Idau v Peni [2008] PGDC 149; DC5000 (27 October 2008)

DC5000
PAPUPA NEW GUINEA

[IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF JUSTICE]

Court of Disputed Returns

LLGEP (21) 2, 3 & 4 OF 2007

MAURI IDAU, KOBUGAIAVA SIOA, & PETER EAVA

Petitioners
-v-

REISINO PENI

1^st Respondent

PETER MALAIFEOPE

2^nd Respondent

ELECTORAL COMMISSION OF PAPUA NEW GUINEA

3^rd Respondent

Port Moresby: Pupaka, PM

2008: 29^th Sept; 2^nd & 3^rd Oct.

RULING ON OBJECTION TO COMPETENCY

Local Level Government Election Petitions – Three separate petitions challenging the result of one Ward – Parties represented by same counsel in all cases – Same grounds pleaded in all cases – Identical relief sought in all cases – Same grounds for objection to competency in all cases – Law – Organic Law on National & Local Level Government Elections – Consolidated hearing of objections proper.

Objection to competency – Mandatory requirements of section 208 & 287 of OLNLLGE – Section 208(a) – Lack of details and insufficient facts – Section 208(d) – Petitions not properly or at all attested by two witnesses – Whether filing Statutory Declarations complies with requirements of section 208(d) – Non compliance fatal to petitions – Witnesses’ occupations not disclosed – Whether non discloser of witnesses’ occupations minor or fatal error – Objections sustained – Petitions struck out – Costs

Mr. J. B. Nanei for the Petitioners
Mr. A. M. Ona for the 1^st Respondent
Mr. Dalid for the 2^nd & 3^rd Respondents

27^th October 2008

PUPAKA, PM: This is a joint ruling in relation to a set of objections to competency filed against three Local Level Government (LLG) election petitions disputing the results of Vabukori Council Ward in the Motu-Koitabu LLG area.

The 1^st Respondent was declared winner on 11^th June 2008. The Petitioners, namely Messrs Mauri Idau, Kobuga Iava Sioa, and Peter Eava, filed separate petitions disputing the result of that election. All three Petitioners seek the same set of relief. They first of all want a declaration from the Court that the Vabukori Council Ward election was a failure, with the consequent effect that the 1^st Respondent, Mr. Reisino Peni, was not duly elected. The Petitioners also seek a re-count of the votes. However, in relation to the relief for recount, the Petitioners ask that if a re-count produces the same result, i.e., if the 1^st Respondent secures a majority again, they want a fresh election for the Ward. It is uncertain why the last relief is craved though.

There are basically two substantive grounds raised in each petition. The first generic ground is an allegation that the 1^st Respondent awarded cleaning contracts to various community and church groups whose members are voters of the Ward. The cleaning contracts were awarded close to the polling dates such that it amounted to bribery or undue influence of voters. The second ground is a generic allegation that counting was not properly done. It is said that as a result of irregularities by counting officials, counting was affected. It is left unsaid though, as to what the regular result would have been, had there been no such irregularities.

OBJECTION NOTICES

The 1^st Respondent filed a notice of objections to competency, against each of the petitions. Whilst these were pending, another set of similarly worded objections was filed for the 2^nd and 3^rd Respondents. However, on the date of hearing, Mr. Kombagle of counsel for the 2^nd and 3^rd Respondents announced that the 2^nd and 3^rd Respondents wished to abandon their application. Mr. Kombagle said he would be making oral submissions instead, in support of the applications filed by the 1^st Respondent. He was granted leave to address the Court as he wished. This cannot prejudice the petitioner but rather it eliminates the need to hear and determine another set of competency applications. However, had there been any move for a consolidated hearing of the separate set of objections, it would have been allowed, for I am firmly of the view that a consolidated hearing of separate but related objections to competency is quite proper.

CONSOLIDATED HEARING OF OBJECTIONS

The 1^st Respondent’s objections, separately filed in respect of each petition, were heard together, as it was convenient for all concerned, including the Court. Separate hearings would have been needless and time consuming. The petitions are similarly worded and seek to invalidate results of the same election. The relief sought are identical and objections by the 1^st Respondent are also same in all cases.

APPLICABLE LAW

These objections are based on sections 208, 209, 210 and 287 of the Organic Law on National and Local Level Government Elections (OLNLLGE). Only subsections (1), (4) and (5) of section 287 are relevant for the current purposes.

