has all the powers necessary for managing, and for directing and supervising the management of, the business and affairs of the company.
(3) Subsections (1) and (2) are subject to any modifications, exceptions, or limitations contained in this Act or in the company’s constitution.
30.	In Huon Logistics Ltd v Kekam Limited [2024] PGNC342; N11026 (Huon) the Court said this at [15]:
…There is no dispute that a company being a legal person only can only act and be managed and represented by human agents. Such agents are the board of directors as its head and manager and employees as hand and legs to carry out the orders or directions of the board for and on behalf of the company.
31.	To be properly authorised, such authorisation must be provided by the convening of a properly constituted board of the company, on whom rests the legal authority to manage and conduct the affairs and business of the company.
32.	 In Administrative Law and Judicial Review in Papua New Guinea, by Christopher Karaiye (2019) Notion Press the learned author says the following at [2.3.3]:
For bodies corporate, authorised persons or bodies alone must institute proceedings. A body corporate who is registered under the Companies Act, Associations Incorporation Act, Land Groups Incorporations Act, Co-operative Societies Act, or a State-owned statutory entity, etc, must ensure that persons who have the necessary capacity or authority to instruct or sue must commence and maintain proceedings. In some instances, requisite approval such as from Boards by way of resolution must be obtained prior to commencing proceedings on behalf of or in the name of the body corporate. The board resolutions must be given under seal of the body corporate.
33.	In Radio Taxis Ltd v Wamo [2018] PGSC 98; SC1768 (Radio Taxis), Dingake J, sitting as a single Judge of the Supreme Court said at [8] – [13]
8.	A company is in law a separate legal person capable of suing or being sued in its own name. Unless the law provides otherwise, the company cannot initiate legal proceedings without a duly passed resolution authorizing the company to litigate. A company that purports to litigate without a duly passed resolution to that effect lacks locus standi and such proceedings amount to an abuse of Court process.

9.	In this case, the applicant strongly raised the issue of absence of a company resolution to initiate the proceedings.

10.	The reasoning of the lower Court in dismissing the applicant’s application was that there is no evidence before the Court that John Wano Pepena has not given his consent to the first plaintiff, John Wano & Siwi Kuni Co Ltd to institute proceedings.

11.	The Court held that in the absence of any evidence to the contrary from John Wano Pepena, it is reasonable to assume that the proceedings were filed with the authority of the Directors in compliance with Section 138 and Schedule 4 of the Companies Act.

