People of Guam v Camacho [2015] GUSC 37 (20 November 2015)

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Appeal from the Superior Court of Guam
Argued and submitted on May 21, 2015
Hagåtña, Guam

Appearing for Defendant-Appellant:
F. Randall Cunliffe, Esq.
Cunliffe & Cook, P.C.
210 Archbishop Flores St., Ste. 200
Hagåtña, GU 96910

Appearing for Plaintiff-Appellee:
Gerald L. Henderson, Esq.
Assistant Attorney General

Office of the Attorney General

590 S. Marine Corps Dr., Ste. 706
Tamuning, GU 96913

BEFORE: ROBERT J. TORRES, Chief Justice; F. PHILIP CARBULLIDO, Associate Justice; KATHERINE A. MARAMAN, Associate Justice.

[1] This case comes before the court on Defendant-Appellant Kyle J. Indalecio Camacho’s appeal of his judgment of conviction following a jury trial, claiming that the trial court erred in denying his Motion for Judgment of Acquittal. Camacho asserts that Plaintiff-Appellee People of Guam (“People”) presented insufficient evidence to establish Camacho’s guilt for the crimes of kidnapping, second degree robbery, and terrorizing, and that his rights to protection from double jeopardy were violated by the imposition of separate sentences for kidnapping and robbery along with a sentence enhancement for possession of a deadly weapon. For the reasons stated herein, we reverse in part and hold that the trial court erred in not dismissing the special allegations of unlawful possession of a deadly weapon in the commission of a felony for lack of sufficient evidence as charged in the indictment, but affirm the judgment in all other respects.

[2] The case arises from criminal convictions for kidnapping, second degree robbery, and terrorizing. The conduct underlying these charges involved a January 5, 2013 encounter between Camacho and the alleged victim, Bobbie Jo Fausto, in which Camacho purportedly stole her phone, restrained her, and abducted her with her own vehicle, holding her against her will from 8:18 p.m. until 9:30 p.m., when she was rescued by police. Camacho was indicted on one count each of kidnapping, second degree robbery, and terrorizing, as well as two special allegations of unlawful possession of a deadly weapon in the commission of a felony.

[3] During the People’s case-in-chief, Fausto was called to testify. Her testimony described in detail how she was attacked by Camacho while entering her vehicle at Micronesia Mall. She testified that Camacho shoved her, punched her in the head, and slammed the car door on her foot while forcing his way into her car and trying to take her cell phone. When Fausto resisted his demand to surrender the phone, Camacho punched her, causing her to drop the phone inside the car. Fausto then stated that as she opened the door to scream for help, Camacho punched and bit her. He subsequently restrained her with handcuffs.

[4] Fausto’s sister, Shienna Macario, approached the vehicle and opened the door. According to Fausto, Camacho instructed her to tell Macario that if she called the police, Fausto would be killed. According to testimony from both Fausto and Macario, Fausto told her sister to relinquish her phone and warned that Fausto would be killed if Macario called the police. Camacho then drove away in Fausto’s car. They made short stops at several locations so that Camacho could smoke and Fausto could use the restroom. During this time, Fausto managed to obtain her cell phone and to hide it in her waistband, though she was unable to contact anyone.

[5] Fausto further testified that, at one point, Camacho placed her in the back of the vehicle while it was stopped. He displayed an open pocketknife. Fausto testified that Camacho told her that “if [she] resisted even more from how [she] was earlier, he would have used it against [her], he would have killed [her].” Transcript (“Tr.”) at 16 (Jury Trial, Day 2, Oct. 23, 2013). She identified the knife introduced into evidence as the one used to threaten her. Shortly after Camacho displayed his knife, police arrived, arresting Camacho and freeing Fausto. Officers testified that Fausto was rescued at Marbo Cave, approximately six miles from Micronesia Mall, and over an hour after her initial abduction. Tr. at 16, 24 (Jury Trial, Day 1, Oct. 22, 2013). Police testimony also confirmed that Camacho’s knife was recovered at the scene.

