IN THE HIGH COURT OF KIRIBATI
CRIMINAL JURISDICTION
HELD AT KIRITIMATI ISLAND
Criminal Case No. 2025-08465
Between:
The Republic								Complaintant
And: 
Mwatita Mikaere	 							Accused

Counsel:	Ms. Raman Teneaki for the Republic
Ms. Abunaba Takabwebwe for the Accused
SENTENCING JUDGMENT
I. Introduction
1.	Mwatita Mikaere appears before the Court for sentencing, having pleaded guilty to one count of indecent assault of a child under 13, contrary to section 134(3) of the Penal Code Amendment Act 2017.
2.	The offence occurred between January and June 2024 at Abaiang village on Teraina Island and involved digital penetration of a primary school-aged child with a single finger.  While no weapon was used, the prosecution submits that threats were made during the commission of the offence.
3.	The maximum penalty for this offence is 12 years’ imprisonment.  The Court must now determine the appropriate sentence, balancing the gravity of the offending with the personal circumstances of the accused, and guided by applicable sentencing principles and precedent.
II. Facts
4.	The accused was charged with indecent assault of a child under 13, involving digital penetration over a six-month period.  He pleaded guilty before trial, is 25 years old, unemployed, and the sole provider for his wife and infant child.  He has no prior convictions and expressed remorse.  A delay of over a year between the offence and prosecution engaged his right to a timely trial.  Both parties cited Republic v Tereke [2020] KIHC 55 as a benchmark, with the defence proposing 18 months and the prosecution urging a sentence not below 2 years.
III. Issue
5.	The issue for determination is the appropriate custodial sentence for the offence of indecent assault of a child under 13, having regard to: 
1)	The gravity of the offending;
2)	The aggravating and mitigating features;
3)	The personal circumstances of the accused;
4)	The submissions of counsel; and
5)	Relevant sentencing authorities.
IV. Submissions
A. Defence
5.	Counsel for the accused, Ms. Abunaba Takabwebwe, submitted that: 
a)	A starting point of 3 years’ imprisonment is appropriate, based on Republic v Tereke [2020] KIHC 55.
b)	The accused is entitled to a 25–30% reduction for his early guilty plea, consistent with Republic v Arawaia [2013] KICA 11.
c)	He is a first-time offender with no prior convictions, warranting a further reduction (Republic v Mantaia [2019] KIHC 65).
d)	The delay between the offence and prosecution (over one year) justifies a modest reduction, as held in Attorney-General v Li Jian Pei [2015] KICA 5.
e)	The accused is 25 years old, partially educated, unemployed, and the sole provider for his wife and infant child.
f)	A sentence of 18 months’ imprisonment is proposed.
B. Prosecution
6.	Counsel for the Republic, Ms. Raman Teneaki, submitted that: 
a)	The offending involved a serious breach of trust and bodily integrity of a vulnerable child.
b)	The nature of the act, digital penetration of a child under 13, warrants a custodial sentence of sufficient length to reflect the gravity of the offence.
c)	The accused made threats during the commission of the offence, which aggravates the offending even though no weapon was used.
d)	While the accused’s guilty plea and lack of prior convictions are acknowledged, the Court must prioritise deterrence and denunciation.
e)	Republic v Tereke [2020] KIHC 55 is accepted as a benchmark, but the aggravating features of the prolonged offending and the age of the victim justify a sentence above the minimum.
f)	The Republic does not oppose modest reductions for the guilty plea and delay but submits that the final sentence should not fall below 2 years.
7.	The Court now turns to the structured sentencing analysisand ensures a principled and proportionate outcome.
V. Analysis and Consideration
8.	In determining the appropriate sentence, I adopt the structured methodology endorsed by the Court of Appeal in Tekaei v Republic [2016] KICA 11 at [10], which sets out a staged approach to sentencing.  This includes identifying a starting point based on the seriousness of the offending, adjusting for aggravating and mitigating factors, and considering any time spent in custody or constitutional delay.
A. Nature and Gravity of the Offence
9.	The offence involves the sexual assault of a child under the age of 13, a particularly vulnerable class of victim.  The act of digital penetration constitutes a serious violation of bodily integrity and personal autonomy. The offending occurred over a six-month period, suggesting sustained abuse rather than an isolated incident.  The maximum penalty of 12 years’ imprisonment reflects Parliament’s recognition of the gravity of such conduct.  The Court must respond with a sentence that denounces the offending and deters similar conduct.
