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Supreme Court of Guam |
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF GUAM
YASUDA FIRE &
MARINE ) Supreme Court Case No.
CVA97-014
INSURANCE
CO., LTD., ) Superior Court Case No
CV0223-94
)
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
)
v. ) OPINION
)
HEIGHTS ENTERPRISES, )
)
Defendant-Appellant. )
____________________________________)
Filed: May 19, 1998
Cite as: 1998 Guam 5
Appeal from the Superior Court
of Guam
Argued and Submitted on December 11, 1997
Hågatña,
Guam
Appearing for
the Plaintiff-Appellee:
John A. Spade, Esq.
Mair, Mair, Spade &
Thompson
A Professional Corporation
Attorneys At Law
Suite 807, GCIC
Building
414 West Soledad Avenue
Hågatña, Guam
96910
Appearing for the
Defendant-Appellant:
Seth Forman, Esq.
Law Offices of Keogh and
Forman
Suite 105, C&A Prof. Building
251 Martyr Street
P.O. Box
GZ
Hågatña, Guam 96932
BEFORE: PETER C. SIGUENZA, Chief
Justice; JANET HEALY WEEKS, and BENJAMIN J. F. CRUZ, Associate
Justices.
CRUZ, J.:
[1] The Defendant-Appellant, Heights Enterprises, appeals a judgment granting summary judgment in favor of the Plaintiff-Appellee, Yasuda Fire & Marine Insurance Co., Ltd. The Superior Court found that Heights was excluded from coverage under a general liability insurance policy due to two exclusion clauses--a work product exclusion and a professional services exclusion. This court, having heard oral arguments, and having reviewed the record and the applicable law, affirms the trial court's decision based on the reasoning set forth below.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
[2] Yasuda brought a declaratory judgment action to determine whether Yasuda was obligated to indemnify or defend Heights, based on a general liability policy. This cause of action was prompted by an action brought by Fargo Pacific, Inc. against Heights, based on a contractual agreement, for alleged defective workmanship for termite spraying done for the Perlas Courte condominium project[1]. Fargo, as the general contractor, had previously been found liable to the project's owner, Guam Land and Realty, Inc. (GLR), for damage to the project.[2] Heights was insured by Yasuda at the time the underlying claims to this case arose. Heights obtained a Manufacturers' and Contractors' Liability Insurance policy, a general liability policy. Universe Insurance
Underwriters (UIU), agent
for Yasuda, issued the policy to Heights at the request of the company's
President, Norman Imamura. Imamura
is a businessperson and the founder and
president of Heights Enterprises. Imamura earned a two-year degree in
Accounting/Business
Administration from the Honolulu Business College in Hawaii.
Imamura requested the liability insurance policy; however, he made no
specific
requests as to the inclusion of specific types of liability coverage, nor did
the insurance agent make any further inquiry
as to any special needs. After
receiving the policy, Imamura "scanned" the policy, but did not fully understand
it. However, Imamura
at no time notified or inquired of the insurance agent as
to any questions or concerns regarding the provisions or coverage of the
policy
that he did not agree with or understand.
[3] The general liability
policy contained exclusions, two of which are at issue in this case. The first
is what is referred to as a
"work product" exclusion which states that "this
insurance does not apply to: property damage to work performed by or on behalf
of
the named insured arising out of the work or any portion thereof, or out of
materials, parts or equipment furnished in connection
therewith." The second
exclusion refers to "professional services" and provides that "this insurance
policy shall not apply to bodily
injury or property damage due to . . . (D) the
rendering or failure to render professional
services."
[4] Yasuda=s
first motion for summary judgment was denied on May 23, 1994 which Justice
Weeks, then a Superior Court Judge, on the basis that
the case was not ripe for
summary judgment because genuine issues of material fact existed. A subsequent
motion for summary judgment
was then brought by Yasuda on October 24, 1994. The
court below heard oral arguments and entered, on December 27, 1996, a written
decision and order granting summary judgment in favor of Yasuda. The judgment
was entered on March 26, 1997 and a timely notice of
appeal was filed on April
23, 1997.
