IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE MARSHALL ISLANDS

Supreme Court Case No. 2006-010

High Court Civil Action No. 2003-162

JIEN LEKKA, attorney-in-fact for KALORA LEKKA
Plaintiff-Appellant

vs

NEIMATA NAKAMURA KABUA, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees

OPINION

Before: CADRA, Chief Justice; SEABRIGHT and KURREN,, Acting Associate Justices.

Per curiam:

The parties in this action dispute whether Plaintiff may hold and exercise Iroijlaplap title rights to certain lands in the Ralik Chain. The Nitijela issued a declaration of customary law on this issue, stating that only successors of four named Iroijlaplaps may hold and exercise title to the lands. Customary Law ("Ralik Act") § 3, 39 MIRC § 403. Therefore, both parties present their genealogy to the Court in arguing for rights to the lands.

Based on the Nitijela's declaration and the parties' genealogies, the High Court of the Republic of the Marshall Islands found that Plaintiff-Appellant Kalora Lekka is not a successor of any of the named Iroijlaplaps. Further, the High Court declined to find that the Ralik Act impermissibly and retroactively destroys Plaintiffs alleged rights to the lands. Consequently, the High Court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant-Appellee Neimata Nakamura Kabua ("Defendant Neimata") and dismissed the Amended Complaint. Plaintiff now appeals the High Court's order, which we AFFIRM.

BACKGROUND

I. Factual Background

As noted by the High Court, the relevant facts are the parties' genealogies. Indeed, the Nitijela's declaration of customary law governing who may hold and exercise Iroijlaplap rights to lands in the Ralik Chain is based on genealogy:

In the Ralik Chain, excluding Ujelang, there are and shall be four (4) separate Iroijlaplap domains and titles held and exercised by the successors of:

(a) Iroijlaplap Jeimata;

(b) Iroijlaplap Laelan;

(c) Iroijlaplap Joel; and

(d) Iroijlaplap lobokkoj.

Ralik Act § 3.

Defendant. Neimata is a direct descendent of Iroijlaplap Laelan. Iroijlaplap Laelan was the father of Kabua Kabua, who was Defendant Neimata's father. In other words, Iroijlaplap Laelan was Defendant Neimata's paternal grandfather.

Importantly, Plaintiff admits that she is not a direct descendent of any of the four named Iroijlaplaps. Rather, she claims rights to the lands because she is a direct descendent of Iroij Kaiboke. According to Plaintiff, the lands in dispute "originated" with Iroij Kaiboke and are therefore vested in Plaintiff as a descendent of Iroij Kaiboke. Plaintiff disputes the Nitijela's declaration of customary law by countering that, "Under Marshallese customary law, the proper persons to hold the Iroij title for this 'mojen' are the descendants of Kaiboke." (Opening Brief at 12.) However, Iroij Kaiboke is not one of the four Iroijlaplaps named in the Ralik Act.

II. Procedural Background

The following motions were presented to the High Court:

(1) Defendant Neimata's August 30, 2004 Motion for Summary Judgment; and

(2) Plaintiffs August 30, 2004 Motion Setting Forth Applicable Reasons That The Customary Law (Ralik Chain) Act of 1991 Does Not Preclude Plaintiffs Claim. The motions presented the following issue to the High Court: "Does the Ralik Act, which only recognizes successors of Iroijlaplaps Jeimata, Laelan, Joel, and Lobokkoj as the four Iroijlaplaps of the Ralik Chain (excluding Ujelang), preclude Plaintiffs claim to Ralik Chain Iroijlaplap rights ...?" (High Court Order at 2.)

The High Court noted that Plaintiff does not claim to be a "hereditary successor of one of the four-named Iroijlaplaps, but instead claims [the] Ralik Iroijlaplap rights through ... Kaiboke." (High Court Order at 4.) The High Court found that Plaintiff "is not for purposes of the Ralik Act a 'successor' of one of the four- named Iroijlaplaps." (Id. at 8.) The High Court also rejected Plaintiffs argument that the Ralik Act impermissibly and retroactively destroys her rights to the land. Therefore, the High Court granted summary judgment in Defendant Neimata's favor.

DISCUSSION
I. Iroijlaplap Title to the Lands

According to the Constitution of the Republic of the Marshall. Islands, the Nitijela, as a legislative body, is responsible for declaring the customary law in the Marshall Islands. Section 2 of Article X of the Constitution provides:

(1) In the exercise of its legislative functions, it shall be the responsibility of the Nitijela, whenever and to the extent considered appropriate, to declare, by Act, the customary law in the Marshall Islands or in any part thereof. The customary law so declared may include any provisions which, in the opinion of the Nitijela, are necessary or desirable to supplement the established rules of customary law or to take account of any traditional practice.

(2) This Section shall not be construed to authorize the making of any law that would defeat an otherwise valid claim under Article II.

