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High Court of Kiribati |
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KIRIBATI
CIVIL JURISDICTION
HELD AT BETIO
REPUBLIC OF KIRIBATI
High Court Civil Appeal 8 of 2002
Between:
MELITIANA ATI & OTHERS
Appellant
And:
TAWARE ERIAKIM
Respondent
For the Appellant: Mr. Banuera Berina
For Respondent: Mr. Aomoro Amten
Date of Hearing: 4 December 2003
JUDGMENT
The appellant and respondent are or were husband and wife. Whether or not they still are lawfully married they have gone their separate ways. The respondent wife sued the appellant husband for defamation. The Single Magistrate found the defamation proved and assessed damages at $992.00.
Briefly the facts are that the bridegroom got quite drunk at the wedding party. The bride left the hotel after midnight, without him. He joined her between two and three in the morning. A white cloth had been laid out on the floor. The Appellant had intercourse the Respondent. Despite the appellant's drunken condition, it is common ground that there was penetration. Afterwards no blood on the white cloth, just a bits of staining. The bridegroom concluded that his wife had not been a virgin. He communicated this to his sisters who were awaiting the result outside. The sisters telephoned the bride's mother. Subsequent medical examination at the hospital shewed that after all the Respondent had been a virgin.
The Single Magistrate found the defamation proved against the Appellant, holding that he had not proved justification. The defence of qualified privilege had been raised but the Single Magistrate did not, in her reasons, consider it.
Mr Berina, without objection from Mr Amten, explained the custom to me. That a bride should be a virgin is regarded in Kiribati society, as most important. The white cloth is laid down so that the couple may lie on it and have sexual intercourse for the first time. If the bride be a virgin the hymen will rupture, there will be bleeding and the blood will stain the cloth. The bride and groom are alone but relatives wait outside for report of blood or not.
The custom was followed but unfortunately gave, as medical examination shewed, a false result.
Gatley (8th ed @ para 444) under the sub-heading "Statements Made in the Discharge of a Public or Private Duty" sets out Baron Parke's statement of the law in Toogood v Spyring:
"In general, an action lies for the malicious publication of statements which are false in fact, and injurious to the character of another, and the law considers such publication as malicious, unless it is fairly made by a person in the discharge of some public or private duty whether legal or moral, or in the conduct of his own affairs, in matters where his interest is concerned. In such cases the occasion prevents the inference of malice which the law draws from unauthorized communications, and affords a qualified defence depending on the absence of actual malice. If fairly warranted by any reasonable occasion or exigency, and honestly made, such communications are protected for the common convenience and welfare of society."
That exposition in 1834 is still good law. It covers the situation here. The Appellant spoke in discharge of a private moral duty (to report to his sisters whether or not there was blood on the cloth, whether or not his wife was a virgin). He spoke "in the conduct of his own affairs, in matters where his interest (was) concerned". There is no evidence of actual malice on his part: he acted in good faith.
If the Single Magistrate had considered qualified privilege she should have found the defence proved.
Although, in view of the conclusion I have reached, the assessment of damages becomes of no consequence I suggest that it would have been helpful if the Single Magistrate had given some guidance as to how she reached the figures she did and why she divided the assessment in two – "for loss of plaintiff's marriage $500.00: for general damages - $492.00". Normally an assessment of general damages is one round figure. There should have been no separate assessment "for loss of ... marriage "and the Single Magistrate's assessment of $492.00 "for general damages" is puzzling. In any case I consider a total of $992.00 is rather too high. Perhaps as much as $500.00 would have been more appropriate.
The appeal is allowed. The order of The Single Magistrate is quashed. There will be judgment for the Appellant dismissing the Respondent's action against him.
Dated the 8th day of December 2003.
THE HON ROBIN MILLHOUSE QC
CHIEF JUSTICE
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URL: http://www.paclii.org/ki/cases/KIHC/2003/195.html