For their part the petitioners rely on the scope of section 217, saying it has a wider application and the objections raised are negated by its intent. I will discuss this provision later, at an appropriate juncture. For now I must set out sections 208, 209, 210, and 287, which read:

208. Requisites of petition.

A petition shall—

(a) set out the facts relied on to invalidate the election or return; and

(b) specify the relief to which the petitioner claims to be entitled; and

(c) be signed by a candidate at the election in dispute or by a person who was qualified to vote at the election; and

(d) be attested by two witnesses whose occupations and addresses are stated; and

(e) be filed in the Registry of the National Court at Port Moresby or at the court house in any Provincial headquarters within 40 days after the declaration of the result of the election in accordance with Section 175(1)(a).

209. Deposit as security for costs.

At the time of filing the petition the petitioner shall deposit with the Registrar of the National Court the sum of K2,500.00 as security for costs.

210. No proceedings unless requisites complied with.

Proceedings shall not be heard on a petition unless the requirements of Sections 208 and 209 are complied with.

287. Disputed elections and returns.

(1) Subject to this section, the provisions of Part XVIII of this Law, other than Sections 208(e), 209, 210, 212(2), and 213, shall apply as the provisions of this law relating to disputed Local-level Government elections and returns.
(2) ......
(3) ......

(4) At the time of filing the petition the petitioner shall deposit with the Clerk of the District Court the sum of K50.00 as security for costs.

(5) Proceedings shall not be heard on a petition unless the requirements of Subsections (3) and (4) and Section 208(a) to (d) inclusive are complied with.

OBJECTIONS

Firstly the 1^st Respondent says that the petitions do not disclose sufficient facts; i.e., details of names, dates, specific acts or failures and particulars including how counting results were affected, to show good cause to set aside the election result. It is said the petitioners have therefore failed to comply with the mandatory requirement stipulated in section 208 (a) of the OLNLLGE. Secondly the 1^st Respondent says all three petitions are not properly or at all attested by two witnesses, which is a failure against section 208 (d). It is submitted that the petitions are therefore incompetent.

PETITIONS - GROUNDS

Only two generic grounds are raised in each of these three petitions. The assertions contained in each petition are not only same or similar; they follow the same pattern and sequence in pleading. The same words and phrases are used. It is clear all three petitions were drafted together, possibly by the same draftsman.

The 1^st Respondent obviously thought the numbered paragraphs set out separate and distinct grounds, so he has addressed each of the numbered paragraphs individually and raised objections which are, it is fair to say, only about the manner of presentation than about any ground constituted in the sum of the assertions. This explains why there is needless repetition in the 1^st Respondent’s submissions.

In my view, despite the impression given by the numbering in the pleadings, the petitions raise, at the most, only three distinct grounds; which are one allegation of illegal practice by the 1^st Respondent, amounting to bribery or undue influence, and two, only slightly perceptibly distinct, categories of errors and omissions on the part of the 2^nd and 3^rd Respondents. The last two grounds really can be categorised as one generic allegation of errors or omission by electoral officials during the counting process. The ruling in any one of these two latter grounds will also impact upon the other.

To rule on the objections, I do not intend to state separately the grounds raised. That is not necessary. Instead I shall state them and then simultaneously decide if the pleadings in respect of the grounds live up to the requirements of the law in section 208 of the OLNLLGE.

1. First Ground

The first ground raised in the petitions is contained in the following pleadings, which appear in the first paragraph of all three petitions: “...that the 1^st Respondent, prior to and including the period leading up to the polling date on Saturday 7^th June 2008 and Tuesday 10^th June 2008 did offer cleaning contracts to various selected community and or church groups whose members were electors for the Vabukori Electorate such as Vabukori Village, Taikone and Tainaladeara respectively. Such contract was for money due payable upon completion or after the elections” (sic). It is said this act amounts to bribery or undue influence of electors of the Vabukori Electorate. It is ‘Vabukori Council Ward’, not Vabukori Electorate, but I think the wrong choice of words poses no threat to these petitions.

This first ground raises the issue of illegal practice within the meaning of section 215 (1) of the OLNLLGE, which, if proved, will result in the 1^st Respondent’s election being declared void, ultimately further resulting in a fresh election being held for the Ward.

