People of Guam v Flores [2009] GUSC 22; 2009 Guam 22 (31 December 2009)

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF GUAM

PEOPLE OF GUAM,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

V

ANTHONY C. FLORES,
Defendant-Appellant.

Supreme Court Case No.: CRA07-004
Superior Court Case No.: CF0191-02

OPINION

Filed: December 31, 2009
Cite as: 2009 Guam 22

Appeal from the Superior Court of Guam
Argued and submitted on May 22, 2008
Hagåtña, Guam

For Plaintiff-Appellee:
Marianne Woloschuk, Esq.
Assistant Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General
287 W. O=Brien Dr.
Hagåtña, GU 96910

For Defendant-Appellant:
Ana Maria C. Gayle, Esq.
Alternate Public Defender
Suite 902, DNA Bldg.
238 Archbishop Flores St.
Hagåtña, GU 96910

BEFORE: ROBERT J. TORRES, Chief Justice; F. PHILIP CARBULLIDO, Associate Justice; KATHERINE A. MARAMAN, Associate Justice.

MARAMAN, J.:

[1] Defendant-Appellant, Anthony C. Flores, appeals from a final judgment convicting him after a jury trial of the charges of Murder (as a 1st Degree Felony) and two special allegations (Possession and Use of a Deadly Weapon in the Commission of a Felony). On appeal Flores argues that: (1) his statutory right to a speedy trial under 8 GCA § 80.60 and his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial were violated; (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion for a new trial based on violations of 8 GCA § 70.10 and the seminal disclosure case of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); (3) there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction; and (4) the trial court committed error in denying the motion for a new trial based on extrinsic information and in-trial publicity. For the reasons discussed below we reverse the judgment of conviction.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

[2] On November 12, 1999, Guam Police Department (“GPD”) Officer Jojo Garcia responded to an assault complaint at the Hamilton Hotel where Sherri Lea Taylor was residing. Officer Garcia saw Taylor’s face when she first opened the door, and he noticed she appeared badly beaten with blood on her face. Transcripts (“Tr.”), vol. XII at 85 (Jury Trial, Sept. 13, 2005). During his interview of Taylor, she said a man named “Ton” assaulted her. Id. at 91-92. Taylor also tried telling Officer Garcia the surname of her attacker. Because the assault to Taylor’s face made her unable to speak clearly enough for Officer Garcia to understand, he initially thought Taylor said “Perez”. Id. at 91. Taylor continued to shake her head no whenever Officer Garcia said Perez until Officer Garcia finally understood Taylor was saying “Flores”. Id. at 94. When Officer Garcia mentioned “Flores”, Taylor acknowledged he was correct.¹ Id. Officer Garcia reported that Taylor told him she was struck several times in the face by the assailant’s fists, was struck with a telephone and a chair, and was choked. Id. at 93. Taylor also described to Officer Garcia how Flores beat her. Guam Fire Department Emergency Medical Technicians (EMTs) also responded to the Hamilton Hotel to treat Taylor’s injuries. The EMTs noticed Taylor’s injuries, specifically the bruising to her face. Taylor told the EMTs that a man struck her with his hands, and a chair and strangled her with the telephone line. Tr., vol. XVII at 25-26 (Jury Trial, Sept. 20, 2005). That night Taylor was transported to Guam Memorial Hospital where she was seen in the emergency room and discharged a few hours later.

[3] The next day, Defendant-Appellant, Anthony C. Flores, was arrested, charged with aggravated assault of Taylor and confined. On November 14, 1999, Taylor’s friends reported to GPD that others had threatened to harm Taylor. A few days later, Taylor was transported and admitted to Naval Hospital. The military doctors determined Taylor did not need surgery since she was presenting symptoms of what appeared to be severe liver failure and shock. Doctors found alcohol and Tylenol in Taylor’s system and ultimately determined that her liver was failing and that she was dying. Tr., vol. XIV at 92-94 (Jury Trial, Sept. 15, 2005). On November 20, 1999, Taylor’s organs shut down, and she died.

[4] On November 23, 1999, Dr. Arthur Lorezel performed the initial autopsy examination on Taylor. Soon after, on November 30, 1999, Dr. Aurelio Espinola did a second autopsy concluding Taylor died of blunt force trauma to her chest and abdomen area.

[5] Indictments were filed against Flores in four different cases. The first indictment filed in criminal case no. CF0700-99 charged Flores with attempted murder, aggravated assault and burglary. ER, tab 29 at 1 (Indictment, Nov. 23, 1999). The indictments in CF0458-00, CF0607-01, and CF0191-02 charged Flores with two charges of murder, as first degree felonies, and special allegations for possession and use of a deadly weapon in the commission of a felony. ER, tab 28 at 1 (Indictment, CF0458-00, Aug. 29, 2000); ER, tab 25 at 1 (Indictment, CF0607-01, Nov. 30, 2001); ER, tab 23 at 1 (Indictment, CF0191-02, Apr. 26, 2002). Flores has been incarcerated since his arrest.

