United Micronesian Development Association v New Hampshire Fire Insurance Co [1982] TTLawRp 1; 8 TTR 225 (6 January 1982)

UNITED MICRONESIAN DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

NEW HAMPSHIRE FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant

Civil Appeal No. 344

Appellate Division of the High Court

Northern Mariana Islands District

January 6, 1982

Appeal from a jury verdict for plaintiffs. The Appellate Division of the High Court, Gianotti, Associate Justice, held that in each of five grounds of appeal raised, the issue was a matter of the trial court's discretion and the trial court did not abuse such discretion, and therefore the judgment was affirmed.

1. Appeal and Error-Prejudicial Error

Comments made in chambers by a trial court judge to counsel is generally not a sufficient ground for mistrial.

2. Appeal and Error-Prejudicial Error

Statement by presiding judge, at a conference in chambers with counsel present, that he felt the verdict would not be in favor of the defendant, was not a sufficient ground for a mistrial.

3. Trial-Instructions

In many instances improper remarks of counsel, in the opening statement, during the trial, or in the concluding argument, may be cured by an instruction to the jury.

4. Appeal and Error-Prejudicial Error

Certain possibly improper statements made by defense counsel during closing argument, referring to witnesses as "slick" and "ping pong," were not a valid basis for setting aside the verdict, where the trial court sustained defendant's objection to the use of the statements and made a curative instruction to the jury.

5. Jury-Special Questions

The submission of specific questions to the jury at the close of trial is within the discretion of the trial court.

6. Jury-Sequestration

Generally, a mere violation of a sequestration order does not compel the trial court to declare a mistrial.

7. Jury-Deliberations

The general rule is that the haste or shortness of time taken by a jury in arriving at its verdict has no effect upon the validity of the verdict.

8. Appeal and Error-Affirmance-Grounds

Contention of defendant on appeal that each of five grounds of appeal in itself would not justify a mistrial, but all of them accumulated are a basis for error, was without merit, where each of the individual grounds for appeal were without foundation.

Counsel for Appellant:	E. R. CRAIN, ESQ., CRAIN, MOORE, AND LAYNE, P.O. Box 795, Saipan, CM 96950
Counsel for Appellee:	MICHAEL A. WHITE, ESQ., WHITE AND NOVO-GRADAC, P.O. Box 222 CHRB, Saipan, CM 96950

Before NAKAMURA, Associate Justice, GIANOTTI, Associate Justice

GIANOTTI, Associate Justice

This is an appeal from a verdict rendered November 13, 1978, and a judgment the same day in favor of the plaintiff-appellee, United Micronesian Development Association, against New Hampshire Fire Insurance Company, defendant-appellant.

There are approximately five grounds for appeal raised by appellant, none of which raises any particular involved legal issue; however, as appellant stated in his opening brief, on page 2 :

This case is unique in that, among other considerations, it was the first civil jury trial ever had in the High Court of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands in the Northern Marianas.

For this reason, we think it necessary to discuss the particular grounds of appeal in light of the present tendencies of the new political entities now formed in Micronesia to allow jury trials under certain circumstances.

The appellant's primary argument appears to have been that none of the separate grounds raised is sufficient to reverse the finding, however, that all of the grounds accumulated in one complaint necessitates reversal.

We disagree.

In considering this opinion, one primary factor must be recognized. On each of the grounds of appeal brought by appellant, the question raised was a matter within the trial judge's discretion. This Court fails to find any case of an abuse of his discretion.

[1] Sometime during the trial, the presiding judge, at a conference in chambers with counsel present, apparently made a statement he (the trial judge) felt the verdict would not be in favor of the defendant-appellant. This sort of statement is not as uncommon as the appellant would like us to believe and generally is not a sufficient ground for mistrial.

If the trial court judge does not force his will upon the parties, and they are both aware of his remarks, especially when represented by counsel, comments in chambers ordinarily have been held not to be prejudicial 6 A.L.R.3rd 1466, citing numerous cases.
Even where he names the amount which he thinks should be paid, a trial judge's suggestion to the defendant's counsel out of hearing of the jury that he ought to settle the case does not violate a constitutional provision guaranteeing impartial judges. 6 A.L.R.3rd 1457, as discussed in 75 Am. Jur. 2d Trials § 101.

[2] Clearly, this suggestion was made out of hearing of the parties and there is no reason to believe that the statement of the trial judge in any way influenced the jury verdict.

The second ground raised by appellant has to do with certain statements made by appellee's counsel during closing arguments, specifically references to one of the witnesses being described by the word "slick," and another statement in regards to one of the defendant's employees described by the word "ping pong." The appellant would have us believe that the use of these words influenced the jury's decision. Appellant fails, however, to advise us that both of these statements were objected to by appellant's counsel and the objections were in fact sustained as to the use of the terms with the statement by the Court.

"I believe you are going beyond what has been shown, Mr. White."

See Partial Transcript, p. 4.

The trial judge advised the jury of the following instruction:

"On opening instructions I told you that the statements and arguments are not evidence. At that time I think I told you that we could ignore anything that counsel had to say as long as they were talking, as long as they were arguing. Well, perhaps I understated it. You do not have to accept anything that counsel says to you in argument. His argument is only to guide you and to attempt to influence you to do the one basic task that you have and that is to listen to and be guided by the facts." (Closing Instructions.)

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