People of Guam v Villapando [1999] GUSC 27; 1999 Guam 31 (10 December 1999)

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Supreme Court Case No. CRA99-0l0
Superior Court Case No. CF0078-98
_______________________________________________

Appeals from the Superior Court of Guam
Argued and submitted on August 20, 1999
Hagåtña, Guam

Counsel for the People: Angela M. Borzachillo Assistant Attorney General Office of the Attorney General Prosecution Division 2-200E Judicial Ctr. Bldg. 120 W O=Brien Dr. Hagåtña, Guam 96910	Counsel for Villapando and Jiro: Howard Trapp, Esq. Howard Trapp Incorporated 200 Saylor Bldg. 139 Chalan Santo Papa Hagåtña, Guam 96910
Counsel for Espina: Matthew T. Gregory, Esq. Mair, Mair, Spade & Thompson, P.C. Suite 807, GCIC Bldg. 414 W Soledad Ave. Hagåtña, Guam 96910	Counsel for Thomas and Villacorta: Rawlen M.T. Mantanona, Esq. Mantanona Law Office Suite 601B, GCIC Bldg. 414 W Soledad Ave. Hagåtña, Guam 96910
Counsel for Ronquillo: F. Randall Cunliffe, Esq. Cunliffe & Cook, P.C. 210 Archbishop F.C. Flores St., Suite 200 Hagåtña, Guam 96910	Counsel for Davis, Reyes, Mendiola, Quinata, Blas, Flores, Pinaula and Pangelinan: Richard S. Dirkx Assistant Public Defender Public Defender Service Corp. 200 Judicial Center Annex 110 W O=Brien Dr. Hagåtña, Guam 96910
Counsel for Sablan: A Alexander Gorman, Esq. Suite 905, GCIC Bldg. 414 W Soledad Ave. Hagåtña, Guam 96910	Counsel for Atienza: Robert N. Davis, Esq. Gayle & Teker, P.C. Gayle & Teker Bldg. 330 Hernan Cortez Ave. Hagåtña, Guam 96910

BEFORE: BENJAMIN J. F. CRUZ, Chief Justice, PETER C. SIGUENZA, Associate Justice, and JOHN A. MANGLONA, Designated Justice.

CRUZ, C.J.:

[1] This matter comes before the court based upon motions to dismiss, filed on behalf of each defendant, pursuant to 8 GCA ' 25.30 (1993)and our prior ruling in People v. Palomo, 1998 Guam 12. Defendant Villapando was denied his motion to dismiss when the trial court determined that ' 25.30 and the law in Palomo did not apply to felony cases. The remainder of the defendants were granted dismissals when another trial court ruled that the same law was applicable to felonies. Villapando appealed the denial of his motion, sought and was granted interlocutory review by this court. The People appealed the dismissals in the remaining cases.

[2] The court has not been presented with convincing arguments to support the reversal of its decision in Palomo. Furthermore, upon review of the applicable law and the arguments of the parties, the court finds that ' 25.30 and its interpretation in Palomo mandates application to felony cases.

[3] The incidents which led to the arrest of Villapando for possession of an illegal substance occurred on or about June 22, 1996. Villapando was arrested, booked and released and given a citation and notice to appear on September 25, 1996. On or before September 25, 1996, no complaint or affidavit was filed nor was Villapando notified that he need not appear and that no prosecution would be instituted against him. On June 28, 1997, Villapando was charged by a Magistrate=s Complaint with possession of a schedule II controlled substance (the first charge) as well as possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver (the second charge)[1]. Villapando made a motion to dismiss based upon ' 25.30 and Palomo which the trial court denied, finding that the decision in Palomo did not apply to felony offenses. Villapando moved this court to take jurisdiction over this case based upon its power of interlocutory review. This court accepted jurisdiction under 7 GCA ' 3108(b) (1994).