The Petitioners did not disclose some facts. I say this generally and not in any way with deference to the 1^st Respondent’s submissions on this point. In fact the 1^st Respondent failed to point out which facts are not stated and how the non discloser has prejudiced him. I do not think it is the duty of the Court to determine or work out details like this, thereby allowing parties like the 1^st Respondent a free passage. Yet the Court must, as a matter of law, decide if any non disclosers are sufficient to render the petitions incompetent, so I will have to work out from the pleadings which facts are not disclosed and how the lack of them affects these petitions.
The dates when the cleaning contracts were “offered” are not disclosed. Just how close to the polling dates these contracts were offered will be one of the factors taken into account in deciding if the conduct complained of amounted to undue influence. The period defined as “...prior to and including the period leading up to the polling date on Saturday 7^th June 2008 Tuesday 10^th June 2008...” is too general. Secondly the number of contracts offered and the number of groups involved is not disclosed. Thirdly the reference to contracts being “offered” is not definitive in the circumstances. It is capable of creating some confusion on the part of the respondents and the Court. Being offered is different from being awarded or given. Allegation of being offered cannot immediately indicate whether cleaning contracts were awarded for the purpose of unduly influencing eligible voters of the groups within the villages.

Nevertheless I think the ground pleaded is undue influence. That being so the facts stated are sufficient to identify the misconduct alleged against the 1^st Respondent. Facts disclosed are capable of alerting the 1^st Respondent of the alleged illegal act and the issues created by it. While some facts are not stated I do not think the lack of them is fatal to the petitions. Given the circumstances of these petitions, I think the missing details, though those ought to have been disclosed up front as facts, are also matters of evidence. In any case these details would be presented through relevant witnesses when the time comes to present evidence.
In the end result I must decline to find this first ground incompetent, in relation to all of the three petitions.

2. Second Ground

I think the Petitioners’ second ground is pleaded in paragraphs 2-5 of their petitions. I have to say that this second ground is not clearly pleaded. There seem to be just enough said to conclude that a discernable ground for invalidation of the election result is stated. Beyond that I am unable to pin down the specific facts which constitute and or demonstrate a trial able error or omission.

In said that regard I do appreciate Mr. Nanei’s submission that the petitions were drafted by the Petitioners themselves, or as I have since found, drafted by one of them. I also appreciate that English is an acquired language for the Petitioner who drafted these petitions. However I cannot help noting that these petitions have been drafted by an educated person. Despite the lack of clarity in presentation and alignment or organisation of the facts, so as to make it easier to understand and follow, the choice and use of English words and spelling are indicative of a more than average order of learning. Nevertheless, lest the Court is accused of presuming too much in this regard, I have extrapolated what I think the Petitioners mean to say in relation to this second ground.

I consider the Petitioners are saying that the 3^rd Respondent’s officers failed to account for 145 votes in the final count. They think that after the last elimination count, the third placed candidate’s votes were allocated between the first and second placed candidates, being Mr. Kobuga Sioa and the 1^st Respondent respectively. As a result the 1^st Respondent was declared winner. I understand Mr. Mauri Idau was the second candidate to be eliminated after Mr. Gima Raka, the first candidate to be eliminated.

On the bases of what is disclosed, Mr. Mauri Idau’s votes were not relevant for the final count so this second ground is about how Mr. Peter Eava’s votes were distributed between the 1^st Respondent and Mr. Kobuga Sioa. The Petitioners think only 464 of Mr. Peter Eava’s votes were counted. They seem to have arrived at this conclusion based on the fact that, after distribution of Mr. Peter Eava’s votes, the 1^st Respondent collected 311 votes, to Mr. Kobuga Iava Sioa’s 153. So the major presumption seems to be that, had the rest of Mr. Peter Eava’s votes (145 votes) been distributed the result may have been different. In other words Mr. Kobuga Iava Sioa could have won.

I think it is still early days to say there is merit in the conclusion preferred by the Petitioners. For instance, allowance will be made for the possibility that 2^nd and 3^rd preferences from Mr. Peter Eava’s votes could have been allocated to other eliminated candidates, namely Messrs Mauri Idau and Mr. Gima Raka, and others if any. In that regard the petitioners failed to disclose the number of candidates who nominated and contested the Ward. They even failed to disclose the number of elimination counts done. There is mention of a first, second and final elimination. Where there any other elimination counts, say a fourth or fifth count, before the final count?