12.	In this matter there is no evidence of any resolution passed by the Company. This cannot be assumed.

13.	In the result, it seems to me that the applicant has established that it has an arguable or prima facie case.
[Italics added]
34.	As a decision of the Supreme Court, Radio Taxis is authority that binds me (Constitution, Schedule 2.9(1) and Underlying Law Act 2000, s 19(1)).
35.	The submissions on behalf of the Plaintiff as to why the authority of Radio Taxis should not be followed are not persuasive, including that the Supreme Court incorrectly applied the law in that it did not address the issue on appeal and can be distinguished on the facts. The pronouncement that a company that purports to litigate without a duly passed resolution to that effect lacks locus standi is sound law.  It is one based on the important principle that appropriate authority and requisite endorsement from relevant entities is required to commence proceedings (see Administrative Law and Judicial Review in Papua New Guinea (supra) Footnote 12 p 32). 
36.	 The principle enunciated in Radio Taxis has found voice in non-judicial review application. For example, in Application by Edward Mike Jondi as General Secretary of the PNG Party [2016] SC1561, a matter that concerned an application under Section 18(1) of the Constitution, an issue before the Supreme Court was whether the applicant had standing.  In considering that question the Court (Gavara-Nanu J, David J & Yagi, J) said the following at [16]:
16. It is trite principle in corporate law that a body corporate is required to make decisions through a recognized body within its corporate structure and in most cases it is a Committee or a Board. An officer, be it a President, Chairman, Secretary, Treasurer or whosoever or howsoever maybe described, is a Committee or Board member of the body corporate and has no legal authority to make decisions independently on behalf of a body corporate. A body corporate functions and operates through a collective voice. In practice that process is known as a Committee or Board resolution. In this case there is no evidence of a resolution approved or endorsed by the PNC Party through its Party Executive or Committee or Board authorizing the applicant to initiate this proceeding.
37.		The Supreme Court, in refusing leave on the basis that the applicant did not have standing, cited with approval an earlier Supreme Court decision of Morauta v Pala [2016] SC1529 where the Court had found that the applicant had no standing on the basis that he was pursuing the Constitutional Reference under Section 18(1) of the Constitution in his capacity as the Managing Director of a foreign company. He did not have any personal interest in the subject matter in the proceedings. He was pursuing the matter in the interest of the company. He was used by the foreign company to further their corporate interest. There was also no evidence of a company resolution expressly authorizing the applicant to pursue the natter on behalf of the company (at [17]).
38.	The decision of Radio Taxis has been followed or supported by other decisions of this court.
39.	For example, in Opotio v Bure [2023] PGNC228; N10400 (Opotio) Dowa J said at [15]:
15. .....Ramu Transport Services Ltd is a company, and under section 16 & 17 of the Companies Act it is a separate legal entity having capacity to sue and be sued in its corporate name. The company functions through its Board of Directors. Where a company intends to institute court proceedings, it must be authorized by the Board of Directors through a collective board resolution pursuant to section 138 and Schedule 4 of the Companies Act. Refer: Radio Taxis Ltd v Wano (2018) SC1768. I find there is no evidence of a resolution by the Board of Directors of RTSL supporting the proceedings initiated by the Plaintiff. 
40.	Again, the submission on behalf of the Plaintiff that this authority should be ignored as it can be distinguished on the facts is not persuasive. While the dispute before the learned Judge involved a termination under a contract of employment, the factual differences do not detract from the enunciated principle relevant to the issue before me to be determined.
41.	It was the principle before the Court and discussed in Huon where David J cited and followed both Radio Taxis and Opotio at [21] - [23].  In dismissing the proceedings for lack of a board resolution authorising the institution of proceeding the learned Judge in Huon went on to say the following at [24] – [30]:
24. Going by this judge-made rule, it will be necessary to attach the necessary board resolution and minutes when the litigation is instituted.
25. In this scenario, the onus is upon a plaintiff company to demonstrate that its board has a duly passed resolution authorising the company to institute litigation.
26. In the same vein, where a company is a plaintiff in proceedings that have not been properly authorised, it is possible to retrospectively validate the proceedings with subsequent ratification under the power of management accorded to the board of a company under s.109 of the Companies Act.

27. However, there is another argument that nowhere in the Companies Act or any other law including the National Court Rules can there be found any provision that expressly provides that the existence of board resolution as among the mandatory requirement for the company to institute legal proceedings. The plaintiff advances this proposition.

28. A qualification to that observation, in my view, is that where it is raised in a defence, eg, under Order 8 Rule 14 (Matters for specific pleading) of the National Court Rules or generally and it is taken issue of by the plaintiff company, then the plaintiff is taken to the task of proving that such board resolution authorising the institution of litigation is in existence.

29. The plaintiff has failed to prove by cogent evidence that the plaintiff’s board has authorised these proceedings to be instituted.