[4] Espina was arrested, booked and released on September 19, 1995, on charges of theft of a motor vehicle, theft of property, three (3) counts of conspiracy to commit theft, arson, criminal mischief, and destruction of evidence. Espina was given a citation and notice to appear in the Superior Court on December 20, 1995, which he signed. On December 20, 1995, Espina appeared at court only to find that no charges had been filed against him. Espina was later indicted for theft of a motor vehicle, theft of property, theft by receipt of property, i.e., a motor vehicle, arson, criminal mischief and theft by receiving on January 29, 1998.[2] Pursuant to a motion to dismiss under ' 25.30 and Palomo, the trial court dismissed the case against Espina. The People timely appealed.

[5] Thomas was arrested, booked and released on September 14, 1995 for theft of a motor vehicle and related offenses. Upon release, Thomas signed a citation and notice to appear in the Superior Court on December 20, 1995; however, Thomas arrived at court to find no charges had been filed against him. Thomas was subsequently indicted on January 29, 1998, for theft of a motor vehicle, theft of property, theft by receipt of property, i.e. a motor vehicle, arson, criminal mischief and theft by receiving.[3] The trial court dismissed the case against him based upon a motion to dismiss pursuant to ' 25.30 and Palomo. The People timely appealed.

[6] Ronquillo was arrested, booked and released on February 14, 1995 for theft by deception. Upon release, she was given a citation and notice to appear in the Superior Court on May 14, 1995. Ronquillo appeared on May 14, 1995, at the Superior Court to discover that no charges had been filed against her. She was later indicted on May 1, 1997, for theft of property, two (2) counts of theft by deception and theft of property held in trust. Again, pursuant to a motion to dismiss based under ' 25.30 and Palomo, the trial court dismissed the case against Ronquillo. The People timely appealed.

[7] Davis was arrested, booked and released on July 16, 1996, for driving under the influence. He was given a citation and notice to appear in the Superior Court on October 16, 1996; however, no charges were filed against him at that time. Subsequently, on April 2, 1997, an indictment was filed charging Davis with driving while under the influence of alcohol (as a 3rd degree felony) and improper storage of an open container (as a misdemeanor). The trial court dismissed the case pursuant to a motion to dismiss under ' 25.30 and Palomo. The People timely appealed.

[8] Reyes was arrested, booked and released on September 27, 1996, for under ring, theft by deception, and conspiracy to commit theft. She was given a citation and notice to appear in the Superior Court on January 8, 1997. On that date, no charges had been filed. On November 13, 1997, Reyes was indicted on conspiracy and theft. The trial court dismissed the case pursuant to a motion to dismiss under ' 25.30 and Palomo. The People timely appealed.

[9] Sablan was arrested, booked and released on August 8, 1997. He was given a citation and notice to appear in the Superior Court on December 10, 1997. No charges were filed against him at that time. Subsequently, he was indicted for driving under the influence of alcohol on January 16, 1998. The trial court dismissed the case based upon a motion to dismiss pursuant to ' 25.30 and Palomo. The People timely appealed.

[10] Mendiola was arrested, booked and released on May 9, 1996, for drinking in a motor vehicle, possessing an open container in the motor vehicle and possession of a firearm without an identification card. Upon release, Mendiola was given a citation and notice to appear in the Superior Court on August 14, 1996. Mendiola was subsequently indicted on a charge of possession of a firearm without an identification card on January 22, 1998. The court dismissed the case pursuant to a motion to dismiss under ' 25.30 and Palomo. The People timely appealed.

[11] Jiro was arrested, booked and released on August 29, 1997, for theft of property held in trust. Upon release, Jiro was given a citation and notice to appear in the Superior Court on January 2, 1998. It is not clear whether she appeared on January 2, 1998; however, no charges were filed against her by that date. She was later indicted on March 13, 1998 for theft. The court dismissed her case based upon a motion to dismiss under ' 25.30 and Palomo. The People timely appealed.

