n11279

PAPUA NEW GUINEA
[NATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE]

OS   NO. 279 OF 2024

BETWEEN
PETER GILMAI
Plaintiff

AND
ABEL TOL in his capacity as the Acting Managing Director of the National Housing Corporation
First Defendant

AND
DOMMY KETEFA in his capacity as Chairman of the National Housing Corporation Disciplinary Committee
Second Defendant

AND
JULIAS SAUN in his capacity as Personnel Officer of National Housing Corporation
Third Defendant

AND
NATIONAL HOUSING CORPORATION
Fourth Defendant

LAE:  COLLIER J
9 MAY 2025
  
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – originating summons by employee of National Housing Corporation for declaratory relief seeking reinstatement and quashing of suspension of employment without pay – where declaratory relief in the nature of judicial review application – abuse of process

PROFESSIONAL ETHICS – where written submissions provided to Court and plaintiff contained fake authorities and case summaries – generative artificial intelligence tool ChatGPT – misleading Court – Professional Conduct Rules 1989

The plaintiff was a Manager in Lae of the National Housing Corporation. His employment was suspended without pay following allegations of impropriety. A disciplinary investigation was conducted and a recommendation made to the Acting Managing Director for final determination. No final determination was made following that recommendation. The plaintiff remained suspended without pay.

At the hearing of the Originating Summons and Notice of Motion before the Court, the lawyer for the defendants handed up written submissions and provided a copy to the plaintiff. Upon investigation by the Court after judgment was reserved, it became clear that the four authorities cited, and summarised, by the lawyer for the defendants in her written submissions were fake. An order was made by the Court requiring the lawyer for the defendants to appear and provide explanation. No source for these authorities was able to be provided by the lawyer for the defendants. The lawyer communicated with the Court and admitted that the “authorities” she had cited had been produced by generative artificial intelligence tool ChatGPT.

Held:

The Originating Summons was dismissed as an abuse of process. The Notice of Motion was upheld. In the circumstances it was appropriate that the parties bear their own costs. A copy of the decision be provided to the Public Solicitor with a recommendation to provide assistance to the plaintiff. A copy of the decision also to be provided to the Papua New Guinea Law Society. The lawyer for the defendant to appear at the National Court in Lae to show cause why she should not be cited for contempt of Court.

Cases cited
Bolton v Law Society [1994] 1 WLR 512
Keko v Barrick (Niugini) Ltd [2015] N7569
Mata v Avianca, Inc (No. 22-CV-1461 (PKC), 2023 WL 4114965, at *1–17 (S.D.N.Y. June 22, 2023) 
Madang Timbers Ltd v Wasa [2021] SC2154
Re Paul Luben and David Poka [1987] N612
State v Sasoruo [1997] PNGLR 676
Valu v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (No 2) [2025] FedCFamC2G 95

Counsel
Peter Gilmai, the plaintiff, in person
Ms J Kare, for the Defendants

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

1	COLLIER J: Before the Court are an Originating Summons and a Notice of Motion. 

2	In the Originating Summons filed by the plaintiff on 9 December 2024, the following orders were sought:

1.	A declaration that the Plaintiff’s suspension from employment without pay with the Fourth Defendant through letter dated 16th August 2023 by the First, and the Third Defendant is illegal, irregular, incompetent and is void ab initio.
2.	A declaration that the NHC Disciplinary Committee Meeting Resolution made on 16.2.2024 and recommendation made and submitted to the First Defendant (Acting Managing Director) on 20.2.2024 to reinstate the Plaintiff to his substantive position be affirmed.
3.	An Order that the Acting Managing Director based on the NHC Disciplinary recommendation reinstate the Plaintiff to his position as Manager Lae forthwith.
4.	An Order that the Plaintiff’s outstanding Salaries, leave fares and gratuity allowances be fully restored and paid to him backdated to the date of suspension.
5.	An order that the period of suspension of the Plaintiff be taken and counted as continued period of service rendered by the Plaintiff to the Fourth Defendant.
6.	An order that all costs incurred by the Plaintiff in relations to the unlawful suspension in Law and Port Moresby during the suspension period be refunded by the 4th Defendant.
7.	Any other orders the court sees fit.
8.	The costs of this application be paid by the Defendants.
3	In the Notice of Motion filed by the defendants on 12 March 2025 the following orders were sought:

1.	Pursuant to Order 12 Rule 1 and Order 1 Rule 7 of the National Court Rules, the requirements for service be dispensed with.
2.	Pursuant to Order 12 Rule 40(1)(a), (b) and (c) of the National Court Rules, Order 12 Rule 1 of the National Court Rules and the inherent jurisdiction of this Honourable Court to control proceedings before it, the proceedings herein be dismissed.
3.	The Plaintiff pay the Defendants costs of the proceedings.
4.	Any further or other order that this Honourable Court deems appropriate.
4	In my view, for the reasons that follow, the Originating Summons should be dismissed and the Notice of Motion upheld.

background

5	On 3 September 2021, the plaintiff commenced employment with the fourth defendant, the National Housing Corporation (NHC), as “Manager, Lae”.

6	On 13 November 2023, the plaintiff was served with a Notice of Suspension Without Pay (Notice) from the first defendant, Mr Abel Tol, who at material times was the Acting Managing Director of NHC. That Notice read as follows:

TAKE NOTICE that pursuant to Clauses 156 & 160 of the NHC Determination No. 1 of 1990 (Amended), you are hereby Suspended without Pay.
AND TAKE FURTHER NOTICE, that your actions have contravene Clause 160(1)(a), (h) and (i) of the NHC Determination No. 1 of 1990 (Amended). Therefore, your suspension is effective as of the date of this notice.
The suspension ensues from soliciting and collecting a substantial amount of money at the 7th City, Guest House (in the presence of Paul Ero and Paul Hoge Anis) from one James Wanga, for the purchase of a piece of land at West Taraka which were not receipted. This action is quite serious, deemed unlawful and contravenes the above states Clauses of the NHC Determination.
Therefore, this leaves me with no option but to have you suspended without pay immediately due to the seriousness of the alleged offence.
You are required to respond within seven (7) working days form the date of receipt of the Notice for my consideration and further decisions.
Dated this 16th day of August, 2023
(emphasis in original)

7	On 15 November 2023, the plaintiff served on Mr Tol a response to the Notice, in which the plaintiff denied the allegations made in the Notice, and sought its withdrawal. In the response the plaintiff also said that he believed that the allegations forming the basis of the Notice were made by a former employee, namely Mr Stanley Kultu, about whom the plaintiff had previously made a complaint. The plaintiff claimed that the allegations made by Mr Kultu were in retaliation for the plaintiff’s earlier complaint.

8	It does not appear to be in dispute that the suspension of the plaintiff was the subject of an investigation by the NHC Disciplinary Committee.

9	At the date of the hearing before me, the plaintiff had not been advised as to any final determination of his suspension without pay. 

evidence of plaintiff

10	The plaintiff filed an affidavit on 14 January 2025 in which he deposed, in summary:

•	the allegations in the Notice were entirely false and baseless;
•	the use of the Clause 156 of the NHC Determination No. 1 (Amended) in the Notice was unlawful and defamatory under the law;
•	prior to his suspension, the first, second and fourth defendants failed to carry out proper and thorough inhouse investigations to ascertain facts concerning allegations of improper land sales;
•	the suspension was based on a false allegations without any legal merit;
•	the Notice failed to outline relevant facts of the allegations;
•	the plaintiff had a formal meeting with the human resources department of the fourth defendant (HR) on 22 May 2024 in which they advised him that the NHC Disciplinary Committee had made its recommendation regarding his suspension to the first defendant for final determination;
•	the plaintiff annexed a letter dated 22 May 2024 from HR confirming the substance of the formal meeting (Annexure “E”); and
•	the attitude and conduct of the first defendant in failing to take action or make a decision in regard to the plaintiff’s suspension was unacceptable, improper and unlawful.