The petitioners need to have instilled clarity in the pleadings. They have failed to do that. They have failed to state vital facts. There is a plausible alternative explanation as to what may have happened to or who might have scored the so called unaccounted for (145) votes from Mr. Peter Eava’s elimination. The pleadings make no attempt to rule this possibility or any other possibilities out. The petitions speak of a failure by the electoral officials to do a “quality check”. I guess I shall never know what this means because, as vague as this general assertion is, facts that constitute a ‘quality check’ are not pleaded.

In the end I must find this second ground incompetent and consequently I strike out this ground, in relation to all three petitions.

3. Third Ground

The third ground is a lot simpler, in that there is relative clarity in its pleading, but it is premised upon a vital misconception.

The petitioners say counting was done suspiciously. The petitions allude to tempering of votes, especially when allocating Mr. Peter Eava’s votes between the 1^st Respondent and the runner up, Mr. Kobuga Iava Sioa. They say the counting officials collected ballot papers in bundles and put them in the 1^st Respondent’s tray. The only conclusion left to be drawn from this is that votes scored in the final elimination by Mr. Kobuga Iava Sioa may have been counted as the 1^st Respondent’s, deliberately or otherwise.

However this ground is based upon a misconception. I alluded to the possibility that a ruling on competency in one ground, relative to the counting process, would affect ruling in the other. The misconception is that the Petitioners think Mr. Kobuga Sioa’s votes, scored as 2^nd or 3^rd preferences from Peter Eava’s votes, may have been posted as the 1^st Respondent’s. However it is left unsaid as to which votes may have been counted for the 1^st Respondent. Do they mean the missing 145 votes? Neither the 1^st Respondent nor Mr. Kobuga Iava Sioa could have scored from the missing 145 votes. I already opined that those could have been collected by eliminated candidates.

Of the 464 votes that are accounted for, there seems to be no dispute as to how many votes the 1^st Respondent collected and how many collected by Mr. Kobuga Iava Sioa. If by any chance the petitioners think some votes collected by Mr. Kobuga Iava Sioa in the final count were posted for the 1^st Respondent, the fact of it is not stated in the pleadings. To restate the trite and obvious, a trial cannot be run on a ground or assertion not pleaded in the petition. Such is the nature of election petitions.

For these reasons I also strike down this third and final ground for being incompetent, in relation to all three petitions.

OBJECTION - LACK OF ATTESTATION

The 1^st Respondent identified two defects in relation to the requirement of section 208 (d) and has urged the Court to find all three petitions incompetent. In all three cases witnesses did not signed upon the petition proper. Instead they filed Statutory Declarations. Each of the petitions is accompanied by two Statutory Declarations. The six persons who filed the declarations say the same things in them. Obviously the declarations were prepared for the witnesses by the same person. They averred before the same Commissioner for Oaths and their declarations were filed on the same day. All of them starts his or her attestation by stating their name, after which they repeat a standard phrase “...of Vabukori Village, National Capital District, do solemnly and sincerely declare that I am qualified to vote at the Council Election of Vabukori Ward.” The witnesses then make assertions that apparently serve no attestation purposes but are clearly meant to be evidence in the respective petitions.
Given this scenario, the 1^st Respondent says the petitions are not attested by two witnesses as required by law. Alternatively, even if the Statutory Declarations are accepted as serving the purposes of attestation, nevertheless the attestations are bad for the witnesses’ failure to disclose their respective occupations, thereby rendering the purported attestations incompetent.

It seems the Court must decide whether compliance with section 208 (d) of the OLNLLGE is restricted to attestation upon the body of the petition itself and not outside of it. The Court must also decide if Statutory Declarations are acceptable for purposes of attestation.

Section 208 (d) requires a petition to be “be attested by two witnesses whose occupations and addresses are stated”.

It is now settled law, since Biri -v- Ninkama (SC235), that “an electoral petition disputing the validity of an election addressed to the National Court [read District Court, section 287(2)(d)] and filed pursuant to s. 206 of the Organic Law on National Elections must comply strictly with each and every requirement of s. 208 of that Law.” This pronouncement by the Supreme Court was the result of a reference to it, pursuant to s. 18 (2) of the Constitution, by the National Court of two questions of law that arose in the course of the hearing of a disputed election petition. The question that elicited the answer above was posed as “To what extent must an electoral petition disputing the validity of an election addressed to the National Court and filed pursuant to the Organic Law on National Elections comply with s. 208 of that law.”

