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Kirabuke v Republic [1974] NRSC 1; [1969-1982] NLR (D) 31 (22 November 1974)

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NAURU

Criminal Appeal No. 16 of 1974

KIRABUKE

v

THE REPUBLICt>

22nd N2nd November, 1974.

Criminal law - judgment - need for magistrate to make clear finding of every
disputed fact in issue and to give reasonm>

Criminal law - intent to commit offence of unlawf wounding - test oest of intent is subjective.

Appeal against conviction for unlawful wounding. It was not disputed that tpellant and the alleged victim quarrelled and struggleuggled physically with one another and that in the course of that struggle the appellant picked up his fishing spear and subsequently the spear pierced the alleged victim's leg, causing a small wound. The defence case was that the appellant picked up the spear to protect himself against an assault by the alleged victim and that the alleged victim struggled to take it from him and was accidentally stabbed in the process. The magistrate reviewed the evidence and commented upon it but made no clear findings of fact. In the course of the appeal it was argued that the wounding was the natural and probable consequence of the appellant's acts and that he must be taken to have foreseen and intended it.

Held: (1) The magistrate made no clear finding of fact on the issue of intent to wound. He should have done so in respect of every disputed fact in issue.

(2) The test of intent is subjective and intent could not be infurred merely because the wounding was the natural and probable consequence of the appellant's acts.

B. Dowiyogo for the appellant
J.H. Berriman for the respondent

Thompson C. J:

The appellant a Gilbertese employee of the, Nauru Phosphate Corporation was convicted in the District Court of wounding Matanea Eria, another Gilbertese employee of the Corporation. He was sentenced to served two months imprisonment.

The charge arose out of an incident in the Corporation's Location late at night. The appellant and Matanea were sitting outside the quarters where they live when a quarrel started. In the course of it the appellant picked up a fishing spear which he had under a mat. He and Matanea struggled for it. In the struggle the spear pierced Matanea's leg, causing a small wound.

The prosecution case was that the appellant and Matanea were having a conversation when the appellant made some remarks about Matanea's girlfriend and told him that she did not love him; that Matanea countered by saying to the appellant "Where is your wife?" It was alleged that the appellant then picked up the spear and told Matanea to watch out, meaning that he was going to spear him. Then the struggle for the spear ensued.

The appellant's case was that Matanea started the quarrel and challenged him to fight; and that he picked up the spear to defend himself.

Evidence of the events leading up to the struggle for the spear was given by Matanea, for the prosecution, and by the appellant himself. One witness, called by the prosecution, gave evidence of coming to the scene when the two men were struggling for the spear. He did not know anything about the preceding events. Another witness, called by the defence, said that he heard the noise of a struggle and when he went outside saw the two men bending down together but not struggling. That witness also said that he heard Matanea ask the appellant why he had sent his wife away and the appellant replied "You have nothing to do with it ... she has done nothing wrong". He gave evidence that he though that Matanea wanted to fight the appellant and that he heard the appellant asking Matanea to go away.

The learned magistrate, who had the advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses give their evidence, rejected the evidence of the witness called by the defence because of his demeanour hearing the of the witness and because he apparently did not answer frankly some questions put to him about discussions he might have had with other people about the incident. Although the learned magistrate reviewed the evidence in considerable detail and said that he accepted certain portions of Matanea's evidence, he did not expressly reject the evidence of the appellant. He commented "The act of aiming the spear at the Complainant which is an aggressive act and saying "Watch Out" is in my opinion sufficient to foresee the possibility of the Complainant being wounded". But he did not expressly find that the appellant did aim the spear at Matanea and say "Watch Out". The only finding of fact recorded as such is contained in the last paragraph of the judgment which reads:

"On the evidence before this Court I am satisfied that the Accused did cause the injury to the Complainant. I therefore hold that the Prosecution has proved its case beyond all reasonable doubt and I find the Accused guilty of the charge and convict him".

In a case such as the present where a number of facts are not in issue, and the question of the accused person's guilt depends on a few facts in dispute and evidence of those few facts is given by only one witness on each side, it is very important that the judgment of the trial magistrate should set out clearly his findings as to those facts and his reasons for those findings. Having found those facts he must consider whether they establish the offence charged.

In this present case it is not clear whether the learned magistrate found as fact that the appellant seized his spear and threatened to attack Matanea with it or that he got hold of it to defend himself, as he has asserted, if he was attacked. Although the nature of the weapon was such that it would not have been lawful to use it to strike at Matanea even in self-defence, the question whether the appellant did strike at Matanea with it should have been decided in order to determine whether the appellant intended to wound Matanea, Mr. Berriman has submitted that the appellant must be taken to have foreseen the natural and probable consequences of his act and to have intended them. That is an over-simplification of the matter. The proper test of intent is subjective and, although the consequences, of a man's act are evidence from which his intention may be deduced, they cannot be taken in isolation but must be considered together with any other evidence of what he intended.

The prosecution had to prove that the appellant intended to wound Matanea. If, as he has stated in his evidence, he did not strike at, or threaten to strike at, Matanea and there was merely a struggle for possession of the spear it is not proper in my view to conclude, in the absence of any other evidence of intent, that the appellant intended to wound Matanea.

Mr. Dowiyogo has submitted that the issue of provocation should also have been considered. In view of the provisions of Section 268 of the Criminal Code, that the defence of provocation is limited to offences "of which an assault is an element" and since an assault is not an element of the offence of unlawful wounding (R. v Johnson (1964) Qd.R.1) there was not, in fact, any issue of provocation to be considered.

However, the absence of any adequate findings of fact in the judgment and of any consideration of those facts in relation to the issue of whether the appellant intended to strike at Matanea with the spear make it impossible to know whether or not the learned magistrate was satisfied beyond all reasonable doubt as to all the elements of the offence with which the appellant was charged and applied the law correctly to the facts as he found them. That being so, the conviction cannot be left to stand.

The conviction is quashed and the sentence is set aside.


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