30. For these reasons, the plaintiff lacks locus standi and the proceedings amount to an abuse of the process of the Court. The proceedings must be dismissed in their entirety.
42.	Again the submissions on behalf of the Plaintiff that this authority should not be followed because of a lack of requirement of a board resolution to institute proceedings under the rules and no clear provision in the Companies Act is not persuasive given the earlier authorities that discussed these matters and which I have discussed and which are clear on the importance of a board resolution evidencing the authority to act.
43.	His Honour in Huon observed as much at [27] of his judgment before going on at [28] to make the qualification he did.
44.	Finally, the question is whether the court should permit the Plaintiff an opportunity to cure the defect and/or invoke its inherent jurisdiction under s 155(4) of the Act to do so.  That section vests a general power in the National and Supreme Court to enforce a primary right in the absence of other law.  It is a residual power, not a grant of jurisdiction to cover all and every situation or render a result that is inconsistent with existing law (Medaing v RAMU Nico Management (MCC) Ltd [2011] PGSC 40; SC1144).  Order 16 of the Rules provides an exclusive procedure for judicial review applications, locus standi a fundamental requirement of Order 16 Rule 3(5) of the Rules. 
45.	While it may be possible retrospectively to validate the proceedings with subsequent ratification under the power of management accorded to the board of a company under s.109 of the Companies Act, and by the Plaintiff’s own constitution, I have concluded that to permit that course at this late stage of the proceedings would give rise to a significant prejudice to the Fifth Defendant and to the overall interests of justice. Such a course would of necessity involve a further adjournment of proceedings to enable the parties to consider the terms of any ratification including its validity and retrospectivity (see for example, Firth v Staines [1890] 2 QB 70).
46.	These proceedings have been on foot since 2023. The matter has been listed for substantive hearing twice.  It would be wrong to assume that a further delay would be without impact, the perils of delayed judicial determination and the significant stress this may cause parties the subject of much authoritative pronouncement and academic discussion.  The Plaintiff, on the evidence of its General Manager, Liang DongQing, is one of the largest metallurgical companies in the world, a State-owned enterprise of the Chinese Government. The Fifth Defendant deposes to being a small businessman who operates small trading stores. He does not present as a man of means on the evidence before the court. On his evidence he had no money to acquire an interest in the property and was only able to do so by way of borrowings from a relative to meet the payment to the Fourth Defendant.  There is no evidence to suggest that his legal costs are not being met personally.  It is a reasonable inference to draw in the circumstances that any further delay in this litigation would present with impacts for him.  Further, his evidence that he had been trading on the property from March 2013 is undisputed.  That is, on the unchallenged evidence of the Fifth Defendant, for some ten (10) years until he was served with these proceedings on 24 January 2024, and without challenge by the Plaintiff or its agents, he was renting a building on the property, effecting improvements at a cost of K50,000 to a building on the property, before then buying the property for valuable consideration.  That there were activities on the property over a lengthy period,  unchallenged by the Plaintiff, is supported by the evidence of Mr Nelson Kongon and Ms Tina Maral who depose that from 2016 to September 2022 they were paying rent to the Fourth Defendant to live and/or work on the property, the Fourth Defendant renting out eight (8) rooms in a house dwelling on the property where he and his wife resided.  During that time they were unaware of the Plaintiff’s agents attending the property at any time or any Chinese nationals caring for the property, or any dispute over the ownership of the property. 
47.	Given its title to the property since 2006 and its ongoing business activities in Papua New Guinea, it is unclear on the evidence why the Plaintiff’s management only became aware of “unknown locals residing on the property” in February 2023, that is more than a decade after unknown locals commenced to reside and conduct business activities on the property (see affidavit of Mr Liang DongQing filed 6 October 2023).  On the evidence of Mr Liang there was caretaker, Mr Wang, residing there as its agent.  There is no affidavit from Mr Wang, the Plaintiff’s evidence silent on what steps, if any, were taken after March 2017, when on the evidence of Mr Liang and Mr Gu, Mr Gu became aware that someone had forged his signature and affixed a forged common seal to a Contract of Sale and transfer of the property from the Plaintiff purportedly to the Fourth Defendant for K400,000. Having thus been aware of what Mr Liang refers to as a “First instance of fraud – March 2017”, some four (4) years before the events that gave rise to this dispute and the Fifth Defendant receiving a registered interest in the property, there is no evidence of what remedial steps the Plaintiff’s management took to visit the property or make enquires with their caretaker Mr Wang, to see what was happening let alone implement risk management procedures to protect its interest against further fraud.  The application for a replacement copy of the title deed to the property was publicly advertised in the National Gazette and the newspaper. Had the Plaintiff implemented expected risk management procedures it should have been alerted to the Fourth Defendant’s application and its right to object to a replacement title being issued.  The evidence is silent as to why those procedures were not in place, Mr Liang admitting that the Plaintiff had not seen the notice and had thus not raised objection.  The Second Defendant as a registering authority was entitled to proceed absent objection.   
48.	All of these factors, as outlined, inform my discretion as to whether the court should in the exercise of its discretion permit the Plaintiff the opportunity to remedy the defect in relation to the absence of a company resolution.
49.	While no court should allow a person to keep an advantage which has been obtained by fraud, the court also must be careful in dealing with such matters, the authorities clear for example on the need to ensure that fraud is distinctly pleaded and proven (Lazarus Estates Ltd v Beasley [1956] 1 QB 702, per Denning LJ at pp 712-713). While the evidence suggests a case to answer by the Fourth Defendant, there is a paucity of evidence to prove actual fraud against the Fifth Defendant, that is, that he was responsible for the fraud which tainted the decision or decisions under challenge and was not otherwise a victim himself of the fraudulent actions of others in the face of what can be fairly described as a lax approach by the Plaintiff to protect its interests having already been exposed to earlier fraudulent conduct (National Fisheries Authority v New Britain Resources Development Ltd [[2015] N6078 citing with approval Wentworth v Rogers (No 5) (1986) 6 NSWLR 534). 
50.	Judicial review is an exercise in judicial discretion. In my discretion and weighing the various matters I have identified I am unable to conclude that permitting the Plaintiff to rectify a defect that was occasioned by its failure to authorise these proceedings by proper board resolution prior to the commencement of proceedings or ratify same on a timely basis thereafter – in short, to permit the Plaintiff to remedy a defect it created and permit it to do so very late, the proceedings well advanced - would meet the interests of justice. Nor am I able to conclude that, if available to it, the court’s inherent jurisdiction under s 155(4) of the Constitution should be permitted to come to the aid of the Plaintiff in the particular circumstances of this case. 
51.	For these reasons the first objection on competency is upheld and in consequence the proceedings should be dismissed by reason of the Plaintiff’s lack of standing.  
52.	Having so determined, and while not necessary for me to consider the further issue of competency raised on behalf of the Fifth Defendant, I propose to do so.