evidence of FIRST DEFENDANT

11	Mr Tol filed an affidavit on 11 March 2025 in which he deposed, in summary:

•	the plaintiff participated in soliciting and collecting the sum of K80,000.00 from the sale of a property in Lae;
•	the plaintiff conducted the sale at the privately owned 7th Street Guest House on a weekend rather than during business hours at the duly registered office of the fourth defendant in Lae;
•	the allegations were raised by Mr Stanley Kultu in a letter to the Executive Director of Corporation Services, Mr Anthony Luke;
•	the plaintiff admitted to the sale being undertaken in the circumstances alleged in his response to the Notice;
•	the matter was pending full determination by the NHC Disciplinary Committee; and
•	the plaintiff prematurely filed proceedings in the wrong mode – originating summons rather than judicial review.

events at the hearing on 8 may 2025

12	At the hearing on 8 May 2025 the plaintiff appeared in person. The defendants were represented by their lawyer, Ms Kare.

13	The plaintiff raised an issue about whether Ms Kare had been properly briefed by the fourth defendant, given that the fourth defendant was a government body. After exchanges with the Bench, the plaintiff did not press his concerns regarding Ms Kare representing the defendants at the hearing.

14	The plaintiff made oral submissions referable to his concerns about the lack of a decision of Mr Tol, and the fact that he had been suspended without pay for approximately 18 months with no final determination made. 
15	Ms Kare produced written submissions, and I granted leave for her to hand up those submissions to the Bench, with a short adjournment to permit the plaintiff the opportunity to read them.

16	In summary, the defendants submitted that the Originating Summons should be dismissed in its entirety as it was procedurally incompetent. This is because the NHC is a public authority, and a review of its decision(s) must be commenced by way of judicial review pursuant to Order 16 of the National Court Rules 1983 (National Court Rules).

CONSIDERATION 

17	The tenor of the plaintiff’s claim is that the suspension decision of the NHC should be quashed, and his employment reinstated with full pay and back-payment of his salary and entitlements.

18	On the material before the Court, it appears that the only decision that has been made by the NHC is the decision dated 16 August 2023 to suspend the plaintiff without pay. It further appears that a final determination by the first defendant following the investigation of the NHC Disciplinary Committee has not yet been made. In order to provide the declaratory relief sought by the plaintiff, the Court would be required to review the decision of the NHC to suspend the plaintiff without pay. The relief sought by the plaintiff in the Originating Summons, namely prayers for relief 1 and 2, are in the nature of a claim for the issue of a writ of certiorari, which must be sought by way of an application for judicial review made in accordance with Order 16 of the National Court Rules. 

19	Similar circumstances were considered by Hartshorn J in Keko v Barrick (Niugini) Ltd [2015] N7569. There his Honour explained:

7.	Barrick contends that by seeking the relief that the MDC is void ab initio and that the SML is invalid, the plaintiffs are in essence challenging a decision of the Governor General. That is the Governor General’s decision to execute the MDC and SML on the advice of the National Executive Council. The decision is challenged on the basis that the Governor General exceeded or lacked the requisite jurisdiction and so the MDC and SML are invalid and should be quashed.
8.	The declarations sought by the plaintiffs in this instance in substance or in effect are seeking to achieve what should be achieved by seeking orders in the nature of certiorari, after applying and being granted leave for judicial review. The practical effect of the declarations, if granted, would be that the decision of the Governor General, on advice of the National Executive Council, to execute the MDC and the SML would be quashed. The proceeding therefore should have been commenced under Order 16 National Court Rules. That it was not renders this proceeding an abuse of the process of the court.
…
11.	The declarations sought by the plaintiffs are in effect that the decision of the Governor General to enter into the MDC and SML is void ab initio and of no legal force or effect. The argument is that as in reality what is being sought are orders in the nature of certiorari but disguised as declarations, Order 16 Rule 1 (1) National Court Rules requires this proceeding to have been commenced pursuant to Order 16. That it was not constitutes an abuse of process. This is particularly so, as by not commencing the proceeding pursuant to Order 16, leave to apply for judicial review has not been sought.
12. 	I considered this issue in Puri Ruing v. Allan Marat (2012) N4672 and Wan Global Limited v. Luxurflex Limited (2012) SC1199 (see also Bernard Kosie v. John Kapi Natto (2015) N6263, an appeal from which was refused in Bernard Kosie v. John Kapi Natto (2016) unreported SCA 55/15 delivered 6/5/16).
13. 	In Ruing v. Marat (supra), after referring to the Supreme Court cases of Michael Gene v. Hamidian Rad [1999] PNGLR 444 and Telikom (PNG) Ltd v. ICCC and Digicel (2008) SC906, I referred to the following observations of Lay J in Rabaul Shipping Ltd v. Rupen (2008) N3289. At paragraph 7 His Honour said the following with which I respectfully agree:
“If this were a case where the Court was being asked to declare wrong a decision of a tribunal exercising a discretion I would have great difficulty in accepting that an ordinary summons was the appropriate procedure because in those circumstances the only purpose of such a  declaration  is to quash the decision of the tribunal given the statutory authority to make the decision. That is an order in the nature of a prerogative writ by another name...”
14.	I then said that in my view in the case before me:
“... the only reason for the  declaration  that is sought in this instance is to quash the decision of the Head of State made on the advice of the NEC. That is, for this court to review that decision and then to quash it. So although the plaintiffs are not seeking an order for  certiorari , they are seeking an order in the nature of, or similar to,  certiorari . Pursuant to Order 16 Rule 1 (1) National Court Rules, an application for an order in the nature of  certiorari  shall be made by way of an application for judicial review in accordance with Order 16 National Court Rules. It is mandatory. Such an application has not been made in this instance. The application that has been made is by  originating summons  pursuant to Order 4 and constitutes an abuse of the process of this court as it has been commenced incorrectly.”
15. 	As the practical effect of the  declarations , if they are granted, is that the decision of the Governor General, on advice of the National Executive Council to execute the MDC and the SML would be quashed, I am satisfied that the  declarations  sought by the plaintiffs’ are in substance or in effect achieving what should be achieved pursuant to Order 16 National Court Rules. That is that orders in the nature of certiorari should have been sought. To apply for such orders, Order 16 Rule 1 (1) makes it mandatory for an order in the nature of amongst others, certiorari to be made by an application for judicial review. This could only occur if an application for leave for judicial review has been successful. As this proceeding should have been commenced pursuant to Order 16 National Court Rules but was not, and as commencement of such a proceeding is mandatory, the proceeding is an abuse of the process of this court and should be dismissed.
(emphasis added)
20	I gratefully adopt the reasoning and conclusion of his Honour, as being equally applicable to the case before me.

21	Prayers for relief 1 and 2 sought in the Originating Summons would require leave for judicial review. The plaintiff has not properly commenced proceedings to obtain the relief he seeks. Prayers for relief 1 and 2 must be refused. It follows that prayers for relief 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the Originating Summons must also be refused.

CONCLUSION

22	The Originating Summons filed by the plaintiff must be dismissed as an abuse of process. The Notice of Motion of the defendants, in which they claim that the Originating Summons is an abuse of process, is accordingly upheld pursuant to Order 12 Rule 40(1)(c) of the National Court Rules.

23	This however is not the end of this matter. I have a number of comments to make concerning the manner in which this proceeding has been conducted.

24	First, as a matter of principle, while the plaintiff has been unsuccessful in these proceedings, it is of concern to the Court that he has been suspended for approximately 18 months without pay, with apparently no final determination in sight, and without any explanation as to why his employment status has not been resolved. As a matter of good business and professional practice, it is surely incumbent on the fourth defendant the NHC, and the first defendant as its Acting Managing Director, to ensure that any issues concerning the employment status of its employees, including the plaintiff, are resolved promptly. A decision to “suspend” any employee for alleged improper conduct is, in the ordinary course, a temporary decision, not a seemingly indefinite decision. 

25	On the material before the Court, there is some evidence that a recommendation has been made by the NHC Disciplinary Committee to the first defendant. If that is the case, then no explanation has been provided by any of the defendants as to why the recommendation of the NHC Disciplinary Committee – whatever that recommendation is – has not resulted in a final determination by the first defendant. That no final determination has been made must, in the ordinary course, reflect very poorly on the defendants, their business practice, and their treatment of their employees.