[6] At the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned a verdict, finding Camacho guilty on all charges and special allegations. Adjusted for concurrent sentences, the court sentenced Camacho to a total of 30 years of incarceration.

[8] This court has jurisdiction over appeals from final judgment of the Superior Court pursuant to 48 U.S.C.A. § 1424-1(a)(2) (Westlaw through Pub. L. 114-49 (2015)), and 7 GCA §§ 3107(b) and 3108 (2005). This is an appeal of a final judgment issued by the Superior Court on October 15, 2014.

[9] Claims of insufficient evidence are matters of law reviewed de novo. People v. Flores, 2009 Guam 22 ¶ 10 (citing People v. Maysho, 2005 Guam 4 ¶ 6; United States v. Shipsey, 363 F.3d 962, 971 n.8 (9th Cir. 2004)). “In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction, this court inquires as to whether the evidence in the record could reasonably support a finding of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v. Root, 2005 Guam 16 ¶ 33 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

[10] A claim of double jeopardy is a question of law, and thus reviewed de novo. People v. San Nicolas, 2001 Guam 4 ¶ 8. Further, determining whether the legislature has authorized the defendant to be punished twice for two violations of the same statute is an issue of statutory interpretation, reviewed de novo. Id. ¶ 9; see also Pangelinan v. Gutierrez, 2000 Guam 11 ¶ 7.

[11] Camacho challenges the sufficiency of evidence used to convict him of the charge of kidnapping. Appellant’s Br. at 6-7 (Feb. 27, 2015). This court has previously addressed the proper standard of analysis for evaluating a sufficiency of evidence challenge, explaining that:

“[i]n reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction,” this court inquires as to “whether the evidence in the record could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v. Sangalang, 2001 Guam 18 ¶ 20 (citations omitted); People v. Reyes, 1998 Guam 32 ¶ 7; People v. Leon Guerrero, 2001 Guam 19 ¶ 32. Because “this is a highly deferential standard of review,” “[w]hen a criminal defendant asserts that there is insufficient evidence to sustain the conviction, this court reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution to ascertain whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Sangalang, 2001 Guam 18 ¶ 20 (emphasis added) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Birges, 723 F.2d 666, 672 (9th Cir. 1984).

People v. Guerrero, 2003 Guam 18 ¶ 13. Thus, when reviewing a jury conviction for sufficiency, the only relevant question is “whether that finding was so insupportable as to fall below the threshold of bare rationality.” Coleman v. Johnson, 132 S. Ct. 2060, 2065 (2012).

[12] The first charge for which Camacho was indicted was kidnapping. Specifically, the indictment alleged that:

On or about the 5th day of January 2013, in Guam, KYLE J. INDALECIO CAMACHO did commit the offense of Kidnapping, in that he intentionally and unlawfully removed another, namely Bobbie Jo Fausto, a substantial distance from the vicinity where he [sic] was found, to facilitate the commission of a felony, that is, robbery, in violation of 9 GCA § 22.20(a)(2) and (b), as amended.

Record on Appeal (“RA”), tab 8 (Indictment, Jan. 16, 2013). The indictment is consistent with the essential elements of the kidnapping statute, which states that “[a] person is guilty of kidnapping if he unlawfully removes another from his place of residence or business, or a substantial distance from the vicinity where he is found . . . with any of the following purposes: . . . (2) to facilitate commission of any felony or flight thereafter.” 9 GCA § 22.20 (2005). Thus, the proper question is whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any reasonable trier of fact could have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that on or about January 5, 2013, Camacho unlawfully removed Fausto a substantial distance in order to facilitate the commission of a robbery .

