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Supreme Court of Guam |
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF GUAM
MARYANN
S. LUJAN
Plaintiff
vs.
DAVID
J. LUJAN, P.D. HEMLANI, and ZHONG YE,
INC.,
Defendants
______________________________________________________________
P.D.
HEMLANI,
Cross-claimant/Appellant
vs.
DAVID
J. LUJAN,
Cross-defendant/Appellee
OPINION
Filed:
June 16, 2000
Cite as: 2000 Guam 21
Supreme Court Case No.
CVA99-014
Superior Court Case No. CV0543-89
Appeal from the Superior Court
of Guam
Argued and submitted on November 3, 1999
Hagåtña,
Guam
Appearing for Cross-claimant/Appellant: Steven A. Zamsky, Esq. Zamsky Law Firm Suite 501, Bank of Guam Building 111 Chalan Santo Papa Hagåtña, Guam 96910 |
Appearing for Cross-defendant/Appellee: David A. Mair, Esq. Maria T. Cenzon-Duenas, Esq. Mair, Mair, Spade & Thompson, P.C. Suite 807, GCIC Building 414 West Soledad Avenue Hagåtña, Guam 96910 |
BEFORE: BENJAMIN J. F.
CRUZ, Chief Justice, JOHN A. MANGLONA, and STEVEN S. UNPINGCO, Designated
Justices
CRUZ,
C.J.:
[1] The trial court
granted David J. Lujan's Motion for a New Trial upon a finding that
pro tempore Judge Marty Taylor was not
qualified to preside at the trial in this matter. P.D. Hemlani appealed. At
issue, are conflicting statutes
on the appointment of
pro tempore judges. Judge Taylor was
appointed pursuant to Guam Public Law 21-03. At the time of this appointment, a
potentially conflicting
statute, Guam Public Law 21-126, was also in effect. The
trial court found that P.L. 21-03 was impliedly repealed by P.L. 21-126,
and
that under the latter statute Judge Marty Taylor did not meet the qualifications
of a pro tempore judge. Upon review of
this matter, we find no implied repeal of P.L. 21-03 by P.L. 21-126, and that
Judge Taylor's appointment pursuant
to P.L. 21-03 was valid. However, we also
find that, subsequent to Judge Taylor's appointment, 7 GCA
' 6108 (1993) went
into effect and repealed both of the aforementioned public laws. We hold that
pursuant to section 6108 Judge Taylor
did not meet the requirements of a
pro tempore judge and was therefore
not qualified to preside in this matter. We hereby affirm the trial court's
decision on other grounds.
PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
[2] This
case arose out of a conveyance of community real property without the consent of
a spouse. David J. Lujan (hereinafter
ALujan@)
was married to Mary Ann Lujan (hereinafter
AMary
Ann@). During the
marriage, the couple acquired two (2) lots of real property as community
property. While still married, Lujan executed
a contract to sell these lots to
Hemlani. Thereafter, P.D. Hemlani (hereinafter
AHemlani@)
executed his own contract to sell one of the lots at issue to Zhong Ye, Inc., a
Guam corporation. Lujan subsequently executed a
quitclaim deed conveying the
lots to Hemlani. Mary Ann became aware of the transfer of property and, on May
18, 1989, filed her Complaint
to Cancel Instrument and to Quiet Title [to]
Community Real Property against both Lujan and Hemlani. Mary Ann amended her
complaint
to include Zhong Ye Inc. as a defendant. Lujan failed to answer the
complaint and Mary Ann took judgment by default against him.
Hemlani, however,
answered the complaint and filed a cross-claim against Lujan. Summary judgments
were entered in favor of Mary Ann.
Thereafter, all the Superior Court of Guam
judges recused themselves from presiding over the dispute between Hemlani and
Lujan. On
May 11, 1994, the Presiding Judge of the Superior Court, pursuant to
section 4 of chapter IV of Guam Public Law 21-03 (hereinafter
AP.L. 21-03"),
appointed Judge Marty Taylor to sit as pro
tempore judge. Judge Taylor was then a member of the judiciary of the
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (hereinafter
ACNMI@).
[3] On May 31, 1996, Lujan
filed a Motion to Disqualify Judge and Remand Action to the Superior Court for
Reassignment (hereinafter
AMotion to Disqualify
and Remand for
Reassignment@). This
motion was argued on June 5, 1996 before another Superior Court judge who denied
the motion upon a finding that the Supreme
Court had not assumed jurisdiction at
the time of Judge Taylor's appointment as pro
tempore judge.
