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District Court of Nauru |
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF NAURU
AT YAREN
CRIMINAL JURISDICTION
Criminal Case No. 41 of 2023
BETWEEN:
CARUSO AMWANO
APPLICANT
AND:
THE REPUBLIC OF NAURU
RESPONDENT
BEFORE: Acting Resident Magistrate Vinay Sharma
DATE OF HEARING: 15 and 17 January 2024
DATE OF RULING: 19 January 2024
APPEARANCE:
APPLICANT: R Tom
RESPONDENT: K Itsimerea & S Shah
RULING
[Application for Variation of Bail Conditions]
INTRODUCTION
That the Applicant humbly seeks a bail variation under his bail condition number 3 and is to be granted his driver licence.
Statement of Offence
Dangerous Driving Occasioning Grievous Bodily Harm: contrary to Section 67B(1)(d) of the Motor Traffic Act 2014.
Particulars of Offence
Caruso Amwano on the 2nd day of October 2023 at Meneng District, Nauru drove a grey Mazda Tribute with registered license plate TT1130 and was involved in an impact occasioning grievous bodily harm to Febriano Baguga and Caruso Amwano was, at the time of the impact, driving the said motor vehicle in a manner that was reckless or negligent.
APPLICANT’S REASONS FOR BAIL VARIATION
RESPONDENT’S POSITION WITH REGARD TO THE VARIATION APPLICATION
CONSIDERATIONS
Applicable Laws
31 Power of review
(1) A Resident Magistrate may review any decision made by a police officer in relation to bail.
(2) A Resident Magistrate may review a decision made by another Resident Magistrate, including a reviewing Resident Magistrate, in relation to bail.
(3) The Supreme Court may review any decision made by it, by a Resident Magistrate or by a police officer in relation to bail.
(4) The Nauru Court of Appeal may review any decision made by it in relation to bail.
(5) A court which has power to review a bail determination, or to hear a fresh application under Section 15(1), may, if not satisfied that there are special facts or circumstances that justify a review, or the making of afresh application, refuse to hear the review or application.
(6) The power to review a decision under this Part in relation to an accused person may be exercised only at the request of the:
(a) accused person;
(b) police officer who instituted the proceedings for the offence of which the person is accused;
(c) Secretary for Justice;
(d) Director of Public Prosecutions; or
(e) victim of the offence.
(7) The power to review a decision under this Part includes the power to confirm, reverse or vary the decision.
(8) The review shall be by way of a rehearing, and evidence or information given or obtained on the making of the decision may be given or obtained on review. (emphasis added)
22 Conditions of bail
...
(2) The court shall have jurisdiction to review the conditions of bail where:
(a) an accused person breaches the conditions of the bail undertaking;
(b) an accused person is charged with or convicted or sentenced for a separate offence;
(c) an accused person seeks variation for personal, humane, compassionate or health reasons; or
(d) circumstances exist, which in the view of the Resident Magistrate, a Judge or Justice of Appeal, justifies a review of the conditions of bail. (emphasis added)
[11] The Bail Act 2018 allows an accused person to make any number of fresh applications if there is change in circumstances, and the effect of the 2 subsections is that it allows the court to review bail conditions if: “there are special facts and circumstances (s.31(5)) and “to vary the bail conditions” (s.31(7)), if the court deems it appropriate.
[6] The statutory test for a renewed application for bail is whether there are special facts or circumstances to consider releasing the Accused on bail. This is the test provided by section 30 (7) of the Act. That section states:
A court which has power to review a bail determination, or hear a fresh application under section 14(1), may, if not satisfied that there are special facts or circumstances, that justify a review, or the making of a fresh application, refuse to hear review or application.
[7] The statutory test appears to be more stringent than the common law test of material change in circumstances applied by this Court in the earlier cases of renewed applications for bail (see, Nagata v State – Bail Ruling [2015] FJHC 644; HAM152.2015 (31 August 2015), State v Dhamendra [2016] FJHC 386; HAM58.2016 (10 May 2016)).
