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Supreme Court of Guam |
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF GUAM
PEOPLE
OF GUAM,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
DALEY
UEKI,
Defendant-Appellant.
Supreme Court Case No.
CRA97-004
Superior Court Case No.
CF0472-96
OPINION
Filed: February 22, 1999
Cite as: 1999 Guam 4
Appeal from the Superior Court
of Guam
Argued and Submitted on 20 February 1998
Hagåtña,
Guam
Appearing for
the Plaintiff-Appellee:
David M Moore
Assistant Attorney
General
Office of the Attorney General, Prosecution Division
Suite 2-200E,
Judicial Center Building
120 West
O=Brien
Drive
Hagåtña, Guam
96910
Appearing for the
Defendant-Appellant:
Richard Parker Arens, Esq.
Cunliffe &
Cook, P.C.
Suite 200, 210 Archbishop Flores Street
Hagåtña,
Guam 96910
BEFORE: PETER C. SIGUENZA,
Chief Justice; JANET HEALY WEEKS and EDUARDO A. CALVO, Associate
Justices.
WEEKS,
J.:
[1] Defendant-Appellant
Daley Ueki was convicted of First Degree Criminal Sexual Conduct and sentenced
to the mandatory minimum sentence
of fifteen years imprisonment. On appeal, Ueki
seeks reversal of his conviction based upon two separate
claimsC ineffective
assistance of counsel and prejudicial vouching by the prosecutor during the
trial. The court finds the record on appeal
insufficient to rule on the
ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Additionally, although the court finds
that the prosecutor=s
statements at trial constitute impermissible vouching, such error does not
affect substantial rights under 8 GCA 130.50(b) (1993).
Therefore, after review
of the record, the court hereby affirms the trial court conviction.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
[2] The
Defendant-Appellant, Daley Ueki
(AUeki@),
was indicted, along with two other co-defendants, on 28 August 1996 for
Conspiracy to Commit First Degree Criminal Sexual Conduct,
as a first degree
felony, and First Degree Criminal Sexual Conduct, as a first degree felony. The
charges arose out of an incident
which occurred on or about 18 August 1996 where
Ueki was alleged to have engaged in sexual penetration with the victim, at a
point
in time when she was mentally incapacitated and physically helpless. Ueki
was appointed counsel, two of whom withdrew before defense
counsel who
eventually represented Ueki at trial was finally appointed. Ueki plead not
guilty to the above charges and his case proceeded
to trial on 6 November 1996.
During the trial, the People presented several witnesses, including the victim
and Hidemi Blailes
(ABlailes@)
who were key to proving its case against
Ueki.
[3] During closing
arguments, the People made the following statements:
ABut what she said on
that stand, I submit to you is the truth. She told you the truth on that stand.
And if she said things when she
was drunk or unconscious or confused, I submit
they were wrong. But what she said on here was the
truth.@ The jury
returned with a guilty verdict on the second charge of First Degree Criminal
Sexual
Conduct.[1]
At the sentencing hearing, held on 10 January 1997, the trial court sentenced
Ueki to fifteen (15) years incarceration, the minimum
time under the
statute.[2]
A judgment was filed on 24 February 1997 and a timely notice of appeal was
subsequently filed on 25 February 1997.
ANALYSIS
[4] This
court has jurisdiction pursuant to 7 GCA
' 3107(b) and 3108
(1994).[3]
On appeal Ueki raises two
issuesC that he
received ineffective assistance of counsel at the trial court level, and that
the People=s
statements made during closing argument constituted prejudicial vouching. Each
issue requires separate analysis and consideration
by the court. Therefore, the
court addresses each issue in turn.
I.
[5] Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are questions of law which this court reviews de novo. People v. Quintanilla, 1998 Guam 17, & 8. Although an ineffective assistance of counsel claim may be heard on direct appeal,[4] it is more properly brought as a writ of habeas corpus. People v. Perez, 1999 Guam 2, & 33; United States v. Carr, 18 F.3d 738, 741 (9th Cir. 1994). Courts will often decline to reach the merits of ineffective assistance of counsel claims because such claims are Amore appropriately addressed in a habeas corpus proceeding because it requires an evidentiary inquiry beyond the official record.@ Carr, 18 F.3d at 741; United States v. Joelson, 7 F.3d 174, 179 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Cochrane, 985 F.2d 1027, 1029 (9th Cir. 1993). Consequently, in Molina, the court held that an ineffective assistance of counsel claim may be brought on direct appeal if the record is sufficiently complete to make a proper finding.
[6] To
determine whether a defendant has received ineffective assistance of counsel, a
two-part test is employed.