26	Second, as I explained to the plaintiff at the hearing, the mode of application for review of decisions of government bodies requires informed engagement with the National Court Rules. The present proceedings were commenced by the plaintiff in an incompetent manner. I note however that the plaintiff is a litigant in person. In my view it would be appropriate for this matter to be referred to the Public Solicitor, for the provision of such assistance to the plaintiff as can be provided and which is acceptable to the plaintiff, in respect of any future proceedings by the plaintiff concerning the suspension of his employment without pay.

27	Finally, and importantly, following reservation of judgment I had the opportunity to properly consider the written submissions handed up to the Court and to the plaintiff at the hearing by Ms Kare for the defendants during the hearing, and which were filed by her with the Court on the morning of the hearing. These written submissions were signed by Ms Kare.

28	It is of the utmost concern to me that both the “authorities” on which Ms Kare relied for the principles supporting her clients’ position, and the detailed commentary which she set out in the submissions as summarising those authorities and the relevant legal principles they purportedly established, appear to be entirely fake. 

29	The authorities set out in Ms Kare’s submissions were as follows:

•	“Application by Herman Leahy [2000] PNGLR 276”;
•	“Kagamung v Southern Highlands Provincial Government [2001] PGNC 103”;
•	“Peter Makeng v Peter Yama (2008) SC1012”; and
•	“Bata Kamo v Secretary for the Department of Lands & Physical Planning (2005) N2806”.

30	A detailed search by me of legal databases, namely PacLII and vLex, revealed that these cases do not exist.

31	It follows that the commentary provided by Ms Kare as allegedly describing the relevance of those authorities to the present proceedings must similarly be fake.

32	These fake cases can be contrasted with the authority of Keko v Barrick (Niugini) Ltd [2015] N7569 which I have cited above as warranting the dismissal of the plaintiff’s Originating Summons. This is an real decision of the National Court of Justice of Papua New Guinea, available on legal data bases, found by me in the course of considering the present proceedings.

33	I requested the Civil Track Officer at the Lae Registry of the National Court, Mr Richard Daniel, to contact Ms Kare at approximately 2.00pm on 8 May 2025, several hours after the hearing had been adjourned and judgment reserved. In line with this request, the Civil Track Officer contacted Ms Kare by telephone prior to her boarding her flight from Lae to Port Moresby, and requested her to – by 4.30pm on 8 May 2025 – provide copies to the Registry of the cases she identified in her written submissions. The Civil Track Officer further informed Ms Kare that if she did not provide the authorities by 4.30pm, I would be ordering her to appear personally in the National Court in Lae on 9 May 2025 at 9.30am.

34	I further understand that in her text conversations with the Civil Track Officer, Ms Kare told a further falsehood referable to these fake authorities. At 2.06pm on 8 May 2025, Ms Kare texted Mr Daniel as follows:

Dear, I am about go board on PX 105 and do not have sufficient time to go through a send the docs. Also, those cases are not online but are reported and cited in administration law textbooks. I will need to go back and send the cases. Pls let her Honour know. My sincere apologies. Thank you, Jacinta.
(errors in original)
35	The “authorities” identified by Ms Kare were not provided.

36	As a result, on the afternoon of 8 May 2025 I ordered Ms Kare to appear in Court before me, in person, at 9.30am to explain the source of the authorities referenced in her written submissions. A copy of that Order was served on Ms Kare by the Civil Track Officer by email at 5.41pm on 8 May 2025.

37	I note that when Court resumed for judgment delivery on 9 May 2025 I requested Mr Daniel to take an oath in the witness box in the Court Room. I read out to Mr Daniel the sequence of events and correspondence concerning his interactions with Ms Kare as I have set out above. He affirmed that this sequence of events and correspondence were correct.