It was not within the ambit of the referral (supra) for the Supreme Court to say if it is acceptable to attest a petition outside of the petition document itself. More over, a cursory search of the cases on my part revealed to me no precedents, both National and Supreme Court that may have addressed this factual issue.

Nevertheless I must proceed to decide this issue, and rule on the current applications, by applying the law as I consider the law to be. I have directed my mind to the possibility that there maybe a question in this for referral to the Supreme Court. However I am of the view that if such a course would result in an adjournment of these petitions for an indeterminate period of time, then it is not in the best interests of these parties. Hopefully they may consider their options after the issue is decided by this Court, depending on which of them is adversely affected by the ruling on the issue.

Where attestation is not upon the body of the petition document and there is purported attestation outside of it, I think it is possible to say if it was attestation as a conscious and deliberate fulfilment of a mandatory requirement of law. It is possible say if the attestation is by default or ‘accidental’. However I do not think these Petitioners’ witnesses’ attestation fall into the latter category.

Having said that, in my view, where all the required details of attestation are present, whether upon the body of the petition or outside of it, it will suffice that the purposes for attestation are served. I say this because it is not a requirement of section 208 (d) that attestation is to be strictly upon the body of the petition. This provision merely requires a petition to be “be attested by two witnesses whose occupations and addresses are stated”.

In my view, there is substantial compliance with attestation requirements if, at the time of filing of the petition, or at anytime within 40 days from thence or in any event before the expiration of a period allowed for amendment, an affidavit or Statutory Declaration or other such instrument on oath is filed by two witnesses whose address and occupation are stated upon the affidavit or Statutory Declaration or such other instrument.

In my view the genuineness of a petition can be attested to by an instrument filed to serve the purpose, say by an affidavit. Even if it was not filed purposely for attestation, nevertheless if the details required for proper attestation are disclosed, then that is effective attestation for the purposes of that requirement.

In a similar situation, whilst deciding on the purpose of the address requirement in section 208 (d) Sheehan J said in Agonia v Karo [1992] PNGLR 463:

“The whole purpose of requiring that an attesting witness supplies name, occupation and address is so that the witness is readily identified and able to be located.” (at page 465)

Quite obviously these three Petitioners intended to comply with the requirement for attestation. They thought the best way to secure attestation was to have two witnesses file Statutory Declarations. As I alluded to above, the six witnesses averred before a single Commissioner for Oaths and filed their declarations on the same day. The declarations were filed on 17^th July 2008, which is within the 40 days filing period. Therefore I must accept that the respective sets of Statutory Declarations filed in these three petitions are attestations within the meaning of section 208 (d) of the OLNLLGE. In my view there is full and substantial compliance.

However the issue of attestation does not end at this juncture, with this immediate ruling.

The 1^st Respondent acknowledges that two Statutory Declarations are on the respective petitions. However he says that even if these are to be considered as serving the requirements for attestation, a vital feature of attestation, which is discloser of the attesting witnesses’ occupations, is not stated. He submits that this failure renders the respective attestations incomplete and defective and contrary to the requirements of section 208 (d) of the OLNLLGE.

It cannot be disputed by anyone, including the Petitioners that the attesting witnesses did not disclose their respective occupations, even though they did state their names and addresses. To my mind this failure is fatal to these three petitions.

Mr. Nanei submits that the witnesses have in fact disclosed their occupations. He says the witnesses’ sufficiently identified themselves as “voters”. He also submits that since the word occupation is defined to mean a “person’s regular work or profession, job or principal activity, or any activity on which time is spent by a person”, the attesting witnesses’ occupation in the circumstances of PNG is inappropriate as the majority of voters are unemployed.

All I can say is that this line of argument cannot hold and Mr. Nanei ought to know that. The requirements of section 208, including that of subsection (d), are mandatory requirements of the OLNLLGE. Needless to say it is not within the discretion of the District Court to rule a compulsory requirement of a constitutional law ‘inappropriate’, whatever the circumstances of the country may be.

APPLICATION OF SECTION 217 OF THE OLNLLGE

The Petitioners have adopted a stance that there is sufficient laxity found in section 217 of the OLNLLGE to overcome the apparent lack of discloser of the witnesses’ occupations. It reads:

“217. Real justice to be observed
The National Court shall be guided by the substantial merits and good conscience of each case without regard to legal forms or technicalities, or whether the evidence before it is in accordance with the law of evidence or not.”