[4] The
matter proceeded to trial on June 5 and 6, 1996 before Judge Taylor. On April 9,
1997, Judge Taylor issued Findings of Facts
and Conclusions of Law. Judgment in
favor of Hemlani was rendered on May 16, 1997, and entered on the docket on June
2, 1997. Judgment
on the remaining issue involving Zhong Ye, Inc. was entered on
January 26, 1999 which made the judgment against Lujan a final
judgment.
[5] On February 5,
1999, Lujan filed a Motion for a New Trial (GRCP 59(a)); or, in the Alternative,
for Relief from Judgment (GRCP 60(b))
(hereinafter
AMotion for a New
Trial) which was heard by the same Superior Court judge who heard Lujan's prior
Motion to Disqualify and Remand for
Reassignment. In the Motion for a New Trial,
and pertinent to this appeal, Lujan asserted that the judgment was null and void
because
Judge Taylor was not qualified to serve as a
pro tempore judge of the Superior
Court of Guam under the laws in force at the time of his appointment and at the
time of the trial. Specifically,
Lujan contended that section 6 of Guam Public
Law 21-126 (hereinafter
AP.L. 21-126"), which
was in effect at the time of Judge Taylor's appointment, had superseded P.L.
21-03. On April 22, 1999, the trial
court reversed its earlier ruling and found
that P.L. 21-126 impliedly repealed P.L. 21-03 and that Judge Taylor was not
qualified
to serve as a pro tempore
judge under the requirements of P.L. 21-126. The trial court set aside Judge
Taylor's decision and granted Lujan's Motion for a New
Trial.
[6] On May 12, 1999,
Hemlani appealed the lower court's decision to grant the Motion for a New Trial.
In response, Lujan filed a cross-appeal
in the matter on May 26, 1999. On June
9, 1999, following the general rule that an order granting a new trial is
interlocutory and
not immediately appealable, this court found that the parties
had not satisfactorily demonstrated the grounds for an exception to
the
aforementioned rule and we dismissed both the appeal and cross-appeal for lack
of jurisdiction. On June 11, 1999, Hemlani filed
a Motion for Reconsideration of
the Supreme Court's dismissal. On June 21, 1999, we granted Hemlani's motion
after determining that
Hemlani had met the requirements of Title 7 GCA
' 3108(b) (1994) for
the appeal of an interlocutory matter.
DISCUSSION
[7] This
court has jurisdiction over this appeal of an order for new trial pursuant to
Title 7 GCA ' 25102(d)
(1993). Further, we find that the qualification of a
pro tempore judge is an issue of
general importance, the resolution of which will materially advance the
termination of litigation. Thus, we
have jurisdiction pursuant to 7 GCA
' 3108 (b)(1) and
(3).
[8] An appeal from an order
granting a motion for a new trial, shall be reviewed for abuse of discretion.
Adams v. Duenas, 1998 Guam 15,
& 16.
AA trial judge abuses
his [or] her discretion only when the decision is based on an erroneous
conclusion of law or where the record
contains no evidence on which the judge
could have rationally based the
decision.@
Midsea Industrial, Inc. v. HK Engineering,
LTD., 1998 Guam 14,
& 4 (citation
omitted).
[9] The trial court's
decision to grant a new trial was based on its determination that P.L. 21-126
repealed P.L. 21-03 and was the controlling
statute when Judge Taylor was
appointed judge pro tempore of the
Superior Court on May 11, 1994. Further, the trial court found that under P.L.
21-126, Judge Taylor did not meet the requirements
of a
pro tempore judge, that his
appointment was invalid, that his judgments in this case were void, and that a
new trial was necessary. In reaching
this decision, the trial court acknowledged
our decision in Topasna v. Superior Court of
Guam, in which we held that Title 7 GCA
' 6108 (1993) repealed
both P.L. 21-03 and P.L. 21-126 when section 6108 became effective on April 21,
1996. Topasna v. Superior Court of Guam
1996 Guam 5,
&&
13 and 14 . However, the trial court found that section 6108 had no effect on
Judge Taylor's appointment because the section was
not in effect on the date of
the appointment and that the proper and legal appointment of a
pro tempore judge is not rendered
invalid by passage of a new law changing the requirements for a
pro tempore judge. By making this
finding, the trial court based its decision upon an erroneous conclusion of
law.