[12] Quinata was arrested, booked and released on August 2, 1997 for possession of a concealed firearm, possession of a firearm without an identification card and possession of an unregistered firearm. Upon release, he was given a citation and notice to appear in the Superior Court on December 3, 1997. No charges were filed against Quinata until April 20, 1998, when an indictment was filed charging him with possession of a firearm without an identification card and possession of a concealed firearm. The trial court dismissed the case pursuant to a motion to dismiss under ' 25.30 and Palomo. The People timely appealed.

[13] Blas was arrested, booked and released for burglary and theft of property on June 3, 1997. Upon release, Blas was given a citation and notice to appear in the Superior Court on September 24, 1997. No charges were filed until he was indicted on June 17, 1999, and charged with theft and conspiracy.[4] The trial court dismissed the case based on a motion to dismiss pursuant to ' 25.30 and Palomo. The People timely appealed.

[14] Flores was arrested, booked and released on June 10, 1997, for burglary. Upon release, he signed a citation and notice to appear in the Superior Court on October 1, 1997; however, no charges were filed against him by that date. Flores was later indicted on June 17, 1998, for burglary. The trial court dismissed his case pursuant to a motion to dismiss based upon ' 25.30 and Palomo. The People timely appealed.

[15] Villacorta was arrested, booked and released on July 1, 1997, for burglary and possession of stolen property. Upon release, Villacorta was given a citation and notice to appear in the Superior Court on October 22, 1997. Villacorta was not indicted until July 14, 1998 on charges of burglary, conspiracy and theft. The trial court dismissed the case based upon a motion to dismiss under ' 25.30 and Palomo. The People timely appealed.

[16] Pinaula was arrested, booked and released on January 4, 1998, for possession of a concealed firearm, possession of a firearm without an identification card and driving while under the influence of alcohol. Upon release, Pinaula was given a citation and notice to appear in the Superior Court on May 6, 1998. Pinaula was later indicted on October 13, 1998, on charges of possession of a firearm without an identification card, possession of a concealed weapon, reckless driving and imprudent driving.[5] The trial court dismissed the case based upon a motion to dismiss under ' 25.30 and Palomo. The People timely appealed.

[17] Atienza was arrested, booked and released for terrorizing, reckless conduct, possession of a concealed firearm and driving under the influence. Atienza was to appear in the Superior Court on June 24, 1998; however, no charges were filed at that time. An indictment was filed on January 5, 1999, wherein Atienza was charged with terrorizing and possessing a concealed weapon. The trial court dismissed the case based on a motion to dismiss filed under ' 25.30 and Palomo. The People timely appealed.

[18] Pangelinan was arrested, booked and released on July 31, 1998, for burglary and theft of a motor vehicle. Upon release, Pangelinan was given a citation and notice to appear in Superior Court on December 2, 1998. Pangelinan was later indicted on January 5, 1999 for burglary, theft, and theft by receiving. The trial court dismissed the case pursuant to a motion to dismiss under ' 25.30 and Palomo. The People timely appealed.

[19] In an order dated June 24, 1999, this court set out a briefing schedule; consolidated the above-captioned cases and required the separate Defendants-Appellees to either file briefs or file a statement of joinder in Villapando=s brief on or before July 30, 1999.

[20] Defendants Espina, Thomas, Ronquillo, Villacorta and Atienza all filed motions to join in the brief of Villapando. Defendants Davis, Reyes, Mendiola, Jiro, Quinata, Blas, Flores, Pinaula and Pangelinan all filed briefs on behalf of themselves.[6]

[21] This court has jurisdiction over the appeal in People v. Villapando pursuant to its power to review interlocutory matters under 7 GCA ' 3108(b) (1994). The court has jurisdiction over the remainder of the cases pursuant to 7 GCA ' 3107(b) (1994).[7]

[22] The sole issue in these cases is whether the de facto statute of limitations (hereinafter ASOL@) contained in 8 GCA ' 25.30, as ruled applicable to misdemeanors in Palomo, also applies to the prosecution of felonies. Questions of statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo. People v. Quichocho, 1997 Guam 13, & 3.