Quintanilla, 1998 Guam 17 at
& 8. A defendant
must first establish that
counsel=s performance
was deficient and then that such deficiency prejudiced his defense.
Id. (citing
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984)). To show deficient performance by
counsel, a party must demonstrate that
Acounsel made errors
so serious that counsel was not functioning as the
>counsel=
guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment.@
Id. at
& 9 (quoting
Strickland 466
U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at
2064.).
A. Deficient performance
[7] Failure
of an attorney to advise a client of sentencing exposure constitutes deficient
performance. Teague v. Scott, 60 F.3d
1167, 1171 (5th Cir. 1995);
Alvernaz v. Ratelle, 831 F. Supp. 790,
792 (S.D. Cal. 1993).
Failing to properly advise the defendant of the maximum sentence that he could receive falls below the objective standard required by Strickland. When the defendant lacks a full understanding of the risks of going to trial, he is unable to make an intelligent choice of whether to accept a plea or take his chances in court.
Teague,
60 F.3d 1167, 1171 (5th Cir.
1995).
[8] In
Alvernaz, a defendant was wrongly
advised that if convicted at trial he would receive an eight (8) year maximum
sentence when in fact he could
be facing a life sentence. 831 F. Supp. 790. The
court assumed deficient performance based on the failure to properly advise the
defendant of his sentencing exposure after conviction.
Id. at
792.
[9] The parties agree that
had defense counsel improperly advised Ueki, such would constitute deficient
performance. Ueki contends that
defense counsel did not inform him, prior to
trial, that he faced a minimum term of fifteen (15) years to life in prison. To
support
this contention, Ueki refers to the cross-examination testimony of
Blailes during which defense counsel inquired as to whether
Blailes= counsel had
informed him that he could face incarceration for a minimum term of five (5)
years to life for a First Degree Criminal
Sexual Conduct
conviction.[5]
[10] Although
the People agree that
counsel=s performance
would be considered deficient had he improperly advised Ueki of his sentencing
exposure, the People argue that we cannot
be certain that this is what occurred
in this case as the record does not clearly support such a finding.
B. Prejudice to the Defense
[11] As
to the second prong of prejudice,
A[t]he defendant must
demonstrate actual prejudice by showing that
>there is a
reasonable probability that, but for
counsel=s
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient
to undermine confidence in
the
outcome.=@
Quintanilla, 1998 Guam 17 at
& 15. (citation
omitted).
[12] The record as to
the second prong is insufficient to determine whether Ueki suffered the
requisite prejudice. The only evidence presented
that supports
Ueki=s claim is that
of the cross-examination by defense counsel by Blailes, which alone is
inconclusive.
[13] In
Alvernaz, the Petitioner claimed that
he received ineffective assistance of counsel based on
counsel=s
understatement of the possible consequences of going to trial which caused the
Petitioner to turn down a plea offer. 831 F.Supp.
at 791. The court held that a
Petitioner must establish that
A(1) Petitioner would
have accepted the plea with the advice of competent counsel, and (2) the trial
court would have accepted the
plea" in order to prove prejudice.
Id. at 792-93. The Petitioner, in
Alvernaz, demonstrated that a plea
agreement was offered to him, which he would have accepted had he been made
aware by counsel of the ramifications
of a conviction.
Id. The
Alvernaz court had the benefit of a
complete record pursuant to a full evidentiary hearing on the issue during which
the court heard testimony
from defense counsel, the Petitioner and the
Petitioner=s family
members.[6]
Id. at 791-92. Additionally, the court
received multiple declarations from both parties.
Id. at 792.
[14] However,
in this case, no plea agreement was ever offered to Ueki; therefore, he cannot
say he passed on an opportunity to his detriment.
Ueki submitted an affidavit to
support his allegation that defense counsel deficiently advised him. Affidavits
and trial statements
are probative as to whether a defendant was prejudiced.
Id. at 790. However, Ueki did not
claim in his affidavit that he would have pleaded guilty had he known he could
face life imprisonment.
Nor did Ueki indicate that he would have pushed for a
plea agreement in light of the sentence he faced. Additionally, the record
in
this case is insufficient as it fails to indicate whether defense
counsel=s performance
was deficient and whether such deficient performance, if any, prejudiced the
defendant.