B. Starting Point (Including Aggravating Features)
10.	In Republic v Tereke [2020] KIHC 55, which both parties referred to as the relevant benchmark for sentencing, the Court adopted a starting point of 3 years’ imprisonment for an offence involving digital penetration of a child under 13 with a single finger.  While the mode of assault is similar, the present case is materially more serious.  In Tereke, the offending was described as a single incident involving a child of similar age, but there was no evidence of threats, coercion, or a prolonged pattern of abuse.  Nor was there any indication of a familial or community-based relationship that might have given rise to a breach of trust.  The Court treated the offending as serious but at the lower end of the spectrum for this type of offence.
11.	By contrast, the present case involves several aggravating features that significantly elevate the gravity of the offending:
a)	The offending occurred over a sustained period of approximately six months, suggesting a pattern of repeated abuse rather than an isolated incident.
b)	The complainant was a primary school-aged child, underscoring her extreme vulnerability and the power imbalance inherent in the offending.
c)	The prosecution submits that the accused made threats during the commission of the offence, which would have increased the psychological trauma experienced by the victim and reflects a degree of coercion.  Counsel for the accused disputes this aspect, submitting that no threats were made and that the offending did not involve coercion or intimidation.  The defence maintains that the acts were committed without verbal or implied threats, and without the use of any weapon.  While the Court accepts the prosecution’s submission that threats were made, the absence of detail or contradiction in the defence submission tempers the weight given to this aggravating feature.  The Court proceeds on the basis that some form of coercive conduct occurred, but not of a sustained or violent nature.
d)	The offending involved a breach of trust, given the community and familial context in which it occurred, further compounding the harm.  The defence submission does not elaborate on the relationship between the accused and the complainant, but the prosecution’s account implies a breach of trust arising from a community or familial connection.  While the precise nature of the relationship is not detailed, the Court infers that the offending occurred within a context of familiarity and proximity, which would have heightened the victim’s vulnerability and compounded the psychological harm.  The accused was evidently a known figure in the child’s environment, and the abuse occurred over an extended period, suggesting access and opportunity rooted in trust.  This aggravating feature aligns with the Court’s obligation to protect vulnerable members of close-knit communities from exploitation.
12.	These features distinguish the present case from Tereke and justify a higher starting point.  As emphasised by the Court of Appeal in Tekaei v Republic [2016] KICA 11 at [10], sentencing must begin with a starting point that reflects the relative seriousness of the offending, taking into account both the statutory maximum and the specific aggravating features of the case.  In light of the sustained nature of the abuse, the age and vulnerability of the victim, the use of threats, and the breach of trust, I consider the starting point of 5 years’ imprisonment to be appropriate and proportionate.
C. Mitigating Factors
13.	The following factors mitigate the sentence and warrant careful consideration in line with the third stage of the sentencing methodology endorsed in Tekaei v Republic [2016] KICA 11 at [10(c)]:
a)	Guilty plea: The plea was entered prior to trial but not at the earliest opportunity.  In Republic v Arawaia [2013] KICA 11, the Court recognized that the timing of a plea affects the degree of mitigation.  A full 25–30% reduction is reserved for pleas at the first opportunity.  Here, I consider a reduction of 12 months, equivalent to 20%, appropriate, reflecting the procedural benefit and partial remorse, while acknowledging the delay.
b)	First-time offender: The accused has no prior convictions.  This supports the inference that the offending was not part of a broader pattern.  Given his youth, lack of criminal history, and social vulnerability, I consider a reduction of 10 months to be appropriate.  This exceeds the 3-month reduction granted in Republic v Mantaia [2019] KIHC 65 but is justified by the broader rehabilitative context and remains proportionate within the structured sentencing framework endorsed in Tekaei v Republic [2016] KICA 11.
Compared to Mantaia, Mikaere’s circumstances present a more compelling rehabilitative profile:
�	He is 25 years old—still within the age bracket where rehabilitation is most viable.
�	He is the sole provider for a dependent wife and infant child, indicating social responsibility and potential for reintegration.
�	He has no prior convictions and no history of antisocial behaviour.
�	He pleaded guilty, suggesting insight and remorse.
