People of Guam v Camacho [1999] GUSC 23; 1999 Guam 27 (29 October 1999)

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Appeal from the Superior Court of Guam
Argued and submitted on May 14, 1999
Hagåtña, Guam

Representing the Plaintiff-Appellee: David M. Moore Assistant Attorney General Office of the Attorney General Prosecution Division 2-200E Judicial Ctr. Bldg. 120 W O=Brien Dr. Hagåtña, Guam 96910	Representing the Defendant-Appellant Richard Parker Arens, Esq. Cunliffe & Cook, A Professional Corp. 210 Archbishop Flores, Suite 200 Hagåtña, Guam 96910

BEFORE: BENJAMIN J. F. CRUZ, Chief Justice, PETER C. SIGUENZA, Associate Justice, and JOHN A. MANGLONA, Designated Justice.

CRUZ, CJ:

[1] The Defendant-Appellant, Joaquin C. Camacho, Jr. appeals his conviction for two (2) counts of Murder (as a 1st Degree Felony) and two (2) Special Allegations of Possession and Use of a Deadly Weapon in the Commission of a Felony. The Defendant-Appellant seeks a reversal of the convictions based upon: (1) the trial court's failure to give a self-defense jury instruction; (2) ineffective assistance of counsel for failure of counsel to request a self-defense jury instruction; (3) the trial court's failure to suppress statements and evidence derived from an unlawful delay in bringing the defendant before a judge, pursuant to 8 GCA ' 45.10(a) (1993); and (4) denial of defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal notwithstanding the verdicts. The trial court=s decisions are affirmed.

[2] On or about September 20, 1996, at approximately 11:45 p.m., Officer Peter J. Santos was conducting a check upon the One Stop Business License Center in Anigua. During this check, Officer Santos found a person lying on the ground. Upon approaching the individual, Officer Santos noticed that she had two deep cuts on both sides of her neck and was bleeding quite heavily from her wounds. The individual was dressed like a woman, wearing a black lace jacket, a black sports bra, and white denim shorts. Officer Santos called for medics and began interviewing the individual, who, at the time, was alert and breathing steadily.

[3] The victim identified herself as Raymond Santos (in trial court it was acknowledged that she also went by the name of Rita)[1] and told Officer Santos what had happened to her. According to Raymond/Rita Santos, she was picked up by the person who caused her injuries at about 11:00 p.m. behind Club Texas in Anigua. She also recalled that her attacker was driving a Nissan Sentra. Raymond/Rita Santos said that she was driven to the area behind the One Stop building, where she was stabbed, then dumped by the assailant. She described her attacker to Officer Santos as being Alight complected, male, possibl[y] Chamorro, in his late thirties with long black hair.@[2] Raymond/Rita Santos also stated to Officer Santos the attack occurred inside the car and that the person who attacked her was not standing up at the time of the attack.

[4] At the time Raymond/Rita Santos was found, Officer Santos noticed that the bra she wore was soaked in blood from the neck wounds. Officer Santos also noted that Raymond/Rita Santos was not wearing any shoes and none were found in the area. Raymond/Rita Santos eventually died from the wounds she suffered from during the attack.

[5] Mr. Joaquin Camacho, Sr. testified that, on September 21, 1996, the day following the attack, his son, Joaquin Camacho, Jr. (hereinafter "the Appellant"), was distraught after reading the Sunday edition of the Pacific Daily News that headlined: "Two Killings in 24 Hours." Mr. Camacho testified that the next day he went to his son=s place of work to talk at which time the Appellant broke down and cried. The Appellant then exclaimed, "I stabbed the guy." After talking to his son, it was Mr. Camacho's understanding that the Appellant was involved in a fight with several individuals and that the Appellant had stabbed one of the individuals. Mr. Camacho eventually went to the Attorney General's Office to report the incident. The Appellant=s father believed, based upon the explanation of the Appellant, that the stabbing was in self-defense.

[6] On or about October 15, 1996, officers from the Guam Police Department were sent to find the Appellant at his apartment. At approximately 7:39 a.m., they observed the Appellant walking toward a gold Nissan Sentra. The officers approached the Appellant at which time Officer Nicholas Wellein asked if the Appellant could be interviewed at the Criminal Investigation Section (CIS). The Appellant agreed to accompany the officers and upon his arrival at CIS he was advised of his rights.

