People of Guam v Stephen [2009] GUSC 8; 2009 Guam 08 (3 September 2009)

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Supreme Court Case No.: CRA08-003
Superior Court Case Nos.: CM0061-08, CM0060-08, CM0062-08

Appeal from the Superior Court of Guam
Argued and submitted on April 29, 2009
Mangilao, Guam

Appearing for Plaintiff-Appellant:
Jonathan R. Quan, Esq.
Assistant Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General
287 W O’Brien Dr.
Hagåtña, GU 96910

Appearing for Defendant-Appellee:
Maria G. Fitzpatrick, Esq.
Assistant Public Defender
Public Defender Serv. Corp.
110 W. O’Brien Dr.
Hagåtña, GU 96910

BEFORE: ROBERT J. TORRES, Chief Justice; F. PHILIP CARBULLIDO, Associate Justice; KATHERINE A. MARAMAN, Associate Justice.

[1] This is a consolidated case involving three DUI defendants who were arrested in early February, 2007. All three defendants were given notices to appear on January 30, 2008 at 9:00 AM. The court did not convene until 10:00 AM that day, nor were the defendants listed on the court calendar. As a result, the defendants were never called for an initial hearing. At a rescheduled hearing, the Superior Court dismissed all three cases with prejudice. The People appealed. We find that the Superior Court abused its discretion in dismissing the complaints and therefore reverse.

[2] Defendants-Appellees Stanley Stephen, Luis Santos Deliguin, and Anthony Sikata Michael were arrested in the first week of February, 2007, for allegedly driving while under the influence of alcohol. At the time of their arrests, they were each given a notice to appear ("NTA") before the Superior Court on January 30, 2008 at 9:00 AM. Two days before their scheduled appearance, the People filed complaints against the defendants charging them with Driving While under the Influence of Alcohol (BAC) (Misdemeanor), Driving While under the Influence of Alcohol (Misdemeanor), and Reckless Driving (Misdemeanor). In addition, Deliguin was charged with Driving While under the Influence of a Schedule I Controlled Substance (Misdemeanor).

[3] Both Stephen and Michael appeared in Presiding Judge Lamorena’s courtroom at 9:00 AM on January 30, 2008.[1] However, the Presiding Judge did not begin holding hearings until 10:00 AM that morning as scheduled. In addition, none of the defendants appeared on the calendar, and none of them were ever called.

[4] All three defendants were then summoned to appear for rescheduled initial hearings on March 12, 2008. In an odd twist, Stephen’s summons was addressed to a possibly non-existent person, Hong Mi Ju Dollham, whose address was unknown. None of the defendants appeared for the March 12th hearing, and the Superior Court dismissed each case against the defendants with prejudice. Dismissal was "based on the Court’s finding in an oral ruling that the summons was issued and the arraignment was scheduled after the NTA date." Appellant’s Excerpts of Record ("ER"), tabs 3, 7, 11 (Proposed Orders of Dismissal with Prejudice, Apr. 23, 2008). The People timely appealed.

[5] This court has jurisdiction to hear the People’s appeal from an order dismissing a criminal case pursuant to 48 U.S.C. 1424-1(a)(2) (West 2009), 7 GCA § 3107(a) (2005), and 8 GCA § 130.20(a)(5) (2005). In particular, 8 GCA § 130.20(a)(5) allows the People to appeal from "[a]n order or judgment dismissing or otherwise terminating the action before the defendant has been placed in jeopardy . . . ." 8 GCA § 130.20(a)(5) (2005).

[6] The standard of review is more difficult to determine, because neither the Superior Court nor the parties indicate a source for the court’s authority to dismiss the cases. Assuming the court felt that unnecessary delay had violated the defendants’ due process rights, then the review would be for abuse of discretion. People v. Mendiola, 1999 Guam 8 ¶ 10; United States v. Huntley, 976 F.2d 1287, 1290 (9th Cir. 1991). If, on the other hand, the dismissals were based upon the defendants’ right to a speedy trial, that determination must be reviewed de novo. Mendiola, 1999 Guam 8 ¶ 22; Coffey v. Gov’t of Guam, 1997 Guam 14 ¶ 6.

[7] The Superior Court’s only indication of the legal basis for its decision was the following brief statement, which appears in each defendant’s order of dismissal: "The dismissal is with prejudice based on the Court’s finding in an oral ruling that the summons was issued and the arraignment was scheduled after the NTA date." ER, tabs 3, 7, 11 (Proposed Orders of Dismissal with Prejudice). As the People correctly assert in their brief, there is no statutory or court-mandated rule requiring a court to dismiss a criminal complaint simply because an arraignment occurs after the NTA date. Appellant’s Br. at 1, 3-5 (Dec. 22, 2008). Based on the court’s brief statement, we are unable to determine the legal basis for its order. Often, our inability "to identify or infer a clear and consistent finding by the trial court" will require a remand. People v. Farata, 2007 Guam 8 ¶ 51. However, in this case it is clear that the Superior Court objected to the delay caused by the scheduling error, and the determination of whether that delay justified dismissal with prejudice is a legal question that can be answered by this court without additional fact finding. Although it would have been helpful to examine the court’s legal reasoning in detail, we can just as easily examine the statutory and constitutional sources for the court’s authority ourselves, and determine whether the decision to dismiss was justified.

[8] We begin by examining the constitutional protections against prosecutorial delay. The first is the Sixth Amendment requirement that "the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial." U.S. Const. amend. VI; see also 48 U.S.C. 1421b(g) & (u) (West 2009) (incorporating the Sixth Amendment into Guam law). The second is the protection found in the Due Process Clause, which is applied to delays not covered by the Sixth Amendment. Huntley, 976 F.2d at 1290; see also 48 U.S.C. 1421b(e) & (u) (West 2009) (incorporating the Due Process Clause into Guam law). As we proceed through this analysis, we are also guided by provisions within Guam’s statutes including: (1) the one-year statute of limitations for prosecution of misdemeanors found in 8 GCA § 10.30 (2005); (2) the de facto statute of limitations found in 8 GCA § 25.30 (2005) and interpreted in People v. Palomo, 1998 Guam 12; (3) the court’s power to dismiss a case for "unnecessary delay" found in 8 GCA § 80.70(b) (2005); and (4) the requirement that a defendant be "arraigned promptly" found in 8 GCA § 60.10(a) (2005).

[9] The Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial attaches only after a criminal prosecution has begun and the defendant becomes "accused" of a crime. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 313 (1971). In Marion, the Supreme Court of the United States held that "it is either a formal indictment or information or else the actual restraints imposed by arrest and holding to answer a criminal charge that engage the particular protections of the speedy trial provision of the Sixth Amendment." Id. at 320 (emphasis added). The first question we must answer in applying this rule is whether each defendant’s arrest and release with an NTA was "arrest and holding to answer" for purposes of applying the speedy trial right. Id.

[10] A similar situation was before the Court in United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302 (1986). The defendants in Loud Hawk were released without bail after their indictments were dismissed because evidence was suppressed and the prosecution could not proceed. Id. at 306-08. Seven years later, after a prolonged appeals process involving rehearing, rehearing en banc, and petition for certiorari, the defendants’ indictments were finally reinstated. Id. at 308-10. The defendants successfully argued in the trial court that their Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial had been violated, and the prosecution appealed all the way to the Supreme Court. Id. at 309-10. The Court reversed and held that "when defendants are not incarcerated or subjected to other substantial restrictions on their liberty, a court should not weigh that time towards a claim under the Speedy Trial Clause." Id. at 312. The Court then proceeded to apply the speedy trial analysis only to the delays that occurred after the defendants’ indictments had been reinstated. Id. at 312-17.