ANALYSIS
I.
[5] This
case is on appeal from the granting of a summary judgment motion in favor of the
Plaintiff-Appellee, Yasuda Fire & Marine
Insurance Co., Ltd. The
Defendant-Appellant, Heights Enterprises, claims a misapplication of the law as
well as the existence of
factual disputes that would bar the grant of summary
judgment. First, an issue is presented as to whether the court erred in finding
that no factual disputes existed which would have supported Heights' argument
for use of the doctrine of estoppel. Secondly, there
is the issue of whether the
trial court erred in holding that the liability policy held by Heights excluded
coverage for the claims
of Fargo Pacific, Inc. based on the "work product"
exclusion. Lastly, Heights raises the issue of whether the court erred in
finding
that the "professional services" exclusion also excluded coverage for
the Fargo claims.
[6] This court
has jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 48 U.S.C.
' 1424-3(d) and 7 GCA
''
3107(a) and 3108(a). The trial court's granting of summary judgment will be
reviewed de novo.
Iizuka Corp. v. Kawasho Int'l (GUAM)
Inc., 1997 Guam 10,
&7 . A grant of
summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together
with the affidavits, if any,
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law." Guam R. Civ. P.
56(c).
Doctrine of
Estoppel
[7] Heights
argues that the doctrine of estoppel may be applied in situations to prevent
companies from denying coverage to an insured
based on policy exclusions when
the insured has been led to believe that coverage existed.
Ivey v. United National Indemnity Co.,
259 F.2d 205, 208 (9th Cir. 1958).
Heights argues that it could be construed that the UIU agent mislead Imamura as
to the nature and scope of the company's
coverage, and, as a result, Imamura
detrimentally relied on the agent's representations in obtaining insurance from
Yasuda. Heights
attempts to portray Imamura as an unsophisticated businessperson
with limited education who is naive in negotiating insurance
coverage.
[8] However, the
doctrine of estoppel also cannot be applied so as to broaden or extend the scope
of coverage when no such coverage previously
existed.
Baton v. Transamerica Insurance Co.,
584 F.2d 907, 911 (9th Cir. 1978).
Furthermore, although once the law in California, the courts of California seem
to have since abandoned the Ivey view
by refusing to recognize the use of estoppel or waiver for the purpose of
bringing risks within a policy, which were not covered
by the policy's terms.
Manneck v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp.,
28 Cal. App. 4th 1294, 1303, 33
Cal. Rptr.2d 771, 777 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994). The reasoning reflected in the more
recent California cases is the majority rule.
Estate v. Hapo Federal Credit Union,
869 P.2d 116, 117-8
(1994).
[9] Even under the
minority rule, which applies estoppel where an insurer expressly misrepresents a
policy's coverage, the facts in this
case do not seem to warrant the application
of estoppel. In this case, Imamura sought a policy for liability insurance, a
general
liability policy, which is what he obtained. He did not specifically
request an errors-and-omissions policy or performance bond or
specify certain
risks against which he wished the company to be insured. Furthermore, he failed
to carefully read and review the
policy and did not question its coverage.
Yasuda cites an older California case that was decided when California still
followed the
minority
ruleC
Taff v. Atlas Assurance Co., 58 Cal.
App. 2d 696, 137 P.2d 483 (Cal. Ct. App. 1943). In
Taff, the court refused to extend
coverage where the insured failed even to read the policy to discover if what
the insured presumed to
be covered was actually included.
Id. at
486.
[10] Imamura is a man with
a higher degree of formal education, having received an Associate Degree from a
business college in Hawaii.