[13] The basis of Camacho’s claim seems to stem from a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence for the underlying felony of robbery. Camacho claims that because insufficient evidence existed to convict him of robbery, he cannot be convicted of kidnapping. Appellant’s Br. at 1-3. This assumption is incorrect. Kidnapping requires proof that the defendant unlawfully removed a victim a substantial distance for the purpose of facilitating any other felony or flight thereafter. 9 GCA § 22.20(a)(2). Proof of the elements of the underlying felony is not required so long as the People present sufficient evidence that the victim was moved for the purpose of facilitating that felony.[1]

[14] Evidence in the record clearly establishes that Camacho intentionally and unlawfully removed Fausto a substantial distance from the vicinity where she was found. Testimony provided proof that Camacho forcefully restrained Fausto in her vehicle and drove the vehicle from Micronesia Mall to the parking lot of Marbo Cave, approximately six miles away. Tr. at 43, 63 (Jury Trial, Day 2); Tr. at 16, 24 (Jury Trial, Day 1, Oct. 22, 2013). Evidence further established that this abduction lasted over an hour until her rescue by police. Tr. at 24 (Jury Trial, Day 1). Further, the proof presented at trial was sufficient for a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that removal of the victim was done to facilitate the robbery and flight thereafter. Fausto’s testimony established that Camacho attacked her in an attempt to get her phone, pulling her into the vehicle and restraining her when she fought back and screamed for help. Tr. at 21-24, 42-44 (Jury Trial, Day 2). The jury could conclude from these facts that her removal to a different location was intended to facilitate the robbery by preventing Fausto from alerting others to come to her aid. This conclusion is further supported by Camacho’s threats to Macario that Fausto would be harmed if she called the police. Id. at 8, 44-45. A rational jury could infer that the kidnapping was intended to facilitate the robbery by discouraging others from contacting police, increasing the chances of successful completion of his crime.

[15] For these reasons, we hold that evidence in the record could have led a reasonable jury to find that all elements of the kidnapping charge were satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt.

[16] Though Camacho does not explicitly assert this ground for relief, the court may more appropriately interpret the substance of his first argument as a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence regarding his conviction for second degree robbery. “A person is guilty of robbery in the second degree if, in the course of committing a theft, he . . . (3) is armed with or displays what appears to be explosives or a deadly weapon.” 9 GCA § 40.20(a)(3) (2005). These elements are mirrored in the People’s indictment, which charges “that he intentionally was armed with and displayed what appeared to be a deadly weapon, while in the course of committing theft of a cell phone, in violation of 9 GCA § 40.20(a)(3) and (b).” RA, tab 8 at 2 (Indictment). In essence, Camacho is claiming that his robbery conviction cannot stand because he did not display the deadly weapon in his possession while taking Fausto’s cell phone and did not possess the phone after brandishing his knife, as Fausto had managed to take it back. Appellant’s Br. at 7. These factual allegations appear supported by the record. Tr. at 21-24, 42-44, 55-59, 65-72 (Jury Trial, Day 2). The People counter that the robbery was ongoing from Fausto’s initial assault until the police arrived, since Camacho possessed unlawful control over Fausto’s car and phone the entire time, including when the phone returned to Fausto’s custody. Appellee’s Br. at 7-8 (Mar. 30, 2015). As such, the People argue that Camacho’s act of displaying the knife occurred during the ongoing theft. Id. at 7-9. However, this court need not reach the People’s argument since Camacho’s claim, even if true, does not impugn the sufficiency of evidence to support his conviction.

[17] According to the statute, guilt is proven by showing that Camacho was either armed with or displayed what appeared to be a deadly weapon. 9 GCA § 40.20(a)(3). Though the People alleged that Camacho was both armed with and displayed a weapon in the course of committing the theft, see RA, tab 8 at 2 (Indictment), it is well settled that “[w]hen a statute specifies two or more ways in which an offense may be committed, all may be alleged in the conjunctive in one count and proof of any one of those conjunctively charged acts may establish guilt.” People v. Torres

Supreme Court of Guam

People of Guam v Camacho [2015] GUSC 37 (20 November 2015)