People of Guam v Quinata [2010] GUSC 17; 2010 Guam 17 (29 December 2010)

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF GUAM

PEOPLE OF GUAM,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

V

RICHARD A. QUINATA,
Defendant-Appellant.

OPINION

Filed: December 29, 2010

Cite as: 2010 Guam 17

Supreme Court Case No.: CRA08-011
Superior Court Case No.: CF0372-04

Appeal from the Superior Court of Guam
Argued and submitted on May 21, 2009
Hagåtña, Guam

Appearing for Defendant-Appellant: F. Randall Cunliffe, Esq. Cunliffe & Cook, PC 210 Archbishop FB Flores St. Hagåtña, GU 96910

Appearing for Plaintiff-Appellee: J. Basil O'Mallan III, Esq. Assistant Attorney General Office of the Attorney General 287 W O'Brien Dr. Hagåtña, GU 96910

BEFORE: ROBERT J. TORRES, Chief Justice; F. PHILIP CARBULLIDO, Associate Justice; RICHARD H. BENSON, Justice Pro Tempore.

TORRES, C.J.:

[1] Defendant-Appellant Richard Allen Quinata appeals from a final judgment convicting him of several counts of First Degree Criminal Sexual Conduct (As a 1st Degree Felony). Quinata argues that the convictions should be reversed on the grounds that they were barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause because the trial court granted his motion for judgment of acquittal on certain Second Degree Criminal Sexual Conduct charges. He also appeals the denial of his motion in limine to exclude DNA evidence and testimony of the prosecution's DNA expert. Finally, he appeals the trial court's imposition of a $50,000.00 fine.

[2] We find no violation of Quinata's rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause because the trial court's ruling on Quinata's acquittal motion did not actually constitute an "acquittal" as it is defined by the United States Supreme Court; therefore, the jury was not precluded from convicting Quinata of First Degree Criminal Sexual Conduct. Moreover, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Quinata's motion in limine to exclude DNA evidence because Quinata did not demonstrate he was surprised or unfairly prejudiced by the substance of the DNA expert's testimony. The trial court, however, abused its discretion in sentencing Quinata to pay a fine of $50,000.00 without first determining whether he had the ability to pay such amount. Accordingly, we affirm Quinata's convictions but vacate the fine imposed and remand for a hearing to determine his ability to pay.

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

[3]