Sophistication really is not the issue here, since
this concern is one of practicality. Imamura may have desired to obtain an
errors-or-omissions
policy or a performance bond, but without making this desire
known to the UIU agent, Heights cannot now claim that it was defrauded
and that
Yasuda should be required to provide such extended coverage under the general
liability policy. A reasonable consumer would
have expressed the risks against
which he wished to obtain coverage. A reasonable consumer would have
subsequently read over his
policy to make sure it included coverage for those
risks. A reasonable consumer would have gone back to the insurance agent when
the policy he received did not contain coverage for the risks which he believed
he had obtained coverage. These actions have nothing
to do with sophistication.
Yasuda cannot be expected to have read Imamura's mind and in turn should not be
held responsible for insuring
Heights for risks which were not included in the
policy.
[11] The trial court
clearly appears to have properly assessed the facts presented before it, and
there is no basis for estoppel under
the majority view, and perhaps even under
the minority rule. Additionally, it is not clear what factual dispute Heights
raises as
an issue in this appeal. This court chooses to adopt the majority rule
and thereby refuses to extend coverage where such was neither
contemplated nor
provided for in the policy itself.
II.
[12] A
well settled general principle of insurance law is that, should ambiguities
exist in the language of the policy provisions, they
are to be liberally
construed in favor of the insured. Stroehmann
v. Mutual Life Ins., Co. of New York, 300 U.S. 435, 439 (1937) ("the rule
is settled that in case of ambiguity that construction of the policy will be
adopted which is most favorable
to the insured."). However, in the absence of
any ambiguities in an insurance agreement, the objective rules of contract law
apply,
and the clear and explicit language governs.
Bank of the West v. Superior Court, 2
Cal. 4th 1254, 833 P.2d 545, 551-2
(Cal. 1992) (holding that "[w]hile insurance contracts contain special features,
they are still contracts to which ordinary
rules of contractual interpretation
apply.").
[13] Therefore, the
threshold issue is whether the provisional language of the policy is itself
ambiguous. If unambiguous, interpretation
must express the mutual intentions of
the parties. Id. at 545. However, if
found to be ambiguous, the terms of a promise are to be interpreted in the
manner in which the promisor believed
the promisee understood it at the time of
its making. Id. "This rule, as applied
to the promise of coverage in an insurance policy, protects not the subjective
beliefs of the insured but,
rather, 'the objectively reasonable expectations of
the insured.'" Id. It is only at the
point when this rule fails to resolve the ambiguity that the general principle
applies which construes the ambiguity
against the insurer.
Id.
[14] Heights
contends that the language of the work product exclusion and the professional
services exclusion are both ambiguous. Furthermore,
it is
Heights= contention
that because the provisions are ambiguous, those provisions should be
interpreted in favor of coverage for the insured.
However, what Heights fails to
do is establish how the language is ambiguous to begin with. For ambiguities in
an insurance policy
to exist, it must be shown that a provision is capable of
two or more reasonable interpretations. Adler
v. Western Home Ins. Co., 878 F.Supp. 1329, 1333 (C.D. Cal. 1995).
"Courts will not adopt a strained or absurd interpretation in order to create an
ambiguity where none exists."
Hollingsworth
v. Commercial Union Ins., Co.,
208 Cal. App. 3d 800, 805, 256 Cal. Rptr. 357 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989). Separate
analysis of each provision must be made in order to determine whether
ambiguities exist and in whose
favor the provisions should fall. However, even
an ambiguous policy is not to be so liberally construed as to provide an
unreasonable
or forced interpretation or to provide extended coverage to the
insured. United States v. A.C. Strip,
868 F.2d 181, 186 (6th Cir. 1989).
"Language in a contract must be construed in the context of that instrument as a
whole and the circumstances of that
case, and it cannot be found ambiguous in
the abstract." Bank of the West, 2
Cal. 4th at
1265.
Work Product
Exclusion
[15] There is a
split of authority as to the interpretation of when the work product exclusion
will exclude coverage under a general liability
policy. The trial court chose to
follow the line of cases holding that liability from defective termite treatment
is excluded under
the work product exclusion. There is varying authority which
directs, respectively, the inclusion and exclusion of coverage under
a general
liability policy construing a work product exclusion
provision.