[8] The Bail Act has not defined the phrase ‘special facts or circumstances’ but has left it to the courts to decide on case by case basis. The word ‘special’ has been given the meaning exceptional or unusual in a number of cases. For the facts to be special they must be “peculiar to the particular case which set it apart from other cases" (Lyon v Wilcox [1994] 3 NZLR 422, 431 (CA), following the Full Court in Re M [1993] NZFLR 74). For circumstances to be special they must be exceptional, abnormal or unusual (Crabtree v Hinchliffe (Inspector of Taxes) [1971] 3 All ER 967,976 (Lord Reid), 983 (Viscount Dilhorne)). (emphasis added)
...A successful application to vary bail conditions results in the court — in granting the application to vary — making a fresh grant of bail with new conditions.
Whether there are any special facts and/or circumstances that justify a review of the bail determination made on 6 October 2023?
Whether fresh grant of bail should be refused in the interests of justice?
Bail Conditions
5 Rights following the grant of bail
(1) An accused person who is in custody for an offence and who has been granted bail is entitled to be released, upon giving a bail undertaking, and subject to Section 26, to remain at liberty until required to appear before a court in accordance with the bail undertaking.
18 Refusal of bail
(1) A person making submissions to a court against the presumption in favour of bail shall address the:
(a) likelihood of the accused person not surrendering to custody and not appearing in court;
(b) interests of the accused person; and
(c) public interest and the protection of the community. (emphasis added)
19 Reasons for refusing bail
...
(2) In forming the opinion required by subsection (1), a police officer or court shall have regard to all the relevant circumstances and in particular:
...
(b) in relation to the interests of the accused person:
(i) the length of time the accused person is likely to have to remain in custody before the case is heard;
(ii) the conditions of that custody;
(iii) the need for the accused person to obtain legal advice and to prepare a defence;
(iv) the need for the accused person to be at liberty for other lawful purposes such as employment, education, care of dependants;
(v) whether the accused person is a child, in which case Section 4C applies; or
(vi) whether the accused person is incapacitated by injury or intoxication or otherwise in danger or in need of physical protection; and
(c) in relation to the public interest and the protection of the community:
(i) any previous failure by the accused person to surrender to custody or to observe bail conditions;
(ii) the likelihood of the accused person interfering with evidence, witnesses or assessors or any specially affected person; or
(iii) the likelihood of the accused person committing an arrestable offence while on bail. (emphasis added)
22 Conditions of bail
...
(3) The conditions imposed for the granting of bail under subsection (1) may include:
(a) that the accused person surrender any passports or travel documents in his or her possession to an authorised officer;
(b) that the accused person be barred from applying for or obtaining any passport or travel documents;
(c) that the accused person not commit an offence while released on bail;
(d) that the accused person provide one or more sureties who acknowledge that he or she is acquainted with the accused person and regards the accused person, as a responsible person who is likely to comply with a bail undertaking;
(e) that the accused person not interfere with witnesses;
(f) that the accused person enters into an agreement, without security, to forfeit a specified amount of money into the Courts Trust Fund if the accused person fails to comply with his or her bail undertaking;
(g) that one or more sureties enters into an agreement, without security, to forfeit a specified amount of money into the Courts Trust Fund if the accused person fails to comply with his or her bail undertaking;
(h) that the accused person enters into an agreement, and deposits acceptable security, to forfeit a specified amount of money into the Courts Trust Fund, if the accused person fails to comply with his or her bail undertaking;
(i) that one or more sureties enters into an agreement, and deposits acceptable security, to forfeit a specified amount of money into the Courts Trust Fund, if the accused person fails to comply with his or her bail undertaking;
(j) that the accused person deposits with an authorised officer of the court a specified amount of money in cash and enters into an agreement to forfeit the amount deposited into the Courts Trust Fund, if the accused person fails to comply with his or her bail undertaking;
(k) that one or more sureties deposits with an authorised officer of the court a specified amount of money in cash and enter into an agreement to forfeit the amount deposited into the Courts Trust Fund, if the accused person fails to comply with his or her bail undertaking; or
(l) such other conditions as the court may deem fit.
