Castro v Castro [2009] MPSC 8; 2009 MP 8 (7 August 2009)

Notice: This slip opinion has not been certified by the Clerk of the Supreme Court for publication in the permanent law reports. Until certified, it is subject to revision or withdrawal. In any event of discrepancies between this slip opinion and the opinion certified for publication, the certified opinion controls. Readers are requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk of the Supreme Court, PO Box 502165 Saipan, MP 96950, phone [phone], fax [phone], e-mail [e-mail].

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF THE NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS

MA. MARILYN V. CASTRO,
on behalf of herself and her minor daughter,
LOLAINE MARIE V. CASTRO,
Petitioners-Appellees

V

RICARDO C. CASTRO,
Respondent-Appellant

SUPREME COURT NO. 05-0010-GA
SUPERIOR COURT NO. 05-0171

SLIP OPINION

Cite as: 2009 MP 8

Decided August 7, 2009

Stephen C. Woodruff, Saipan, Northern Mariana Islands, for Petitioners-Appellees

Edward C. Arriola, Saipan, Northern Mariana Islands, for Respondent-Appellant

BEFORE: John A. Manglona, Associate Justice; Timothy H. Bellas, Justice Pro Tem; Jesus C. Borja, Justice Pro Tem.

MANGLONA, J.:

¶ 1 Appellant Ricardo C. Castro appeals a trial court order prohibiting him from entering onto his property and evicting tenants with no legal interest in the property, arguing that the trial court (1) effectuated a compensable taking, (2) violated his procedural due process rights by prohibiting him from commencing eviction proceedings, and (3) violated his substantive due process rights by arbitrarily ousting him from his property. We find that the trial court did not effectuate a taking, as it is inherently incapable of doing so, and that no procedural due process violation occurred because Ricardo was allowed to raise the issue of his property rights during the relevant judicial proceeding. However, because the protective order did not promote a legitimate state objective, the trial court arbitrarily deprived Ricardo of a recognized property interest, and in doing so violated his substantive due process rights. Accordingly, we REVERSE the trial court’s decision and VACATE the protective order.

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