[15] Although defense
counsel, in questioning Blailes, refers to a five (5) year prison term in
relation to a First Degree Criminal Sexual
Conduct charge, this reference does
not demonstrate what counsel did or did not relay to Ueki. During
cross-examination of Blailes,
defense counsel asked whether
Blailes= attorney had
said Blailes could be facing five (5) years incarceration; this, by itself, does
not reflect defense
counsel=s own advise
to Ueki. Furthermore, defense counsel also questioned Blailes as to whether
Blailes= attorney had
informed him that he could also face a maximum confinement of life in prison. If
Ueki asks this court to consider the
cross-examination of Blailes regarding a
five (5) year term to be convincing indirect evidence of what defense counsel
advised Ueki,
then the court must consider defense
counsel=s questions,
as to life imprisonment as the outer boundary of sentencing, to be equally
convincing indirect evidence as
well.
[16] If we assume defense
counsel inquired about a five (5) year minimum incarceration because he did not
know the law or was not aware
of the change in the law, then the fact that he
also mentioned a life maximum sentence becomes puzzling. Ueki, in his affidavit,
indicates that defense counsel informed him that the range of sentencing he
would be facing was five (5) to twenty (20) years and
not fifteen (15) years to
life. Yet, during defense
counsel=s
cross-examination of Blailes, Blailes indicated knowledge of a maximum sentence
of life imprisonment. Furthermore, the record is
without evidence to support a
claim of prejudice to Ueki. No plea agreement was offered, and it is speculative
that any offers for
plea agreements would have been forthcoming or negotiated
had Ueki known his sentencing exposure to be other than what counsel had
informed him.
II.
[17] Additionally,
Ueki argues that the prosecutor, during closing arguments, made statements which
constituted impermissible
Avouching.@
No objection to such statements was made at trial; therefore, the plain error
standard of review applies. United States v.
Young, 470 U.S. 1, 14-16, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 1046
(1985); cf. United States v. Jones, 84
F.3d 1206, 1211 (9th Cir. 1996).
The decision to correct the forfeited error rests within the sound discretion of
the appellate court; however, in exercising
the ability to find plain error,
Acourt[s] should not
exercise that discretion unless the error
>seriously
affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.=@
United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725,
732, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 1776 (1993) (citing the case of
Young, 470 U.S. at 15, 105 S.Ct. at
1046. Such discretion should be
Aused sparingly,
solely in those circumstances in which a miscarriage of justice would otherwise
result.@
Young, 470 U.S. at 15, 105 S.Ct. at
1046. Pursuant to 8 GCA
' 130.50(b),
A[p]lain errors or
defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not
brought to the attention of the
court.@ Therefore,
three things must be demonstrated by an appellant when this standard is
applicable: (1) there was an error; (2) the error
was plain; and (3) substantial
rights were affected. Olano, 507 U.S.
at 732, 113 S.Ct. at
1776.
[18] An
Aerror@
occurs when there has been a violation of a legal rule, not waived by a
defendant, during court proceedings, despite a failure to
make a timely
objection. Id. at 733-34, 113 S.Ct. at
1777. Section 130.50(b) and case authority interpreting Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 52(b), from which
section 130.50(b) is derived, also requires such
error to be
Aplain.@
Id. at 734, 113 S.Ct. at 1777. Courts
have equated the term plain with
Aclear@
or
Aobvious.@
Id., 113 S.Ct. at 1777.
[19] The error alleged in this
case is improper vouching by the prosecutor.
AIn trying to bolster
a witness=s
credibility, a prosecutor may not overstep the bounds
of propriety and
fairness.@
United States v. Kerr, 981 F.2d 1050,
1053 (9th Cir. 1992). Vouching
occurs when the government either: (1) suggests that the government is aware of
evidence not presented to the
jury which would tend to support a particular
witness= testimony; or
(2) places the
Aprestige of the
government behind the witnesses through personal assurances of their veracity .
. . .@
United States v. Molina, 934 F.2d
1440, 1445 (9th Cir. 1991).
In Young, the prosecutor made the following statements to the jury during closing arguments: I think [defense counsel] said that not anyone sitting at this table thinks that Mr. Young intended to defraud Apco. Well, I was sitting there and I think he was. I think he got 85 cents a barrel for every one of those 117,250.91 barrels he hauled and every bit of the money they made on that he got one percent of. So, I think he did. If we are allowed to give our personal impressions since it was asked of me.
Young,
470 U.S. at 5, 105 S.Ct. at 1041. The statements were made in response to
defense counsel=s
remarks. Id. at 17, 105 S.Ct. at 1047.
The Court noted that although defense
counsel=s conduct was
an ethical breach, the
prosecutor=s statement
of his belief of what the evidence demonstrated should not have been made since
such was an Aimproper
expression of personal opinion . . .
.@
Id., 105 S.Ct. at
1047.
[20] The Ninth Circuit has
addressed the issue of prejudicial vouching in
Kerr in which that court reviewed the
following comments made by the prosecutor:
I think he (Jim Lunden) was very candid. I don=t think it was a pat story, because there are variations. I think he (Al Butler) was candid. I think he was honest. Al Butler was candid with you folks. The question is, were they hoodwinking you when they testified? I think not.