38	Ms Kare was offered the opportunity to question Mr Daniel. Ms Kare declined to do so.

39	At 3.13am on 9 May 2025 Ms Kare emailed my Chambers as follows:
Dear Mr Associate, 
Thank you for your email and I want to confirm that I will be appearing before Her Honour this morning at 9:30am. 
I also want to pass my sincere apologies in advance for the cases referred to in my submissions, which I know the Chambers have had difficulty locating them. I myself has had the same issue. To be honest, these cases were referred to in my research using AI Chat GTP and I did not follow up on the websites paclii or vlex to confirm these cases. My sincere apologies to the Court and the staff. My sincere apologies for wasting precious judicial time. The Court has the discretion to disregard all of those cases referred to in the submission and I humbly request that the Court disregards all of those cases referred to. 
Although this may be belated, if Her Honour deems appropriate, the Court may consider a case before the full Supreme Court (case in which I was involved as the lawyer for the Appellant) - Madang Timbers Ltd v Wasa [2021] PGSC 84; SC2154 (30 September 2021) (see attached). This case discusses the law on commencing proceedings using the proper mode of commencement, particularly Order 16 of the National Court Rules. 
Please kindly draw my email to the attention of Her Honour.
Please let me know if any queries. 
Best Regards, 
Jacinta N Kare
40	I have had the opportunity to consider Madang Timbers Ltd v Wasa [2021] SC2154 to which Ms Kare has directed my attention. Unlike the decisions identified in her written submissions, this is an real decision of a Court in Papua New Guinea, namely the Supreme Court of Justice. It is a relevant decision in that it provides at [15] that it is well-settled that a party wishing to challenge the decision of a governmental body or public authority must use Order 16 of the National Court Rules if orders in the nature of prerogative writs are sought, and that the requirements of Order 16 of the National Court Rules are mandatory.

41	The inevitable inference I must draw from this sequence of events is that Ms Kare not only filed submissions with false authorities, she has attempted to misled the Court and the plaintiff. 

42	Further, the statement by Ms Kare in her text message to Mr Daniel that the “authorities” were not reported and “were in administration law text books” was plainly false.

43	At the hearing on 8 May 2025, the plaintiff was endeavouring to respond to submissions which were plainly based in falsehood. It is unclear to me to what extent any submissions made by the lawyers for the defendants earlier, in the course of these proceedings, to both the Court and the plaintiff, were similarly founded in falsehood. In the circumstances of this case, I consider it appropriate that the plaintiff, despite his failure to properly commence his case in OS No. 279 of 2024, should not be required to pay the costs of the defendants of and incidental to the proceedings. 

44	The high standards to which lawyers must adhere are well known. In a paper delivered on 4 September 2013 to the Papua New Guinea Law Society entitled Lawyers Duties to the Court, Justice James Douglas of the Supreme Court of Queensland said as follows:

Dealing with the role of a barrister, Kitto J said in the Australian High Court in Ziems v The Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of NSW [(1957) 97 CLR 279, 298]
“… the Bar is no ordinary profession or occupation. These are not empty words, nor is it their purpose to express or encourage professional pretensions. They should be understood as a reminder that a barrister is more than his client’s confidant, adviser and advocate, and must therefore possess more than honesty, learning and forensic ability. He is, by virtue of a long tradition, in a relationship of intimate collaboration with the judges, as well as with his fellow-members of the Bar, in the high task of endeavouring to make successful the service of the law to the community.”
It is particularly important that lawyers maintain proper ethical standards in all aspects of practice and emphasise the element of public service consistent with the idea of professionalism. It is a good idea in itself but also because “a profession’s most valuable asset is its collective reputation and the confidence which that inspires
45	See Bolton v Law Society [1994] 1 WLR 512 at 519. I further note the following comments of Sevua J in State v Sasoruo [1997] PNGLR 676:

The primary responsibility of the courts and  lawyers  is to administer justice.  Lawyers  generally are officers of the court. It is their  obligation, both professional and  ethical  toward the courts they are to appear before. … Apart from their duty to their clients, they also have a duty to the court.
46	Similar observations were made by Amet J (as his Honour then was) in Re Paul Luben and David Poka [1987] N612.