The petitioners submit that the failure of the attesting witnesses to state their respective occupations is a minor omission. They say that LLG petitions ought to be dealt with in a much simpler way than the National Court proceedings for Parliamentary elections.

I will repeat this for their benefit: The requirements of section 208, including that of subsection (d), are mandatory requirements of constitutional law. People need to understand that. In my view it is incumbent upon lawyers to inform their clients of these matters, particularly the requirements of binding precedents.

In that regard it is useful to cite an excerpt of a judgment by Injia J (as he then was) in Albert Karo -v- Carol Kidu (N1626). I think it succinctly summarizes the pivotal requirements of the relevant provisions of the OLNLLGE that are in issue in the instant competency applications. The Deputy Chief Justice was then also dealing with this same issue, of the scope and application of section 217 of the OLNLLGE, in the context of a similar set of objections on competency that were before him.

“The Supreme Court in Biri v Ninkama, decided that an “electoral petition disputing the validity of an election addressed to the National Court and filed pursuant to S. 206 of the Organic Law on National Elections must strictly comply with each and every requirement of S. 208 of that Law” (at p. 346, underlining is mine). At p. 345, the Supreme Court unanimously decided that “all the requirements in S. 208 and 209 must be complied with. Section 208 is in mandatory terms and being the Organic Law on National elections, it is a Constitutional Law. Section 210 simply precludes any proceedings unless S. 208 and S. 209 are complied with. If “a petition does not comply with all the requirements of S. 208, then there can be no proceedings on the petition because of S. 210” (at p. 345). The application of S. 217 is “only relevant when the National Court determines the merits of the case and when dealing with evidence before it as relevant to the merits” (at p. 346), that is, when the substantive petition is heard. Section 217 does not apply at the preliminary stage when the National Court is dealing with a question of whether a petition complies with the requirements of S. 208.” (Underline added)

The Petitioners, maintaining their contention that election petition hearings, at whatever stage, are meant to be simple proceedings, have also found some excuse in section 222 of the OLNLLGE. They say if lawyers have no right of appearance without leave of court, that surely confirms the need for simplicity, more so in relation to LLG election petitions.

Nevertheless, the sincerity of these petitioners’ argument on the point notwithstanding, the case of Albert Karo -v- Carol Kidu (supra) is, for this instant Court, binding precedent. The clarity of its verdict is such that I cannot do more than cite it. Consequently, all I can say is that the petitioners’ reliance upon any perceived laxity in section 217, for the purposes of these competency applications, is misplaced. It seems clear to me that section 217 of the OLNLLGE has no application during competency application hearings.

I have deliberately left the decision on the determinative ground, in relation to the fate of these petitions, last. In deference to the Petitioners, I consider that had the fate of their petitions been swiftly determined on the bases of the first ground of objection only, it would have been pointless to then go on to consider the competence of the allegations raised in the other grounds. Therefore the viability of the other grounds was considered first, albeit even if only for the record. I think not deciding on the merits or otherwise of the other grounds would have rendered this judgment incomplete.

In the same vein of thought I feel compelled to say that the right to vote and stand for elective public office is a right bestowed by law, namely the Constitution, to those eligible to participate. As to who is eligible is also defined by law. Just how that right may be exercised is prescribed by law. As to who, how, when and where election results can be challenged is prescribed by the same constitutional laws that grant the right to vote and contest elections or challenge election results. These rights are neither customary nor hereditary.

Whilst we enjoy the privileges granted by law, must also adhere to all that the law requires of us. When it comes to matters like these, particularly election processes, it would seem to make no difference whether people are villagers or city dwellers, whether they are educated or unlearned, or indeed whether they are simple or complicated people. The application of the legal regime that regulates the election process applies without distinction or discrimination, unless of course the distinction or discrimination is a matter of the legal regime itself.

In the end result I declare that these three petitions are bad for the reason that the respective attesting witnesses have failed to disclose their respective occupations. Their failure offends against the mandatory requirements of section 208 (d) of the OLNLLGE. Consequently I dismiss all three petitions for being incompetent.

The Respondents shall have their costs of these proceedings. Costs shall reflect the fact that there has been a consolidated hearing of these objections. In any case costs maybe taxed if the parties are unable to agree on the same.

______________________________________________________

J. B. Nanei & Co. Lawyers for the Petitioners
Baniyamai Lawyers for the 1^st Respondent
Parua Lawyers for the 2^nd & 3^rd Respondents