People of Guam v Manibusan [1998] GUSC 20; 1998 Guam 22 (6 November 1998)

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF GUAM

PEOPLE OF GUAM, ) Supreme Court Case No. CVA97-024

) Superior Court Case No. CF0318-96

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

)

VINCENT ROSARIO MANIBUSAN, ) OPINION

)

Defendant, )

)

CALVIN E. HOLLOWAY, SR., )

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF GUAM, )

)

Objector-Appellant. )

____________________________________)

Filed: November 6, 1998

Cite as: 1998 Guam 22

Appeal from the Superior Court of Guam
Argued and Submitted on 19 February 1998
Hagåtña, Guam

Appearing for the Appellant:
KENNETH D. ORCUTT
Assistant Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General, Civil Division
Suite 2-200E, Judicial Center Building
120 West O=Brien Drive
Hagåtña, Guam 96910

BEFORE: PETER C. SIGUENZA, Chief Justice; JANET HEALY WEEKS and JOAQUIN C. ARRIOLA, SR., Associate Justices.

WEEKS, J.:

[1] This matter was brought before this court pursuant to the Appellant=s, the Attorney General of Guam, appeal of sanctions imposed on the Prosecution Division of the Attorney General=s Office (hereinafter the AProsecution@) for its failure to provide discovery to the defendant as ordered by the trial court. The Appellant appealed the sanctions arguing that the trial court lacked authority to impose such monetary sanctions and claiming that even if the trial court did possess such authority the sanctions imposed were an abuse of discretion. The court finds that the trial court does in fact possess the authority to impose such monetary sanctions; however, the court also abused its discretion in this instance. Therefore, the order is VACATED.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

[2] The Defendant, Vincent Rosario Manibusan, was indicted for First and Second Degree

Criminal Sexual Conduct on 4 June 1996. The trial court ordered the mutual exchange of discovery by the parties to occur at least ten days before the trial date and reminded the parties of the continuing duty of disclosure pursuant to 8 GCA ' 70.40 (1993). Additionally the trial court ordered that all police reports were to be produced to the Defendant by 20 June 1996 at five o=clock in the evening. A jury trial was set for 25 July 1996.

[3] On 25 July 1996, the parties were present for the trial and jurors were called in. Defense counsel requested a continuance based on the Prosecution=s failure to provide full discovery, the prosecutor=s desire to amend the indictment and a mistaken belief, by defense counsel, that the trial was to begin on the following day. The Prosecution had provided the Defendant with some discovery, including police reports, prior to the trial date and in accordance with the trial court=s orders. However, several pages of a police report were not included as well as a videotape of an interview of the victim by Healing Hearts. The missing pages of the police report were provided to defense counsel on 23 July 1996 and the defective videotape was provided on 25 July 1996.

[4] A protracted dialogue between the court and the parties resulted in the Prosecution=s moving for a dismissal without prejudice pursuant to 8 GCA ' 80.70 (1993) and defense counsel=s moving to dismiss the indictment with prejudice. The trial court dismissed the indictment without prejudice. The trial court then proceeded to sanction the Prosecution in the amount of three thousand two hundred and seventy dollars ($3,270.00), the amount of the jurors fees incurred for that day. The Defendant, on 5 August 1996, filed an appeal with this court, but such appeal was withdrawn on 19 December 1996. On 9 August 1996 the People filed a Motion for Reconsideration on the issue of the monetary sanctions. The trial court denied that motion. The then Attorney General of Guam, Calvin E. Holloway, Sr., Objector and Appellant subsequently filed a timely Notice of Appeal on 9 June 1997.

ANALYSIS

[5] The issue here is whether, and under what circumstances, it is within the authority of a trial judge to impose monetary sanctions on the Prosecution in a criminal case. This issue is novel in the sense that it has not been previously addressed by an appellate court in a case arising from the Superior Court of Guam.[1]

[6] The court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 7 GCA ' 3107(b) (1994) and 48 U.S.C. ' 1424-3(d) (1988). Whether the trial court possessed the authority to impose monetary sanctions against the Prosecution is a question of law reviewed de novo. People v. Tuncap, 1998 Guam 13, & 11. The imposition of sanctions by the trial court for a discovery violation is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Id.; see also Desoto v. Gov=t of Guam, Civ. No. 82-0002A, 1983 WL 30218 (D. Guam App. Div. Sept. 9, 1983). The rationale for such a deferential standard of review is as follows:

AA trial court is empowered to exercise its supervisory power in such a manner as to provide for the orderly conduct of the court=s business and to guard against inept procedures and unnecessary indulgences which would tend to hinder, hamper, or delay the conduct and dispatch of its proceedings . . . . An attorney has an obligation to respect the legitimate interests of fellow members of the bar, the judiciary, and the administration of justice.@

580 Folsom Associates v. Prometheus Dev. Co., 223 Cal.App. 3d 1, 26, 272 Cal. Rptr.227, 241 (1990) (quoting Mungo v. UTA French Airlines, 166 Cal. App. 3d 327, 333, 323 Cal. Rptr. 369, 373 (1985)).

