3 MILR 8

IN THE SUPREME COURT
REPUBLIC OF THE MARSHALL ISLANDS

S.CT. CIVIL NO. 04-01
(High Ct. Civil No. 2003-172)

BUJEN and WASE, 
Plaintiffs Appellants,

-v-

REPUBLIC OF THE MARSHALL ISLANDS, et al.,
Defendant-Appellees.

APPEAL FROM THE HIGH COURT

APRIL 5, 2005

CADRA, C.J.
GOODWIN, A.J. pro tem, and KURREN, A.J. pro tem

Argued and Submitted March 23, 2005 

SUMMARY:

This is an appeal from an order of the High Court dismissing the appellants’ wrongful discharge action against the government of the RMI. Appellants argued that the statute of limitations in the Government Liability Act, 3 MIRC Chapter 10, § 23, is unconstitutional because it restricts in a discriminatory manner their constitutional right of access to the courts. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court’s decision, finding that all plaintiffs who choose to assert claims against the government are treated equally. 

DIGEST: 

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – Construction – Article I, Section 4(c) and Article II, Section 14(1): Taken together RMI Const., Art. I, Sec. 4(c) (denying sovereign immunity) and RMI Const., Art. II, Sec. 14(1) (guaranteeing access to the court system) guarantee the citizens of RMI the right to sue their government in a court of law. 

2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – Constitutionality of Statutes – Government Liability Act, Section 23: The claims procedure set forth in Section 23 of the Government Liability Act does not appear to be unreasonable on its face, nor can it be said that it discriminates among citizens. 

OPINION OF THE COURT BY GOODWIN, A.J.

This appeal is taken from an order of the High Court dismissing the appellants’ wrongful discharge action against the government of RMI. The appellants argue that the applicable statute of limitations provision, Government Liability Act, 3 MIRC, Chapter 10, § 23, is unconstitutional because it restricts in a discriminatory manner their constitutional right of access to the courts. 

I.

Plaintiffs and appellants ("Appellants") were formerly police officers employed by the Department of Public Safety in RMI. More than a year after their discharge, Appellants filed a wrongful discharge claim with the Attorney-General. After nearly nine months, the Attorney-General rejected the claims. Eleven months after the rejection, Appellants filed the present wrongful discharge action against RMI. On the government’s motion, the High Court dismissed the action because it was not filed within the statute of limitations period prescribed by the Government Liability Act, 3 MIRC, Chapter 10, § 23 ("Section 23"). 

II.

[1] The RMI Const., Art. I, Sec. 4(c) provides: "[T]he Government of the Marshall Islands and any local government shall not be immune from suit in respect of their own actions or those of their agents. . . ." The Constitution also guarantees its citizens access to the court system. RMI Const., Art. II, Sec. 14(1) ("Every person has the right to invoke the judicial process as a means of vindicating any interest preserved or created by law. . . ."). Taken together, these provisions guarantee the citizens of RMI the right to sue their government in a court of law. 

The legislative power of RMI is vested in the Nitijela, which is charged with the power "to make all other laws which it considers necessary and proper. RMI Const., Art. IV, Sec. 1(c). Relevant here, the Nitijela adopted the Government Liability Act, 3 MIRC, Ch. 10, which prescribes the scope of governmental liability for contract and tort claims, and sets forth the procedure citizens must follow in asserting such claims. 

Set against this constitutional backdrop, the question posed by Appellants is whether the Nitijela abused its power by adopting a special set of rules to be followed by citizens suing the government of RMI. The short answer is no. 

III.

Appellants challenge Section 23 of the Government Liability Act, which provides: 

Every tort or contract action [against the Government] is barred unless commenced within one year from the date the claim was filed with the Attorney-General under Section 7 of this Act, or within six (6) months from the date of notification of rejection of the claim under Section 15 of this Act, whichever is sooner. 

3 MIR, Ch. 10, § 23. 

There is no question that Section 23 bars the instant action. But Appellants contend that Section 23 should be invalidated because it violates Article II, Section 14(l) of the RMI Constitution. That section provides: 

Every person has the right to invoke the judicial process as a means 
of vindicating any interest preserved or created by law, subject only 
to regulations which limit access to courts on a non-discriminatory 
basis. 

RMI Const., Art. II, Sec. 14(1) (emphasis added). Appellants seek to have Section 23 declared to be discriminatory—and therefore unconstitutional. They argue in effect that because citizens suing the government have more steps to follow, and less time to take those steps, than citizens who choose to sue each other, the law discriminates against plaintiffs and in favor of the government. 

Appellants’ argument finds no support in other provisions of the RMI Constitution. In 
particular, Article II, Section 12, entitled "Equal Protection and Freedom from Discrimination," provides, in relevant part: 

(1) All persons are equal under the law and are entitled to the equal protection of the laws. 

(2) No law and no executive or judicial action shall, either expressly, or in its practical application, discriminate against any person on the basis of gender, race, color, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, place of birth, family status or descent. 

RMI Const., Art. II, Sec. 12. 

[2] Appellants have failed to show that the statutory procedure for filing a claim against the government discriminates in any manner prohibited by Section 12. Appellants have treated the government as a person, and then stated that the government as a defendant, has greater rights than a citizen would have as a defendant. But the statutory scheme, which may have imperfections that are not before the court in this case, does not discriminate among plaintiffs who chose to assert claims against the government. All such plaintiffs are treated equally. In one case cited by the Appellants, we did hold that Section 9 of the GLA, as applied in that case, was unconstitutional because it made it virtually impossible for a claimant living on a remote atoll to process a claim. See Enos and Enos, v. RMI, 1 MILR (Rev.) 63 (1987). No such problem is before the court in this case. Nor do the appellants cite any reason why they could not have filed their action during the six months after the attorney general denied their claim at the administrative level. They waited eleven months after the claim was rejected. They offer no supporting rationale for this court to declare that the legislative branch was unreasonable in choosing to allow six months from the date of administrative rejection of a claim for the claimant to file an action in court. As long as all plaintiffs are treated equally in the processing of such claims, no violation of equal protection can be maintained. The Nitijela’s choice of restrictions applicable to suits against the government of RMI does not appear to be unreasonable on its face, nor can it be said that the choice discriminates among citizens. We therefore decline Appellants’ invitation to disturb the power and authority of the Nitijela in this matter. 

The decision of the High Court is AFFIRMED.