[23] Villapando appeals to this court to interpret 8 GCA ' 25.30 as applicable to felonies as well as misdemeanors. The basis of his arguments are founded upon this court=s decision in People v. Palomo, 1998 Guam 12, wherein the court construed ' 25.30 to require the People, in misdemeanor cases, to either file a complaint before the notice to appear date given by the police or, if there was no intent to prosecute, to make reasonable efforts to so notify the defendants. The court only addressed the issue as it applied to misdemeanors, as that was the sole issue presented on appeal.

[24] Subsequent to the issuance of the Palomo decision, this court addressed a related issue in People v. Kim, 1999 Guam 7. In Kim, the court found that all charges contained in the misdemeanor complaint, including those not previously listed in the citation and notice to appear, were barred from prosecution if the People failed to file a complaint before the notice to appear date. 1999 Guam 7 at & 10. Although Kim was a misdemeanor case, the court=s ruling is informative in demonstrating a clear determination which this court has previously set forthC to strictly construe ' 25.30.

[25] Villapando argues that the statute on its face is clear, particularly in light of PalomoC regardless of the manner in which felonies must be prosecuted, once ' 25.30 is invoked, it is the People=s duty to either file a complaint or attempt to notify the defendant of non-prosecution before the notice to appear date. It is Villapando=s contention that, under 8 GCA ' 10.70 (1993), the prosecution of a felony may be commenced through the filing of a complaint and that, as such, ' 25.30 applies to felonies as well as misdemeanors.

[26] The People attempt to complicate the matter by framing the single issue as several issues. Accordingly, the People attempt to create further Aissues@ by simply making arguments as to why ' 25.30 should not apply to felonies. The People=s arguments are as follows: (1) the manner in which felonies are mandated to be prosecuted indicates that ' 25.30 is inapplicable to felonies; (2) the court should reconsider its holding in Palomo because: (a) canons of statutory construction preclude a finding that ' 25.30 was violated or that dismissal with prejudice is appropriate; or (b) plain meaning of ' 25.30 does not indicate that the failure to prosecute is a violation of that section; or (c) to the extent that ' 25.30 operates as a de facto SOL, there has been an implied repeal of ' 25.30 by 8 GCA ' 10.20 (1993); (3) application of ' 25.30 may render that section unconstitutional as a violation of the doctrines of separation of powers and delegation; (4) dismissal of felonies under ' 25.30 is not an available remedy.

[27] The defendants who separately filed briefs attempt to rebut the People=s arguments. Additionally, Jiro raises the issue of the court=s jurisdiction over his appeal based upon the People=s failure to include a statement of jurisdiction in compliance with GRAP 13(j). The People refute that argument by stating that the requirements of GRAP 4.1 were met with and that such constitutes the same requirements for GRAP 13(j).[8] The court neither finds this procedural defect detrimental to the People=s appeal nor does it prevent the court from addressing the issue at hand.[9]

1998 Guam 12 at & 14. In determining whether ' 25.30 applies to felonies in addition to misdemeanors, the court will look to the applicable law and address each of the People=s arguments.

[29] It is true, as the People claim, that the court has the ability to overturn precedent. This is the same proposition that this court espoused in Palomo with respect to the trial court=s ruling against existing precedent. Fundamentally, the People argue overturning precedent based on the fact that Palomo was inadequately presented in that only the issue of ' 25.30's application to misdemeanors was before the court for review. As a result, the People argue, the court could not consider the harshness of the consequences if ' 25.30 applied to felonies. The People reiterate the same arguments from Palomo as to why ' 25.30 should not now apply to felonies as well as misdemeanors; however, these same arguments were addressed in Palomo.

[30] The People fail to present any sound reasons which justify the reversal of Palomo. The People=s argument that more investigation, resources and time are required in prosecuting felonies, thereby giving cause to reverse Palomo, is unconvincing. The de jure SOL for felonies is found in 8 GCA ' 10.20 which states that for all felonies, except murder, prosecution must commence within three (3) years of their commission. As we decided in Palomo, the de jure SOL is not negated by ' 25.30.

