Teannaki v Tito [1996] KIHC 1; HCCC 30.94 (8 January 1996)

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KIRIBATI
HCCC 30/94

IN THE MATTER OF:
The election of the Beretitenti Act and

IN THE MATTER OF:
The Elections Ordinance and

IN THE MATTER OF:
The Election for the Beretitenti of the Republic of Kiribati

BETWEEN:

TEATAO TEANNAKI
Member of Parliament of and from Abaiang
Petitioner

AND:

TEBURORO TITO
Member of Parliament of and from South Tarawa and
Beretitenti of the Republic of Kiribati
Respondent

(BEFORE THE HON R LUSSICK C.J.)

Mr B Berina for the Petitioner
Mr T Teiwaki for the Respondent

DECISION ON APPLICATION FOR ADJOURNMENT

This case was set down today for continuation of the hearing which commenced on 4 December 1995 and was adjourned on 14 December 1995 because of the impending parliamentary commitments of both the petitioner and the respondent.

The respondent now applies for the case to be adjourned again on the ground that he wishes to attend a Chief Executives of Micronesia Meeting in Guam commencing on 12 January 1996. The meeting is the first of its kind and is important. A set of By-laws will be formulated during the meeting and will be signed at the conclusion by each of the Chief Executives. It is therefore not possible to send another minister in place of the Respondent.

I accept that the meeting is important, but then so is this case. I regard it as the most important case still awaiting decision in Kiribati. It is in everyone's interest that it be decided as soon as possible. The election was held in September 1994 and it is extraordinary that a petition arising from that election still remains to be decided in January 1996. It is most desirable for election petitions to be dealt with in the shortest possible time after the election, for obvious reasons. The circumstances leading to the delay in this case arose before I came to Kiribati, but upon arriving in August last year I took steps to have the case set down at the earliest available date acceptable to both parties, with a view to disposing of it as a matter of priority.

It is true that the case has already been adjourned once before, but that adjournment was in reality the result of a mutual application, since both parties were required for parliamentary duties.

I have decided to grant the application for adjournment on certain conditions. But first, I want to make it quite clear that no further adjournment will be granted. If the respondent later finds that he is required to attend another conference then he will either have to decline it or face up to the fact that the case will proceed in his absence. I do not see any injustice being done to him if the latter eventuality prevails, since he has already completed his own evidence and it is just a matter of hearing the remainder of his witnesses.

I do not want it to be thought that hearing dates all by the High Court are liable to be changed at the convenience of a party. The granting of this adjournment will cause a considerable disruption of the High Court programme. I have planned sittings in the outer islands in the coming months which cannot be given a date until the present case is disposed of. There is a criminal case fixed for next week which may now have to be interrupted and adjourned part-heard, and another criminal case fixed for the following week which will definitely have to be adjourned. In each case the parties will lose the priority they had been allocated and will have to accept later hearing dates.

However, such is the importance I attach to completing the hearing of the present case that I am prepared to give it priority over the other cases. But I repeat that no further adjournments will be granted.

Counsel for the petitioner has asked for an order for costs in the amount of $150-00. He was not informed of the respondent's intention to apply for an adjournment until 3rd January 1996 and in my view he is entitled to his costs. Contrary to what counsel for the respondent submits, I do not think that the amount claimed is unreasonable.

I make the following orders:

(1) Case is adjourned to 22 January 1996 for continuation of the hearing.

(2) Case must proceed on that date and no further adjournment will be granted.

(3) Respondent is to pay petitioner's costs thrown away by this adjournment allowed at $150-00.

THE HON R LUSSICK
Chief Justice

(08/01/96)