I.

[7] We begin our analysis by noting the absence of any provision of Guam law that directly resolves this issue. There is no express statutory authority which would permit the trial court to sanction a prosecutor for jury fees for failing to provide discovery nor do the Rules of Court provide for such authority. The court does note however, that in a civil context, the inherent power doctrine has been relied on to impose monetary sanctions against the Government for failure to appear at a pre-trial conference. See Desoto, Civ. No. 82-0002A, 1983 WL 30218 at *2 (D. Guam App. Div. Sept. 9, 1983). Furthermore, the interaction of various court rules, the legislative intent of several statutes and reliance on the exercise of a court=s inherent supervisory powers in the conduct of a trial court provide a broad legal basis for imposing such penalties.

[8] As stated by the California Supreme Court in Bauguess v Paine, 22 Cal.3d 626, 365-6, 586 P.2d 942, 947, 150 Cal.Rptr. 461, 466 (1978) (holding attorney=s fees was improper use of supervisory powers), courts have certain supervisory power necessary to execute their duties. That court, in addressing the general concept of supervisory power, further pointed out that, such power, while codified, Aexists apart from express statutory authority.@ Id. Likewise, the courts of Guam have inherent powers, identified through the provision of 7 GCA ' 7107 (1996), which exist even absent such codification. See Matter of Hipp, Inc., 895 F.2d 1503 (5th Cir. 1990)(holding that territorial courts may have inherent powers). The inherent powers have been codified at 7 GCA '7107 and permit the following:

. . .

(c) To provide for the orderly conduct of proceedings before it or its officers;

(d) To compel obedience to its judgments, orders and process, and to the orders of a Judge out of court in an action or proceeding pending therein;

(e) To control in furtherance of justice, the conduct of its ministerial officers and of all other persons in any manner connected with a judicial proceeding before it in every matter appertaining thereto; . . .

The Appellant argues that under Bauguess and Yarnell & Assoc. v. Superior Court 106 Cal.App.3d 918, 165 Cal.Rptr. 421 (1980), and attorney=s fees are not permitted unless authorized by statute or pursuant to a contempt proceeding.[2] The Bauguess decision however, was influenced by the existence of statutory language which only permitted the award of attorneys= fees upon agreement of the parties or unless authorized by statute. 22 Cal.3d at 639, 586 P.2d at 950, 150 Cal.Rtr. at 469. Guam has no such limiting statute.[3]

[9] We think that this court can and should avoid the narrow construction given section 128 by the California Supreme Court in Bauguess and Yarnell. We note that certain inherent powers exist which have defied codification, while others have been codified and repealed.[4] As one jurisdiction has stated:

Undoubtedly, courts of justice possess powers which were not given by legislation and which no legislation can take away. These are >inherent powers= resident in all courts of superior jurisdiction. These powers spring not from legislation but from the nature and constitution of the tribunals themselves.

State of Arizona v. Superior Court, 275 P.2d 887, 889 (Ariz. 1954)

[10] California authority supports the imposition of monetary sanctions in the absence of statutory provisions or court rules. Santandrea v. Siltec Corp., 56 Cal.App.3d 525, 128 Cal.Rptr. 629 (1976) overruled by Bauguess v Paine, 22 Cal.3d 626, 586 P.2d 942, 150 Cal.Rptr. 461 (1978); see also Fairfield v. Superior Court, 246 Cal.App.2d 113, 54 Cal.Rptr. 721 (1966). In these cases, attorneys fees were awarded to compensate a party for unnecessary legal work occasioned by the conduct of the offending party. On Guam, the Appellate Division has likewise relied on the inherent power doctrine to impose monetary sanctions to compensate a party for unnecessary legal work.[5] See Desoto, Civ. No. 82-0002A, 1983 WL 30218 (D. Guam App. Div. Sept. 9, 1983). We therefore find, as a matter of law, that the trial court may rely on its inherent powers to impose monetary sanctions.

II.

[11] The imposition of sanctions by the trial court is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Tuncap. at & 11. A[W]hen the record contains no evidence supporting a court=s decision, the standard is violated.@ Id. at & 13. Personal liability should be imposed only where the court finds counsel=s conduct demonstrates either Aan intentional departure from proper conduct, or, at a minimum, from a reckless disregard of duty owed by counsel to the court.@ U.S. v. Ross, 535 F.2d 346, 349 (6th Cir. 1976) (interpreting the term Avexatious@ as used in federal statute 2 U.S.C. ' 1927). Monetary sanctions should not be imposed for mere inadvertence, mistake or error of judgment.