[81] In Antic, this Court set out the proper approach to the Code’s bail provisions when it addressed the overuse of cash bail and sureties. As issues concerning bail are particularly evasive of review (see Penunsi, at para. 11), it has become necessary to build upon the Antic framework and provide guidance on non-monetary conditions of bail and the serious consequences which flow from their breach.
[82] We can learn a great deal about how to set bail conditions upon seeing how they become criminal offences under s. 145(3). Each condition added onto a release order not only limits the freedom of someone presumed to be innocent, it creates a new risk of criminal liability, particular to the accused, and may result in the loss of liberty, whether through bail revocation or imprisonment. The direct connection between the behaviour addressed in bail conditions and the conduct which is criminalized under s. 145(3) flows both ways. The individualized process of setting bail conditions moves forward into and informs the subjective fault standard for breach. Conversely, understanding how s. 145(3) gives rise to potential criminal liability reinforces that the principles of restraint and review must guide the initial decision to impose bail conditions in practice. Section 145(3) therefore provides an essential perspective through which we can consider the general bail principles; concerns over specific conditions; and how all those involved in the bail system have responsibilities in respect of restraint and review.
A. General Principles Governing Bail Conditions
[83] All those involved in setting bail terms must turn their minds to the general principles for setting bail, which restrain how bail conditions are set. As the default position in the Code is bail without conditions, the first issue is whether a need for any condition has been demonstrated. Restraint and the ladder principle require anyone proposing to add bail conditions to consider if any of the risks in s. 515(10) are at issue and understand which specific risks might arise if the accused is released without conditions: is this person a flight risk, will their release pose a risk to public protection and safety, or is their release likely to result in a public loss of confidence in the administration of justice?
[84] Only conditions which target those specific s. 515(10) risk(s) are necessary. If an accused is a flight risk, but poses no other risks, only those conditions that minimize their risk of absconding should be imposed. Similarly, if an accused poses a risk to public safety and protection, only the least onerous conditions to address that specific threat should be imposed (R. v. S.K., 1998 CanLII 13344 (Sask. Prov. Ct.), at paras. 16-19). Further, such conditions will not be necessary for public protection and safety merely because an accused poses a risk of committing another offence while on bail, unless they pose a “substantial likelihood” of committing an offence that endangers public protection and safety (Morales, at pp. 736-37; s. 515(10)(b)). Any condition imposed to maintain confidence in the administration of justice must be based on a consideration of the combined effect of all the relevant circumstances from the perspective of a reasonable member of the public, especially the four factors set out in s. 515(10)(c): the apparent strength of the prosecution’s case, the gravity of the offence, the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offence, and whether the accused is liable for a potential lengthy term of imprisonment (St-Cloud, at paras. 55-71 and 79).
[85] The requirement of necessity also means that the particular condition must attenuate risks that would otherwise prevent the accused’s release without that condition. Conditions cannot be imposed for gratuitous or punitive purposes (Antic, at para. 67(j); Birtchnell, at paras. 27-28; R. v. McDonald, 2010 ABQB 770, at paras. 34-36 (CanLII)). A condition that may be suitable for a sentencing purpose, like rehabilitation, will not be appropriate unless it is directed towards the risks in s. 515(10) (Omeasoo, at para. 31). Conditions should not be behaviourally-based (R. v. K. (R.), 2014 ONCJ 566, at paras. 14-19 (CanLII); J.A.D., at paras. 9 and 11). A condition that merely seems “good to have”, but is not necessary for the accused’s release, is not appropriate (Birtchnell, at para. 40). Even if some condition is thought to be therapeutic, intended to help, or “couldn’t hurt,” the prospect of additional criminal liability under s. 145(3) means any such limits on otherwise lawful behavior may also attract criminal penalties. Restraint was emphasized by the Court in Antic, at para. 67(j):
Terms of release imposed under s. 515(4) may “only be imposed to the extent that they are necessary” to address concerns related to the statutory criteria for detention and to ensure that the accused can be released. They must not be imposed to change an accused person’s behaviour or to punish an accused person. [Footnote omitted.]
