Trust Territory v Edwin [1979] TTLawRp 3; 8 TTR 23 (9 February 1979)

8 TTR 23

TRUST TERRITORY OF THE PACIFIC ISLANDS, Defendant-Appellant

v.

PETRUS EDWIN, PEINA HAREY, and ERMES PAUL, Plaintiffs-Appellees

Civil Appeal No. 221

Appellate Division of the High Court

Truk District

February 9, 1979

Defendant government appealed from judgment against it. The Appellate Division of the High Court, Laureta, Temporary Justice, held that in action for compensation for damages to taro and soil, wherein defendant claimed court's view of the taro patches was objectionable in that a certain finding could be derived only from the view and a view is never permissible for the purpose of admission of substantive evidence, it was unnecessary for court on appeal to select the precise line of authority, among conflicting lines, as to the purpose of a view and whether it constitutes evidence; the evidence sufficiently supported the judgment for plaintiffs.

1. Appeal and Error-Evidence-Sufficiency

Record and transcript on appeal showed ample grounds for trial court's determination that sufficient evidence was introduced to justify denying motions to dismiss as against individual plaintiffs.

2. Evidence-View-Purpose

In action for compensation for damages to taro and soil, wherein defendant claimed court's view of the taro patches was objectionable in that a certain finding could be derived only from the view and a view is never permissible for the purpose of admission of substantive evidence, it was unnecessary for court on appeal to select the precise line of authority among conflicting lines, as to the purpose of a view and whether it constitutes evidence; the evidence sufficiently supported the judgment for plaintiffs.

3. Evidence-Weight

In action for compensation for damages to taro and soil the trial court was not compelled to accept either in whole or in part any one of the various conflicting statements made by witnesses as to the extent, nature or value of the damage.

4. Evidence-View-Purpose

One of the purposes of a view of the evidence out of court is to assist in gauging and estimating the reliability of the testimony given.

5. Appeal and Error-Waiver and Estoppel-Matters Considered

Party which acquiesced in out-of-court view by the court could not come forth on appeal and allege error in regard to the view.

6. Appeal and Error-Scope of Review-Weight of Evidence

Appellate Division may not reweigh the evidence and decide whether it should reach the same conclusion as the lower court as to the facts.

7. Real Property-Negligence-Damage Shown

Judgment that oil spill from gas station and power plant damaged plaintiffs' fields was supported by evidence that plant and station were in the vicinity of, and on higher ground than, the fields, and that in the operation of the facilities diesel fuel spilled onto the ground and into ditches and was carried to plaintiffs' fields.

8. Judgments-Damages-Limitation by Pleadings

Where plaintiff suing for damages for loss of taro plants due to oil spill caused by defendants' negligence pled the loss of 500 plants the court was not limited to finding he lost 500 plants and could grant judgment for the loss of 950 plants.

9. Real Property-Damages-Loss of Use

Loss of use of taro lands due to oil spilled upon them because of negligence of defendants could be awarded by the court in damages action.

10. Contract-Construction-Parol Evidence

A fully integrated agreement of a contractual nature may not be varied by extrinsic evidence, written or oral, so as to add to, subtract from, or contradict its provisions.

11. Release-Construction-Construction Against Drafter

A release should be strictly construed against the party drafting it.

12. Release-Construction-Error in Preparation

Where government prepared release form signed by person whose land was damaged by government's oil spill, the government, absent justifiable excuse, could not later claim it erred in its creation.

Counsel for Appellant:	District Attorney's Office, Truk District PHILLIP W. JOHNSON, ESQ.
Counsel for Appellees:	Micronesian Legal Services Corporation MICHAEL DE ANGELO, ESQ. DANIEL MACMEEKIN

Before BURNETT, Chief Justice, GIANOTTI, Associate Justice, LAURETA, Temporary Justice

LAURETA, Temporary Justice

In February 1975, appellees Petrus Edwin and Peina Harey filed individual complaints against the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands and Mobil Oil Micronesia, Inc., seeking compensation for damages to their taro and soil. The damages occurred as a result of defendant's alleged negligence in allowing oil to spill from the Public Works Gas Station and the Power Plant, sometime in 1972. In April 1977, appellee Ermes Paul filed a similar complaint alleging damages since 1973. The three cases were consolidated for trial, and trial without a jury was had from June 2-3, 1977. Judgment was entered on June 7, 1977, awarding damages for loss of taro and loss of use of taro paddies in the amount of $1,496.00 to Petrus Edwin, $1,625.00 to Peina Harey and $1,308.30 to Ermes Paul. The Court assessed liability against Mobil Oil Micronesia, Inc., for one twentieth (1/20) and against the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands for nineteen twentieths (19/20) of the judgment. On July 5, 1977, appellant filed a Notice of Appeal; Mobil Oil Micronesia, Inc., has not appealed the judgment.

Appellant raises several grounds for appeal, all of which we consider separately.

Failure To Grant Motion To Dismiss

At the close of plaintiffs' case, appellant moved to dis-miss all three cases on the grounds of insufficient evidence, the Court stating that: " . . . The court notes that under Rule 30, at this junction of the trial, that the question is whether the plaintiff has failed to introduce sufficient evidence to warrant any relief against the defendant."

Defendants made their motions pursuant to Rule 30d (4) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which outlines the procedure to be followed in trial. The section notes the propriety of consideration by the Court at the close of plaintiffs' case, the question whether the plaintiff has failed to introduce sufficient evidence to warrant any relief against a defendant.

The foundation in this action is Rule 33b which partially states: