People of Guam v Roberson [2017] GUSC 18 (7 December 2017)

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF GUAM

THE PEOPLE OF GUAM,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

MICHAEL SUNG HO ROBERSON,

Defendant-Appellant.

Supreme Court Case No.: CRA17-001
Superior Court Case No.: CF0269-16

OPINION

Filed: December 7, 2017

Cite as: 2017 Guam 18

Appeal from the Superior Court of Guam
Argued and submitted on July 13, 2017
Hagåtña, Guam

Appearing for Defendant-Appellant: Howard Trapp, Esq. Howard Trapp, Inc. 200 Saylor Bldg. 139 E. Chalan Santo Papa Hagåtña, GU 96910

Appearing for Plaintiff-Appellee: James Collins, Esq. Office of the Attorney General Prosecution Division 590 S. Marine Corps Dr., Ste. 706 Tamuning, GU 96913

BEFORE: KATHERINE A. MARAMAN, Chief Justice; F. PHILIP CARBULLIDO, Associate Justice; ROBERT J. TORRES, Associate Justice.

TORRES, J.:

[1] Prior to trial, Defendant-Appellant Michael Sung Ho Roberson (“Roberson”) did not file a motion to suppress any evidence that resulted from his traffic stop for an expired vehicle registration. At trial, he took the stand to testify about the stop. He was ultimately convicted by a jury for three separate charges of possession of illegal substances. On appeal, Roberson argues that his defense counsel provided ineffective assistance by not moving to suppress the evidence before trial and for other undeveloped reasons. For the reasons herein, we affirm.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

[2] Roberson was stopped by Guam Police Department (“GPD”) Officer Eric Asanoma after Asanoma noticed Roberson’s vehicle registration was expired. During the stop, Asanoma observed a Ziploc bag of pills on the driver-side floor of the vehicle. Asanoma also observed a strong odor of marijuana coming from the vehicle. Eventually, other GPD officers arrived at the scene, detained Roberson by cuffing him a short distance away from his vehicle, conducted a search of the passenger cab of the vehicle, and ultimately found a partially-burned marijuana cigarette, a Ziploc bag containing Xanax pills, and a prescription bottle containing codeine-based pills. The label on the prescription bottle indicated that it did not belong to Roberson but to a person named George Muna Cruz (“Cruz”).
[3] During Roberson’s jury trial, the People presented witness testimony from the GPD officers present during Roberson’s traffic stop and eventual arrest, as well as from those who took part in the investigation. Testimony was also taken from Cruz, the owner listed on the label of the prescription bottle found in Roberson’s vehicle, as well as other witnesses who were familiar with Roberson and Cruz’s history of mental and physical health. Roberson testified as the only witness on his behalf and offered his account of the incident.
[4] Of the six charges filed against him, he was convicted of three: (i) Possession of a Schedule III Controlled Substance as a third-degree felony; (ii) Possession of a Schedule IV Controlled Substance as a third-degree felony; and (iii) Possession of Less than One Ounce of Marijuana as a violation. Roberson timely filed an appeal.

II. JURISDICTION

[5] This court has jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 48 U.S.C.A. § 1424-1(a)(2) (Westlaw through Pub. L. 115-84 (2017)); 7 GCA §§ 3107 and 3108(a) (2005); and 8 GCA § 130.15(a) (2005).

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

[6] “Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are questions of law[,] which this court reviews de novo.” People v. Damian, 2016 Guam 8 ¶ 11 (quoting People v. Moses, 2007 Guam 5 ¶ 9) (internal quotation marks omitted).

IV. ANALYSIS

[7] Roberson argues on appeal that he was deprived of a fair trial because defense counsel only offered Roberson’s testimony that the “government’s evidence was obtained in violation of Roberson’s rights, instead of moving [pre-trial] that the evidence obtained in violation of Roberson’s rights be suppressed.” Appellant’s Br. at 14 (May 17, 2017). Roberson cites solely to an excerpt from 8 GCA § 65.15 as authoritative support for his argument, see id. at 15, which states in relevant part: “The following shall be raised prior to trial . . . (c) Motions to suppress evidence,” 8 GCA § 65.15(c) (2005).
[8] This court employs the Strickland two-part test established by the United States Supreme Court to determine whether a defendant was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. See People v. Katzuta, 2016 Guam 25 ¶ 83 (citations omitted); see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Counsel’s competence is presumed, Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 384 (1986), and under Strickland, to rebut the presumption of competence, a defendant must prove that: “(1) trial counsel’s performance was deficient so as to fall below the prevailing professional norms; and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the defendant so as to deprive him of a fair trial,” Katzuta, 2016 Guam 25 ¶ 83 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 694). “In order to prevail, [a defendant] would need to establish that the decisions about which he complains were not made for strategic purposes but out of a lack of diligence or for some illegitimate motive.” Damian, 2016 Guam 8 ¶ 31. “This court has also required that the ‘record [be] sufficiently complete to make a proper finding’ in order to review such a claim.” People v. Pablo, 2016 Guam 11 ¶ 12 (alteration in original) (quoting People v. Ueki, 1999 Guam 4 ¶ 5).
[9] In Kimmelman, the United States Supreme Court recognized that counsel’s failure to properly raise a Fourth Amendment claim prior to trial may serve as a valid basis for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim under the Sixth Amendment. See 477 U.S. at 382-83. There, the Court agreed that a “failure to file a suppression motion does not constitute per se ineffective assistance of counsel.” Id.