[6] Flores filed a pre-trial motion asserting that his right to a speedy trial was violated and renewed the motion after trial. At trial, Flores moved for a mistrial based on mid-trial publicity and after trial filed a motion for a new trial on the same basis. Other post-trial motions filed by Flores included motions for a new trial based on violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial and discovery violations under 8 GCA § 70.10 and Brady. Flores also filed a motion for judgment of acquittal claiming insufficiency of the evidence. The trial court denied all of Flores’ post-trial motions.

[7] A jury convicted Flores of murder and two counts of possession and use of a deadly weapon. A judgment of conviction was entered on March 19, 2007, and Flores timely appealed.

II. JURISDICTION

[8] This court has jurisdiction over this appeal from a final judgment of conviction. 48 U.S.C. § 1424-1(a)(2) (2007); 7 GCA §§ 3107(b), 3108(a) (2005); 8 GCA §§ 130.10, 130.15(a) (2005).

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

[9] A trial court’s denial of a defendant’s motion to dismiss on statutory speedy trial grounds is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People v. Nicholson, 2007 Guam 9 ¶ 8. We review de novo a defendant’s Sixth Amendment speedy trial claim. People v. Mendiola, 1999 Guam 8 ¶ 22. Denial by the trial court of a motion to dismiss an indictment is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People v. Gutierrez, 2005 Guam 19 ¶ 13. The standard of review for a denial of a motion for mistrial is abuse of discretion. Caston v. State, 823 So. 2d 473, 492 (Miss. 2002). A denial of a motion for a new trial is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People v. Quinata, 1999 Guam 6 ¶ 16. This also applies when the motion for a new trial is based on trial publicity. See State v. Manuel, 408 So. 2d 1235, 1238 (La. 1982). “Whether a Brady violation requires a new trial is reviewed for abuse of discretion.” State v. Wilson, 200 P.3d 1283, 1292 (Kan. Ct. App. 2008).

[10] Finally, claims of insufficient evidence are matters of law that are reviewed de novo. See People v. Maysho, 2005 Guam 4 ¶ 6 (“If a defendant preserves the claim of sufficiency of the evidence by filing a motion for acquittal, the standard of review on appeal is de novo.”); see also United States v. Shipsey, 363 F.3d 962, 971 n.8 (9th Cir. 2004) (Claims of insufficient evidence are reviewed de novo). “When a criminal defendant asserts that there is insufficient evidence to sustain the conviction, this court reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution to ascertain whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v. Flores, 2004 Guam 18 ¶ 6 (quoting People v. Reyes, 1998 Guam 32 ¶ 7 (citations omitted)).

IV. DISCUSSION

[11] On appeal, Flores claims: (1) his statutory and constitutional speedy trial rights were violated; (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion for a new trial based on violations of 8 GCA § 70.10 and Brady; (3) there was insufficient evidence to sustain the conviction for the murder charge; and (4) the trial court erred in denying the motion for a new trial based on the jury’s exposure to extrinsic information and in-trial publicity. Although the judgment is reversed on one ground, we address the merits of each argument, because they could be dispositive and may be raised again during any new trial.

A. Speedy Trial Violations

1. Statutory Right to a Speedy Trial

[12] Flores first argues his statutory speedy trial right was violated because the trial court failed to bring him to trial within the time prescribed under 8 GCA § 80.60, and no good cause was shown for the almost six-year delay in starting his trial. Indictments were filed against Flores in four different cases. The first indictment filed in CF0700-99 (“first indictment”) on November 23, 1999, charged Flores with attempted murder, two charges of aggravated assault, and burglary. ER, tab 29 at 1 (Indictment, CF0700-99, Nov. 23, 1999). The charges in the second, third, and fourth indictments are two charges of murder as first degree felonies, and special allegations for possession and use of a deadly weapon in commission of a felony.² ER, tab 28, at 1 (Indictment, CF0458-00, Aug. 29, 2000); ER, tab 25 at 1 (Indictment, CF0607-01, Nov. 30, 2001); ER, tab 23 at 1 (Indictment, CF0191-02, Apr. 26, 2002).

[13] Flores acknowledges the charges in the first indictment are different from the charges in the subsequent indictments and therefore concedes his speedy trial calculation should begin with the second indictment. Appellant’s Br. at 11 (Feb. 11, 2008). Flores asserts there was a delay of 529 days with no good cause shown from the arraignment in the second indictment. Id.