Kerr,
981 F.2d at 1053. The Kerr court
opined that A[a]
prosecutor has no business telling the jury his individual impressions of the
evidence. Because he is the
sovereign=s
representative, the jury may be misled into thinking his conclusions have been
validated by the
government=s
investigatory
apparatus.@
Id.
[21] In
this case, the
prosecutor=s
statements were as follows:
ABut what she said on
that stand, I submit to you is the truth. She told you the truth on that stand.
And if she said things when she
was drunk or unconscious or confused, I submit
they were wrong. But what she said on here was the
truth.@ Transcript at
41 (November 18, 1996).
[22]
The People concede that the prosecutor asserted her personal opinion of the
victim and her testimony. Clearly, the prosecutor was
attempting to bolster the
credibility of the victim. The
prosecutor=s conduct
amounts to the same type of
Aimproper expression
of personal opinion@
that was present in the Young case.
Young, 470 U.S. at 17, 105 S.Ct. at
1047. She presented her beliefs, as a representative of the government, as to
the credibility and veracity
of the
victim=s testimony
before the jury. This conduct can be misleading to a jury. Accordingly, the
court finds that the
prosecutor=s
statements constituted inappropriate vouching which establishes an error that is
plain; therefore, satisfying the first two requirements
under the plain error
standard.
[23] The next
question is whether the plain error affected substantial rights. In other words,
was the error prejudicial in that it affected
the outcome of the proceedings.
Olano, 507 U.S. at 734, 113 S.Ct. at
1778. In order to make a determination, the comments must be viewed against the
entire record to see
if plain error occurred.
United States v. Williams, 989 F.2d
1061, 1071-72 (9th Cir. 1993). The
burden lies with the defendant to demonstrate that the error that occurred was
prejudicial. Olano, 507 U.S. at 734,
113 S.Ct. at 1178.
[24] In
Williams, the court looked to several
factors in determining the effect of the
prosecutor=s vouching
on the outcome of the case: (1) the form of the vouching; (2) the extent of the
personal opinion asserted; (3) the extent
to which a
prosecutor=s
statements exhibited extra record knowledge supporting a
witness= veracity; and
(4) the testimony=s
import viewed in the context of the case as a whole.
Williams, 989 F.2d at 1072. Although
looking to several factors in analyzing the effects of the vouching, the
Williams court focused on the fourth
factor, viewing the record in its entirety. Because of the character of the
vouching in this case, this
court also focuses on the fourth
factor.
[25] Ueki argues that
absent such bolstering, the jury would not have given the
witness= testimony
much weight, pointing out that the witness was severely intoxicated and was not
conscious during many of the relevant moments
during the incident. Ueki further
points out that the case may very well have hinged upon her testimony, given the
fact that the
only other critical witness admitted to lying under
oath.
[26] The People concede
that the comments were directed toward a critical prosecution witness. However,
the People further claim that
there was other direct evidence that linked Ueki
to the crime and that the testimony of the vouched witness was not crucial.
Specifically,
the People point to
Ueki=s statement upon
questioning by the police in which he wrote,
Ashe was asleep,
naked, so I fucked
her.@ Ueki, in
response, contends that an admission of having sex does not constitute an
admission of criminal sexual
conduct.
[27] Viewing the record
of the trial in its entirety, this court finds that sufficient evidence was
presented to the jury to support and
uphold the conviction. The People presented
several witnesses in its case in chief. The victim testified as to the events
which occurred
that evening. See
Transcript at 45-112 (November 13, 1996). Although the
victim=s story may
have changed between the time of the incident and trial, her testimony was
extremely emotional and the jury was able to
make findings based on such an
emotional state. Id. at 55-58.
Additionally, the victim testified that she did not consent to having
intercourse with Ueki. Id. at 58-59.
[28] The People called Officer
Joseph Guerrero who responded to the
victim=s 911 call.
Officer Guerrero testified that he was familiar with the victim and when he
encountered her that morning she was
Adistraught@
whereas he=s known her
usually to be Ahappy
and, you know, she=s
in a good mood, but this is the first time I ever seen her like
that.@
Id. 116, 120-22. Officer Anthony
Camacho and Fireman Peter Martinez testified similarly to Officer Guerrero as to
the victim=s physical
and emotional state. Id. at 160-61,
229-231. Likewise, Godofredo Tagamolila, owner of a Laundromat near the crime
scene, testified and identified the three
suspects in this case.
