People of the Territory of Guam v Quenga [1997] GUSC 7; 1997 Guam 06 (18 May 1997)

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF GUAM
TERRITORY OF GUAM

PEOPLE OF THE TERRITORY OF GUAM
Appellant,

vs.

DWAYNE S. QUENGA
Appellee.

Criminal Case No. CRA96-005
Filed: May 18, 1997

Cite as: 1997 Guam 6

Appeal from the Superior Court of Guam
Argued and Submitted 19 December 1996
Agana, Guam

Appearing for the Plaintiff-Appellant
ANGELA BORZACHILLO
Assistant Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General
Prosecution Division
Suite 2-200E, Judicial Center Bldg.
120 West O’Brien Drive
Agana, Guam 96910
Appearing for the Defendant-Appellee
DOUGLAS G. MOYLAN
LAW OFFICES OF ROBERT J. TORRES
A Professional Corporation
173 Aspinall Avenue, Suite 206A
Agana, Guam 96910

_______________

OPINION

BEFORE: PETER C. SIGUENZA, Chief Justice, MONESSA G. LUJAN[1] and JOSE I. LEON GUERRERO[2], Associate Justices.

SIGUENZA, C.J.:

I. BACKGROUND

[1] The Defendant-Appellant, Dwayne S. Quenga, was sixteen years of age at the time he was indicted by a Territorial Grand Jury on October 25, 1995 for two counts of Second Degree Robbery under 9 GCA '40.20(a)(3). He was also sixteen on the date of the alleged offenses. Pursuant to 9 GCA '40.20(b), this offense is a second degree felony. 19 GCA '5106(a) directs that minors are to be tried as adults if they are charged with a felony of the first or second degree alleged to have occurred between their sixteenth and eighteenth birthdays. Accordingly, Quenga was arraigned in the Superior Court of Guam and faced prosecution as an adult. Prior to trial his counsel brought a motion seeking a hearing where a Superior Court Judge would determine whether he might be more appropriately adjudicated as a juvenile offender and then be removed to a proceeding under the jurisdiction of the Family Court. The trial judge hearing the motion concluded that there was no basis in law for the provision of such a removal hearing and declined to consider the merits of the removal request. This appeal comes forward seeking interlocutory review of the trial judge>s determination.

II. Issues presented for Review

[2] There are two issues presented here. There is the question of whether an individual situated as Quenga is entitled to judicial review of his prosecution as an adult and the possible removal of his case to Family Court if it is found inappropriate. There is also the threshold issue of whether this appeal is ripe for review, i.e., whether this Court has jurisdiction to hear the matter as an interlocutory criminal appeal[3].

III. ANALYSIS

[3] We first consider whether our jurisdiction is appropriately exercised over this matter. Interlocutory appeals are generally not available in criminal cases. 8 GCA '130.15 delineates those matters which may be appealed by a criminal defendant. With the exception of subsection (d), which addresses bail determinations, only post-conviction rulings (including a denial of a motion for new trial) are listed as reviewable. In addition to the express restrictions 0placed on criminal appeals by section 130.15 is the general rule that only final orders may be appealed. See, e.g., People of the Territory of Guam v. Lefever, 454 F.2d 270, 271 (9th Cir. 1972); People of the Territory of Guam v. Cruz, 913 F.2d 748, 750 (9th Cir. 1990). The Guam legislature incorporated the finality rule when it set the parameters of this Court>s jurisdiction in 7 GCA '3108(a).

[4] However, the Legislature also saw fit to give this Court the discretion to review interlocutory appeals under limited circumstances. 7 GCA ' 3108(b) provides:

(b) Interlocutory review. Orders other than final judgments shall be available to immediate appellate review as provided by law and in other cases only at the discretion of the Supreme Court where it determines that resolution of the questions of law on which the order is based will:

(1) Materially advance the termination of the litigation or clarify further proceedings therein;

(2) Protect a party from substantial and irreparable injury; or

(3) Clarify issues of general importance in the administration of justice.

[5] The question is whether we should exercise our discretion, on any or several of these bases, to grant appellate review of the issue presented. For reasons discussed below, we conclude that we should not.

[6] In determining whether discretionary review is desirable we observe that the issue presented here is very closely related to a particular question which the Guam Legislature has affirmatively barred from interlocutory review. As the Appellant characterizes his claim, he wants to be provided a Ade-certification@ hearing that could permit his removal from a criminal action to a juvenile proceeding. There is no statutory basis for such a hearing and therefore no statutory description of what appeal might be allowed on its denial. There is, however, an absolute timing restriction placed on appeals from the obverse situation, certification hearings where a minor is discretionarily ordered to stand trial as an adult. 19 GCA '5125 (b) states in relevant part: AA child may appeal from a decision of the Family Division to certify him as an adult, but such appeal may be taken only if the child is convicted of the underlying offense.@

[7] On its face this provision reflects an apparent understanding that such orders should not be considered final until after a conviction occurs and that the proceedings should not be delayed to accommodate an interlocutory appeal. The circumstances giving rise to this language supports this interpretation.

[8] The language quoted above was enacted through Guam Public Law 17-12, which became law on June 23, 1983. The drafter>s comments accompanying the section indicate that although subsection (b) was intended to express current law, it was deliberately aimed at avoiding inconsistent court decisions Awhich may vary from time to time@ and to Amake clear the route and availability of appeals form [sic] such decisions.@ Though not addressed by name in those comments, historical context suggests that one of the cases that provided a Avarying@ interpretation of the availability of appeals was People of the Territory of Guam v. Kingsbury, 649 F.2d 740 (9th Cir. 1981). In that case the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit first determined that it had jurisdiction to review the Appellate Division of the District Court of Guam>s denial of a petition for a Writ of Mandate sought before trial, which would have directed dismissal of the minor>s indictment below and compelled his adjudication as a juvenile. The Kingsbury panel focused, under prevailing federal standards governing interlocutory review, on whether pre-trial review was available on the basis that post-conviction appeal would be barred:

AAppealability here therefore turns on whether Guam law requires a juvenile to question the propriety of standing trial as an adult before the trial takes place and precludes him from raising the issue on post-conviction appeal. The relevant Guam statutes and precedent do not provide a clear answer to this question. Guidance can be found, however, by examining judicial interpretations of similar statutes in other jurisdictions.@ Id. at 742.

[9] Noting that the other jurisdictions whose language regarding the juvenile certification process was as broadly worded as Guam>s permitted pre-trial review of certification, two of the three judges on the panel concluded that jurisdiction obtained. Id. The third judge dissented on this issue and filed a separate opinion. Kingsbury, 649 F.2d at 744 (9th Cir. 1981)(Poole, J., dissenting). Significantly, Judge Poole>s dissent emphasized that the Ninth Circuit had previously addressed the identical issue in Guam v. Lefever, 454 F.2d 270 (9