[7] Officer Wellein began interviewing the Appellant at approximately 8:25 a.m. The Appellant explained that he was involved in a fight with transvestites at the One Stop building in Anigua. In this initial interview, the Appellant did not admit that he stabbed any person and that he had left the area after he was able to escape from his attackers. The Appellant provided a written statement, consented to be fingerprinted, photographed, and to have his apartment searched. However, he was not arrested after this interview.

[8] Officer Wellein began a second interview of the Appellant after the written statement from the first interview was completed. After the Appellant was urged to tell the truth, the Appellant began crying and stated "I did it. I was the one who stabbed her." Officer Wellein continued the interview and asked the Appellant to give more details. The Appellant stated that he picked up a "woman" wearing a white top and black shorts outside the Ginza Massage. The Appellant later called the woman "one of the gays" who "asked him if he needed her services." He then drove to the back of the One Stop building. The Appellant stated that he and the woman got out of the car and went to the beach. The Appellant stated that he then confronted the woman about a previous altercation he had with the woman and her friends.

[9] According to the Appellant, the woman then reached inside her purse and when the Appellant turned around the woman had a knife in her hand. The Appellant claimed that the woman came toward him with the knife. The Appellant stated that he took the knife away from the woman, pulled her forward and began stabbing her in her neck, side, and in the back. After making this admission, the Appellant was not formally arrested by Officer Wellein, despite the fact that Officer Wellein had probable cause to do so. Officer Wellein testified that he wanted to get more information and requested the Appellant to provide a second written statement and to draw sketches regarding the events of September 20, 1996. The sketches prepared by the Appellant were shown to the jury and admitted into evidence.

[10] After completing the written statement and the sketches, Officer Weillen asked the Appellant if he was willing to do a reenactment of the incident. The Appellant, Officer Weillen, and a crime lab technician proceeded to the area where the Appellant first picked up the woman he stabbed. Shortly thereafter, they proceeded to the area behind the One Stop building where the car was parked and then to the site of the stabbing. During the reenactment, the Appellant referred to the woman as "Meshan." After the video reenactment, the Appellant was still not arrested. They then proceeded up to the Appellant's apartment to locate certain items of evidence. Only after interviewing the Appellant twice and asking him for sketches and a video reenactment did Officer Weillen arrest him. The Appellant was then formally arrested at approximately 6:10 p.m. and appeared before a magistrate at around 6:20 p.m., on October 15, 1996.

[11] The Appellant was indicted on two (2) counts of Murder (as a 1st Degree Felony) and A Special Allegation of Possession and Use of a Deadly Weapon in the Commission of a Felony with each count of murder. Prior to the trial, Appellant filed a motion to suppress evidence for failing to bring Appellant before a judge without unnecessary delay and to suppress defendant's statements because of a violation of the McNabb-Mallory rule. See 8 GCA '45.10; Mallory v. United States 354 U.S. 449, 77 S.Ct. 1356 (1957); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 63 S.Ct. 608 (1943), reh=g denied, 391 U.S. 784, 63 S.Ct. 1322 (1943). Both motions were denied by the trial court.

[12] A jury trial was held and the People rested after presenting evidence over a four-day period. After the People rested their case, the Appellant moved for a Judgment of Acquittal citing insufficiency of the evidence. The Court denied the motion. The Appellant was eventually found guilty of both counts in the indictment including the special allegations.

[13] The Appellant filed a motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdicts on August 21, 1997. After hearing oral argument on the matter, the trial court issued a decision and order denying the Appellant's motion. The Appellant was subsequently sentenced to life imprisonment for count two in the indictment, Murder (as a 1st Degree Felony), and received a consecutive sentence of twenty-five (25) years imprisonment for the special allegation in count two, Possession and Use of Deadly Weapon in the Commission of a Felony. Sentencing was deferred for Count One and the special allegation. The appeal was timely filed. The Appellant is presently incarcerated.

[14] This court has jurisdiction based upon 8 GCA ' 130.15 (a) (1993), 7 GCA '' 3107 and 3108 (1994).

[15] The Appellant presents the court with four issues to consider. The first issue raised by the Appellant is whether the trial court's failure to give a self-defense jury instruction, sua sponte, is reversible error. The Appellant states that he was deprived of his constitutional right to have the jury determine every material issue presented by the evidence because the trial court failed to give a jury instruction of self-defense. We review this issue for plain error. 8 GCA ' 90.19 (1993) and ' 130.50 (1993); People of Guam v. Ueki, 1999 Guam 4, && 17-18.

