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Supreme Court of Guam |
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF GUAM
THE PEOPLE OF GUAM,
v.
QUINTON ANDREW PRESCOTT BEZON,
Supreme Court Case No.: CRA17-015
Superior Court Case No.:
CF0650-15
OPINION
Cite as: 2018 Guam 28
Appeal from the Superior Court of Guam
Argued and submitted
on June 12, 2018
Hagåtña, Guam
Appearing for Defendant-Appellant:
Howard Trapp, Esq. [Argued] Howard Trapp, Inc. 200 Saylor Building 139 Chalan Santo Papa Hagåtña, GU 96910 Joseph C. Razzano, Esq.
Edwin J. Torres, Esq. Civille & Tang, PLLC 330 Hernan Cortez Ave., Ste. 200 Hagåtña, GU 96910 |
Appearing for Plaintiff-Appellee:
James C. Collins, Esq. Assistant Attorney General Office of the Attorney General Prosecution Division 590 S. Marine Corps Dr., Ste. 706 Tamuning, GU 96913 |
BEFORE: KATHERINE A. MARAMAN, Chief Justice; F. PHILIP CARBULLIDO, Associate Justice; ROBERT J. TORRES, Associate Justice.
MARAMAN, C.J.:
[1] Defendant-Appellant Quinton Andrew
Prescott Bezon appeals a final judgment convicting him of Third Degree Criminal
Sexual Conduct
and Fourth Degree Criminal Sexual Conduct, sentencing him to a
total of four years’ incarceration, and ordering him to pay
a fine of
$2,000.00, plus court costs, and to register as a Level I Sex Offender. Bezon
argues that the trial court denied him the
opportunity to allocute and that he
should be resentenced as a result. Following oral arguments, we sua
sponte ordered additional briefing on whether Bezon’s trial counsel
violated Bezon’s Sixth Amendment right to make his own defense
by telling
the jury that Bezon had had consensual sexual intercourse with the victim, even
though Bezon insisted that he and the
victim had not had sexual intercourse.
For the reasons discussed below, we hold that trial counsel’s alleged
concession did
not violate Bezon’s Sixth Amendment right to make his own
defense and hold that the trial court committed plain error in not
providing
Bezon an opportunity for allocution. We reverse and remand for
resentencing.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
[2] Bezon was convicted of Third Degree Criminal Sexual Conduct (“CSC”) and Fourth Degree CSC. During opening statements, Bezon’s counsel stated:
And you will have to decide, ladies and gentlemen, is this rape or was this consensual, and then someone who was in trouble decided to say it was rape. Someone who perhaps did something inappropriate the night before, a married woman, whose spouse was upset with her, and she claims to be raped.
//
//
Transcripts (“Tr.”) at 16 (Jury Trial, Apr. 21, 2017)
(emphasis added). In a written statement included in the presentence
investigation report
(“PSI”),[1] Bezon
contended that his defense attorney had misrepresented him by arguing at trial
that the sexual intercourse was consensual,
while Bezon maintained that no
sexual intercourse occurred. However, at his sentencing hearing, Bezon’s
counsel stated that
Bezon “regret[ted] some of the things he said in [the
written statement].” Tr. at 8 (Sentencing Hr’g, July 13,
2017).
[3] At the sentencing hearing, Bezon’s counsel argued for
a suspended sentence. After hearing arguments from counsel, the trial
court
proceeded to sentencing without first personally addressing Bezon or inquiring
whether Bezon wanted to make a statement to
the court before sentencing was
imposed. The trial court sentenced Bezon to four years’ incarceration,
none suspended, for
Third Degree CSC and one year’s incarceration, not
suspended, for Fourth Degree CSC, to be served concurrently for a total
of four
years’ incarceration. It also ordered Bezon to pay a fine of $2,000.00,
plus court costs, and to register as a Level
I Sex Offender once out on parole,
among other conditions. Bezon timely filed his Notice of Appeal.
[4] In his appeal, Bezon challenged only his sentence on the basis
that he was not given an opportunity for allocution at his sentencing
hearing.
After oral arguments, we ordered supplemental briefing on the issue of whether
Bezon’s trial counsel violated Bezon’s
Sixth Amendment right to make
his own defense in light of McCoy v. Louisiana, -- U.S. --, 138 S. Ct.
1500 (2018).
II. JURISDICTION
[5] This court has jurisdiction over an appeal from a final judgment of conviction. 48 U.S.C.A. § 1424-1(a)(2) (Westlaw through Pub. L. 115-281 (2018)); 7 GCA §§ 3107(b), 3108(a) (2005); 8 GCA §§ 130.10, 130.15(a) (2005).
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
[6] We review de novo alleged violations of a defendant’s constitutional rights. People v. Ongiil, 2016 Guam 34 ¶ 16 (collecting cases). Where no timely objection is made at a sentencing hearing, allocution errors are subject to plain error review. People v. Meseral, 2014 Guam 13 ¶ 15 (collecting cases).
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Bezon’s Sixth Amendment Right to Make His Own Defense Was Not
Violated
[7] The Sixth Amendment guarantees to each criminal
defendant “the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.” U.S. Const.
amend.
VI; see also 48 U.S.C.A. § 1421b(g) (Westlaw through Pub. L.
115-281 (2018)). The U.S. Supreme Court has made clear that “[t]rial
management is the lawyer’s province: Counsel provides his or her
assistance by making decisions such as ‘what arguments
to pursue, what
evidentiary objections to raise, and what agreements to conclude regarding the
admission of evidence.’”
McCoy, 138 S. Ct. at 1508 (quoting
Gonzalez v. United States, 553 U.S. 242, 248 (2008)). However, certain
decisions “are reserved for the client—notably, whether to plead
guilty, waive the right
to a jury trial, testify in one’s own behalf, and
forgo an appeal.” Id. A “[v]iolation of a defendant’s
Sixth Amendment-secured autonomy” is a structural error. Id. at
1511.
[8] In McCoy, defendant McCoy appealed a denial of his
motion for a new trial, which he had brought on the basis that the trial court
violated
his constitutional rights by allowing his trial counsel to concede the
defendant’s guilt, over the defendant’s objection.
Id. at
1507. The Court ruled that “[a]utonomy to decide that the objective of
the defense is to assert innocence” is a decision
reserved for the client.
Id. at 1508. It ruled that “[w]hen a client expressly asserts that
the objective of ‘his defence’ is to maintain innocence of
the charged criminal acts, his lawyer must abide by that objective and may not
override
it by conceding guilt.” Id. at 1509 (quoting U.S. Const.
amend. VI). The Court ultimately held that “[t]he trial court’s
allowance of [counsel’s]
admission of McCoy’s guilt despite
McCoy’s insistent objections was incompatible with the Sixth
Amendment” and
ordered a new trial. Id. at
1512.
[9] Applying McCoy, the court in United States v.
Rosemond, 322 F. Supp. 3d 482 (S.D.N.Y. 2018), held that defense counsel did
not violate defendant Rosemond’s right to autonomy where counsel conceded
that
Rosemond “directed a shooting and focus[ed] instead on whether the
government proved beyond a reasonable doubt that [the defendant]
possessed the
requisite intent to kill.” 322 F. Supp. 3d at 486. The court
found that “the concession by itself was insufficient to establish
Rosemond’s
guilt as to any one of the four counts in the
indictment.” Id. The court declined to extend McCoy to
counsel’s choices “other than the defendant’s decision to
maintain innocence or concede guilt.” Id. The court noted that
such an extension of McCoy “could lead to endless post-conviction
litigation concerning what transpired between defendants and their lawyers and
how the
defendants’ unsuccessful defenses were conducted.”
Id. at 487. We find this reasoning persuasive and shall apply
Rosemond to the case at hand.
[10] Bezon argues that his Sixth
Amendment right to autonomy was violated because he “wanted his trial
counsel to deny that he engaged
in the actus reus,” but his trial
counsel nevertheless conceded this point in front of the jury.
Appellant’s Suppl. Br. at 8 (Sept. 13,
2018). The only statement by
Bezon’s trial counsel that could be construed to be an admission that
Bezon had sexual intercourse
with the victim is the following made during
opening statements:
And you will have to decide, ladies and gentlemen, is this rape or was
this consensual, and then someone who was in trouble decided to say it was
rape. Someone who perhaps did something inappropriate the night before,
a
married woman, whose spouse was upset with her, and she claims to be
raped.
Tr. at 16 (Jury Trial, Apr. 21, 2017) (emphasis added). Trial
counsel’s defense strategy was not to admit that sexual intercourse
had
occurred and that it was consensual. Rather, counsel called into question the
credibility of the victim and the People’s
expert witness. See,
e.g., Tr. at 32-33, 34-36 (Closing Args., Apr. 25, 2017). Also, counsel
specifically stated:
So the questions that you have to come up with and the answers that
you’re going to have to reach are: Was there intercourse? Did he
touch her breast? Did he touch her vagina with his penis, while he was
inserting his penis into her vagina? Those are the
three charges against him.
Did those things happen?
Id. at 38 (emphasis added). Counsel
also highlighted Bezon’s version of events: that he had asked the victim
whether she
wanted to have sexual intercourse and when she answered in the
negative, he stopped. Id. at 39.
[11] Assuming,
arguendo, that trial counsel conceded that Bezon had sexual intercourse
with the victim, this concession did not violate Bezon’s Sixth
Amendment
right to make his own defense. The determination of which arguments to
strategically advance at trial to achieve acquittal
falls within the purview of
defense counsel. See McCoy, 138 S. Ct. at 1508. In McCoy, the
defendant’s right to autonomy was violated where he “expressly
assert[ed] that the objective of ‘his defence’ [wa]s to
maintain innocence of the charged criminal acts” and his counsel
“overr[o]de it by conceding
guilt.” Id. at 1509 (quoting
U.S. Const. amend. VI). Here, Bezon and his trial counsel’s objectives
were identical—both sought a
judgment of acquittal. The disagreement,
assuming there was one, was simply over the best course to attempt to avoid
conviction.
Moreover, this case is similar to the facts of Rosemond in
that Bezon’s trial counsel’s alleged concession that Bezon
had sexual intercourse with the victim did not amount to a concession that Bezon
had committed any of the charged crimes or any lesser offense. See
Rosemond, 322 F. Supp. 3d at 486 (emphasizing fact that trial
counsel’s “concession by itself was insufficient to establish
Rosemond’s
guilt as to any one of the four counts in the
indictment”). Therefore, trial counsel did not violate Bezon’s
right to
autonomy in conceding that Bezon had sexual intercourse with the
victim.
B. The Trial Court Erred in Not Affording Bezon the Opportunity
to Allocute
[12] We have previously ruled on issues surrounding
allocution errors in People v. Meseral, 2014 Guam 13. Consistent with
our prior precedent in Meseral, we will reverse Bezon’s sentence.
Title 8 GCA § 120.26 requires the trial court, before imposing sentence, to
“address
the defendant personally and ask him if he wishes to make a
statement on his own behalf and to present any information in mitigation
of
punishment.” 8 GCA § 120.26 (2005). The trial court did not afford
Bezon such an opportunity. See Tr. at 11-14 (Sentencing Hr’g, July
13, 2017). Since Bezon did not object at the sentencing hearing to the trial
court not
affording him the opportunity to allocute, see Tr. at 11-14
(Sentencing Hr’g, July 13, 2017), we will review for plain error, see
Meseral, 2014 Guam 13 ¶ 15. Under plain error review, “we will
not reverse unless ‘(1) there was an error; (2) the error is clear or
obvious under current law; (3) the error affected substantial rights; and (4)
reversal is necessary to prevent a miscarriage of justice
or to maintain the
integrity of the judicial process.’” Meseral, 2014 Guam 13
¶ 16 (quoting People v. Quitugua, 2009 Guam 10 ¶
11).
[13] Both parties agree that the failure by the trial court to
personally address Bezon was erroneous and that the error was clear and
obvious
under Guam law. See Appellant’s Br. at 6-7 (Mar. 26, 2018);
Appellee’s Br. at 6 (Apr. 2, 2018). At issue is whether the error
affected Bezon’s
substantial rights and, if so, whether reversal is
necessary to prevent a miscarriage of justice or to maintain the integrity of
the judicial process.
[14] Under the third prong of plain error
review, a defendant must show that “he was prejudiced, that is, that the
error affected
the outcome of the proceedings.” Meseral, 2014 Guam
13 ¶ 77 (citation omitted). In Meseral, we acknowledged that there
may be a “special category of forfeited errors” that must be
corrected regardless of a showing
of prejudice, to preserve and protect
“the fairness and the reputation of the [judicial] process.” Id.
(quoting Quitugua, 2009 Guam 10 ¶ 31 n.8). We held that
allocution errors do not fall into this special category and declined to adopt a
presumption of prejudice.
Id. ¶ 80. Instead, we adopted the Fourth
Circuit’s case-by-case approach for determining whether an allocution
violation
is prejudicial. Id. ¶ 81 (citing United States v.
Muhammad, 478 F.3d 247, 249 (4th Cir. 2007)).
[15] Bezon argues
that he was prejudiced by not being afforded a final opportunity to address the
court before it imposed a sentence because
it may have impacted the ultimate
outcome. Appellant’s Br. at 7. The People argue that Bezon was not
prejudiced because he
provided a detailed, written statement directly to the
court in connection with the PSI. Appellee’s Br. at 7. In
Meseral, we noted that “the absence of a statement by [the
defendant] in the [PSI] . . . weighs in favor of finding prejudice.”
2014
Guam 13 ¶ 82. Relying on this language, the People suggest that statements
in a PSI may provide an effective substitute for oral allocution.
Appellee’s Br. at 7. Whether the defendant filed a statement in a PSI is
a factor to consider in determining prejudice, but
it is not determinative. A
PSI and an allocution are individually required by separate statutes—9 GCA
§ 80.12 and 8 GCA
§ 120.26, respectively—and, therefore, a PSI
is not a substitute for allocution. Moreover, in United States v. Noel,
581 F.3d 490 (7th Cir. 2009), the Seventh Circuit held that a defendant’s
substantial rights were affected where a defendant’s written
statement was
read aloud at a sentencing hearing by counsel because the judge did not ask the
defendant directly whether he would
like to address the court. 581 F.3d at
502-03. The court held that although the defendant “ha[d] not submitted
that he would
have said anything different than what he wrote in his letter,
allowing counsel to speak in [the defendant]’s stead [did] not
cure the
prejudice stemming from the violation of his rights.” Id. at 503
(citing Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 301, 304 (1961)). Similarly,
Bezon providing a written statement to the court in connection with the PSI did
not cure the prejudice
stemming from the violation of his right to
allocute.
[16] The People also cite to United States v.
Covington, 681 F.3d 908 (7th Cir. 2012), to support their argument that the
error did not affect Bezon’s substantial rights. See
Appellee’s Br. at 7. In Covington, the court held that a
district court interrupting a defendant during allocution did not violate the
defendant’s right of allocution
and that even if the interruption was
error, the error did not affect the defendant’s substantial rights. 681
F.3d at 910-11.
The court held that the error did not affect the
defendant’s substantial rights because the topics that the defendant
argued
he would have offered details about, had he not been interrupted, had
already been touched on during his allocution. Id. at 911. Unlike the
defendant in Covington, Bezon may have discussed topics that he did not
touch upon in his written statement. This is likely, given that—as noted
by Bezon’s counsel—Bezon “regret[ted] some of the things he
said in [the written statement].” Tr. at 8 (Sentencing
Hr’g, July
13, 2017). Therefore, Bezon’s written statement did not cure the
prejudice stemming from the violation of
his right to
allocute.
[17] In appellate review of allocution errors, we will not
“speculate as to what [the defendant] may have said, nor will we try
to
ascertain whether it would have been persuasive.” Meseral, 2014
Guam 13 ¶ 82. At the sentencing hearing, Bezon’s counsel argued for
a suspended sentence. Tr. at 7 (Sentencing Hr’g, July
13, 2017). The
trial court did not impose this argued-for sentence. Rather, it sentenced Bezon
to four years’ incarceration,
none suspended, for Third Degree CSC and one
year of incarceration, none suspended, for Fourth Degree CSC, to be served
concurrently
for a total of four years’ incarceration. Record on Appeal
(“RA”), tab 93 at 3 (Judgment, Aug. 31, 2017). Given
that we do not
know what Bezon may have said during allocution, we cannot conclude that Bezon
would have received the same sentence
had he been afforded the opportunity to
allocute. See Meseral, 2014 Guam 13 ¶ 82. Therefore, the trial
court’s failure to address Bezon personally was an error that affected his
substantial rights.
[18] Under the fourth prong of the plain error
test, we may reverse a trial court’s decision if we find that reversal is
necessary
to prevent a miscarriage of justice or to maintain the integrity of
the judicial process. Id. ¶ 84 (citations omitted). In
Meseral, we noted that the U.S. Supreme Court has stated that an
allocution-related error “is not a fundamental defect which inherently
results in a complete miscarriage of justice, nor an omission inconsistent with
the rudimentary demands of fair procedure.”
Id. ¶ 85 (quoting
Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962)). However, we also noted
that “the denial of the right to allocution is the kind of error that
undermines the
fairness of the judicial process” and that “the right
has value in terms of maximizing the perceived equity of the
process.” Id. ¶ 86 (quoting United States v. Luepke,
495 F.3d 443, 451 (7th Cir. 2007)).
[19] Bezon’s counsel stated
that Bezon regretted some of the things that he included in his written
statement. Therefore, his ability
to express himself to the trial court in this
previous statement does not excuse or cure the trial court’s error, as
Bezon
likely would have said something different during allocution than what he
included in his written statement. There is nothing in
the record that
“indicates that the denial of [Bezon’s] right to allocution did not
implicate the core values in the
sentencing procedures,” and, therefore,
we find plain error, as the error seriously affected the integrity of the
judicial
process. Id. ¶ 87. “[R]esentencing is the
appropriate remedy for [an] allocution error.” Id. As we find no
controlling differences between this case and Meseral, we will reverse
and remand for resentencing consistent with this prior precedent. See
2014 Guam 13.
V. CONCLUSION
[20] The alleged concession by Bezon’s trial counsel did not violate Bezon’s Sixth Amendment right to make his own defense. Accordingly, we AFFIRM Bezon’s conviction of Third Degree CSC and Fourth Degree CSC. However, the trial court committed plain error when it failed to personally address Bezon and failed to ask him whether he wished to make a statement before pronouncing the sentence, in violation of 8 GCA § 120.26. We REVERSE Bezon’s sentence and REMAND for resentencing.
[1] Although PSIs are not public documents, we have previously held that we may access and review a PSI “where relevant to an issue on which an appeal has been taken.” People v. Roby, 2017 Guam 7 ¶ 46 (quoting 9 GCA § 80.14(a) (2005)). The PSI is relevant, and therefore reviewable, as the People argue that Bezon’s substantial rights were not affected by the alleged error in this case because of a written statement included in the PSI.
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