[31] Rather, pursuant to ' 25.30, the People have the option of informing the police to push back the notice to appear dates in order to allow the People adequate time to conduct an investigation and determine whether prosecution should be commenced. The very nature of a situation where a citation and notice to appear is issued provide the People with a known suspect. These are not crimes where the police and the People have no clue as to who may have committed them or where to begin the investigation. It is because of this inherent Ahead start@ that the People should be able to make a determination, under ' 25.30 whether to prosecute a defendant. As with misdemeanors, the People may instruct the police to set the notice to appear date further off, yet still within the applicable de jure SOL.[10] If felonies are so much more serious in nature, then it would logically follow that the People would not want to delay commencement of prosecution in these cases, particularly where a known suspect exists.

[32] Whereas the People are legally correct that prosecution is not commenced before the filing of a complaint or indictment, the statutes contemplate that the process is commenced when an arrest is made. This is why ' 25.30 makes sense. The statute mandates that the prosecutor make a decision on prosecution and if she decides to prosecute then she must file a Acomplaint.@ If not, then she must make reasonable efforts to notify the defendant of non-prosecution.

[33] The People argue that, based upon the timing of the enactment of sections 25.30 and 10.20, the subsequent enactment of ' 10.20 impliedly repealed ' 25.30. However, ' 25.30 is not repugnant to 8 GCA '' 10.20 or 10.30 (1993). In fact, they work in conjunction with one another. See Nat=l Labor Relations Bd. V. Kolkka, 170 F.3d 837, 941 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Kee Leasing Co. v. McGahan (In re Glacier Bay), 944 F.2d 597, 581 (9th Cir. 1991) (citations and quotations omitted) (holding that A[i]n order to find irreconcilable conflict, the new statute must be clearly repugnant in work or purpose to the old statute.@).

[34] As shown above, the court, in Palomo, viewed two options in charging out cases, misdemeanors in that case. First, the police could arrest and detain a defendant, thereby not invoking ' 25.30 at all and ' 10.20 would be the only time constraint placed upon the People to commence prosecution. See 8 GCA ' 45.10 (1993). Second, the citation and notice to appear issued by the police could be issued. However, once that method of preliminary Aprosecution@ is invoked, then the mandates and the time-guidelines of ' 25.30 and the date on which the defendant is required to appear come into play. In that regard, the statutes of limitations provided by both are not repugnant. This issue of statutory construction is one which the court previously considered in Palomo, but disregarded based on the foregoing analysis. Once again, at this time, the court finds no reason to reverse its previous decision in Palomo.[11]

[35] The People argue that the holding in Palomo is inapplicable to felony cases because the manner in which felonies are charged out and prosecuted is wholly different and distinct from the manner in which misdemeanors are charged and, therefore, ' 25.30 does not apply to felonies. It is the People=s contention that because ' 25.30 refers to Acomplaints,@ whereas 8 GCA ' 1.15 (1993) mandates that felonies shall by prosecuted by indictments, is indicative of a clear intent that ' 25.30 does not apply to felonies. The People further contend that the prosecution of felonies, as opposed to misdemeanors, is a long and arduous process which requires more investigative time and resources; therefore, felonies were not contemplated under ' 25.30 especially when the filing of a complaint in misdemeanor cases is a relatively simple task. Furthermore, the People believe it was not the Legislature=s intent to require both the filing of a complaint and indictment of defendants by a grand jury, a duplicative endeavor.

[36] However, it is argued by the defendants that the statutory scheme indicates ' 25.30's application to felonies. The defendants= arguments as to the issue of complaints being filed for felonies are two-fold. First the filing of the complaint is to allow the court to hold or detain a defendant upon a probable cause determination by the magistrate. A felony prosecution requires an indictment upon a probable cause determination by a grand jury. Once detained, a defendant must have an indictment of him within the (10) days or have a preliminary examination. See 8 GCA 45.50(b) (1993). Secondly, the defendants contend that an indictment is a complaint under ' 15.10.

