People of Guam v Angoco [1998] GUSC 10; 1998 Guam 10 (6 July 1998)

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF GUAM

THE PEOPLE OF GUAM, ) Supreme Court Case No. CRA97-010
) Superior Court Case No. CF0053-94

Plaintiff-Appellee, )

)

vs. )

) OPINION

MANUEL ANTHONY ANGOCO, )

)

Defendant-Appellant. )

____________________________________)

Filed: July 6, 1998

Cite as: 1998 Guam 10

Appeal from the Superior Court of Guam
Argued and Submitted on February 17, 1998
Hagåtña, Guam

Appearing for the Plaintiff-Appellee
Monica J. Hickey
Assistant Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General
Prosecution Division
Suite 2-200E, Judicial Center Building
120 West O=Brien Drive
Hagåtña, Guam 96910

Appearing for the Defendant-Appellant
Wilson A. Quinley
Law Office of Wilson Quinley
Suite 5001, GCIC Building
414 West Soledad Avenue
Hagåtña, Guam 96910

BEFORE: PETER C. SIGUENZA, Chief Justice, JANET HEALY WEEKS, and BENJAMIN J. F. CRUZ, Associate Justices.

CRUZ, J:

[1] Defendant-Appellant makes this appeal pursuant to the trial court=s attempt to extend its jurisdiction over the Defendant-Appellant after the expiration of his probationary term. The trial court revoked the Defendant-Appellant=s probation after his probationary period had ended and, as a result, the Defendant-Appellant was sentenced to incarceration for thirty (30) days. This court, after reviewing the applicable statutes regarding the trial court=s jurisdiction over probation, finds that the trial court acted beyond its jurisdiction in revoking the Defendant-Appellant=s probation and in ordering incarceration. Therefore, the trial court=s decision is hereby REVERSED.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

[2] The Defendant-Appellant was indicted in Superior Court Case Number CF0053-94, for theft, as a third degree felony on February 25, 1994. The Defendant-Appellant subsequently pled guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to theft as a misdemeanor with the judgment being filed on August 29, 1994. The judgment imposed several conditions on the Defendant-Appellant, including the requirement that he pay a fine to the Victim=s Compensation Fund, perform community service hours, and be placed on two (2) years probation beginning August 15, 1994. That two year probationary period was to end on August 15, 1996. A probation violation was later alleged and summons was issued on Feb. 10, 1997. On June 16, 1997 a revocation of probation hearing was held. Counsel for the Defendant-Appellant requested that the summons be quashed and the matter dismissed asserting the court lacked jurisdiction, pursuant to 9 GCA ' 80.66 (1993), because the probationary period had expired. On June 16, 1997, the court heard from the probation officer, Officer David Uson, the Defendant, and defense counsel. As a result, the court made a ruling from the bench revoking probation and sentenced the Defendant-Appellant to thirty (30) days incarceration. Included in the record on appeal were the minutes and the transcript from the June 16, 1997 hearing which memorialized the court=s intent that the revocation ruling was a final disposition of the case. Although this court would prefer written orders for purposes of establishing jurisdiction on appeal, the trial court=s ruling is sufficient to establish that a final order in the case was made at that time. The Defendant-Appellant filed a timely Notice of Appeal on June 26, 1997.

ISSUES

[3] On appeal, the Defendant-Appellant raises the issue of whether the trial court retained jurisdiction to revoke the Defendant-Appellant=s probation after the probationary period had terminated. Furthermore, should this court find that the trial court still retained jurisdiction, the Appellant argues that his due process rights were violated when the trial court revoked the Defendant-Appellant=s probation.

ANALYSIS

[4] The court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 48 U.S.C. ' 1424-3(d) (1984) and 7 GCA '3107(b) (1994). Questions of jurisdiction are reviewed de novo. People v. Quichocho, 1997 Guam 13, & 3. The court reviews the trial court=s revocation of a probationer=s probation for clear abuse of discretion. U.S. v. Daly, 839 F.2d 598, 599-600 (9th Cir. 1988).

I.

[5] This court first addresses the threshold issue of whether the statute is facially unambiguous. The statute provides in relevant part:

' 80.66. Revocation of Probation: When Permitted.

(a) At any time before the discharge of the offender or the termination of the period of suspension or probation:

(1) upon a showing of probable cause that an offender has violated a condition of his suspension or probation, the court may summon the offender to appear before it or may issue a warrant for his arrest. The warrant or summons shall be served in the manner provided by 8 GCA '15.70 (Criminal Procedure). The offender may be arrested without a warrant only in those circumstances where such an arrest is otherwise permitted by law;

(2) the court, if satisfied that the offender has inexcusably failed to comply with a substantial requirement imposed as a condition of the order may revoke the suspension or probation and sentence or re-sentence the offender. Violation of a condition shall not result in revocation, however, unless the court determines that revocation under all the circumstances then existing will best satisfy the ends of justice and the best interests of the public.

9 GCA