[86] Moreover, bail conditions must be sufficiently linked to the defined statutory risks. They should be as narrowly defined as possible to meet their objective of addressing the risks under s. 515(10) (R. v. D.A., 2014 ONSC 2166, [2014] O.J. No. 2059 (QL), at paras. 14-17; R. v. Pammett, 2014 ONSC 5597, at paras. 10-12 (CanLII); R. v. Clarke, [2000] O.J. No. 5738 (QL) (Sup. Ct.), at paras. 9 and 12; K. (R.), at paras. 14-19; J.A.D., at paras. 9 and 11). As with the setting of probation conditions, the level of connection between a non-enumerated condition and a risk under s. 515(10) should be comparable to the clear linkages between the enumerated conditions in s. 515(4) and the risks under s. 515(10) (R. v. Shoker, 2006 SCC 44, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 399, at paras. 13-14). This Court in Penunsi recently emphasized this in relation to conditions on peace bonds:
Where the condition is not demonstrably connected to the alleged fear, it may merely set the defendant up for breach . . . Any condition should not be so onerous as effectively to constitute a detention order by setting the defendant up to fail. [Citations omitted; para. 80.]
[87] A bail condition must be reasonable. As with probation conditions, bail conditions cannot contravene federal or provincial legislation or the Charter (Shoker, at para. 14). The enumerated bail conditions in s. 515(4) to (4.2) help inform the extent of discretion a judicial official has in imposing other reasonable non-enumerated bail conditions (Shoker, at para. 14). Conditions must be clear, minimally intrusive, and proportionate to any risk. Conditions will also only be reasonable if they realistically can and will be met by the accused, as “[r]equiring the accused to perform the impossible is simply another means of denying judicial interim release” by setting them up to fail, as well as adding the risk that the accused will be criminally charged for failing to comply (Omeasoo, at paras. 33 and 37-38; see also Penunsi, at para. 80). As noted by Rosborough J. in Omeasoo, removing an unreasonable condition will not cause any more risk to the community than imposing a condition that is impossible for the accused to respect (para. 39). Reasonable conditions also must not limit the Charter rights of an accused, such as their freedom of expression or association, unless that condition is reasonably connected and necessary to address the accused’s risk of absconding, harming public safety, or causing loss of confidence in the administration of justice (R. v. Manseau, [1997] AZ-51286266 (Que. Sup. Ct.); Clarke).
[88] Bail conditions are to be tailored to the individual risks posed by the accused. There should not be a list of conditions inserted by rote. The only bail condition that should be routinely added is the condition to attend court (Birtchnell, at para. 6), as well as those conditions that must be considered for certain offences under s. 515(4.1) to (4.3). There is no problem with referring to checklists to canvass available conditions. The problem arises if conditions are simply added, not because they are strictly necessary, but merely out of habit, because the accused agreed to it, or because some behavior modification is viewed as desirable. Bail conditions may be easy to list, but hard to live.
[89] In summary, to ensure the principles of restraint and review are firmly grounded in how people think about appropriate bail conditions, these questions may help structure the analysis:
• If released without conditions, would the accused pose any specific statutory risks that justify imposing any bail conditions? If the accused is released without conditions, are they at risk of failing to attend their court date, harming public safety and protection, or reducing confidence in the administration of justice?
• Is this condition necessary? If this condition was not imposed, would that create a risk of the accused absconding, harm to public protection and safety, or loss of confidence in the administration of justice which would prevent the court from releasing the accused on an undertaking without conditions?
• Is this condition reasonable? Is the condition clear and proportional to the risk posed by the accused? Can the accused be expected to meet this condition safely and reasonably? Based on what is known of the accused, is it likely that their living situation, addiction, disability, or illness will make them unable to fulfill this condition?
• Is this condition sufficiently linked to the grounds of detention under s. 515(10)(c)? Is it narrowly focussed on addressing that specific risk posed by the accused’s release?
• What is the cumulative effect of all the conditions? Taken together, are they the fewest and least onerous conditions required in the circumstances?
