Nissan Motor Corporation in Guam v Sea Star Group Inc [2002] GUSC 5; 2002 Guam 05 (9 April 2002)

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF GUAM

NISSAN MOTOR CORPORATION IN GUAM
Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant,

vs.

SEA STAR GROUP INC.
Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee.

Supreme Court Case No. CVA01-001
Superior Court Case No. CV1047-98

OPINION

Filed: April 9, 2002

Cite as: 2002 Guam 5

Appeal from the Superior Court of Guam
Argued and submitted on December 11, 2001
Hagåtña, Guam

Appearing for the Plaintiff-Appellee/ Cross-Appellant: Louie J. Yanza, Esq. McKeown Vernier Price Maher 115 Hesler Place, Ground Floor Governor Joseph Flores Building Hagåtña, Guam 96910

Appearing for the Defendant-Appellant/ Cross-Appellee: Kevin J. Fowler, Esq. Dooley Lannen Roberts & Fowler LLP Suite 201, Orlean Pacific Plaza 865 South Marine Drive Tamuning, Guam 96911

BEFORE: F. PHILIP CARBULLIDO, Chief Justice[1], JOHN A. MANGLONA, Designated Justice, and ANITA A. SUKOLA, Justice Pro Tempore.

CARBULLIDO, J.:

[1] Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant Nissan Motor Corporation (hereinafter ANissan@) filed suit against Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee Sea Star Group (hereinafter ASea Star@) to recover for property damage suffered by Nissan as a result of Sea Star=s negligence. The trial court found Sea Star negligent, and awarded Nissan the estimated cost of repair for eleven of the fourteen damaged vehicles. The trial court also refused to award Nissan damages for its lost profits, finding that sale prices in the car industry are too speculative for measuring loss of income. Sea Star and Nissan appeal. We find that the trial court did not err in its findings, and therefore affirm the trial court=s judgment.

I.

[2] Nissan sought recovery for fourteen vehicles that were damaged during Typhoon Paka. The vehicles were among several hundred new vehicles stored by Nissan on a lot adjacent to property owned by Sea Star. Sea Star maintained a twenty-seven-foot aluminum storage container on its property that was used as a satellite office. In preparing for the arrival of the typhoon, Sea Star attempted to secure the container by moving it up against a cyclone fence and pinning it to the ground by bending four rebar stakes around the container=s edges. During Typhoon Paka=s passage, the container was picked up and carried approximately 130 feet. It eventually landed on the fence separating Nissan and Sea Star=s lots, coming to rest against the rear of five Nissan vehicles. Nissan also alleges that nine other vehicles suffered damage from the container=s flying debris.

[3] Nissan filed suit against Sea Star arguing that Sea Star negligently failed to secure its property and that this negligence resulted in the damage to Nissan=s property. The trial court found in favor of Nissan, concluding that Sea Star failed to exercise ordinary care in securing the container. Nissan was awarded the estimated cost of repair on eleven of the fourteen damaged vehicles. With respect to the remaining three vehicles, the trial court determined that Nissan failed to establish that Sea Star was the proximate cause of the damage. This appeal followed.

II.

[4] This court maintains jurisdiction over final judgments of the Superior Court. Title 7 GCA '' 3107, 3108(a) (1994).

III.

A. Sea Star=s Appeal

[5] Sea Star asserts three findings by the trial court were in error: (1) that the maximum wind speed during Typhoon Paka was 150 miles per hour (mph); (2) that Sea Star owed Nissan a duty of care; and (3) that Sea Star failed to exercise reasonable care in securing its container.

1. Wind speed

[6] Sea Star argues that the trial court erred in finding that the maximum speed of Typhoon Paka=s winds was 150 mph. We disagree. A lower court=s findings of fact are reviewed for clear error. Yang v. Hong, 1998 Guam 9, & 4. AA finding is clearly erroneous when, even though some evidence supports it, the entire record produces the definite and firm conviction that the court below committed a mistake.@ Yang, 1998 Guam 9 at & 7 (citation omitted).

[7] Experts for both parties did place the speed of Typhoon Paka=s wind gusts at over 150 mph. Transcript vol. --, p. 157 (Bench Trial, July 17, 2000); Transcript vol. --, p. 28 (Continued Bench Trial, July 18, 2000). However, eyewitness testimony presented during the trial recalled that Nissan=s container was tossed by the Typhoon=s strong winds, and not specifically by a wind gust. Transcript vol. --, pp. 38-39 (Bench Trial, July 17, 2000). In light of this testimony, a specific finding by the trail court as to the maximum speed of Typhoon Paka=s wind gusts was not necessary.

[8] The trial court=s finding that ATyphoon Paka struck Guam with winds over one hundred and twenty-five miles per hour (125 mph) up to one hundred and fifty miles per hour (150 mph)@ can be construed as a statement limited to the storm=s sustained wind speeds. Experts for both parties testified that Typhoon Paka had sustained winds within the 125 mph and 150 mph range. Transcript vol. --, p. 154 (Bench Trial, July 17, 2000); Transcript vol. --, pp. 28-29, 37 (Continued Bench Trial, July 18, 2000). Thus, the evidence provided by both experts would support a finding by the trial court that the maximum sustained winds of Typhoon Paka were 150 mph.

[9] We do not have a definite and firm conviction that the trial court=s finding as to maximum wind speeds was erroneous. Even if we were to conclude that the trial court=s finding was in error, the error would be harmless, since extraordinary wind speed will not act to relieve Sea Star of its liability, as will be discussed further.

2. Duty

[10] Sea Star argues that policy considerations support relieving it of its duty to act as a reasonable landowner. A[T]he existence of a legal duty in a given factual situation is a question of law . . . .