These factors, taken together, elevate the significance of his first-offender status beyond the baseline recognized in Mantaia.  Hence, a 10-month reduction reflects this enhanced rehabilitative potential.
c)	Delay in prosecution: There was a delay of over one year between the commission of the offence (Jan to June 2024) and the filing of charges (October to November 2025).  Such delay engages the accused’s constitutional right under section 10(1) of the Constitution of Kiribati to a fair hearing within a reasonable time.  As held in Attorney-General v Li Jian Pei [2015] KICA 5 and reaffirmed in Tekaei at [19]–[20], even if the delay is institutional rather than prosecutorial, a modest reduction is warranted to mark the breach.  I consider a reduction of 3 months appropriate.
d)	Personal circumstances: The accused is 25 years old, partially educated, unemployed, and the sole provider for his wife and infant child.  While these circumstances do not justify a further numerical reduction, they are relevant to the overall assessment of culpability and rehabilitation prospects.  Youth and family responsibilities are recognized in sentencing jurisprudence as factors that may support leniency within the lower range of available penalties, provided they do not detract from the need for deterrence.  
14.	Taken together, these mitigating factors reflect genuine remorse, procedural fairness concerns, and rehabilitative potential.  They do not, however, outweigh the seriousness of the offending, but they do temper the final sentence to ensure it remains proportionate and just.  
D. Totality and Final Sentence
15.	Having identified a starting point of 5 years (60 months) to reflect the seriousness of the offending and its aggravating features, I now apply the mitigating factors in sequence, consistent with the structured approach endorsed in Tekaei v Republic [2016] KICA 11 at [10].
16.	The following deductions are warranted:
a)	12 months for the guilty plea, recognizing its procedural and rehabilitative value;
b)	10 months for lack of prior convictions;
c)	3 months for the delay in prosecution, which engages the accused’s constitutional right to a fair hearing within a reasonable time.
17.	These reductions total 25 months, resulting in a final sentence of 35 months’ imprisonment.
18.	I am satisfied that this sentence reflects the totality of the offending.  It is neither crushing nor lenient.  It accounts for the sustained nature of the abuse, the vulnerability of the victim, and the psychological harm caused, while also acknowledging the accused’s remorse, clean record, and procedural delay.  The resulting sentence of 35 months’ imprisonment appropriately balances the seriousness of the offending with the mitigating factors.  It adheres to the staged sentencing framework set out in Tekaei v Republic [2016] KICA 11 and ensures a principled and proportionate outcome.
19.	Having weighed all relevant considerations, the Court now turns to the formal imposition of sentence.
VI. Conclusion
20.	The sentence imposed reflects a careful and principled balancing of the aggravating and mitigating features of the case.  The offending was grave: it involved repeated sexual abuse of a young child over an extended period, accompanied by threats and a breach of trust.  These features demanded a firm custodial response.
21.	At the same time, the Court has recognized the accused’s early guilty plea, lack of prior convictions, and the delay in prosecution as genuine mitigating factors. His personal circumstances, youth, limited education, and family responsibilities, have been considered in determining the appropriate level of leniency within the lower range of available penalties.
22.	The final sentence of 35 months’ imprisonment is proportionate to the seriousness of the offending and consistent with the structured sentencing methodology endorsed in Tekaei v Republic [2016] KICA 11.  It serves the core purposes of criminal punishment: denunciation, deterrence, and protection of the public, while also acknowledging the accused’s rehabilitative potential and procedural rights.
23.	Sexual offences against children represent some of the gravest breaches of personal integrity and community trust.  Sentences must reflect the enduring harm caused and affirm the Court’s commitment to protecting vulnerable members of society.  The public must have confidence that such offending will be met with a response that is firm, fair, and principled.
VII. Sentence
24.	For the reasons set out above, the accused is sentenced to 35 months’ (equivalent to 2 years and 11 months) imprisonment with effect from today.
25.	Time spent in custody, if any, shall be deducted pursuant to law.  The sentence shall be served in accordance with the Penal Code and any applicable correctional regulations.
26.	This sentence reflects:
(i)	The seriousness of the offending, including its sustained nature, the vulnerability of the victim, and the breach of trust;
(ii)	The mitigating factors, including the accused’s guilty plea, lack of prior convictions, and the delay in prosecution;
(iii)	The structured sentencing methodology endorsed in Tekaei v Republic [2016] KICA 11, ensuring consistency, fairness, and transparency.
27.	The custodial sentence imposed is necessary and proportionate.  It affirms the dignity of the victim, deters future offending, and reinforces public confidence in the administration of justice.  While denunciation and deterrence are paramount, the Court also recognizes the importance of rehabilitation, particularly for young, first-time offenders.  It is hoped that the custodial term will provide an opportunity for reflection, reform, and eventual reintegration.
DATED at Ronton, this 17th day of November 2025.

__________________________
HON. AOMORO T. AMTEN
Judge of the High Court