Constitution of the Republic of the Marshall Islands, art. X, § 2.

Pursuant to this constitutional authority, the Nitijela passed the Ralik Act, which "declare[s] the customary law with respect to the four Iroijlaplap domains in the Ralik Chain, excluding Ujelang." 39 MIRC ch. 4. In Section 3 of the Ralik Act, the Nitijela made the following declaration:

In the Ralik Chain, excluding Ujelang, there are and shall be four (4) separate Iroijlaplap domains and titles held and exercised by the successors of:

(a) lroijlaplap Jeimata;

(b) Iroijlaplap Laelan;

(c) Iroijlaplap Joel; and

(d) Iroijlaplap Lobokkoj.

Ralik Act § 3.

Traditional rules of statutory interpretation apply to this Court's construction of Section 3 of the Ralik Act. "The preeminent canon of statutory interpretation requires us to presume that the legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there." Miranda v Anchondo, 684 F.3d 844, 849 (9th Cir. 2012) (quotations, brackets and citation omitted). "Thus, statutory interpretation 'begins with the statutory text.'" Id. (citation omitted). "If the statutory language is unambiguous and the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent, judicial inquiry must cease." Id. (quotations and citation omitted). "Resorting to legislative history as an interpretive device is inappropriate if the statute is clear." Id. (citations omitted). Additionally, "when a statute designates certain persons, things, or manners of operation, all omissions should be understood as exclusions." Boudette v Barnette, 923 F.2d 754, 757 (9th Cir. 1991) (citation omitted).

The statutory language of Section 3 of the Ralik Act is clear: with respect to lands in the Ralik Chain (excluding Ujelang), there are four separate Iroijlaplap domains and titles to be held and exercised by the successors of the four named Iroijlaplaps. In re Jackson, 184 F.3d 1046, 1051 (9th Cir. 1999) ("Statutory interpretation begins with the plain meaning of the statute's language."). Given that the statute designates only four Iroijlaplaps, successors of any other Iroijiaplap are excluded from holding title to the Ralik. Chain lands. Boudette, 923 F.2d at 757 ("[W]hen a statute designates certain persons, things, or manners of operation, all omissions should be understood as exclusions."). Accordingly, the statutory language is clear that the Nitijela intended that only successors of the four named Iroijlaplaps may hold and exercise title to the lands at issue.

Plaintiff admits she is not a direct descendent of any of the four named Iroijlaplaps. Therefore, under the plain language of the statute, the Court finds that Plaintiff is not a successor of any of them. Miranda, 684 F.3d at 849 ("Unless otherwise defined, words of a statute will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning." (Brackets and citation omitted).) Accordingly, the Ralik. Act precludes Plaintiff from holding and exercising Iroijlaplap rights to the Ralik Chain lands.

II. The Takings Claim

Next, Plaintiff argues that the Ralik Act deprived her of her property without due process of law in violation of Article II, Section 4(1) of the Marshall Islands Constitution. We disagree.

As noted above, the Constitution specifically gives the Nitijela the right to declare customary law. This power, including the power to "supplement the established rules of customary law or to take account of any traditional practice," is only limited by the prohibition of making a law "that would defeat an otherwise valid claim under Article II." Id. art. X, § 2(2). Thus, the plain language of the Constitution unambiguously provides the Nitijela with broad powers to declare the customary law. And, in our view, the Constitution affords the Nitijela correspondingly broad discretion in its exercise of that power.

Given this broad mandate and discretion, we cannot constitutionally review the Nitijela's decision-making de novo or "second-guess such determination." See .Kabua Kabua v Kabua Family Defendants, C.A. Nos. 1984-98 & 1984-102 (consol), 24 (High Ct. Marshall Islands Dec. 1, 1993). Instead, where the Nitijela has exercised its Constitutional duties we must defer to its specific findings unless a claimant clearly establishes a violation of Article II.

And this is where Plaintiffs argument falls short. Although the Constitution provides a specific limitation on the Nitijela's ability to declare customary law (if the law would defeat a valid due process claim), Plaintiff has simply failed to provide evidence that the Nitijela exceeded its authority in invoking Article X, Section 2 when it enacted the Ralik Act. In short, there is simply no evidence to support Plaintiff's claim that she had "vested property rights" that were taken without due process of law.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff is not a successor of any of the named Iroijlaplaps in Section 3 of the Ralik Act and concludes that the Act precludes Plaintiff from holding and exercising Iroijlaplap rights to the lands at issue. Further, the Court rejects Plaintiff's claim that she possessed vested property rights taken without due process. As a result, the Court AFFIRMS the High Court's September 11, 2006 Order Granting Defendant Neimata Nakamura Kabua's Summary Judgment Motion.

AFFIRMED.

Dated this 23rd day of July, 2013

Daniel N. Cadra
Chief Justice

J. Michael Seabright
Associate Justice

Barry M. Kurren
Associate Justice