These questions are inter-related and they do not have to be addressed in any particular order, nor do they have to be asked and answered about every condition in every case. The practicalities of a busy bail court do not make it realistic or desirable to require that the judicial official inquire into conditions which do not raise red flags. What is important is that all those involved in the setting of bail use these types of organizing questions to guide policy and to assess which bail conditions should be sought and imposed.
[90] When considering the appropriateness of bail conditions, the criminal offence created by s. 145(3) not only counsels restraint and review, but provides an additional frame of reference which incorporates considerations of proportionality into the assessment. Given the direct relationship between imposition and breach, the assessments of necessity and reasonableness discussed in Antic should also take into account that failures to comply with imposed conditions become separate crimes against the administration of justice. Accordingly, the question becomes: is it necessary and reasonable to impose this condition as a personal source of potential criminal liability knowing that a breach may result in a deprivation of liberty because of a charge or conviction under s. 145(3)? In short, when considering whether a proposed condition meets a demonstrated and specific risk, is it proportionate that a breach of this condition would be a criminal offence or become a reason to revoke the bail? (emphasis added)
[85] The requirement of necessity also means that the particular condition must attenuate risks that would otherwise prevent the accused’s release without that condition. Conditions cannot be imposed for gratuitous or punitive purposes (Antic, at para. 67(j); Birtchnell, at paras. 27-28; R. v. McDonald, 2010 ABQB 770, at paras. 34-36 (CanLII)). A condition that may be suitable for a sentencing purpose, like rehabilitation, will not be appropriate unless it is directed towards the risks in s. 515(10) (Omeasoo, at para. 31). Conditions should not be behaviourally-based (R. v. K. (R.), 2014 ONCJ 566, at paras. 14-19; J.A.D., at paras. 9 and 11 (CanLII)). A condition that merely seems “good to have”, but is not necessary for the accused’s release, is not appropriate (Birtchnell, at para. 40). Even if some condition is thought to be therapeutic, intended to help, or “couldn’t hurt,” the prospect of additional criminal liability under s. 145(3) means any such limits on otherwise lawful behavior may also attract criminal penalties. Restraint was emphasized by the Court in Antic, at para. 67(j):
Terms of release imposed under s. 515(4) may “only be imposed to the extent that they are necessary” to address concerns related to the statutory criteria for detention and to ensure that the accused can be released. They must not be imposed to change an accused person’s behaviour or to punish an accused person. [Footnote omitted.]
[86] Moreover, bail conditions must be sufficiently linked to the defined statutory risks. They should be as narrowly defined as possible to meet their objective of addressing the risks under s. 515(10) (R. v. D.A., 2014 ONSC 2166, [2014] O.J. No. 2059, at paras. 14-17 (QL); R. v. Pammett, 2014 ONSC 5597, at paras. 10-12 (CanLII); R. v. Clarke, [2000] O.J. No. 5738 (Sup. Ct.), at paras. 9 and 12 (QL); K. (R.), at paras. 14-19; J.A.D., at paras. 9 and 11). As with the setting of probation conditions, the level of connection between a non-enumerated condition and a risk under s. 515(10) should be comparable to the clear linkages between the enumerated conditions in s. 515(4) and the risks under s. 515(10) (R. v. Shoker, 2006 SCC 44, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 39, at paras. 13-14). This Court in Penunsi recently emphasized this in relation to conditions on peace bonds:
Where the condition is not demonstrably connected to the alleged fear, it may merely set the defendant up for breach . . . Any condition should not be so onerous as effectively to constitute a detention order by setting the defendant up to fail. [Citations omitted; para. 80.] (emphasis added)
CONCLUSION
ORDERS
Dated this 19th day of January 2024.
Acting Resident Magistrate
Vinay Sharma
[1] [2023] NRSC 12; Criminal Appeal 5 of 2021 (18 May 2023), at [11]
[2] [2019] FJHC 820; HAM146.2019 (23 August 2019), at [6].[7] and[8]
[3] [2023] VSC 8, at [17]
[4] 2020 SCC 14, [2020] 2 S.C.R. 3
[5] 2021 BCSC 1103 (CanLII)
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