State v Tanedo [1975] PGNC 8; N10C (31 October 1975)

Unreported National Court Decisions

N10C

PAPUA NEW GUINEA

[NATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE]
THE STATE
V
TANEDO

Port Moresby

Prentice DCJ
13 October 1975
15-17 October 1975
20-24 October 1975
27-28 October 1975
31 October 1975

FIFTH INTERLOCUTORY JUDGMENT

PRENTICE DCJ: This morning I halivered jred judgment allowing amendment of the indictment as requested by the prosecution.

Mr. Wall thereafter reiterated his submission of no case to answer, and alternatively, soughtling that the case presentesented was such that on the evidence no jury could reasonably convict. I ruled against him on these matters.

Mr. Wall has now asked that a reference be made the Supreme Court under s. 20 of the Supreme Court Act 1975, of the question of whether the amendments made to the indictment, should have been made as a matter of law. I have noted his submission.

As the application has been made by counsel for the accused person verdict, I am obliged to make such a reservation of law. Mr. Wall goes on to submit that the reference to the Supreme Court should, indeed must, be made at this stage - that the proceedings should be adjourned until the ruling of the Supreme Court can be obtained. If such a practice were established, it would of course, be highly inconvenient and could in reality, prevent trials from ever being concluded.

I have consulted with the Chief Justice in the adjournment break. He confirms my view that the practice of the former Supreme Court (pre Independence) of Papua New Guinea was, on such an application being made, for the trial judge to go ahead and complete the trial before stating the required case.

The Section presently under consideration appears on all fours with s.26 of the former Supreme Court (Full Court) Act. A reading of the sub-sections of s.20, compels me to the conclusion that an adjournment of the trial pending decision of the reference is not required by law. Sub-section 2 refers to a question of law having been reserved before judgment, yet a conviction ensuing. It makes provision for the Judge’s powers thereafter. It appears to me that a Judge of the National Court has a discretion to refer the question immediately to the Supreme Court if he thinks it proper; but is not obliged to do so. In the majority of cases I would think it highly inexpedient that he should do so.

An example of what I conceive is the correct procedure under the present Section, is the case of In The Matter of The State v. John Mogo Wonom of JigiN10C.html#_edn69" title="">[lxix]¹ in whicne, J. despite a chaa challenge to the indictment, proceeded to sentence after conviction, before referring the case to the Supreme Court. The framework of the on is such that it may indeed be arguable that such a referreference is to go ahead only after a conviction. This however, was not the interpretation inferentially adopted in Abia Tambule’s caseN10C.html#_edn70" title="">[lxx]².

I indicate that I shall state a case in due course, but I rule that the trial will continue.

Solicitor for the State: L.W. Roberts-Smith, Public Prosecutor.

Counsel for the State: B.M. Ryan, B.T.J. Sharp.

Solicitor for the Accused: N.H. Pratt, A Public Solicitor.

Counsel for the Accused: C.F. Wall. A.J. Alpine.

N10C.html#_ednref69" title="">[lxix]^{Unreported SC86}

N10C.html#_ednref70" title="">[lxx]^{Unreported FC57}