[11] The defendants argue that they suffered "the anxiety and concern of the accused" after they were arrested, presumably because their scheduled hearing might result in charges being filed against them. Appellees’ Br. at 6-7 (Jan. 21, 2009) (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. 532). A similar argument was rejected in Loud Hawk. 474 U.S. at 312. There, the fact that the defendants were required to appear at an evidentiary hearing at one point was not considered "actual restraint" for purposes of invoking the right to a speedy trial. Id. The Court also concluded that neither the government’s obvious intent to prosecute the defendants nor the fact that the defendants found it necessary to hire attorneys during their release was sufficient to invoke the speedy trial right. Id. at 311-12. Applying the same reasoning here, we must conclude that the mere fact that the defendants were arrested, served with NTAs, and released does not, by itself, invoke the right to a speedy trial. Although the defendants almost certainly felt some anxiety due to their pending hearings, their arrest and release without bond did not render them "accused" for purposes of the Sixth Amendment.

[12] If a defendant is not arrested and held to answer, the speedy trial right attaches at the time of indictment. Marion, 404 U.S. at 321. Of course, there are no indictments in the present case for determining when a defendant becomes "accused" for purposes of the speedy trial right. Here, the defendants have been charged only with misdemeanors. In Guam, a complaint, rather than an indictment, is sufficient to charge a defendant accused of committing a misdemeanor. 8 GCA § 1.15 (2005). Because a complaint is analogous to an indictment in that both are accusatory pleadings, it follows that the Sixth Amendment speedy-trial right would attach upon the filing of a complaint in misdemeanor cases, provided that the defendant was released soon after arrest without having to post a bond.

[13] California courts, which review accusatory pleadings similar to those used in Guam, have reached a similar conclusion and have determined that in misdemeanor cases, the Sixth Amendment speedy trial right attaches upon the filing of a complaint. People v. Martinez, 996 P.2d 32, 41 (Cal. 2000). The right attaches whether or not the defendant is made aware of the complaint. Cf. Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 648, 653 (1992) (speedy trial violation found where defendant was unaware of indictment for over eight years). Thus, under this reasoning, only the approximately six-week delay between the filing of the complaints on January 28, 2008 and the rescheduled initial appearance on March 12, 2008 would be subject to a speedy trial analysis.

[14] Our speedy-trial analysis must therefore examine the approximately six-week delay between the filing of the complaints and dismissal of the cases. In determining whether the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial has been violated, one must consider: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the defendant’s assertion of the right to a speedy trial; and (4) whether or not prejudice resulted from the delay. Mendiola, 1999 Guam 8 ¶ 22. Here, the defendants did not assert their right to a speedy trial, but there was little opportunity to do so given that their cases were dismissed at the rescheduled hearing. More relevant is the fact that the defendants were not able to articulate any specific reason they might have been prejudiced by the delay. The lack of demonstrated prejudice weighs against a speedy-trial dismissal.

[15] The reason for the delay appears to be a combination of mistakes on the part of the Attorney General’s Office, the Superior Court, and possibly the officer who filled out the original NTAs. Based on the record, we are unable to determine the reason that the original hearing was held at 10:00 AM even though the NTA indicated 9:00 AM. Why the defendants’ names were absent from the calendar that day is also a mystery, and we are at a loss as to whether the court or the Attorney General’s Office is the party responsible for the mistake. However, the prosecuting attorney assigned to the hearing had an opportunity to correct the mistake by requesting the defendants be called before the judge. Because at least some of the delay can be attributed to the People, this factor weighs in the defendants’ favor.

[16] Finally, we consider the length of the delay. Sometimes, the delay itself can be long enough to be "presumptively prejudicial." Doggett, 505 U.S. at 651-52. However, the approximately six-week delay between complaint and the first hearing was far less than other delays typically found to be constitutional.

Supreme Court of Guam

People of Guam v Stephen [2009] GUSC 8; 2009 Guam 08 (3 September 2009)