[16] The Appellant's second issue is that his trial counsel failed to request a self-defense jury instruction which rendered his assistance to the Appellant as ineffective. The Appellant believes that he was prejudiced by his trial counsel's failure to request a self-defense jury instruction. We review this matter de novo. People v. Quintanilla, 1998 Guam 17, & 8.

[17] The third issue raised by the Appellant is whether the trial court erred in failing to suppress statements and evidence because of the unnecessary delay in bringing the Appellant before a Superior Court judge. The Appellant relies upon 8 GCA ' 45.10, which requires that a person be brought before a judge of the Superior Court "without unnecessary delay." 8 GCA ' 45.10(a). This matter will be reviewed de novo. Coffey v. Government of Guam, 1997 Guam 14, & 6.

[18] The final issue raised by the Appellant is whether the trial court erred in denying Appellant's motion for Judgment of Acquittal Notwithstanding the Verdicts. Appellant contends that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to convict him of any of the charges. We review this last concern de novo. People of Guam v. Quinata, 1999 Guam 6, & 9; People of Guam v. Cruz, 1998 Guam 18, & 8.

A. SELF-DEFENSE JURY INSTRUCTION.

[19] The Appellant argues that the trial court should have given a sua sponte jury instruction of self-defense and that the trial court's failure to do so prejudiced the Appellant. In support of this position, he primarily relies upon People v. Mayweather, 66 Cal.Rptr. 547 (1968), which reversed a conviction because of the trial court's failure to give a self-defense instruction. Unlike this case, in Mayweather the failure to give the instruction was not reviewed under the plain error standard.

[20] Courts are not bound to present every conceivable defense potentially suggested by the evidence. See United States v. Span, 970 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1992). The Ninth Circuit found no plain error in a court's failure to give a jury instruction regarding excessive force where the Appellant did not present such a defense and the Appellant did not request the instruction. Id. at 578.

[21] Based upon the facts presented here, we find that the failure of the trial court to give a self-defense jury instruction sua sponte does not rise to the level of plain error. As in Span, the Appellant here did not present a self-defense theory at trial but instead relied upon an alternative theory that he did not commit the crime.[3] The court could not logically reverse on this issue when the two defenses basically exclude each other. In addition, the Appellant did not request the instruction. Reversal is not warranted on these bases.

[22] As a result of defense counsel=s failure to request a self-defense jury instruction, the Appellant claims that his assistance of counsel was ineffective. In a recent decision, People v. Kintaro, this court reiterated that in determining whether a criminal defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel we will employ the two-prong test from the U.S. Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984). People v. Kintaro, 1999 Guam 15, & 11. The first prong requires that a defendant demonstrate that his trial counsel=s performance was deficient. In the second prong, the defendant must prove the deficient performance prejudiced his defense. Id. (citing Quintanilla at & 8).

[23] Applying the first prong of this test, the Appellant claims that a jury instruction for self-defense should have been requested in light of the evidence presented, but trial counsel failed to do so. In examining this claim, the court must judge the reasonableness of counsel=s challenged conduct, or lack thereof, based upon the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel=s conduct. Kintaro at & 12; Quintanilla at & 9 (quoting Washington, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S.Ct. at 2066).

[24] In counsel=s notice of witnesses and nature of defense, he raises three possible defenses: 1) the act was in self-defense, 2) he lacked the necessary mens rea for the offenses charged, and 3) another person committed the crime. During trial, however, trial counsel abandoned the self-defense and mens rea theories, instead arguing to the jury that the Appellant was not the person who stabbed Raymond/Rita Santos.

[25] In Kintaro, an appellant challenged his driving under the influence (DUI) conviction. The appellant argued that his lawyer provided him with ineffective assistance by failing to object when the prosecution relied solely upon appellant=s admission and offered no proof that appellant was driving on that occasion. Kintaro at & 13. We disagreed with appellant in that case because we noted that appellant=s defense needed to admit that appellant was driving at the time of his arrest in order to assert other defenses. Id. at

Supreme Court of Guam

People of Guam v Camacho [1999] GUSC 23; 1999 Guam 27 (29 October 1999)