People of Guam v Aldan [2018] GUSC 19 (13 December 2018)

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Appeal from the Superior Court of Guam
Argued and Submitted on February 19, 2018
Hagåtña, Guam

Appearing for Defendant-Appellant:
Stephen P. Hattori, Esq. (briefed)
Theresa G. Rojas, Esq. (argued)
Public Defender Service Corporation
779 Route 4
Sinajana, GU 96910

Appearing for the Plaintiff-Appellee:
Christine S. Tenorio, Esq.
Assistant Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General
Prosecution Division
590 S. Marine Corps Dr., Ste. 801
Tamuning, GU 96913

BEFORE: KATHERINE A. MARAMAN, Chief Justice; F. PHILIP CARBULLIDO, Associate Justice; ROBERT J. TORRES, Associate Justice.

[1] Defendant-Appellant Dennis Castro Aldan a/k/a Danny Christopher Castro (“Aldan”) appeals a final judgment of conviction for (1) theft by receiving a stolen motor vehicle; (2) possession of a schedule II controlled substance; (3) unauthorized use of a motor vehicle; (4) falsifying evidence; (5) impersonation; and (6) fraudulent vehicle identification.
[2] Aldan alleges, among other things, that the trial court erred in giving Jury Instruction 3B, which shifted the burden of proof by instructing that the defendant’s failure to present evidence can be held against him. We conclude that the giving of Jury Instruction 3B constitutes plain error. Pursuant to the following opinion, we vacate the judgment of conviction and decline to reach the additional allegations of error.

[3] In March 2016, after going outside for a coffee break, Alma Bueno’s brother and his girlfriend discovered that Bueno’s 2010 Toyota Corolla was missing. The police put out an All-Points Bulletin for the vehicle.
[4] About six weeks later, a patrolling officer came across a Toyota Corolla with a suspicious license plate in the parking lot of a game room. The vehicle fit the description of the missing car, and the license plate was suspicious because it was an older design on a newer model car. The patrolling officer discovered that the plates were registered to a Honda CR-X. The patrolling officer requested backup, and two other officers responded to the request. As the officers entered the game room to investigate, Aldan walked out. One of the officers approached Aldan, who identified himself as “Daniel Christopher Castro,” and Aldan consented to a pat-down search. During the search, the officers discovered a lanyard with car keys and a couple of packets that tested presumptively positive for methamphetamine. The officers used the car keys to unlock the Corolla with suspicious license plates. The officers confirmed that the Vehicle Identification Number (“VIN”) matched the Corolla reported by Bueno as stolen.
[5] Upon determining that the car was stolen, the officers placed Aldan under arrest, orally provided Miranda warnings, and subsequently interrogated him. Aldan informed one of the officers that his girlfriend Maria Cruz from Barrigada gave him the car and that the license plate was already attached. During processing, Aldan’s fingerprints returned a match for “Dennis Castro Aldan,” not Daniel Christopher Castro. Aldan, however, signed the custody receipt as “Danny C. Castro.”
[6] The case proceeded to trial. After the People called their final witness, the defense rested without calling any witnesses.
[7] At the jury instruction conference, the prosecutor objected to Instruction 3B—Production of All Evidence is Not Required. The original instruction read: “If weak or less satisfactory evidence is offered by the Government, when it appears that stronger and more satisfactory evidence was within the power of the Government, the evidence should be viewed with distrust.” Transcript (“Tr.”) at 6 (Closing Args. & Jury Instrs., June 17, 2016). The prosecutor argued that the instruction should mirror the language of 6 GCA § 8101, upon which the instruction is based, and sought to replace the term “the Government” with “any party.” The defense did not object, and the court granted the change. After the change, Instruction 3B read in its entirety:

Neither side is required to call as witnesses all persons who may have been present at any of the events disclosed by the evidence, or who may appear to have some knowledge of these events, or to produce all objects or documents mentioned or suggested by the evidence.

If weaker and less satisfactory evidence is offered by a party, when it appears that stronger and more satisfactory evidence was within the power of a party, the evidence offered should be viewed with distrust.

