Aguon v Gutierrez [2002] GUSC 14; 2002 Guam 14 (4 September 2002)

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF GUAM

PACITA AGUON,
individually, and on behalf of all those similarly situated,
Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

CARL T.C. GUTIERREZ, Governor of Guam,
MICHAEL J. REIDY, Acting Director of Administration,
Y'ASELA A. PEREIRA, Treasurer of Guam; JOHN H. RIOS, Director of
the Government of Guam Retirement Fund; GERALD S.A. PEREZ,
ODILIA M. BAUTISTA, JENNIFER MUNA-AGUON,
MARK J. HEATH and PAUL D. UNTALAN,
in their capacities as members of the Board of Trustees
of the Government of Guam Retirement Fund,
and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive,
Respondents-Appellees.

Supreme Court Case No. CVA01-010
Superior Court Case No. SP0207-97

OPINION

Filed: September 4, 2002

Cite as: 2002 Guam 14

Appeal from the Superior Court of Guam
Argued and submitted on June 18, 2002
Hagåtña, Guam

Appearing for the Petitioner-Appellant: Michael F. Phillips, Esq. Phillips & Bordallo, P.C. 410 West O=Brien Dr., Suite 102 Hagåtña, Guam 96910
Appearing for Respondents-Appellees Gutierrez, Reidy, and Pereira: Eric A. Heisel Assistant Attorney General Office of the Attorney General Suite 2-200E, Judicial Center Building 120 West O=Brien Drive Hagåtña, Guam 96910	Appearing for Respondents-Appellees Board of Trustees of the Retirement Fund: Joanne L. Grimes, Esq. Elyze J. McDonald, Esq. Carlsmith Ball LLP 134 West Soledad Ave Suite 2-200E, Judicial Center Building Bank of Hawaii Building, Suite 401 Hagåtña, Guam 96910

BEFORE: F. PHILIP CARBULLIDO, Chief Justice,[1] FRANCES M. TYDINGCO-GATEWOOD, Associate Justice, and JOHN A. MANGLONA, Designated Justice.

CARBULLIDO, J.:

[1] Petitioner-Appellant Pacita Aguon (hereinafter AAguon@) sought a mandate from the Superior Court directing Respondents-Appellants Carl T.C. Gutierrez, Governor of Guam, et al.[2] (hereinafter collectively referred to as ARespondents@) to implement a cumulative increase in her annual annuity pursuant to Title 4 GCA ' 8122.1. Respondents filed a motion for summary judgment, which the lower court granted after finding that section 8122.1 conferred a supplemental and not cumulative benefit. Aguon appeals this grant of summary judgment and the underlying interpretation of section 8122.1. We agree with the lower court=s reading of section 8122.1 and affirm the grant of summary judgment.

I.

[2] Aguon filed a petition for a writ of a mandate in the Superior Court to compel Respondents to implement the annual increase in her annuity as set forth in Title 4 GCA ' 8122.1 for the years 1990 to 1999.[3] It is undisputed that Aguon received a $1,500 supplement from the Retirement Fund for each year she was qualified to receive an annual annuity. However, Aguon believes that section 8122.1 does not simply supplement her annual annuity, but rather provides for a cumulative increase. Under this theory, if Aguon=s annual annuity in 1990 was $10,000, then she would be entitled to $11,500 in 1990 ($10,000 annuity + $1,500 increase), $13,000 in 1991 ($11,500 payment from the previous year + $1,500 increase), $14,500 in 1992 ($13,000 payment from the previous year + $1,500 increase), and so on for each subsequent year.

[3] Respondents filed several motions, including a motion for summary judgment, which is the subject of the instant appeal. The trial court agreed with Respondents and found section 8122.1 conferred a supplemental rather than cumulative increase. Because Aguon received her supplemental increases during the years in question, the trial court concluded that section 8122.1 had been complied with and granted summary judgment for Respondents.

II.

[4] This court has jurisdiction over all final judgments of the Superior Court pursuant to Title 7 GCA ' 3107 (1994).

III.

[5] A grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo, Iizuka Corp. v. Kawasho Int`l (Guam), Inc., 1997 Guam 10, & 7, and is only proper in instances where there are no genuine issues of material fact, Guam R. Civ. P. 56(c). The parties here concede that there are no facts in dispute and that the issue presented on appeal is strictly one of statutory interpretation. Issues of statutory construction are questions of law reviewed de novo. Ada v. Guam Tel. Auth., 1999 Guam 10, & 10.

[6] AIn cases involving statutory construction, the plain language of a statute must be the starting point.@ Pangelinan v. Gutierrez, 2000 Guam 11, & 23; Am. Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 68, 102 S. Ct. 1534, 1537 (1982). In looking at the statute=s language, the court=s task is to determine whether or not the statutory language is Aplain and unambiguous.@ Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340, 117 S. Ct. 843, 846 (1997). AThe plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is determined by reference to the language itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.@ Id. at 341, 117 S. Ct. at 846.

[7] We start our analysis of section 8122.1 with a literal reading of the statute=s language. The language of section 8122.1 is as follows:

The annual annuity