Was the Plaintiff’s mode of proceedings under Order 16 correct?
53.	The second ground of competency lacks merit.  This is because the question of whether Order 16 is the proper mode of proceedings is a consideration dependent upon the relief being sought and the application of Order 16, Rule 1, to see whether Order 16 is mandatory (Rule 1(1)) or optional (Rule 1(2) (see Telikom (PNG) Ltd v Independent Consumer and Competition Commission (2008) SC906 per Kirriwom and Cannings JJ at [124]).  
54.	Order 16 Rule 1 (1) and (2) provides:
(1) An application for an order in the nature of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari or quo warranto shall be made by way of an application for judicial review in accordance with this Order.
(2) An application for a declaration or an injunction may be made by way of an application for judicial review, and on such an application the Court may grant the declaration or injunction claimed if it considers that ... it would be just and convenient for the declaration or injunction to be granted on an application for judicial review.
	[Italics added]
55.	Where in the present circumstances the Plaintiff was seeking the relief of certiorari and mandamus along with other relief the Plaintiff was required to commence proceedings by way of judicial review.
56.	There is nothing in dicta of the Deputy Chief Justice n Jimm Trading Ltd v Maddison [2017] N6749, relied upon by the Fifth Defendant as to the appropriateness of the Order 16 mode of proceedings, that suggests otherwise when the full passage of His Honours judgment at [58] – [66] is considered.
57.	 Applying these principles to this case,  where the Plaintiff was seeking inter alia orders in the nature of prerogative writs, the Plaintiff used the correct mode of proceeding. The fact that there is an allegation of fraud against an individual does not detract from that conclusion, fraud a recognised ground of review under Order 16. 
ORDERS
58.	The court makes the following orders:
a.	The Plaintiff’s Notice of Motion filed 4 August 2024 be dismissed by reason of lack of standing.
b.	The Plaintiff pay the Defendants’ costs on a party and party basis to be agreed or taxed.
c.	Time to abridge.

Lawyers for the plaintiff: Posman Kua Aisi
Lawyer for the first, second and third defendants: Office of the Solicitor General
Lawyers for the fifth defendant: Raynett & Kaki