Tr. at 75 (Closing Args. & Jury Instrs.); Record on Appeal (“RA”), tab 50 (Jury Instr. No. 3B, June 20, 2016).
[8] During closing arguments, the defense maintained that the prosecutor could have called Maria Cruz to the stand to help determine whether Aldan actually stole the car. Defense counsel also argued “that interchangeable names are very common on Guam,” to suggest that Aldan may not have provided false information to police when he identified himself as Danny C. Castro. Tr. at 42-43 (Closing Args. & Jury Instrs.). In rebuttal, the prosecutor questioned why Aldan did not call his girlfriend Maria Cruz or “his mama” to confirm his story and asked: “Why is [defense counsel] the person who is making all these theories up and presenting them to you?” Id. at 51-52. The prosecutor also highlighted Instruction 3B and stated that it “is relevant to this particular offense [of theft].” Id.
[9] Aldan was convicted by the jury on all counts of the indictment, and timely appealed his convictions.

[10] This court has jurisdiction over appeals from final judgments of conviction. 48 U.S.C.A. § 1424-1(a)(2) (Westlaw through Pub. L. 115-231 (2018)); 8 GCA §§ 130.10, 130.15(a) (2005).

[11] We review jury instructions for plain error when no objection was made at trial. See People v. Gargarita, 2015 Guam 28 ¶ 11 (citing People v. Felder, 2012 Guam 8 ¶ 8). When considering “whether the proffered instructions accurately stated the relevant law,” we review “under a de novo standard.” Gargarita, 2015 Guam 28 ¶ 12 (citing People v. Diego, 2013 Guam 15 ¶ 9). In reviewing allegations of error, we “will not address issues unnecessary to the resolution of the case.” Hemlani v. Hemlani, 2015 Guam 16 ¶ 33 (collecting cases).

[12] In this case, we must address the appropriateness of a jury instruction that tracks the language of a Guam statute. Specifically, we address whether the giving of a “weaker and less satisfactory evidence” instruction, see Jury Instruction 3B, which tracks almost verbatim 6 GCA § 8101, constitutes plain error in a criminal case by improperly shifting the burden of proof to the defendant and infringing upon his constitutional rights.
A. The Giving of Jury Instruction 3B Constitutes Plain Error in this Case
[13] Aldan did not object to Jury Instruction 3B at trial. Therefore, our analysis is limited to plain error review. Gargarita, 2015 Guam 28 ¶ 11. Reversal under a plain error standard is granted only when: “(1) there was an error; (2) the error is clear or obvious under current law; (3) the error affected substantial rights; and (4) reversal is necessary to prevent a miscarriage of justice or to maintain the integrity of the judicial process.” Id. (quoting Felder, 2012 Guam 8 ¶ 19). The party alleging plain error has the burden of proving it. People v. Quitugua, 2009 Guam 10 ¶ 11. Under the circumstances of this case, we find that Aldan has met this burden. We now examine each element.

1. The giving of Jury Instruction 3B was error.
[14] Generally, a jury instruction that accurately tracks the language of the statute is sufficient to inform the jury of its duties. See Diego, 2013 Guam 15 ¶ 28; People v. Demapan, 2004 Guam 24 ¶ 20. However, “simply tracking the language of the . . . statute will generally not suffice” when the statute does not completely or accurately state the law. People v. Torres, 2014 Guam 8 ¶ 27 (analyzing the issue under the sufficiency of the language in an indictment). Aldan alleges that Jury Instruction 3B, despite tracking the statutory language of 6 GCA § 8101, improperly suggested that he had an obligation to refute the prosecution’s evidence. See Appellant’s Br. at 14 (Oct. 10, 2017). The instruction, Aldan contends, essentially gives the jury the impression that uncontroverted evidence presented by the government must be taken as true. Id. at 14. Aldan further argues that this infringes upon his right to remain silent. Id. at 15. He urges us to follow the Oregon Supreme Court on this issue. Id. at 14. The Oregon Supreme Court has held that issuance of the “weaker and less satisfactory evidence” jury instruction is error except in cases where the defendant presents an affirmative defense. See State v. Mains, 669 P.2d 1112, 1117 (Or. 1983) (en banc). The People respond that since the instruction tracks the language of 6 GCA § 8101, it is not erroneous. Appellee’s Br. at 19 (Nov. 8, 2017). We agree that the rule from Mains, and related cases, is good law insofar as we determine that simply tracking statutory language does not insulate the “weaker and less satisfactory evidence” instruction from claims of constitutional error. See People v. Cox, 2018 Guam 16 ¶ 41 (“Merely tracking the statute alone is not sufficient to save an otherwise constitutionally flawed jury instruction.”).
[15] In Mains

Supreme Court of Guam

People of Guam v Aldan [2018] GUSC 19 (13 December 2018)