[10] The trial court
concluded that the provisions of P.L. 21-126 replaced P.L. 21-03 and that the
irreconcilable conflict between the
two statutes indicated a repeal by
implication. The relevant section of P.L. 21-126 provides:
Assignment and appointment of temporary judges. If the proper dispatch of the business of the Superior Court so requires, the Presiding Judge of the Superior Court may appoint one (1) or more judges pro tempore from among active attorney members of the Guam Bar Association in good standing to serve for designated temporary periods in the court under the following conditions: (i) Such judges shall only be appointed on a case-by-case basis as needed to try cases for which full-time judges are not available; and (ii) such judges shall meet all the academic and other qualifications of full-time judges. The Judicial Council shall establish a schedule of fees to be paid such judges pro tempore for their services, and the Superior Court is authorized to expend from its current budget the funds necessary to enable the court to utilize such services of such judges pro tempore.
Guam Pub. L. 21-126:6 (July 28,
1992) (emphasis in original). The relevant section of P.L. 21-03
provides:
The Presiding Judge of the Superior Court of Guam may assign justices of the High Court of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands or judges or justices of courts of record of the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands in good standing, or a justice or district court judge of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, including a judge of the District Court of Guam or the District Court of the Mariana Islands who is appointed by the President, or a judge or justice from any jurisdiction which extends such privilege to Guam judges, with the consent of the judge or justice so assigned and of the chief judge of Guam whenever such an assignment is necessary for the proper dispatch of the business of the court. Such judges and justices shall have all the powers of a judge of the Superior Court of Guam, consistent with the terms of assignment by the Presiding Judge.
Guam
Pub. L. 21-03:IV:4 (April 17,
1991).
[11] Our analysis of
whether the latter statute repealed the earlier statute, begins with the rule
for statutory repeals by implication.
AWhile repeals by
implication are disfavored, such repeal may be found when a later statute,
covers the whole situation of an earlier
one and is clearly intended as a
substitute.@
Topasna, 1996 Guam
5 at
& 13 (citations
omitted). Turning to specific provisions of the above-mentioned statutes, P.L.
21-03 authorizes the Presiding Judge
to appoint judges from other jurisdictions,
including the CNMI, as temporary judges of the Superior Court. Public Law 21-126
does
not expressly exclude the appointment of extra-territorial jurists but
expands the authority of the Presiding Judge to appoint temporary
judges from
the active attorney membership of the Guam Bar Association. The trial court
points to the additional requirements and
mandatory language present in P.L.
21-126 which are absent in P.L. 21-03
(e.g. that appointments are to be on a
case-by-case basis, and that temporary judges are to meet the qualifications of
full-time judges)
to find that the later statute encompassed the earlier.
However, because repeals by implication are disfavored, these differences
are
simply not sufficient to justify the trial court's conclusion.
[12] Our decision in
Topasna, that 7 GCA
' 6108 impliedly
repealed both P.L. 21-03 and P.L. 21-126, is distinguishable. Most telling is
that section 6108 entirely divested
the Presiding Judge's authority to appoint
temporary judges and addressed the appointment of temporary judges by the Chief
Justice.
Topasna, 1996 Guam 5 at
& 13. Because the
Presiding Judge's authority to appoint temporary judges was entirely divested,
P.L. 21-03 and P.L. 21-126 were necessarily
repealed. This certainly was not the
effect of P.L. 21-126 on P.L. 21-03. We conclude that P. L. 21-126 did not cover
the Awhole
situation@ of the
appointment of temporary judges provided by P.L. 21-03 and did not impliedly
repeal it. We hold, therefore, that the trial
court's conclusion of law was
erroneous and that the Presiding Judge's appointment of Judge Taylor pursuant to
P.L. 21-03 was appropriate
at the time of the
appointment.
[13] In his Motion
for a New Trial, Lujan argued that section 6108 became effective on April 21,
1996 and after this date, only the Chief
Justice could appoint
pro tempore judges. Lujan argued that
Judge Taylor was not appointed by the Chief Justice after April 21, 1996, that
Judge Taylor was, therefore,
without authority or jurisdiction to hear this
case, and that any verdict rendered by Judge Taylor was void. In response, the
trial
court found that it did not need to address the issue as it had already
held that P.L. 21-126 repealed P.L. 21-03 and Judge Taylor
was not qualified.