[16] There are two
cases of import that support exclusion from coverage in the present situation-
Hawk Termite & Pest Control, Inc. v. Old
Republic Ins. Co., 596 So. 2d 96 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) and
Uhock v. Sleitweiler, 778 P.2d 359
(Kan. Ct. App. 1988). In Uhock,
homeowners brought suit against the exterminator alleging liability for termite
damage to their home. The exterminator subsequently
sought indemnification from
a second pest controller. Id. Judgment
was issued against the exterminator, garnishment was then issued against the
exterminator, which the court dismissed, and
the homeowners appealed.
Id. The court in Kansas had previously
ruled, and accordingly in Uhock held,
that the work product exclusion language was unambiguous.
Id. at 364. The court, relying on the
reasoning found in Owings v. Gifford,
697 P.2d 865 (Kan.1985), stated:
When an exterminator treats a home, warranties arise both under his contract with the owner and by operation of tort law. Since an exterminator can control the quality of his work, he is liable to the owner when the work is faulty. The risk that the exterminator may incur liability under warranty is a normal part of doing business.
The exterminator may obtain a performance bond or purchase a guarantee of contractual performance for repair or replacement of faulty workmanship.
Uhock,
778 P.2d at 364. A general liability policy
Ais not a performance
bond or a guarantee of contract
performance.@
Owings, 697 P.2d at
865.
[17] In
Hawk, the homeowner brought suit
against the exterminator alleging negligence. 596 So. 2d at 96. The exterminator
brought a declaratory
judgment action seeking to determine its rights under its
insurance policy. Id. The work
exclusion policy excluded coverage for "failure of the insured 's . . . to meet
the level of performance, quality, fitness
or durability . . . represented by
the named insured" or due to "lack of performance."
Id. at 97. The court found no
ambiguity in the language and determined it was a simple case of poor
workmanship that was not covered
under the terms of the insurance policy.
Id.
[18] In
contrast, there are the cases of Hurtig v.
Terminix Wood Treating & Contracting Co., 692 P.2d 1153 (Haw. 1984),
Isle of Palms Pest Control Co. v. Monticello
Ins. Co., 459 S.E.2d 318 (S.C. Ct. App. 1994), and
Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Ratliff, 927
S.W.2d 531 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996). In
Hurtig, homeowners brought suit
against Terminix for failure to correctly perform work under a contract to
inspect and treat for termites,
which led to termite damage to the house. 692
P.2d at 1153. Terminix moved for summary judgment on the issue of the it's
coverage
under the policy. Id. The
court granted in favor of coverage and the Appellate and Supreme Courts
affirmed. Id. The Hawaii Supreme Court
issued a brief one-page opinion which reflected a 3-2 majority. The exclusion
provided that coverage did
not apply "to property damage to work performed by or
on behalf of the named insured arising out of the work or any portion thereof,
or out of materials, parts or equipment furnished in connection therewith . . .
." Id. at 1154. The court relied on
the general rule in favor of coverage and held that the exclusion only applied
to damages to the inspection
and application of chemicals.
Id.
[19] At the time of oral
arguments before the trial court in this matter, the
Isle of Palms and
Ratliff cases had not yet been
decided. Heights seeks additional support from the above two cases and claims
they demonstrate an emerging
majority rule on the issue. In
Isle of Palms, an exterminator sought
a declaratory judgment against the insurer, seeking a determination of coverage
for an alleged negligent
preparation of a termite inspection report. 459 S.E. 2d
at 318. The trial court held that the inspection was covered under the terms
of
the policy and the appellate court affirmed this determination, citing the
Hurtig decision.
Id. The court determined that the work
product exclusion did not apply in that case because "the only product or work
of the insured
is the inspection performed by the Isle of Palms, these
exclusions are clearly inapplicable, and do not remove the Purchaser's claim
from the scope of the policy or relieve Monticello of its duty to defend."