47	In addition to their obligations under the general law, lawyers have significant professional obligations under the Professional Conduct Rules 1989. In particular, s 15(2) of those Rules provides that lawyers are not to mislead or knowingly deceive the Court.

48	In my view the written submissions, as well as Ms Kare’s text message to Mr Daniel on 8 May 2025, were liable to mislead the Court. It may be that Ms Kare did not know that the authorities she “researched” on ChatGPT were fake. However, that is not the point. She did not check them. She signed off on them. If I had blindly accepted that Counsel had done her work, in the discharge of her duty to the law, the Court, and her client, and if I had blindly included those fake authorities in my judgment, it would have promulgated a complete falsehood. The Courts expect the highest professional and ethical standards from the legal profession to assist them in the administration of justice in this country. Providing fake authorities and fake summaries of those authorities is entirely inconsistent with that sacred obligation.

49	Generative artificial intelligence tools such as ChatGPT appear to provide a convenient means for lawyers to perform research tasks required in the ordinary conduct of their practices. However convenient such a tool may appear – such tools are plainly unreliable. Unchecked reliance by lawyers on such tools can, indeed, lead to what can only be described as disastrous consequences such as those experienced by the defendants’ lawyer in this case. It also brings into serious question the quality of the legal advice provided to the defendants by their lawyer in this case. 

50	The use of generative artificial intelligence tools such as ChatGPT by lawyers in proceedings before the Court is an unfortunate trend not confined to Papua New Guinea – see for example the decision of Judge Skaros earlier this year in Valu v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (No 2) [2025] FedCFamC2G 95, and in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York in Mata v Avianca, Inc (No. 22-CV-1461 (PKC), 2023 WL 4114965, at *1–17 (S.D.N.Y. June 22, 2023). 

51	I note that following detailed comments by me in Court on 9 May 2025 regarding these events, I asked Ms Kare if she wanted to say anything further. Ms Kare indicated that she did not.

52	In light of my grave concerns regarding the material provided by the lawyer for the defendants to the plaintiff and the Court, I order that a copy of this decision be given by the Registry of the National Court of Justice in Lae to the Papua New Guinea Law Society, for investigation as to whether disciplinary action concerning the lawyer for the defendants, Ms Jacinta Kare, is appropriate.

53	I also consider that there is a prospect that Ms Kare has committed contempt of the National Court of Justice. That is a separate issue, for separate decision. Accordingly, I will also order that the lawyer for the defendants, Ms Jacinta Kare, appear before Justice Murray at the National Court of Justice in Lae at 1.30pm on 15 May 2025 to show cause why she should not be cited for contempt of the National Court of Justice. A copy of the transcript of the hearings on 8 and 9 May 2025 will also be ordered to be made available to her Honour for that purpose.

54.    The Court Orders That:

1.	The Originating Summons filed by the plaintiff on 9 December 2024 be dismissed.
2.	The Notice of Motion filed by the defendants on 12 March 2025 be upheld.
3.	A copy of this decision and information concerning this proceeding OS No. 279 of 2024 be provided forthwith by the Registry of the National Court of Justice in Lae to the Public Solicitor, with a recommendation that the Public Solicitor provides such assistance to the plaintiff, Mr Peter Gilmai, as it is able and which is acceptable to the plaintiff.
4.	The parties bear their own costs of and incidental to the proceedings.
5. 	A copy of this decision be provided forthwith by the Registry of the National Court of Justice in Lae to the Papua New Guinea Law Society for investigation as to whether disciplinary action should be taken against the lawyer for the defendants, Ms Jacinta Kare. 
6.	The lawyer for the defendants, Ms Jacinta Kare, appear before Justice Murray at the National Court of Justice in Lae at 1.30pm on 15 May 2025 to show cause why Ms Kare should not be cited for contempt of the National Court of Justice.
7. 	A copy of the transcript of the hearings on 8 May 2025 and 9 May 2025 be produced and provided to Justice Murray before the hearing at 1.30pm on 15 May 2025.
________________________________________________________________
Lawyers for the defendants: Kare and Associates Lawyers