Ammu v Ladrik [1994] MHSC 5; 2 MILR 20 (17 August 1994)

2 MILR 20

IN THE SUPREME COURT
REPUBLIC OF THE MARSHALL ISLANDS

S.Ct. CIVIL NO. 94-01

(High Ct. Civil No. 1992-007)

LIKIRI AMMU,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

-v-

ALION and BOKOJ LADRIK, et al.

Defendants-Appellees.

APPEAL FROM THE HIGH COURT

AUGUST 17, 1994

ASHFORD, C.J.
KING, A.J.¹ (sitting by Cabinet appointment) and PHILIPPO, A.J. (sitting by designation)

SUMMARY:

This was a contest concerning the iroij edrik rights in Ledrikran and Utinoen wetos, Majuro. The High Court granted summary judgment for the Defendants, holding Plaintiff recognized the Defendants as holder of those rights by a stipulation in an earlier action between them involving the same rights in the same wetos. The High Court denied Plaintiff's Motions for Summary Judgment in which Plaintiff (a) urged the High Court to follow an earlier ruling of the High Court in another case, and (b) sought to nullify the stipulation by claiming Defendants had no royal blood and therefore could not exercise iroij edrik rights. The Supreme Court affirmed.

DIGEST:

1. CIVIL PROCEDURE - Motions - Summary Judgments - Record: The pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, collectively, are the record of the case.

2. CIVIL PROCEDURE - Same - Same - Same: Summary judgment is determined on the basis of the record.

3. APPEAL AND ERROR - Review - Questions of Law - Summary Judgments: The standard of review of the trial court's grant or denial of summary judgment is de novo.

4. STARE DECISIS: The doctrine of stare decisis, now commonly called following precedent, is concerned with determination of points of law, not with conclusions of fact.

5. CIVIL PROCEDURE - Motions - Summary Judgments - Unsworn Statements: Unsworn statements and arguments in a memorandum of counsel, filed with a Motion For Summary Judgment, cannot be considered as establishing fact.

6. EQUITY - Principles - Estoppel: Equitable estoppel precludes a person from denying or asserting anything to the contrary of that which has, in contemplation of law, been established as the truth by acts, deeds or representations, either express or implied.

OPINION OF THE COURT BY ASHFORD, C.J.

BACKGROUND:

Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment invoked the doctrines of (a) estoppel arising from a stipulation in High Court Civil Action No. 1982-13 between Plaintiff and Defendants herein and therein, and (b) res judicata arising from the adjudications in that civil action and in Trust Territory Land Determination Hearings. The High Court granted the motion insofar as it was based on the estoppel defense and denied the motion insofar as it was based on the doctrine of res judicata. On this appeal, we need not reach the res judicata defense.

High Court Civil No. 1982-13 was an action between Likiri Lamdrik (Likiri Ammu in the current litigation), Plaintiff, and Bokoj Ladrik and others, Defendants. Subsequent to the stipulation above mentioned, a third party was allowed to intervene in the action, but it was ultimately dismissed for lack of prosecution. The stipulation was signed by Plaintiff Likiri Lamdrik and by Defendant Alion Ladrik. It recited that "Plaintiff Likri Lamdrik announced her wishes to dismiss her action against Alion Ladrik and his brothers and sisters upon ground they now have recognized Likri and her children as alap and dri jerbal to the wato formerly held by Ammu as follows: 1. Otenoen wato, Laura; 2. Bikenout wato, Arrak; 3. Ledrikran wato, Woja." The stipulation further recited that the parties entered into a settlement "that this action be dismissed." It also stated that Plaintiff Likri signed it "to indicate my full agreement with the decision of my Iroij edrik" and that Plaintiff wished to inform the Court "of my willingness to work and cooperate with Iroij edrik Alion Ladrik so long as we live, including my successors...."

The case now before the Court, on appeal from the High Court, is a dispute over entitlement to the iroij edrik rights in Ledrikran and Utinoen wetos. Plaintiff has not challenged Defendants' assertion that these are the same wetos as those identified in the stipulation as Ledrikran wato and Otenoen wato.

Plaintiff filed two motions for summary judgment. The first urged the Court to follow the same course taken by the High Court in an earlier action, Civil No. 1988-21, in which the High Court held that the doctrine of stare decisis required the Court to follow rulings of the High Court of the Trust Territory, trial division, in Civil Actions Nos. 2-74 and 12-74.

Plaintiffs second motion for summary judgment asserted (1) Civil Actions 2-74, 12-74 and 1988-21 established that Defendants do not hold any iroij edrik rights in lands formerly owned by Iroijlaplap Jebdrik, and (2) Defendants, lacking royal blood, were without authority to stipulate with Plaintiff as alap and dri jerbal of Ledrikran and Utinoen wetos.

[1,2] Rule 45(c) MIRCivP provides that summary judgment shall be rendered "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." The documents referred to, collectively, are the record of the case. Summary judgment is determined on the basis of the record. USA Small Bus. Adm v. Trans Atoll Ser Corp. et al., 1 MILR (Rev.) 57 (Nov 12, 1986).

[3] The standard of review of the trial court's grant or denial of summary judgment is de novo. Kruso v. International Telephone & Telegraph Corp., 872 F.2d 1416, 1421 (9th Cir. 1989); State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. v. Martin, 872 F.2d 319, 320 (9th Cir. 1989).

PLAINTIFF'S MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT:

[4] Plaintiff's first motion for summary judgment was supported by an affidavit of Plaintiff which gave some of the genealogies of the parties and purported to quote from a "ruling" entered in Civil No. 1988-21, to the effect that Defendants herein did not have royal blood. A copy of the ruling was not furnished to the court² and Plaintiff made no statement of her own knowledge concerning the royal or commoner status of the Defendants. In short, the record failed to establish that there was no dispute as to any material fact. Aside from that deficiency, it is worth noting that the doctrine of stare decisis, now commonly called following precedent, is concerned with determination of points of law, not with conclusions of fact.

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