Id. at 192-24. The testimony of
Officer Jesse J.S. Castro completed the chronology of events from the time the
Officers searched for
the suspects until the suspects were brought into the
police station. Id. at 197-205.
[29] Additionally, the People
presented as witnesses, Officer Samuel S. Bersamin, criminalist Felisa May
Pineda, Dr. Patchara Boonprakong,
emergency room nurse Maria Frenaflor Achate,
Nurse Joann Canovas from Healing Hearts Crisis Center, and Hidemi Blailes.
Ueki=s clothing, the
victim=s stained
clothing, the photographs of the crime scene and the surrounding vicinity,
Ueki=s statement,
Blailes= statement,
and the victim=s
information chart from Healing Hearts were all admitted into evidence in support
of the People=s case
and upon which the jury could have found Ueki guilty.
[30] The jury was free to judge
for itself the weight of the evidence presented and the credibility of the
testifying witnesses. Likewise,
the
victim=s state of mind
was also corroborated by the
Officers= testimony,
which the jury could have relied upon to determine the crime was committed. As
to Blailes=
credibility, despite the manner in which Ueki may have viewed his testimony and
veracity, the jury could have equally believed or
disbelieved him, as they were
so
instructed.[7]
The jury, in choosing to convict him, was also free to draw inferences and
determine the ultimate conclusions as to
Ueki=s own admission.
[31] The
prosecutor=s
statements were improper; however, the
victim=s testimony was
not the sole piece of evidence against Ueki. Therefore, the court finds
A[v]iewed in context,
the prosecutor=s
statements, although inappropriate and amounting to error, were not such as to
undermine the fundamental fairness of the trial and
contribute to a miscarriage
of justice.@
Young, 470 U.S. at 16, 105 S.Ct. at
1047.
CONCLUSION
[32] The
record is insufficient for this court to determine whether Ueki received
ineffective assistance of counsel at the trial court
level. The court reiterates
its position that such matters are more properly raised through a Petition for
Writ of Habeas Corpus.
Even examining the record as it stands, although
Ueki=s allegations, if
true, would demonstrate deficient performance, no prejudice has been
established.
[33] The
prosecutor=s
statements, indicating her personal opinion that a particular witness was
telling the truth, constitute vouching. The
prosecutor=s comments
in the instant case were clearly in error, amounting to plain error. The People
concede that it was vouching, claiming
only minimal effects. However, this plain
error did not affect substantial rights or prejudice Ueki, when viewed in light
of other
evidence and testimony upon which the jury could have relied in
rendering its verdict.
[34] The
trial court conviction is hereby
AFFIRMED.
JANET HEALY WEEKS EDUARDO A.
CALVO
Associate Justice Associate Justice
PETER C. SIGUENZA
Chief
Justice
[1]The first charge in the indictment, Conspiracy to Commit First Degree Criminal Sexual Conduct, was dismissed by the trial court on 14 November 1996.
[2]On 26 July 1996, the Governor signed into law P.L. 23-114 which changed the mandatory minimum sentencing for criminal sexual conduct from five (5) to fifteen (15) years incarceration to fifteen (15) years to life without the possibility of parole.
[3]The Defendant-Appellant claimed the court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 8 GCA ' 130.20(a)(6) (1993) and 8 GCA 130.60 (1993); however, section 130.20 only refers to specific circumstances under which appeals which may be brought by the Government in criminal cases. Since the appeal was brought by the Defendant-Appellant, the court=s jurisdiction is found in other statutory authority.
[4]United States v. Molina, 934 F.2d 1440, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991)
[5]Blailes was initially charged with First Degree Criminal Sexual Conduct; however, he pleaded guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to Fourth Degree Criminal Sexual Conduct and testified for the People against his co-defendant, Ueki. Presumably, the nature of the cross-examination was to show that Blailes= testimony was tainted in that he made a deal with the People after realizing the grave punishment he himself might be subjected to had he gone to trial.
[6]The Petitioner had filed petitions for a writ of habeas corpus, which were all denied, by the Superior Court in California, the California District Court of Appeals, and the California Supreme Court. Alvarez, 831 F. Supp. at 791. After the denial by the California Supreme Court, the Petitioner filed the action in the U.S. District Court, Southern District of California. Id. Applying the federal habeas corpus standard, the court conducted a full evidentiary hearing which provided a sufficient record to address the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 792.
[7]The jury was instructed at the close of trial that:
A witness who is wilfully false in one material part of his or her testimony is to be distrusted in others. You may reject the whole testimony of a witness who willfully has testified falsely as to a material point unless, from all the evidence, you believe the probability of truth favors his or her testimony in other particulars.
Transcript at 53 (November 18, 1996).
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