Republic of the Marshall Islands v American Tobacco Company (2) [2001] MHSC 1; 2 MILR 167 (7 March 2001)

2 MILR 167

IN THE SUPREME COURT
REPUBLIC OF THE MARSHALL ISLANDS

S.Ct. CIVIL NO. 00-04

(High Ct. Civil No. 1997-261)

THE REPUBLIC OF THE MARSHALL,
Plaintiff,

-v-

AMERICAN TOBACCO COMPANY, et al.,
Defendants.

APPEAL FROM THE HIGH COURT

MARCH 7, 2001

FIELDS, C. J.
GOODWIN, A.J. pro tem,¹ and KURREN, A.J. pro tem²

SUMMARY:

Defendants filed an action in the Supreme Court seeking a writ of prohibition or mandamus directed to the High Court. The Supreme Court declined to issue the writ because the petition sought relief from an interlocutory order and Defendants, if prejudiced, had a remedy by appeal from a final judgment.

DIGEST:

1. WRITS, EXTRAORDINARY - Requirements - Matters of Public Importance: The Supreme Court will hear writs of mandamus or prohibition challenging High Court action in cases of extraordinary public importance.

2. WRITS, EXTRAORDINARY - Writs In Lieu of Interlocutory Appeals Disfavored: Interlocutory rulings of the trial court can be assigned as error on appeal from a final judgment.

3. WRITS, EXTRAORDINARY - Same - Same: Assuming that the writ procedure can sometimes be utilized as a substitute for an interlocutory appeal, in the rare case where such an appeal is available, it should be noted that interlocutory appeals are not favored.

4. WRITS, EXTRAORDINARY - Same - Same: Common law courts have learned from experience that interlocutory and piecemeal appeals in most cases are wasteful of both time and judicial resources. Extraordinary writ practice employed in lieu of an interlocutory appeal suffers from many of the same infirmities.

[1] Pursuant to Rule 21 (b), Defendants have filed and served their petition for writs of mandamus or prohibition to challenge the continuing jurisdiction of the High Court to proceed with this litigation. In cases of extraordinary public importance we have considered, and ruled upon, petitions for similar relief in the past. See Kabua v. High Court, et al. (2), 1 MILR (Rev.) 27, 30 (Mar 17, 1986). This case meets the public importance standards cited in Kabua. Accordingly, we have set the petition for oral argument. Now, after argument, and after our examination of the papers submitted by the parties, we deny the writ because the petition does not reveal sufficient grounds for departure from established judicial procedure of trial and appeal.

The propriety of continuing this litigation was appropriately tested in the High Court by a Rule 12 (b) (6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, which was denied without prejudice to further consideration of narrowly focused motions as the case progresses in the High Court. Contrary to the assertions by the Petitioner that the High Court summarily denied the dismissal motion, the record shows that the Court considered the tendered questions on their merits and ruled according to its understanding of the record and relevant law at that time.

[2] We express no opinion on the merits of the interlocutory rulings of the trial court, but note that any errors of law that may occur in the trial court can be assigned as error on appeal from a final judgment. See e.g., Bauman v. United States District Court, 557 F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 1977).

[3] The petitioner's quest for termination by way of an extraordinary writ is not helped by the argument that waiting for an appeal of a final judgment is costly in time and client resources. The generality of that claim is not peculiar to this litigation. Assuming that the writ procedure can sometimes be utilized as a substitute for an interlocutory appeal, in the rare case where such an appeal is available, it should be noted that interlocutory appeals are not favored by most of the English speaking judicial systems that have been called to our attention.

[4] Common law courts have learned from experience that interlocutory and piecemeal appeals in most cases are wasteful of both time and judicial resources. See, e.g., Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 309 (1995). Extraordinary writ practice employed in lieu of an interlocutory appeal suffers from many of the same infirmities. In the case at bar, for example, major questions of law remain to be decided in a final, appealable judgment. Interlocutory statements by the trial judges at various stages of pretrial may alarm one or more of the parties, but do not constitute final and appealable judgments.

Petition denied without prejudice to legal questions being renewed upon timely appeal. No party to recover costs in this petition.

____________

¹Honorable Alfred T. Goodwin, Senior Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation by the Cabinet.

²Honorable Barry M. Kurren, Magistrate Judge, District of Hawaii, sitting by designation of the Cabinet.