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People of Guam v Castro [2016] GUSC 16 (29 April 2016)

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF GUAM


PEOPLE OF GUAM,
Plaintiff-Appellee,


v.


Patrick Muna Castro,
Defendant-Appellant.


OPINION


Filed: April 29, 2016


Cite as: 2016 Guam 16


Supreme Court Case No.: CRA15-014
Superior Court Case No.: CF0296-12


Appeal from the Superior Court of Guam
Argued and submitted on October 27, 2015
Hagåtña, Guam


Appearing for Defendant-Appellant:
Joaquin C. Arriola, Jr., Esq.
Zachary C. Taimanglo, Esq.
Arriola, Cowan & Arriola
259 Martyr Street, Ste. 201
Hagåtña, GU 96910
Appearing for Plaintiff-Appellee:
Marianne Woloschuk, Esq.
Assistant Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General
Prosecution Division
590 S. Marine Corps Drive, Ste. 706
Tamuning, GU 96913

BEFORE: ROBERT J. TORRES, Chief Justice; F. PHILIP CARBULLIDO, Associate Justice; KATHERINE A. MARAMAN, Associate Justice.


MARAMAN, J.:


[1] Defendant-Appellant Patrick Muna Castro appeals the trial court's denial of his two motions to withdraw his guilty plea: one motion pursuant to contract law and the other pursuant to the plea not being made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. Castro argues that the governing statute for withdrawal of a guilty plea, 8 GCA § 120.42, suggests such motions be liberally granted because there is no language restricting withdrawing pleas in the period after acceptance but before sentencing. Castro further contends that if the correct standard, "fair and just" reason, is used, then the trial court should grant his motions to withdraw in part based on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.


[2] For the reasons stated herein, we adopt the "fair and just" reason standard whereby a defendant must present a plausible reason to justify a withdrawal of a guilty plea after a trial court's acceptance but before sentencing, and affirm in part, reverse in part and remand to the trial court to determine whether Castro presented a "fair and just" reason to withdraw his guilty plea arising from his ineffective assistance of counsel claim.


I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND


[3] The Grand Jury returned an indictment charging Castro with four counts of theft by receiving stolen property, three counts as a second degree felony and one count as a third degree felony. At arraignment, Castro entered pleas of not guilty and asserted his right to a speedy trial of twelve jurors. The trial court appointed the Public Defender Service Corporation as counsel. Castro subsequently waived his request for a speedy trial. The trial court was prepared for jury selection and received jurors in the courtroom. Subsequently, Castro and the People indicated to the trial court that Castro agreed to enter a guilty plea. As a result, the court reconvened later that afternoon to conduct the Change of Plea Hearing.


A. Plea Agreement and Plea Colloquy


[4] Castro entered into the Plea Agreement ("Agreement") with the People. The Agreement contained several terms including: Castro to plead guilty on two counts of theft by receiving stolen property (as a Second Degree Felony), the People to drop the other two charges, and Castro to serve a prison sentence and pay a fine. Castro agreed to cooperate with the Attorney General's Office ("AG") in the prosecution against Irvin White in CF0387-12, and his sentencing was held in abeyance. If Castro does not fully cooperate with the AG, then the AG may withdraw the Agreement and prosecute Castro to the full extent of the law, but the determination of whether Castro fully cooperated was reserved for and in the sole discretion of the AG.


[5] In the Agreement, Castro waived certain constitutional and statutory rights. These rights included: the right to a jury trial; the right against self-incrimination; the right to prosecution by indictment or preliminary hearing; the right to speedy sentencing; the right to move for a reduction in sentence; and the right to appeal conviction. Before Castro's signature on the Agreement, it states "[b]y his signature, [Castro] attests he has read this [A]greement and its provisions have been fully explained by his attorney. [Castro] believes his lawyer has done all that anyone could do to counsel and assist him and is satisfied with the advice and help received." Record on Appeal ("RA"), tab 44 at 7 (Plea Agreement, July 19, 2012). Other provisions in the Agreement pertinent to this appeal include: "[Castro] voluntarily, and without coercion or promises apart from this [A]greement, agrees to enter guilty pleas," and "[Castro] states he has told his lawyer all the facts and circumstances known about the charges." Id. at 2, 6. More so, the Agreement states that "[h]is lawyer has counseled and advised him on the nature of each charge as well as on any and all lesser included charges." Id. at 6.


[6] At the Change of Plea Hearing, the trial court determined that defense counsel fully explained the Agreement to Castro, that Castro was aware of the maximum penalties, understood the nature of the charges and the rights he was waiving, was not threatened or forced, did not receive any non-written promises, and agreed to cooperate in the prosecution of White. Castro also confirmed that his counsel gave him good legal advice and that Castro was satisfied with the help he received. The trial court again asked, and Castro affirmed, that he was satisfied with the help from his defense counsel. Castro pleaded guilty to the two charges, admitting that he did commit the two offenses. After finding Castro's guilty plea was knowingly and voluntarily made, the trial court accepted the plea and the Agreement, with sentencing to be conducted later.


B. Counsel Discharged


[7] Months later, Castro stated in open court that he wished to discharge defense counsel, alleging he had been deceived by counsel and that he wished to withdraw his guilty plea. In his Motion to Withdraw as Attorney of Record, defense counsel requested withdrawal not only because he was discharged, but also because he disagreed with the deception claim. Further, counsel fundamentally disagreed with Castro's decision to withdraw his guilty plea, and counsel believed there was no meritorious claim to withdraw the Agreement. New counsel was appointed to represent Castro.


C. Motions to Withdraw Agreement


[8]


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