Id. at 322
n.2.
[20] Lastly, in
Ratliff, the court addressed the issue
of exclusion from coverage for a negligent inspection report for another pest
control business. 927
S.W.2d at 531. The court determined that under the general
liability policy, the terms "occurrence" and "property" carried ambiguous
definitions contained within the policy.
Id. As a result of the ambiguity, the
court found in favor of coverage for the insured and expressed the view that, if
insurance companies
do not intend to cover the types of claims presented in that
case, they should use language more specific to the risks particular
to the
business being insured. Id. at
534.
[21] As the trial court
concluded below, "[t]his Court finds the reasoning of
Uhock and the
Hurtig dissent more sound than
the somewhat wooden analysis presented by the
Hurtig majority."
Yasuda v. Heights, Civ. No. CV0233-94
(Guam Super. Ct. December 27, 1996). We agree with the trial court's legal
conclusions and finds no cause to
overturn the decision below. Although we are
concerned with ensuring that an insured is properly protected and receives the
benefit
of his bargain, we must also balance the interests of the insurer in
limiting its responsibilities.
[22] Additionally, there are
clear distinctions between the Hurtig
line of cases and the case at bar. In
Ratliff, there is no mention of
whether the case actually involved the interpretation of a work product
exclusion provision in the insurance
policy. Furthermore, in
Ratliff, as in
Isle of Palms, the factual scenario
involved termite inspection rather than termite treatment. In
Isle of Palms itself, although it
employed a confused analysis, the court drew a definite distinction between
inspection and faulty workmanship.
Hurtig did involve a mix of both
inspection and treatment for termite infestation; however, the
Hurtig opinion is not persuasive to
this court based on a lack of reasoning to support the majority's position. In
Hurtig, a two-justice minority issued
a dissent in which they opined that Terminix failed to properly perform its
duties under the
contractCto inspect
and treat the house for termites. Hurtig,
692 P.2d at 1155. The minority emphasized that the majority's decision
and reasoning would act to transmute a general liability policy
into a
performance bond, covering the "business
risks"[3]
of an insured. Id. The dissent
disagreed completely with what it regarded as the majority's schizophrenic
rational, noting the comparison between the
case under decision and those
previous.
[23] We
fail to see any ambiguity in the language of the work product exclusion here. It
is also important to note that alternate forms
of insurance are available to an
insured to protect himself against the "business risks" which have been at issue
in all of these
cases--performance bonds, a guarantee of contractual performance
for repair or replacement of faulty workmanship, or omissions-and-errors
policies. To allow coverage in the face of these exclusions creates a slippery
slope that undermines the distinctions such provisions
are intended to
create.
Professional-Services
Exclusion
[24] The
professional-services exclusion present in the
Isle of Palms case reads as follows:
"[a]ll coverage is excluded hereunder for claims arising out of the rendering or
failure to render any professional
service by any Insured or any Additional
Named Insured." 459 S.E.2d at 320. The court in
Isle of Palms had previously defined a
professional act or service as:
one arising out of a vocation, calling, occupation, or employment involving specialized knowledge, labor, a skill, and the labor or skill involved is predominantly mental or intellectual rather than physical or manual . . . . In determining whether a particular act is of a professional nature or a "professional service" we must look not to the title or character of the party performing the act, but to the act itself.
Id.
at 321. Although training and licensing are required to practice pest control,
the above definition would likely place extermination
outside the ambit of the
professional-services
exception.
[25] However, Yasuda
argues that the professional-services exclusion is not ambiguous and that the
term professional services is not limited
to those traditionally recognized
professions such as law or medicine. In
Hollingsworth, the court addressed the
issue of what constituted "professional services." 208 Cal. App. 3d at 803.