[37] A complaint is defined in ' 15.10 as follows:

8 GCA ' 15.10 (1993). The question then becomes whether an indictment is a form of a complaint. An indictment contains the essential facts constituting the offenses charged, in writing, signed by the prosecutor and filed with the Superior Court. In that regard, it seems to satisfy the requirements for a complaint under ' 15.10.[12] It could be construed that an indictment is a specific or more specialized type of complaint in that a complaint may simply be prepared by the prosecuting attorney after some investigation, whereas other more stringent procedures are required in order to obtain an indictment.

[38] It should also be considered that ' 15.10 does not say an indictment is a form of a complaint. It delineates that an indictment is different from a complaint; however, under ' 1.15, a complaint must meet the same requirements as an indictment. Also, ' 1.15, does clearly state that felonies must be prosecuted through indictments whereas all other offenses shall be prosecuted by complaints.

[39] In People v. Quinata, 785 F.2d 812 (9th Cir. 1986), the defendant was charged as an adult for manslaughter, although he had turned eighteen (18) the day after the death. The court dismissed the case against him as he was not an adult at the time of the alleged crime. Id. at 813. A petition was then filed in the Juvenile Division. Id. The defendant made a motion to dismiss because he was no longer a juvenile. Id. On appeal, the Appellate Division reversed. Id. The defendant then appealed to the Ninth Circuit and the case was affirmed. Id. Upon remand, the People moved to certify Quinata to be tried as an adult. Id. The motion was granted; however, Quinata then appealed claiming a violation of the statute of limitations. Id. The court found that the petition in Juvenile Court stated the essential facts and was signed by the prosecuting attorney. Id. at 814. Therefore, the court concluded that the petition, filed approximately a month after the death occurred, although not labeled a complaint, met the definition of a complaint and was timely filed.[13] Id. at 814. AA petition in the Juvenile Division, like a complaint or indictment in the Adult Division, is meant to inform the defendant of the offense the state accuses him of having committed.@ Id. at 813. The Ninth Circuit also makes a reference to complaints and indictments being alike. Id.

[40] The reasoning behind the Quinata decision is clear. The court looked to the definition of a complaint and found the petition satisfied that definition. This court was result oriented in that it made reference to the fact that A[w]ere [the court] to accept appellant=s argument, a juvenile offender like Quinata could go free by pursuing numerous motions and appeals to delay the prosecution.@ Id. at 814.

[41] The People argue that the holding in Quinata does not speak to prosecutions as envisioned by ' 25.30 nor does it provide for dismissal of a case not filed under ' 25.30. This may be true, however, we may look to Quinata in our determination of whether an indictment can be construed as a complaint under the current statutory scheme. All consequences which flow from that determination may or may not be part and parcel of the determination itself. Unquestionably more work is involved in prosecuting a felony; however, this does not mean that statutory limitations should be ignored in order to give the People an additional time.

[42] As to the argument of whether the statutory scheme demonstrates that ' 25.30 is applicable to felonies, several statutes under Title 8 must be examined. 8 GCA ' 25.50 (1993) provides as follows:

Chapter 25 of Title 8 refers to citations. Section 25.50 contemplates the application of citations to both felonies and misdemeanors. For example, should a defendant fail to appear pursuant to the notice to appear, he will be subject to an additional felony or misdemeanor charge.

[43] It is the People=s contention that 8 GCA ' 45.20 (1993), a section entitled AComplaint to be Filed; When,@ applies only to misdemeanor cases. However, subsection (b) refers to a grand jury, indicating the application to both felony and misdemeanor charges.

Additionally, referring to 8 GCA ' 45.30 (1993), the section governing first appearances by defendants, the statute once again contemplates application to misdemeanors and felonies.

Supreme Court of Guam

People of Guam v Villapando [1999] GUSC 27; 1999 Guam 31 (10 December 1999)