However, the trial court went on to state that had Judge Taylor's appointment
been proper the appointment would
not be rendered invalid due to passage of a
new law or due to a change in requirements for
pro tempore judges and that section
6108 would bear no effect. This conclusion is clearly
erroneous.
[14] In
Topasna, we held that 7 GCA
' 6108 repealed by
implication both P.L. 21-03 and P.L. 21-126.
Topasna, 1996 Guam 5,
& 13. Section 6108
went into effect on the date the first Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
assumed office, April 21, 1996.
Id.
at & 14. As
of April 21, 1996, the Chief Justice assumed administrative supervision over the
entire judicial branch of the government
of Guam, including the responsibility
to appoint pro tempore judges for the
Superior Court. Id. at
&&
11-14. Thus, the requirements for a pro
tempore judge were set by 7 GCA
'
6108(a)[1]
which provided:
When there is no Judge qualified or available to hear a cause or action or hearing in the Superior Court, the Presiding Judge shall request the Chief Justice to appoint a Judge pro tempore to hear the action. Such Judge pro tempore shall meet the same qualifications as a regularly appointed Judge of the Superior Court.
Therefore,
the proper procedure after April 21, 1996 for the appointment of Judge Taylor as
a pro tempore judge of the Superior
Court should have been for the Presiding Judge to request the Chief Justice to
make the
appointment.[1]
We find that on or after April 21, 1996, Judge Taylor was not appointed
pro tempore judge by the Chief Justice
and that any actions taken by Judge Taylor after this date in this case are void
and without effect. See e.g.
Toby v. Superior Court of Los Angeles,
47 P.2d 338 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1935) (holding a temporary judge's acts are
void when such judge is without statutory authority to preside).
On this basis,
we hold that a new trial is necessary and affirm the trial court's decision to
grant a new trial.
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[15] We
note Hemlani's argument that Lujan waived any objection to Judge Taylor
presiding over this case. Hemlani argues that our holding
in
Topasna, that the disqualification of
a judge is a jurisdictional defect which cannot be waived, should not apply in
civil cases. Topasna, 1996 Guam 5 at
& 6. In
Topasna, the underlying matter
concerned the qualifications of an appointed
pro tempore judge to preside over a
criminal matter. Id. at
&&
1 and 2. Here, the underlying matter is civil in nature. Hemlani states that the
Topasna decision rested on the Texas
case of Lee v. Texas, 555 S.W. 2d 121
(Tex. Crim. App. 1977). Hemlani
contends that Lee was modified by the
Texas Supreme Court in Buckholts Independent
School District v. Glaser, 632 S.W.2d 146 (Tex. 1982). Specifically,
Hemlani states that Buckholts stands
for the proposition that a judge's disqualification is jurisdictional only if
founded on constitutional grounds. Hemlani's
reliance on
Buckholts is misplaced. In
Buckholts, a trial judge failed to
recuse himself from a challenge to a school bond election and the court found
that this failure was not
fundamental error.
Id. at 148. The court explained that
the statute requiring the judge to recuse himself because he resided in the
county of the contested
election also contained a provision requiring the
presiding judge to assign a judge to hear the motion to recuse.
Id. The court further stated that the
mention of motions to recuse in the statute showed that the legislature did not
intend a disqualification
that would make all actions void.
Id. The court found that the correct
procedure was for the appellants to file a motion to recuse and that their
failure to do so amounted
to a waiver of any error by the trial judge.
Id. Thus, the requirement of filing of
a motion to recuse meant that the disqualification of the judge in
Buckholts was not a jurisdictional
question and Hemlani's interpretation of
Buckholts is wrong. The issue in
Hemlani's appeal is dissimilar and
Buckholt is inapplicable. In this
appeal, the ultimate question is whether the appointment of Judge Taylor was
valid. This question is jurisdictional
and under
Topasna can be raised at any time.
Therefore, Hemlani's argument that Lujan somehow waived any objection to Judge
Taylor's qualification
is meritless. Lujan previously raised the issue in his
Motion to Disqualify. The issue was preserved and raised again in the post-trial
motion.
[16] We also note
Hemlani's argument that Lujan's Motion for a New Trial should not have been
heard by the trial court. Hemlani states
that the applicable statute in
challenging the qualifications of a judge is Title 7 GCA
URL: http://www.paclii.org/gu/cases/GUSC/2000/21.html