Hollingsworth involved a claim of
negligent ear-piercing, allegedly performed by the insured as a service offered
in a retail cosmetic store. Id. The
court granted summary judgment in favor of the insurer, finding that coverage
was excluded under the professional services exclusion
of the policy.
Id. The insured argued that because
ear-piercing was not state regulated, nor did it require licensing, it did not
qualify as a "professional
service" that would fall under the exclusion.
Id. at
806.
[26] The court held that
the conclusion was based on three separate factors. First, the court considered
a plain reading and understanding
of the language of the provision itself.
Id. Secondly, the court noted case law
indicating that in an insurance contract the language must be "construed in the
context of the
instrument as a whole, and in the circumstances of the case, and
cannot be found to be ambiguous in the abstract."
Id. at 807. Lastly, the court
attempted to balance the interests of the parties, giving weight to the
insured's reasonable expectations
of coverage and the insurer's right to limit
the extent of the policy's coverage when plain language has been used to do so.
Id. The court further expressed the
desire not to rewrite an insurance contract to force inclusion of coverage not
contemplated. Id.
[27] In the case at
bar, this court must decide whether the term
Aprofessional
services@, in the
contract of this insurance contract, is properly applied to pest extermination
services. In the instant case, the exclusion
reads as follows:
This insurance shall not apply to bodily or property damage to
A. the rendering of or failure to render (1) medical, surgical, dental, x-ray or nursing service or treatment, or the furnishing of food or beverages in connection therewith; (2) any service or treatment conducive to health or of a professional nature; (3) any cosmetic or tonsorial service or treatment;
B. the furnishing or dispensing of drugs or medical, or surgical supplies or appliances.
C. the rendering of or failure to render any cosmetic, ear piercing, tonsorial massage, physiotherapy, chiropody, hearing aid, optical or optometrical services or treatments.
D. the rendering of or failure to render any professional services
[28] This
court chooses to adopt a definition of professional services which stays truer
to a literal interpretation of the language--the
rendering of services
professionally. The distinction drawn is that of the professional versus the
amateur, an example which Justice
Weeks alluded to in oral arguments. For
example, in the world of sports there are professional athletes, who are paid
for their services,
and there are amateur athletes, who are unpaid. This is not
to say that had Heights, as a professional service provider, not charged
the
homeowners for services rendered that Heights would not be considered to have
engaged in professional services. Getting paid
is not the issue, but rather the
status of the service provider as one generally paid for rendering such
services. If, for example,
one has a business license allowing one to be paid
for such services, one would be considered a professional service provider.
Unlike
the Isle of Palms court, this
court views the status of the service provider as having weight equal to that of
the service or act provided.
[29] Accordingly, the court
determines that the trial court made a proper legal determination as to what
constitutes professional services
which we now adopt, subject to the
clarification noted above.
CONCLUSION
[30] In summary, we conclude the trial court properly found this case to be appropriate for summary judgment. A general liability insurance policy is meant to be just that, a policy for general liability, and not a policy which protects against all possible risks. The precise reason that performance bonds and errors and omissions policies exist is to cover specified risks which a general liability policy will not. Both the professional-services and work product exclusions were unambiguous and wholly effective. We have construed the professional services exclusion to include the services which Heights performed. Therefore, we must affirm the trial court's decision granting summary judgment in favor of Yasuda. Affirmed.
BENJAMIN J. F. CRUZ, Associate Justice JANET HEALY WEEKS, Associate Justice
PETER C. SIGUENZA, Chief Justice
[1]The underlying action was initiated in the Superior Court as Civil Case Number CV0615 -94 .
[2]An action was conducted in Guam, although initiated in Hawaii before a panel, certified by the American Arbitration Assocaition, by GLR against Fargo. Fargo was found liable to GLR for work on the Perlas Courte condominium project for the sum of $710,000.00 on February 16, 1994.
[3]Business
risks were described by the court as risks of injury to persons or property
caused by faulty products or workmanship.
Hurtig, 692 P.2d at 1155.
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